The implementation of environmental directives in the European Community: A comparative analysis. by Riegstra-Voslamber, Ellen A.
UNIVERSITY OF SURREY LIBRARY
ProQuest Number: 10130972
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10130972
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
U niversity o f Surrey  
School of Language and International Studies
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTIVES IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
A Com parative Analysis
b y
Ellen A. Riegstra-Voslam ber
Submitted in part fu lfilm en t o f the requirem ents for the 
degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy
November 1997
ABSTRACT
Statistics available from  the European Commission indicate tha t the 
im plem entation o f EC directives on the environm ent is a problem . There is a 
gap between adoption and transposition in to  national law as w ell as pa rtia l 
fa ilu re  in  im plem entation and enforcem ent. There is a concurrent iden tified  
gap in  the lite ra tu re  on com parative im plem entation research addressed in  
th is thesis, the m ain objective o f w hich is to analyse the orig ins o f the 
environm ental im plem entation problem  and to develop and test a model o f EC 
environm ental im plem entation w hich can be used to explain and understand 
the orig ins o f the cu rren t situation.
The lite ra tu re  suggests tha t im plem entation may be considered as the 
fu lfillin g  o f a dual task. F irst, the in tro du ctio n  in to  national law o f measures 
adopted by the EC and second, the insta lla tion  o f a fram ework at Member State 
level, which sees to it  tha t the adopted measures are applied and enforced. A 
model o f the EC policy-m aking and im plem entation process, based on Easton's 
systems approach and borrow ing from  Sabatier and Mazmanian's w ork on 
im plem entation, is employed to structure the analysis. Hypotheses based on 
fo u r ide n tifie d  composite model variables are tested against evidence from  
fo u r case studies; the D rinking W ater D irective and the Birds D irective in  the 
Netherlands and the U nited Kingdom.
O f the fo u r investigated model variables, the ‘degree o f in s titu tio n a l change’ 
shows the best corre la tion  to the degree o f im plem entation success. In the 
Netherlands a serious obstacle to im plem entation has been the constitu tiona l 
system o f tha t Member State. Under the threat o f various legal measures 
against i t  by the Commission, the Netherlands has amended its constitu tional 
provisions fo r law-making in  order to speed up the process o f im plem enting 
EC legislation. A sim ilar im portan t change has taken place in  the United 
Kingdom, w hich was forced to a lte r its  regulatory system on the supply and 
con tro l o f d rink ing  water. The most s ign ificant im pact o f Com m unity e ffo rt in  
environm ental m atters has been to encourage jthe convergence and 
strengthening o f na tiona l regulation; non-im plem entation has been a 
stim ulus fo r the strengthening o f Com m unity structures and generated ideas 
fo r possible fu tu re  Com m unity instrum ents. The model developed and tested 
has not on ly  proven useful in  helping structure the analysis bu t i t  has also 
been o f some co n tribu to ry  value in  explanation. It has enabled comparison o f 
im plem entation across environm ental po licy  sectors and across Member 
States, thus o ffe ring  po ten tia l fo r fu rth e r studies in  th is area.
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C o n v e n tio n
There is some overlap and occasionally confusion as to  the use o f the terms 
European Community, European Union, European Economic Com m unity,
Com m unity o r Union etc.. Inconsistency in  the use o f these terms is found in  
the o ffic ia l publications o f the Commission and other Com m unity institu tions, 
and in  the lite ra tu re .
In  the Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in  M aastricht, w hich took 
effect on November 1993 the fo llow ing can be found:
« "By th is Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establishing among
themselves an European Union, here inafter called "the Union" , ... The |
Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the I
policies and form s o f co-operation established by th is Treaty" (A rtic le  A,
T itle  I o f the TEU);
• The European Council shall provide the Union w ith  the necessary im petus 
fo r its  developm ent and shall define the general p o litica l guidelines 
thereof (A rtic le  D, T itle  I o f the TEU);
• The TEU replaces the term  European Economic Com m unity (EEC) w ith  
European Community (EC) (A rtic le  G, sub A ( l)  o f the TEU).
The Treaty on European Union allows the three Communities (the European 
Economic Community, the ECSC and Euratom) to exist alongside each other.
However, the ECSC Treaty w ill expire in  2002, and incorporation o f the ECSC 
in to  the other two Communities is like ly , w hich could lead to  (m ajor) revisions 
o f the European Com m unity and Euratom and possibly a new name.
These possible developments are being discussed at the ongoing In te r 
Governmental Conference (IGC) w hich started in  A p ril 1996, and which may 
w ell continue fo r more than a year.
It is clear from  the above tha t the European Com m unity is in  constant 
developm ent and changes are expected in  the near fu tu re . In th is thesis the 
d e fin itio n  as stated in  the Treaty on European Union, w hich refers to the 
European Com m unity (abbreviated to 'C om m unity'), is used, although the 
lite ra tu re  consulted often uses the expressions EEC, EU and Com m unity 
in te rchangeab ly .
F inally, some o f the texts in  Dutch were translated in to  English by the 
researcher.
X lll
CHAPTER I; THE PROBLEM: IMPLEMENTATION OF EC 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The centra l problem  addressed in  th is thesis is tha t o f non-im plem entation o f 
EC environm ental law. I t  has been known fo r some tim e tha t on ly p a rt o f the 
large num ber o f EC environm ental d irectives tha t have fo rm a lly  come in to  
effect since the establishm ent o f the European Com m unity in  1957 are actually 
being im plem ented by Member State governments. Only in  recent years, 
however, has media a ttention and public awareness started to focus on th is 
'im plem entation gap', w hich occurs no t on ly in  environm ental bu t also in  
o ther sectors o f EC legislative competence. Each year the European 
Commission draws up a report on the m onitoring o f im plem entation o f EC 
legislation. EC data show th a t the environm ental im plem entation gap has not 
closed since 1991, the firs t year fo r w hich sector-specific data are available. 
The numbers o f reasoned opinions given by the Commission have increased to 
h igh levels in  1994 and "1995 was a year o f intense Com m unity law 
enforcem ent a c tiv ity  at the Commission, w ith  an unprecedented num ber o f 
A rtic le  169 decisions - 5068 o f them, as against 4802 in  1994" (COM(96) 600 fina l, 
1996; 6). The evidence fo r non-im plem entation is based on the EC’s own 
statistics, which are incom plete due to the Commission's lim ite d  data gathering 
and enforcem ent capabilities and therefore present a hazy view  o f the 
situation. In a ll like lihood , the true  s ituation is worse than presented by the 
EC’s statistics.
The problem  o f environm ental non-im plem entation is im po rtan t fo r the 
fo llow ing  reasons:
• variable im plem entation o f environm ental p ro tection leg isla tion  may lead 
to differences in  com pliance costs and therefore in  economic 
com petitiveness across the Com m unity, contravening the objectives o f the 
Common Market;
• na tura l resources are no t a fforded appropriate levels o f p ro tection against 
overuse or abuse;
• the overall a u th o rity  and c re d ib ility  o f the Com m unity are tarnished in  its 
Member States, h indering  and weakening fu rth e r Com m unity legislative 
and enforcem ent capabilities.
The m ain objective o f th is thesis is to  analyse the dimensions and orig ins o f 
th is problem  and to develop and test a m odel o f EC environm ental 
im plem entation which can be used to explain the current situation and to 
p red ict fu tu re  developments. This Chapter sets the scene o f the subject, 
concentrating on ide n tify in g  the evidence fo r the im plem entation problem , 
id e n tify in g  interfaces w ith  key actors and issues, and concluding w ith  a 
descrip tion o f the fu rth e r developm ent o f the thesis.
By its  very nature, the im plem entation o f EC environm ental law  touches upon 
many areas which are in  themselves fie lds  o f research and topics o f pub lic  
discussion and debate. The manner in  w hich these discussions are conducted 
is often coloured by the p a rticu la r p o in t o f view from  which the problem  is 
approached, which fo r the purposes o f the EC are usually from  an economic, 
legal, o r p o litica l perspective. The overlap between studies on im plem entation 
and these fie lds o f study is schem atically portrayed in  figure  1.
F igu re  1: Schem atic re p re s e n ta tio n  o f ove rlaps betw een 
im p le m e n ta tio n  and o th e r fie ld s  o f s tu d y
i C O N o M K  N
IMPLEMENTATION
I. \  \ \
source: present w rite r
1.1 EC E n v iro n m e n ta l P o licy  and  Im p le m e n ta tio n  Problem s
Many environm ental goals have been set ou t in  the European Com m unity: in  
the past two decades more than 200 European laws having some re la tion  to the
environm ent have come in to  effect (Krâm er, 1992a; 210). A lthough many 
environm ental goals have been set ou t by the EC, many are no t achieved: the 
Commission's report 'Towards Sustainability' (COM(92) 23 fin a l Vol. II, 27 
March 1992) recognised the slow b u t relentless deterio ra tion  o f the general 
state o f the environm ent throughout the Com m unity. This was acknowledged 
in  the 1992 report on the 'State o f the Environm ent' (COM(92) 23 fina l, Vol. I ll, 
1992). In  th is report the Commission follow s the approach tra d itio n a lly  adopted 
by the Organisation fo r Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The 
OECD reports every year on the state o f the environm ent by review ing the 
conditions o f the ind iv idu a l components o f the environm ent (a ir, water, soil 
etc. ) and the agents responsible fo r triggering changes. The Commission's 
1992 report on the state o f the environm ent concludes regarding water and 
soil:
... despite the Investments made over the last twenty years or so, generally, the state 
of the Community's water resources has not improved. The situation varies according 
to the region and the parameter measured, but there are far more examples of 
deterioration in quality than of improvements (COM(92), 23 final Vol. HI, 1992;19).
... Physical degradation of the soil is widespread throughout the Community. An 
increase in the pollutant content has been observed at many sites (COM(92), 23 final 
Vol. Ill, 1992; 30).
The 1992 State o f the Environm ent report has been updated by a 1995 State o f 
the Environm ent report, the Dobris Assessment. The Dobris Assessment was 
presented by the European Environm ental Agency and represents a collection 
o f statistics by environm ental m edium  and economic sector. The in fo rm ation  
was contributed on a vo lun ta ry basis and com piled by a Commission task force 
pending the European Environm ental Agency's creation. The re p o rt states tha t 
"data ava ilab ility  and qu a lity  th roughout Europe are patchy, there are 
im portan t gaps w hich make i t  d iffic u lt to  draw m eaningful conclusions ... data 
are by no means always comparable le t alone standardised" (Dobris Assessment, 
1995; x iv). However several conclusions on the state o f the environm ent 
regarding a ir, water and soil are made:
... Although air quality is improving with respect to some pollutants (SO2), it is 
deteriorating with respect to others ... the impact of air pollution on human health 
and the environment are seen as major European problems which require regulations 
... the nutrient levels in most European rivers in many areas of Europe are still too 
high, and unless drastic efforts are made to reduce inputs of nutrients,
eutrophication is likely to continue to be an important European environmental issue 
... soil degradation is a crucial environmental problem today, a problem that is 
increasing (Dobris Assessment, 1995; xxi, 104 and 169).
EC environm ental leg islation, stretching from  levels o f lead emissions from  
cars and circumstances in  w hich b irds may be legally hunted to  safety o f 
bathing water, has won immense pub lic  support. Increased pub lic  
environm ental awareness, expressed both as public op in ion  and through the 
media and pressure groups, has made the environm ent an issue o f p o litica l 
im portance at the highest levels in  the European Community. In  1994 a MORI 
p o ll revealed tha t 43% o f the B ritish  public said they trusted "Brussels" ra ther 
than the B ritish  Government to make the rig h t decisions about environm ental 
p ro tection (Environm ental Policy Consultants, 1994;4). Despite apparent 
legislative enthusiasm and support, the Com m unity's environm ental po licy  
has a poor im plem entation and enforcement record in  its  Member States. The 
House o f Lords pointed ou t in  its  1992 Report 'Im plem entation and Enforcement 
o f EC Environm ental Legislation' tha t "there is a substantial body o f evidence 
to ind icate tha t Com m unity environm ental leg islation is being w idely 
disregarded. Of even greater concern is the absence o f an appropriate p o litica l 
response to th is evidence. The Com m unity has paid insu ffic ie n t a tten tion  to 
how its  policies can be given effect, enforced o r evaluated" (House o f Lords 
European Com m unity Committee, 1992; 35). Referring to the problem  on non­
im plem entation Timmermans ( 1994) argues that:
there is evidence to suggest that a problem, does indeed exist and that it may well be 
on the increase (Timmermans, 1994; 393).
The problems w ith  im plem entation o f EC legislation had already been brought 
to the a tten tion  o f the Com m unity. It was the European Parliam ent, especially 
members like  Ken Collins (Judge, 1992), w hich was in  large p a rt responsible 
fo r stim ulating the Commission to begin to  take serious note o f the poor 
im plem entation record in  the 1980s. One o f the firs t actions was a 1983 
resolution in  which the European Parliam ent requested the Commission to 
subm it Annual Reports on the fa ilu re  o f Member States to im plem ent EC 
legislation (OJ C 68, 1983; 32). The Commission acceded to this request and 
subm itted its  firs t Annual Report on the m onitoring o f the application o f EC 
law in  1984. S im ilar reports have been subm itted annually and the 
Commission's decision to prepare these Reports has im proved s ign ifican tly  the
Com m unity's overview o f im plem entation by its  Member State. The European 
Parliam ent's Committee on Environm ent, Public Health and Consumer 
Protection (C-11 Committee) took a fu rth e r step in  January 1987 when i t  
decided to produce two m ajor reports on the im plem entation o f European 
Environm ental law. Subm itted and adopted by Parliament in  1988, each o f 
these reports dealt w ith  a single environm ental m edium  (a ir and water) and 
concentrated on im plem entation results (OJ C 94/151-8, 1988). These reports 
coincided w ith  the in tro du ctio n  o f the Fourth Action Programme on the 
Environm ent (COM (86) 485 Final) and the Commission's stated objective o f 
securing the im plem entation o f environm ental d irectives. The rapporteur 
concluded that:
... the implementation of environmental legislation should henceforth be assessed 
systematically by Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection (EP/PE 116.085/fin ., 1988; 54).
The European Council meeting at D ub lin  in  June 1990 acknowledged the extent 
o f the im plem entation problem  and gave the issue a h igh p o litica l p ro file , by 
adopting a "Declaration on the Environm ental Im perative" w hich stated that:
... Community environmental legislation will only be effective if  it is fully 
implemented and enforced by the Member States. We therefore renew our commitment 
in this respect. To ensure transparency, comparability of effort and full information 
to the public, we invite the Commission to conduct regular reviews and to publish 
detailed reports on its findings. There should also be periodic evaluations of existing 
Directives to ensure that they are adapted to scientific and technical progress, and to 
resolve persistent difficulties in implementation; such reviews should not, of course, 
lead to a reduced standard of environmental protection in any case (European Council, 
Dublin Declaration, 1990; 19).
The data in  the Reports o f the Commission to  the European Parliam ent show 
the extent o f the problem  o f non-im plem entation. Before exam ining the data 
and the Commission's comments in  its  Annual Reports some remarks have to be 
made. According to Timmermans ( 1994) the precise extent o f the non­
im plem entation problem  cannot be established w ith  certa in ty. The few 
statistics tha t are available (i.e. the Annual Reports o f the Commission to the 
European Parliam ent ) "cover the fie ld  on ly  very p a rtia lly  ... what W eiler said
about our knowledge o f the problem  in  1991 s till holds true: i t  is a black hole" 
(Timmermans, 1994; 392).
Furtherm ore, on ly  since its  E ighth Annual Report (1991) has the Commission 
added a separate chapter dealing w ith  the environm ent, g iving detailed 
accounts o f compliance by country and by the various sectors o f 
environm ental po licy, as was requested by the European Council in  D ublin  in  
1990. The Commission is to ta lly  dependent fo r its  data gathering upon a few 
sources. These are firs tly  the Member States themselves; reporting  by the 
Member States on im plem entation measures is not com pulsory, unless stated in  
the d irective, and even then there is no pena lty fo r not doing so. Incom plete 
and p a rtia l im plem entation is often reported as being complete. Another 
source o f in fo rm a tion  is the com plaints th a t the Commission receives from  
ind ividua ls. The Commission states tha t "the success o f the com plaints 
procedure, w hich involves no expense o r fo rm alities, demonstrates the 
public 's growing awareness o f the Com m unity's im portance" (OJ C 154, 1994; 6). 
However:
... one of the most serious problems encountered by the Commission in processing 
complaint cases is the collection and verification of information about the facts of the 
case. When scrutinizing national implementing legislation, the Commission simply 
examines the lawfulness of the Member States' implementing measures. But when it 
analyses the way these measures are put into effect, it has neither the means to 
investigate the facts of a specific case nor the power to impose periodic controls on 
the Member States (OJ C 233, 1993;43).
Apart from  examming com plaints, the Commission draws on every possible 
source o f in fo rm a tion  to id e n tify  infringem ents. It detects cases by its  own 
inqu iries from  local newspapers o r o ther pub lic  media. Another source o f 
in fo rm a tion  is the European Parliam ent. The Commission derives in fo rm ation  
from  the questions the European Parliam ent asks and the pe titions i t  receives. 
In these circumstances o f p a rtia l in fo rm a tion  provision to the Commission, i t  
remains lik e ly  tha t the situa tion  o f non-im plem entation as reported by the 
Commission in  the Annual Reports is a best-case scenario and in  a ll like lihood  
the true s ituation is worse. In  its  Eighth Annual Report on the A pplica tion o f 
EC Law (OJ C 338, 1991), the Commission expressed serious concern about the 
num ber o f incorrect applications o f EC Environm ental law  and the increasing 
num ber o f in fringem ent procedures (OJ C 338, 1991; 46). The Eighth Report 
m entioned tha t in  the environm ental sector:
Community directives are seldom transposed in the national law of the Member States 
within the period they prescribe (OJ C 338, 1991;220).
Moreover, even when nationa l leg is la tion  is adopted i t  is frequen tly  defective 
e ither in  fo rm  o r content. One year la te r the Commission s till expressed serious 
concern about the num ber o f inco rrect applications o f the EC’s Environm ental 
leg isla tion  and the increasing num ber o f in fringem ent procedures. The 
Commission's N inth Annual Report on the A pplication o f EC Law (OJ C 250, Vol. 
35,1992) concluded that:
... the conclusions to be drawn from monitoring the application o f Community 
environmental law in 1991 do not differ substantially from those set forth in the 
Eighth Report. Whereas the body of Community law is growing larger ... Member 
States' application of the existing law is still unsatisfactory on the whole ... a number 
of Member States continue to see the deadlines for transposai as optional or 
indicative. It  is not unusual for implementing measures to provide for derogations 
which have no basis in the Directive transposed... (OJ C 250, 1992; 245).
I t also observed tha t transposition is often too flexib le ; tha t reports required 
by directives are frequently not subm itted; and tha t measures to im plem ent 
European Court o f Justice ru lings are by no means taken in  every case, even 
after a second judgement (OJ C 250,1992; 245). The Commission concluded tha t 
the developments re la ting  to environm ental law, un like  o ther branches o f 
Com m unity law, are o f considerable and ever-increasing in te rest to the pub lic  
at large. I t  predicted tha t non-im plem entation o f EC environm ental leg islation 
w ill a ttract more public a ttention. In  its  Tenth Annual Report, the Commission 
stated tha t ea rlie r reports on the activ ities o f Member States concerning 
im plem entation do no t give a satisfactory p ic tu re  o f the situa tion  regarding 
im plem entation o f Com m unity environm ental leg islation, and tha t "the 
present report does not o ffe r a b righ te r p icture" (OJ C 233, 1993; 41). Most o f 
the problem s described in  its  ea rlie r Annual Reports were s till unrem edied 
and the num ber o f com plaints continued to rise steadily throughout 1992. 
According to the Commission " in  general terms, com plaints are evidence o f 
p ractical problems. The Member States need to make a greater e ffo rt to abide 
by Community law on the environm ent" (OJ C 233, 1993; 45). The Commission 
then continues:
The mandatory character of Community environment directives is not always
recognized; in practice directives are commonly regarded as mere recommendations. 
This means that existing legislation is deprived of its effect and raises doubts about 
the status of future programmes. This report offers a valuable opportunity to promote 
a more open and more transparent discussion of the subject, involving not only the 
institutional actors in the Community and the Member States but also Europe's 
citizens, who are the primary victims of the failure to keep environmental trends 
under proper control and of the general degradation of our shared heritage (OJ C 233, 
1993; 41),
This is underlined by Kram er (1992a) who argues tha t "EC Environm ental 
leg islation is considered by Member States and Com m unity nationals as 
im ported legislation, despite o f the fact that, as a ru le , i t  is adopted 
unanim ously at Com m unity level" (Krâmer,1992a; 213). In  its  1992 special 
report on the environm ent the European Court o f Auditors states that:
... the Environmental Directives constitute the main instrument of preventative 
Community action for the protection of the natural environment and their role is 
fundamental. However, they are being implemented slowly and there is a significant 
gap between the set of rules in force and their actual application ... The adoption of 
Directives is indispensable for the establishment of a legal reference framework and 
for the définition of standards and procedures in the environmental field. However, it 
is relatively vain to draw up laws that remain largely unapplied, and there is a need 
for a better balance between the two aspects of drafting directives and monitoring 
their application (European Court of Auditors, 1992; 18-19).
In  the Commission’s Reply to the Court o f Auditors Special Report, the 
Commission states: " it  notes the C ourt’s comments on the im plem entation o f 
environm ental leg islation  and, in  general, share th is assessment. The 
Commission is conscious o f the issues to w hich the Court draws a ttention and 
shares its  assessment o f the need to  im prove the application o f legislation" (OJ 
C 245, 1992; 29). This need to im prove application o f EC Environm ental 
leg islation has been emphasised by the Commission in  its  proposed policies, fo r 
example i t  was one o f the aims in  the F ifth  Environm ental Action Program (OJ 
C 138,1993).
In table 1 (Im plem entation gap o f EC Environm ental directives, 1990-1994) data 
from  the three latest (Tenth, Eleventh, and Tw elfth) Annual Reports fo r the 
environm ent, consumer pro tection , and nuclear safety sector is presented 
w hich helps in  assessing the dim ensions o f the problem s h igh ligh ted  by the
European Commission. The table contains data fo r both the to ta l num ber o f 
environm ental d irectives in  force and the num ber o f d irectives fo r which 
measures have been n o tified  (o r w hich had been transposed by Member States 
in to  leg islation). The im portan t numbers in  th is table are the percentages 
w hich indicate how m any o f the directives have been transposed; th is num ber 
is a d irect measurement o f the compliance o f Member States w ith  EC law. 
A lthough there are large differences in  perform ance between d iffe re n t 
Member States, on average an increase in  percentage o f transposed directives 
was registered from  1990 (88.5%) to 1992 (91.9%), ind icating some 
im provem ent. There was however a subsequent decrease from  1992 (91.9%) to 
1994 (89.0%), ind ica ting  a w idening im plem entation gap, re tu rn ing  to the 1990 
leve l.
In the Annual Report over the year 1993 (OJ C 154, 1994), the num ber o f cases 
referred to the European C ourt o f Justice (ECJ) dropped, as shown in  table 2 
(Breaches o f EC Environm ental directives 1989-1994). The Commission argues 
tha t th is trend is explained by the effectiveness o f its  action, w hich succeeded 
in  most cases in  persuading Member States to observe Com m unity law w ithou t 
going as fa r as a re fe rra l to the Court o f Justice. Table 2 contains data 
concerning cases o f suspected non-im plem entation ('suspected 
infringem ents') and established cases o f non-im plem entation, ordered in to  
three progressively more serious A rtic le  169 categories by the Commission: 
letters o f form al notice, reasoned opinions and referrals to the European Court 
o f Justice. The two im portan t trends observed:
•  the rise in  the to ta l num ber o f reasoned opinions (46 in  1994), w hich have 
gone up almost to  the 1991 num ber o f 50. This increase suggests tha t a 
large num ber o f re ferra ls to the C ourt o f Justice are in  the m aking fo r the 
com ing years;
• the continuous drop in  the numbers o f suspected infringem ents, le tte r o f 
fo rm al notice and referra ls to the European Court o f Justice, possibly 
re flecting  combined e ffo rts to clamp down on non-im plem entation (as 
claimed by the Commission).
A t firs t glance these data suggest an overall s ituation o f im provem ent in  
fo rm al compliance w ith  EC environm ental directives; at the same tim e, i t  is 
apparent from  the data tha t fundam ental problems rem ain. The decrease in  
the num ber o f suspected infringem ents, le tters o f form al notice and referra ls
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to  the Court o f Justice as shown in  table 2 may also be e?q)lained in  a num ber o f 
other ways as indicated earlier. In  the Tw elfth Annual Report (COM(95) 500) 
published in  1995, im plem entation o f EC Environm ental poUcy is s till a 
problem  area. The Commission m entions that:
If  we look at the three main sectors in which directives are transposed, the frontier- 
free area, agriculture and the environment, it can be seen, globally speaking, that 
whereas there was a clear average increase in the rate of transposai in the first two, 
there was some falling off where the environment was concerned... (COM(95) 500, 
1995; iv).
The Commission suggests tha t action is needed, in  fo r example:
... administrative cooperation with and between Member States to facilitate the full, 
proper and timely transposai of environmental directives, which, as this report 
shows, is currently lacking... (COM(95) 500, 1995; 64).
W hat lies behind these figures as shown in  tables 1 and 2, and how im portan t 
are they? First i t  should be noted tha t there is some inconsistency in  the data 
the Commission publishes. The categories and numbers d iffe r between source 
type and also between consecutive Annual Reports. For example, previous to 
1991 there was no separate category o f num ber o f com plaints on the 
environm ent received by the Commission; in  1991 the category was separately 
listed and 353 com plaints had been received. In  1992 the num ber o f 
com plaints was no t e xp lic itly  m entioned bu t stated to have gone up by 33% 
re la tive to the previous year (m aking i t  471 com plaints); and a fte r 1992 the 
category was discontinued and no fu rth e r in fo rm a tion  was given on the 
num ber o f com plaints about the envirom nent. A considerable am ount o f data 
is no t supplied at a ll, fo r example the num ber o f A rtic le  169 letters o r reasoned 
opinions specified by country, although these data are supposed to be public 
in fo rm ation . As the Commission its e lf states, i t  gives a 'certa in  am ount' o f 
p u b lic ity  to the sending o f reasoned opinions and the re fe rra l o f cases to the 
European Court o f Justice. It does no t publicise the sending o f A rtic le  169 
letters, unless they are concerned w ith  fa ilu re  to im plem ent a Court o f Justice 
ru ling  or fa ilu re  to n o tify  national im plem enting measures (OJ C 233, 1993; 8). 
Secondly, w ith  regard to table 2 the A rtic le  169 infringem ent procedure must 
be p u t in to  perspective. The fo rm a l A rtic le  169 procedure contains three 
separate stages, w ith  each stage requ iring  a specific and fo rm a l decision by
12
the Commission. The Commission holds six meetings a year on infringem ents, 
and Member States usually have two m onths to rep ly  to a form al decision by 
the Commission. Together w ith  the long tim e that cases generally take to 
reach the European Court o f Justice, th is means tha t between two to three 
years usually elapse between the decision to open proceedings pursuant to 
A rtic le  169 and the dehvery o f a judgem ent by the Court o f Justice. In  other 
words on ly the 'hard  and persistent’ cases where a Member State has fa iled  to 
act a fte r three years reach the European Court o f Justice.
T h ird ly , before starting an A rtic le  169 procedure, the Commission tries to settle 
the dispute via  m ediation and discussion. Alongside the form al stages in  the 
procedure la id  down by the Treaty, the Commission continues w ith  its  po licy o f 
awareness-raising and regular contact w ith  the au thorities o f the Member 
States. For th is purpose i t  arranges package meetings, at w hich a set o f 
in fringem ent cases are discussed. By generating awareness among the 
national authorities and easing in fo rm a tio n  exchanges, they make a valuable 
con tribu tion  to the transposai exercise, according to the Commission:
... these meetings and contacts are just as important as the formal procedure...
(COM(95)500, 1995; ii).
However, no in fo rm ation  about these in fo rm a l 'discussions' and meetings is 
given by the Commission except tha t they are 'very im portan t'.
Having p u t the data in to  perspective, the fo llow ing trends can be detected in  
the im plem entation o f environm ental directives over the period 1989-1995. 
W ith  respect to the 'im plem entation gap' the trend is towards an im provem ent 
in  1992, and a downwards trend in  1993 and 1994 to almost the level o f 1990. The 
num ber should be seen in  re la tion  to the num ber o f new environm ental 
d irectives needing im plem entation each year. This num ber has gone down 
since 1992 from  19 in  1992 to 7 in  1993 and 9 in  1994. The re la tive ly low  
percentage o f directives im plem ented in  Ita ly  (76% in  1995) and the United 
Kingdom (81.6% in  1995) are o f some concern to the Commission.
W ith respect to the breaches o f environm ental directives, the re ferra ls to the 
Court o f Justice dropped substantially from  1990 to 1994. The faU o f the num ber 
o f reasoned opinions since 1991 stopped in  1994, where almost a doubling in  
the num ber o f reasoned opinions appears. According to the Commission, th is 
has to do w ith  the fa ilu re  to n o tify  im plem enting measures:
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... the Commission is quite clearly anxious to wind up a large number of proceedings 
commenced in the past and never brought to a satisfactory outcome ... the failure to 
transpose is very damaging to the Community's interests (COM{95)500, 1995; ii).
1.2 The Com m on M a rke t and Im p le m e n ta tio n
The development o f EC environm ental law  is closely linked  to, and has been in  
continual co n flic t w ith , the developm ent o f the Common M arket and economic 
interests in  general. The recognition o f the problem s w ith  im plem entation o f 
EC Environm ental law is p a rt o f and stems from  a recognition o f 
im plem entation problem s w ith  EC leg islation  generally. The a tten tion  to 
im plem entation o f EC leg islation was in itia lly  brought about by the In terna l 
M arket issue, as noted in  the Financial Times:
Pressure on industry to improve its environmental performance is entering a new 
phase ... there is a growing emphasis on improving levels of compliance with 
regulation, the European Commission has acknowledged that its failure to enforce its 
200-odd directives equally across member countries could hinder the operation of 
the single m arke t... (Financial Times, 10^ November 1992).
The more deeply the EC penetrated Member States' policies, the more im portan t 
im plem entation became:
Uneven implementation of EC rules could distort competition across the market quite 
as much as having no rules at all. The setting of penalties for breaking EC directives 
is left to the Member Sates. I f  some states enforce EC law punctually, while others 
either fail to get EC decisions onto their statute books or pay scant attention to them, 
there could be a backlash from virtuous states, leading to a bureaucratic tit-for-tat, 
and a "single market" sliding back into an anarchy of covert protectionism rather as 
the Common Market did in the 1970s (Colchester and Buchan, 1990:132).
This is underlined by the M o lito r Group, a group o f experts advising the 
European Commission on legislative and adm in istra tive  s im p lifica tion . In  th e ir 
1995 report they state tha t "ind u s try  is especially concerned by uneven 
im plem entation, bo th  through inconsistent transposition and through weak 
enforcement" (M o lito r Group, 1995;53). A 1994 survey by the Union o f 
Industria l and Employers' Confederations o f Europe (UNICE) showed tha t the 
m a jo rity  o f businesses favoured more consistent enforcem ent before they
14
started w orrying about the scientific  basis, costs o r technical com plexity o f 
those laws (ENDS, 1995c;17).
The drive  towards the ’1992 Common M arket' was a m ajor stim ulus prom pting 
the EC to take action on the im plem entation issue. For the Common M arket 
some 300 regulations and directives had been pu t forw ard by the Commission, 
a ll o f w hich had to be im plem ented w ith in  specific timetables. In  March 1992, 
the European Commission form ed a High Level Group on the O peration o f the 
In te rna l M arket, chaired by Peter Sutherland. This Group was responsible, 
among other things, fo r proposing a strategy fo r guaranteeing tha t a ll the 
benefits o f the In te rna l M arket were acquired in  practice a fte r 1992. In  the 
in troduction  to the report com piled by the Group in  October 1992, the European 
Commissioners M artin  Bangemann and Karel van M iert stated:
To make the Internal Market work effectively calls for action to ensure that systems 
and structures adapt to meet new requirements, and to encourage people, whether 
involved as consumers, in businesses or in administrations, to respond to the 
opportunities being created (Sutherland Report, 1992;i).
A clear objective emphasised by the M o lito r Group is to make EC law  understood 
and enforced in  the same way as nationa l law. They argue tha t the rules o f the 
In te rna l M arket must have equivalent effect throughout the Com m unity. The 
Group proposed tha t fo r these objectives to be realised:
A cooperative approach to the enforcement of Internal Market legislation should be 
extended and intensified urgently as the single most important way of reinforcing 
mutual confidence between Member States and the Commission, and there needs to be 
a permanent framework for administrative partnership, based on groups of contact 
points, between the Member States and the Commission to deal with the application of 
Internal Market rules (Sutherland Report, 1992, Recommendation 31 and 32).
The problem s w ith  im plem entation and enforcement o f EC legislation are no t 
confined to a few Member States o r to  environm ental po licy  alone; a ll EC 
policies and aU Member States are experiencing d ifficu ltie s  as table 3 
(Breaches o f a ll EC directives, 1990-1994) demonstrates. Table 3 contains data 
fo r suspected cases o f non-im plem entation (suspected infringem ents) and 
established cases o f non-im plem entation categorised by the Commission in  
letters o f form al notice, reasoned opinions and referrals to the C ourt o f Justice.
15
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The data in  table 3 shows an increase in  1994 in  the numbers o f suspected 
infringem ents, reasoned opinions and referra ls to  the European C ourt o f 
Justice; on ly the num ber o f le tters o f fo rm al notice have gone down.
A fte r 1992, subsequent to the com pletion o f the legislative programme fo r the 
Common Market, e fforts to  ensure compliance w ith  im plem entation deadhnes 
have been stepped up. The pressure exerted by the Commission on Member 
States is evidenced by the Commission’s Eleventh Annual Report on 
m onitoring the application o f Com m unity law (OJ C 154, 1994). According to the 
Commission, its  own m onitoring activ ities helped to clear up a considerable 
num ber o f infringem ents in  1993 (OJ C 154, 1994; 6). These m onitoring 
activ ities consist o f the A rtic le  169 in fringem ent procedure and increasing 
awareness among the Member States. The effectiveness o f the above action by 
the Commission is evidenced by the decrease in  the num ber o f actual 
in fringem ent cases referred to  the Court, due to the success by the Commission 
to persuade Member States to observe Com m unity law.
In  1992 both the Dutch and the B ritish  governments reahsed the extent o f the 
non-im plem entation problem  and started to pay a ttention to  the issue. The 
Netherlands were consistently late w ith  im plem entation o f directives. Hanf, 
speaking at a conference in  1991, noted th a t "the Netherlands ranks th ird  
among the Member States in  terms o f having been the target o f an 
in fringem ent procedure" (Hanf, 1991;7). For a country tha t was about to take 
on its  ro le  as six-m onth Presidency o f the Council th is was not a good start. In  
the United Kingdom, w hich was to  take over the Presidency o f the Council 
shortly  a fte r the Netherlands in  1992, Parliam ent’s Select Committee on 
Procedure also investigated im plem entation problems and the House o f Lords 
Select Committee on the European Communities held a hearing and published a 
report. I t  dealt specifica lly w ith  the im plem entation problems o f EC 
Environm ental law  (House o f Lords, 1991-92, no.53-I and II).
1.3 The European C ou rt o f Justice  and Im p le m e n ta tio n
The European Court o f Justice has played a key ro le both in  resolving these 
conflicts and in  guiding the developm ent o f EC environm ental po licy  and its 
expression in  leg islation. A num ber o f w ell-publicised in fringem ent 
proceedings commenced by the Commission against Member States has turned 
the spo tligh t on the im plem entation o f EC environm ental legislation, as has 
the increasing num ber o f com plaints w hich are made to the Commission about 
the poor im plem entation o f EC Environm ental law. The European Court o f
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Justice has p u t pressure on the Member States by applying far-reaching 
consequences to  non-im plem entation by those Member States fo r w hich the 
legally-b inding compliance date had long passed i.e. Emmott v M in ister fo r 
Social Welfare (case C 208/90 [1991] IRLR 387) and Francovich v Ita lian  State 
(Cases C-6 &  9 /90 , 1992, IRLR 84). Insu ffic ien t im plem entation o f directives 
can become costly fo r Member States. The Court o f Justice has ru led  tha t a 
Member State can be held responsible fo r damages caused by non­
im plem entation o f EC legislation (Francovich v Ita lian  State, Case C-6 & 9 /90 , 
1992, IRLR 84). A ll the more reason, therefore, fo r the governments o f the 
Member States to p u t pa rticu la r emphasis on correct im plem entation o f 
Com m unity law  to overcome a p o te n tia lly  embarrassing and costly situation. 
The fact tha t non-im plem entation had become a salient p o litica l issue was 
shown in  1992, when the C ourt o f Justice tem porary postponed its  legal 
hearings against the governm ent o f the United Kingdom on the inadequate 
qua lity  o f its  bathing water. The exception was made fo r the U nited Kingdom 
to  spare i t  embarrassment at the sta rt o f its  Presidency o f the Council.
1.4 R eg u la tio n  and Im p le m e n ta tio n
The growth in  legislative a c tiv ity  o f the European Com m unity has been 
described as an increase in  ’regulatory a c tiv ity ' a t supra-national level. The 
concept o f regulation is used in  m any d iffe re n t contexts. The various 
perceptions o f the meaning assigned to  the term  'regu la tion ' are so d iffe ren t, 
and usage in  the media so laden w ith  p o litica l emphasis, tha t the issue o f 
’regu la tion ’ (and associated issues such as deregulation and re-regulation) 
requ ire  some fu rth e r c la rifica tio n .
There are im portan t differences in  the use o f the term  regu la tion  between 
Europe and the U nited States, where the regulation debate has m ostly taken 
place and where the meanings associated w ith  regulation have been form ed. 
In  the U nited States regulation is a d is tin c t type o f policy-m aking, and in  
economics and pohtica l science the study o f regulation has developed in to  a 
d is tin c t sub-discipline. In  Am erican usage 'regu la tion ' is associated w ith  a 
precise range o f po licy  instrum ents o r legal rules. W ith in  the fram ework o f 
Am erican public po licy  and adm in istra tion , regulation can be defined as:
... sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are
generally regarded as desirable to society... (Selznick, 1985; 363-364).
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In  Am erica the norm ative basis o f pub lic regulation is the acceptance o f the 
superior efficiency o f the m arket economy (Majone, 1990;12). In practice, 
federal regulation in  the U nited States takes the fo rm  o f the establishm ent o f 
specialised agencies, to w hich specific rule-m aking, fa c t-fin d ing , and 
enforcem ent powers in  a specific fie ld  are given (e.g. the Environm ental 
P rotection Agency).
In  Europe, research on the economics and po litics o f regula tion  is s till a 
re la tive ly  new area o f scholarship. The term  regulation is com m only viewed 
as re fe rring  to the whole realm  o f leg islation, governance and social con tro l 
(Majone, 1990;12). Relative to  the Am erican usage o f the term , the European 
usage is much less specific and used to describe the whole process o f 
fo rm u la tion , im plem entation and enforcem ent. Im plem entation o f EC 
Environm ental law, the subject o f th is thesis, relates to the ’regula tion ’ 
spectrum, as defined by the European usage o f the term . However, this thesis 
is no t addressing th is area specifica lly.
1.5 D e fin itio n  o f Im p le m e n ta tio n  and Sum m ary
1.5.1 D e fin ition  o f Im plem entation
In the lite ra tu re , d iffe re n t meanings and uses o f im plem entation are to be 
found. The lack o f a u n ita ry  d e fin itio n  does no t add to the c la rity  o f the 
problems w ith  im plem entation in  the European Com m unity, therefore a 
d e fin itio n  o f im plem entation is proposed in  th is section.
According to A rtic le  5 o f the Treaty, Member States are obliged:
to take all appropriate measures ... to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community ... 
they shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of this Treaty.
A rtic le  5 stipulates a 'general d u ty  arising from  loya lty  to the Com m unity', th is 
du ty  can be expanded w ith  a special p rovision arising from  an ins tru c tion  i.e. 
secondary law. This general d u ty  has been fu rth e r defined in  the 
jurisprudence o f the European Court o f Justice. Member States are to organise 
the appropriate authorities to im plem ent Com m unity po licy and to provide the 
necessary staff, equipm ent and fund ing (Case C 71/76 [1977] Th ie ffrey v 
Conseil de Torde des avocats). The Court o f Justice has gradually extended the 
obligations so tha t they also cover (national) enforcement, the d u ty  to co-
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operate extends therefore to the adm in istra tive and ju d ic ia l bodies o f the 
Member States (Vervaele, 1992;7).
From the above a dual task w hich Member States have to fu lf il becomes 
apparent. This dual task is also m entioned in  the hterature; examples are the 
de fin itions o f im plem entation from  M acrory (1992), Mortelmans and van R ijn 
(1992), the House o f Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
(1992) and C urtin  and Mortelmans (1994). Im plem entation is defined as follows 
fo r the purposes o f th is study:
• The firs t task consists o f the processes and efforts a Member State has to  
make when in troducing  Com m unity law  in to  its  own nationa l legal system, 
"ensuring at the very least tha t the "black le tte r" na tiona l law  is in  place" 
according to M acrory, a process o f "conversion" according to Mortelmans 
and van R ijn, 'fo rm a l im plem entation ' according to the House o f Lords 
Select Committee;
• The second task is the establishm ent o f competent authorities, ru le  m aking, 
adm in istra tive guidelines, th e ir application to in d iv id u a l cases, and 
enforcem ent in  case o f non-com pliance, "correct adm in istra tion  o f 
Com m unity law in  specific case by a ... Member State" according to C urtin  
and Mortelmans; the House o f Lords Select Committee refers to th is stage as 
'p rac tica l im plem entation '.
1.5.2 Summary
The evidence discussed in  th is Chapter demonstrates tha t im plem entation o f 
European environm ental leg islation is beset by problems. I t  has been argued 
tha t th is h is to ry  o f non-im plem entation is underm ining the c re d ib ility  and 
a u th o rity  o f the European Com m unity:
Post-litigation non-compliance by Member States has spread dramatically in 
recent years, the danger being that if a court is forced to condone the wholesale 
violation of a norm, that norm can no longer be termed law (Curtin, 1993;30).
McGowan and Wallace (1996) "observe im plem entation problem s as a 
persistent feature o f contem porary European governance" (McGowan and 
Wallace, 1996; 568). V iolations from  Member States range from  fa ilu re  to 
n o tify  im plem entation measures to non-com pliance w ith  an environm ental 
d irective. Effective im plem entation o f EC legislation became a m ajor issue in
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the ea rly 1990s as the EC moved towards consolidating the Common Market. It 
was realised tha t the Treaty goal o f an 'In te rna l M arket' in  1993 was severely 
underm ined by slow and incorrect im plem entation o f Com m unity legislation. 
I t  was also recognised tha t im plem entation o f EC legislation is n o t an autom atic 
step, bu t a crucia l aspect in  achieving the Com m unity goals set out in  the 
Treaty. A part from  the com pletion o f the 'In te rna l M arket' in  1992, several 
other factors led to  the increased awareness and recognition o f the problem  o f 
non-im plem entation o f EC leg islation.
The European Parliam ent played an im po rtan t ro le  in  creating awareness o f 
the problem , requesting Annual Reports from  the European Commission on 
im plem entation o f Com m unity legislation by the Member States. The C-11 
Committee o f the European Parliam ent has been especially active in  bring ing 
a tten tion  to the problem  o f non-im plem entation o f European Environm ental 
law. The Commission and the European Court o f Justice took action to address 
th e ir problem . The form er, realising the extent o f the problem , no t on ly 
published Annual Reports on im plem entation, bu t also increased the num ber 
o f A rt. 169 procedures. These actions indicated the im portance w ith  which the 
Commission viewed im plem entation, fu rth e r underlined by the Commission’s 
w illingness to proceed to the Court o f Justice. Together w ith  tough judgements 
by the Court o f Justice, th is sent a clear message to the Member States that 
non-im plem entation has fa r-reaching consequences.
1.6 O bjectives and D eve lopm ent o f the  Thesis
The m ain objective o f th is thesis is to analyse the orig ins o f the environm ental 
im plem entation problem  and to  develop and test a model o f EC environm ental 
im plem entation which can be used to explain and understand the origins o f 
the cu rren t situation. A flow -diagram  representing the developm ent o f th is 
research is shown (figure  2). The adopted m ethodology fa lls  in to  five  phases.
In  Part 1 the problem  o f non-im plem entation is investigated and fu rth e r 
defined and the relevance o f previous research is discussed. This Chapter has 
concentrated on exploring the extent o f the problem  using available published 
data, and on estabüshing a d e fin itio n  o f the term  'im plem entation '. Data 
pubhshed by the European Commission indicate tha t the problem  o f non­
im plem entation has no t receded, and a fte r a d ip  in  the early 1990s the num ber 
o f reported in fringem ent cases are again on the rise. In  Chapter II the 
lite ra tu re  is examined fo r previous attem pts at seeking a theoretica l
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: Flow diag ram  representing the developm ent o f t
Part 1: The Problem of EC Environmental Implementation: 
Dimensions and Literature Review
* Outline: extent of the problem
* Relation to other EC policy sectors
* Relevance of previous research
* Identification of ’gap' in literature
* Methodology: Definition of Problem and 
Thesis Objectives
1
Part 2: Background: Development of EC Environmental Law
* Development of EC environmental law
* Conflicts between the environment 
and other sectors
* 1 he EC environmental instrument: 
the directive
* European Court of Justice demands
Part 3: Implementation Structures and Processes
* Formulation and adoption of EC directives
* Administrative implementation processes in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
Part 4 : Dev elopment of a Model of the EC
Environmental Implementation Process
* Systems theory and the EC political system
* A Model of the EC Implementation System
* Model Variables and hypotheses
Part 5 : Empirical Analysis and Conclusions
* Two by two Matrix: four case studies
Comparative analysis and conclusions
* Intendews to validate empirical findings
source: present w rite r
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perspective on po licy  im plem entation. A lthough the re levant lite ra tu re  on 
im plem entation is p le n tifu l, lit t le  analytica l o r com parative em pirica l w ork is 
available on im plem entation in  the European Comm unity. To overcome th is 
'gap' in  the lite ra tu re , the theoretica l fram ework form ed by systems theory is 
ide n tifie d  as a vehicle to  capture the relevant aspects o f p reviously tested 
theories and allows adaption to the unique structure o f the European 
Com m unity, w hile  p rov id ing  a m ethodological basis fo r fu rth e r developm ent. 
Before th is model is developed in  greater detail, the background to the 
developm ent o f the im plem entation problem  in  the European Com m unity is 
discussed in  Part 2. This background is explored in  order to understand the 
issues invo lved in  EC environm ental leg isla tion  and form s an im portan t 
perspective from  w hich to explore the case studies, w hich fo rm  p a rt o f the 
la te r em pirica l analysis.
The environm ental issue is a re la tive ly  recent area o f pub lic  pohcy and 
touches upon many po licy  areas. P articu lar tension exists between 
environm ental and economic p rio ritie s . The Com m unity instrum ent most 
frequen tly  used fo r enactment o f environm ental pohcy is the d irective, and i t  
is argued th a t its  status as the p rim a ry  legislative instrum ent w ill be 
m aintained in  the foreseeable fu tu re . The characteristics o f the d irective  and 
the Com m unity demands regarding im plem entation, specifica lly as developed 
by the Court o f Justice jurisprudence, are examined.
The po licy structures and processes o f EC environm ental leg islation and 
im plem entation are investigated in  Part 3 w ith  a view to  id e n tify in g  possible 
sources o f d iffic u lty  w ith  subsequent im plem entation. The generation and 
im plem entation o f environm ental d irectives is seen to be d iv is ib le  in to  two 
stages: the fo rm u la tion  and adoption stage, concluded w ith in  the ins titu tions o f 
the EC b u t invo lv ing  governments o f the Member States, and the 
im plem entation stage which takes place w ith in  the Member States, invo lv ing  
the Commission and European Court o f Justice. A dm in istra tive im plem entation 
structures and processes in  the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, two 
Member States w hich are the focus fo r la te r em pirica l studies, are 
investigated.
In  Part 4 a model based on p o litica l systems theory is examined and m odified to 
capture and integrate sahent elements from  other theories and adapt these to 
the unique structure o f the European Com m unity's im plem entation system. A t 
the highest level, the proposed model consists o f two overlapping and 
h ie ra rch ica lly  linked  sub-systems, the one com prising the EC and the other 
the Member State sub-systems.
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An approach fo r systematic measurement and analysis o f the degree o f 
im plem entation success is devised w hich is tw o-fo ld. F irst the causal linkages 
between inputs, processes and outcomes are iden tified . The sub-systems are 
parameterised by fo u r summary variables which measure key aspects o f both 
structure and process. Each variable is operationalised as a composite o f 
component index variables. Outcomes are established as the form al responses 
from  the European Commission to  Member State's im plem entation efforts. 
Secondly, having id e n tifie d  the key variables in  Com m unity im plem entation, 
an attem pt is made to relate system variable values to outcomes. A comparative 
approach between the U nited Kingdom  and the Netherlands is achieved by the 
estabhshment o f a two-by-two m a trix  w hich allows the effect o f each o f the 
key variables on the im plem entation outcome to be assessed.
In order to test the m atrix against actual events, the case method is used in  Part
5. Part 5 provides a detailed account o f two environm ental directives, the Birds 
D irective and the D rinking  W ater D irective, w hich are analysed in  both the 
U nited Kingdom and the Netherlands. F inally, the strengths and weaknesses o f 
the analysis are examined. Recommendations fo r im proving im plem entation 
in  the Com m unity are advanced and fu tu re  developments regarding the 
European Com m unity are discussed.
Thus, in  m ethodological terms, the pubhshed evidence w hich has been 
examined, confirm s the existence o f a problem : tha t o f im plem entation o f 
environm ental leg islation. An exam ination is made o f the m ethod and process 
o f leg islation and o f the procedures fo llow ed fo r the transfer o f th is leg islation 
from  the central Com m unity level to tha t o f the Member State. Various 
theoretica l vehicles and perspectives are considered fo r th e ir usefulness to 
help structure the problem , hypothesise possible causes and then test against 
practice. For the em pirica l investigation a two-by-two form at o f case studies 
have been adopted thus ahowing greater confidence in  the find ings.
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
ORGANISATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
2.1 In tro d u c tio n
A p rim a ry  source fo r theoretica l perspectives on im plem entation is form ed by 
the large body o f lite ra tu re  on p o litica l science, (in te rna tiona l) law  
(p a rticu la rly  EC leg isla tion), and In te rna tiona l Organisations. Im plem entation 
was firs t studied as a dedicated area o f theoretica l research in  the United States 
in  the 1970S by scholars in  p o litica l science, law, in te rna tiona l re lations, and 
sociology. The dom inant mode o f research was in itia lly  the so called 'top- 
down' approach, ph ilosoph ica lly based on rationalism . Under th is approach 
the concept o f po licy  im plem entation was large ly lim ite d  to the adm in istra tive 
processes w hich took place w ith in  the pub lic  bureaucracies charged w ith  
p ractica l im plem entation. This narrow  approach was la te r critic ised  and 
m odified by adherents o f the 'm odem ' top-down approach.
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1992) fo r example, critic ised the early top-down 
approach fo r its  im ph c it recognition of, and emphasis on h ierarch ica l 
contro l. Mazmanian and Sabatier considered im plem entation to be a dynamic 
process and stressed tha t public policies were im plem ented in  a complex 
environm ent, which was no t accounted fo r in  the previous studies. The 
'm odem ' top-down approach concentrated on the ide n tifica tion  o f the factors, 
such as socioeconomic conditions, pub lic  support and adm inistrative 
behaviour, w hich were invo lved in  the w ider im plem entation processes.
In  the early 1980s the top-down approach came under considerable critic ism  
and as a resu lt the 'bottom -up ' approach emerged. The methodologies used in  
the bottom -up approach emphasise the analysis o f subjective accounts tha t 
can be generated by 'getting inside ' situations. In  pursuing understanding by 
explanation ('verstehen'), the emphasis is on theory grounded in  em pirical 
observations w hich take account o f meaning and in te rp re ta tion . Adherents o f 
the bottom -up approach w ork w ith  a co-operative democratic model where the 
fo rm u la tion  and im plem entation o f p o licy  unfolds through in te raction  
between the actors involved. The strengths and the weaknesses o f both 
approaches are discussed in  th is Chapter, follow ed by a lite ra tu re  review  o f 
im plem entation and in te rna tio n a l organisations, inc lud ing  the European 
Community.
A lthough there is p le n tifu l lite ra tu re  on im plem entation, lit t le  analytica l 
w ork has been done on im plem entation specifica lly in  the European
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Com m unity, where the firs t im plem entation studies were carried ou t re la tive ly  
late, in  the 1980s. A dd itiona lly , lit t le  w ork has been done in  em pirica lly 
ve rify in g  the results o f theoretica l w ork o r in  com parative analyses o f 
im plem entation across d iffe re n t sectors o r Member States and across d iffe re n t 
directives. This 'gap' in  the lite ra tu re  is the ground on w hich the fu rth e r 
development o f th is thesis takes place.
2.2 The D eve lopm ent o f Im p le m e n ta tio n  Research
2.2.1 The Top-down approach
One o f the earliest studies o f im plem entation is by Pressman and W ildavsky 
(1973). Their study concerns a job  creation scheme designed in  W ashington 
which fa iled  when im plem ented in  Oakland. The focus was upon the 
im plem entation o f a governm ent decision to establish a program m e and why 
the im plem entation o f th is programme fa iled. The m ain conclusion o f the 
Pressman and W ildavsky study was tha t good intentions are no t enough: 
"People ... appear to th in k  tha t im plem entation should be easy; they are, 
therefore, upset when expected events do no t occur or tu rn  out badly" 
(Pressman,1973; x iii) . Pressman and W ildavsky's w ork in  1973 was a serious 
attem pt to come to grips w ith  the subject o f im plem entation in  the United 
States, at the tim e "a much discussed, bu t ra re ly  studied subject". They defined 
im plem entation as a process o f in te raction  between the setting o f goals and 
actions geared towards achieving them, "one should be conscious o f the steps 
required to accomplish each lin k  in  the chain" (Pressman, 1973; xv i).
Pressman and W ildavsky id e n tifie d  "decision-points" w ith in  sem i-independent 
organisations o r agencies w hich can block o r change the d irec tion  o f 
im plem entation.
They proposed in  th e ir conclusion tha t e lim inating  these ide n tifie d  problem  
points w ould lead to sim pler and more effective im plem entation. Their 
in flu e n tia l w ork in troduced a new emphasis in to  po licy analysis. A central 
preoccupation became the extent to  w hich o ffic ia l policy-m akers can use a 
va rie ty  o f con tro l mechanisms and in s titu tio n a l arrangements to guide social 
change. According to Pressman and W ildavsky's studies, what should surprise 
us is tha t correct im plem entation takes place at a ll. Problems in  th is area are to 
be expected, because o f the "com plexity o f jo in t action". Pressman and 
W ildavsky have been critic ised  fo r the fact tha t they hypothesise 
im plem entation as a complex in te raction  o f m utual bargaining between 
essentially independent ins titu tions. H jern and Porter (1981), fo r example.
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re lax the pure independence between ins titu tio n s  and in troduce in teracting 
im plem entation networks o r ’action sets’ . Alexander (1982,1989) critic ised 
Pressman and W ildavsky fo r the fact tha t th e ir num erical dem onstrations are 
lim ite d :
Rather than illustrating the implementation process in general, the Pressman- 
Wildavsky model turns out to be a special case, and the applicability of the 
'Pressman-Wildavsky Paradox' is correspondingly limited (Alexander, 1989; 463).
In  spite o f th is critic ism  the w ork o f Pressman and W ildavsky has paved the 
way fo r more research on im plem entation (Van Meter and Van H orn,1975; 
Ackerman and Hassler,1981; W ilson,1984; Ytn,1982; Mazmanian and 
Sabatier,1980 b,1981,1992; Sabatier and Mazmanian,1979,1986 a,1986 b).
2.2.2 The development o f la te r top-down research
In  the early 1980s the top-down approach became the subject o f critic ism . Also 
at th is tim e European researchers (H jem ,1982; Hanf,1982; H jem  and H ull, 1982) 
became interested in  the area o f study which u n til then had been 
predom inantly N orth  Am erican. Among the researchers who re fined  and 
tested the top-down approach were Elmore, Van Meter and Van Horn and 
Mazmanian and Sabatier. Most o f the early American studies were analyses o f 
a single case and came to pessim istic conclusions. The 'second generation’ o f 
im plem entation studies, according to  Goggin (1984) were more analytica l:
They sought to explain variation in implementation success across programs and 
governmental units by reference to specific variables and conceptual frameworks, but 
maintained the same 'top-down' perspective as earlier writers (Sabatier, 1986a; 21).
They also looked at other bodies o f lite ra tu re  to develop im plem entation 
models, such as organisation theory, organisational change and contro l, 
organisational behaviour theories and systemic theories o f management in  
public adm in istra tion. Elmore (1978) argues tha t understanding o f 
organisations is essential fo r the analysis o f im plem entation:
organisational theory does not support a single analytic model, rather there are four 
distinct models" (Elmore, 1978; 185).
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These fo u r d is tin c t models are firs tly  the systems management model, which 
capture the organisational assumptions o f ra tiona l po licy  analysis. Secondly 
the bureaucratic process model w hich represents the sociological view  o f 
organisations, focusing on the bureaucracy and street-level im plem entors. 
T h ird ly  the organisational developm ent m odel, which treats the needs o f 
ind iv idua ls  fo r pa rtic ipa tion  and th e ir com m itm ent to im plem entation as 
param ount. The fin a l model is the co n flic t and bargaining model, which treats 
organisations as areas o f co n flic t and views im plem entation as a bargaining 
process in  w hich the partic ipants converge on tem porary solutions bu t no 
stable resu lt is ever reached (Elmore, 1978; 186). Yanow (1990) argues tha t the 
"ce n tra lity  o f organizational theories to  case studies in  p o licy  im plem entation 
has been largely im p lic it to date" (Yanow, 1990;213). He concludes, like  
Elmore, tha t organisation theory supports fo u r d iffe ren t analytica l concepts, 
o r fo u r lenses o f analysis. Each lens embodies a d e fin itio n  o f the problem  o f 
im plem entation and proposes a solution to i t  (table 4).
Table 4: The T o u r Lenses’ o f Im p lem enta tion  Analysis
Human Relations
Political
Structural
S\ stems
lndi\ idual
Dispositions
Desired
behavioural
change
Implementors'
needs
Inter­
personal
Leadership
Motivation
Incentives
Expectation
Roles
Group In ter- Group Organisation Inter-Organisation
Massing 
assent Power, 
Influence 
Negotiation 
Games
Bargaining
norm
Strategies,
Tactics
Interest
groups
Coalitions
Bureaucratic structure 
design Control model 
{beha\ ioural rules 
organisation)
intergovernmental 
relations. Decisions 
goals
communications, 
En\ironmenls, 
linkages feedback 
information
source: adapled from Yanow, 1990;217.
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Yanow points ou t that:
It is important to note that these four lenses are fully distinct chiefly in an analytic 
sense. In implementation analysis as well as in organizational diagnosis, the lenses 
are often used in various combinations. Implementation analyses that have focused on 
intergovernmental relations describe problems that amalgamate elements from the 
systems, structural, and political lenses: multiple decision points, unclear 
communications, incomplete information, conflicting lines of authority and sources 
of power, and so forth. Human relations theorists have adopted systems language 
(feedback, communication) in applications to individual behavior; the political lens’s 
attention to leaders has enhanced the human relationists' study of the leadership 
role... (Yanow, 1990;216)
Some authors (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1992) 
strive to develop a fram ework w hich synthesises most o f the elements pointed 
out by Elmore. Van Meter and Van Horn critic ise  studies like  Pressman and 
W ildavsky's stating that:
... while these studies have been highly informative, their contributions have been 
limited by the absence of a theoretical perspective (Van Meter et al, 1975; 451).
Van Meter and Van Horn aim  to develop a conceptual fram ework "tha t can be 
used to analyse po licy  im plem entation, both where i t  involves actors w ith in  a 
single organization and across organizational boundaries" (Van Meter et al, 
1975; 447). They use the p o litica l systems model introduced by Easton (1965) 
w ith  a small adaption. They consider 'pohcy' and 'perform ance' as two d is tinc t 
categories and concentrate on the linkage between them. They argue:
the analysis of the implementation process raises serious boundary problems .... it is 
often difficult to define the relevant actors ... furthermore, many of the variables 
needed to complete an implementation study are difficult - if  not impossible - to 
measure (Van Meter et al, 1975; 451).
Van Meter and Van Horn hypothesise tha t "im plem entation w ül be most 
successful where on ly  m arginal change is required and goal consensus is 
h igh" (Van Meter et al, 1975; 461). Four 'mega' factors are included in  th e ir 
model: in terorgan isational com m unication and enforcem ent activ ities, the 
characteristics o f the im plem enting agencies, the economic, social and
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p o litica l environm ent affecting the ju ris d ic tio n  o r organisation w ith in  w hich 
im plem entation takes place and the d isposition o f im plem entors. "Each o f these 
factors consists o f several variables, some o f which w ill be ide n tifie d " (Van 
Meter et al, 1975; 465). One such factor is the economic, social and po litica l 
condition. Van Meter et al suggest that:
for illustrative purposes, we propose that consideration be given to the follovdng 
questions regarding the economic, social and political environment affecting the 
jurisdiction or the organization within which implementation takes place: the 
availability of economic resources within the implementing jurisdiction, the extent to 
which economic conditions are affected by the implementation of the policy in 
question, the nature of the public opinion i.e. to what extent are private interest 
groups mobilized in support or opposition to policy. (Van Meter et al, 1975; 472)
Mazmanian and Sabatier's (1980a,1980b,1981,1992) conceptual fram ework fo r 
the analysis o f im plem entation also incorporates systems theory. They state 
th a t th e ir fram ew ork fo r im plem entation analysis:
incorporates those basic, yet uncontrollable, factors deemed critical by general social 
system theorists in determining the capacity for, and constraints on, self-conscious 
social change (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1992; 19).
These c ritica l systemic factors include variables such as socio-economic 
conditions and technology, public support, attitudes and resources o f 
constituency groups, h ie ra rch ica l in teg ra tion  o f adm in istra tive  agencies and 
support o f agency sovereigns. Mazmanian and Sabatier argue tha t in  any 
specific p o licy  area, p o licy  fo rm u la tion  and im plem entation are norm ally 
dom inated by a "po licy subsystem". Such a po licy subsystem is composed o f 
re levant agencies, legislative committees, in terest groups and one o r more 
levels o f government. These organisational im peratives lead to an emphasis in  
Mazmanian and Sabatier's fram ework on sovereigns and in te rest groups, as 
w ell as on the form er's po ten tia l ab ih ty  to structure the behaviour o f 
im plem enting agencies. An understanding o f the general theory o f 
organisational behaviour, inc lud ing  the ra tiona l pu rsu it by ind iv idua ls, is also 
incorporated in to  th e ir fram ework. For Mazmanian and Sabatier 
im plem entation is:
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... the carrying out of basic policy decisions, usually made in a statute (Mazmanian 
and Sabatier, 1992;20)
And the crucia l ro le  o f im plem entation analysis is:
... the identification of the variables which affect the achievement of legal objectives 
throughout the process (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1992;21).
Mazmanian and Sabatier specify th e ir dependent variable as compliance, 
which they measure as the p ropo rtion  o f a goal tha t is achieved. They 
developed th e ir fram ework from  research on the im plem entation o f coastal 
conservation po licy  in  C aliforn ia. The fact tha t pub lic  policies are 
im plem ented in  a complex environm ent and tha t th e ir im plem entation is 
affected by many factors, inc lud ing  socioeconomic conditions, pub lic support 
and adm in istra tive behaviour, is recognised by Sabatier and Mazmanian in  
th e ir conceptual fram ework o f the im plem entation process.
The ir conceptual fram ework comprises sixteen legal, p o litica l and 'tra c ta b ility ’ 
variables affecting the d iffe re n t stages o f the im plem entation process (figure  
3). Mazmanian and Sabatier group th e ir variables in to  ’sta tu tory variables’ and 
’non-statu tory variables' w hich is shown in  figure  3. They subsequently 
sought to synthesize th is large num ber o f variables in to  a shorter lis t o f six 
su ffic ie n t and generally necessary conditions fo r the effective 
im plem entation o f legal objectives:
1. Clear and consistent objectives.
Effective im plem entation requires th a t a program m e’s standards and 
objectives are understood by those ind iv idua ls responsible fo r th e ir 
achievement. Therefore the c la rity  w ith  w hich standards and objectives are 
stated are v ita l (Van Meter et al, 1975; 466).
2. Adequate causal theory.
This condition  is borrowed from  Pressman and W idavsky (1973) who argue tha t 
p o licy  in terventions incorporate an im p lic it theory about how to effectuate 
social change. Sabatier and Mazmanian emphasise the adequacy o f the 
ju risd ic tio n  and po licy  levers given to im plem enting o ffic ia ls as a means o f 
ascertaining those causal assumptions.
3. Implementation process legally structured to enhance compliance by 
im plem enting officials and target groups.
Again re ly ing  on Pressman and W idavsky (1973), Mazmanian and Sabatier 
argue tha t im plem entation is influenced by a va rie ty o f legal mechanisms.
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These include the num ber o f veto po in ts invo lved in  programme delivery, the 
sanctions available, and the assignment o f programmes to  im plem enting 
agencies w hich w ould be supportive to the programme.
4. Committed and sk illfu l im plem enting officials
Inspired by lip s k y  (1971), Mazmanian and Sabatier recognise the unavoidable 
d iscretion given to  im plem enting o ffic ia ls . The ir com m itm ent to po licy 
objectives and s k ill in  u tilis in g  available resources are viewed as c ritica l.
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) re fe r to ’the disposition o f im plem enters'. 
"Three elements o f the im plem enters’ response may affect th e ir a b ility  and 
w illingness to carry ou t the po licy: th e ir cognition o f the po licy, the d irection  
o f th e ir response towards i t  (acceptance, n e u tra lity  o r re jection) and the 
in tens ity  o f tha t response" (Van Meter et a l,1975; 472).
The goals o f a po licy may be rejected fo r a va rie ty o f reasons: they may offend 
im plem enters’ personal value systems, extra-organisational loya lties, sense o f 
self-interest, o r existing and pre fe rred  relationships. According to  Van Meter:
What all this suggests is that the researcher must gather multiple indicators of 
various elements of the dispositions of policy implementors (Van Meter et al, 1975; 
474).
5. Support o f interest groups and sovereigns.
Borrowed from  Bardach (1974) and Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980a), this 
varib le  recognises the need to  m ain ta in  p o litica l support th roughout the long 
im plem entation process.
6. Changes in  socio-economic conditions
"This variable recognizes tha t changes in  socio-economic conditions could 
have dram atic repercussions on the p o litica l support o r causal theory o f a 
programme" (Sabatier, 1986a; 25).
In  th e ir critic ism  on the early classic approach, Sabatier and Mazmanian 
re ject h ierarch ica l con tro l as im possible. However they argue th a t the 
behaviour o f street-level bureaucrats and target groups can be kept w ith in  
acceptable bounds over tim e i f  the six conditions are met (Sabatier, 1986a;25). 
Im plem entation is considered to be a dynam ic process. Feasibility conditions 
keep changing over tim e: o ld  constraints disappear o r are overcome, w hile  
new ones emerge. In  th e ir study Mazmanian and Sabatier conceptualise the 
im plem entation process as one o f ’evo lu tion ’. They argue tha t as po licy  is 
enacted i t  is autom atically changed, as resources are altered o r problems arise.
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A num ber o f scholars have also emphasised tha t policies evolve during 
im plem entation because o f a process o f bargaining and compromise between 
more o r less autonomous actors and organisations (Bardach, 1974; Barrett and 
Fudge, 1981; Hànf, 1982; H jem  and H ull, 1982; Hanf, 1985).
These and other em pirica l studies have n o t on ly shown tha t pohcy shapes 
po licy, bu t also tha t im plem entation shapes pohcy. Thus, a pure ly sequential 
model - firs t pohcy, then im plem entation- should be rejected as too simple and 
replaced by a more evo lu tionary m odel. Sabatier and Mazmanian view 
pohcym aking as a process o f fo rm u la tion , im plem entation and re form ula tion . 
They do acknowledge the evo lu tion  concept bu t argue tha t we need no t re ject 
the form ula tion-im p lem enta tion  d is tin c tio n  in  order to incorporate the 
evolution o f po licy  over tim e. Mazmanian and Sabatier have been re fin ing  
th e ir theoretica l fram ew ork fo r over several years and according to Goggin:
the importance of their model is underscored by the fact that it has become the 
standard for scholars who wish to test the validity of the leading propositions of the 
implementation literature (Goggin, 1984; 160).
H jem  comments on the Mazmanian and Sabatier volum e and the em pirical 
testing o f th e ir fram ework:
... one reason why the Mazmanian and Sabatier volume is rewarding is its overall 
structure (Hjern, 1982; 304).
Mazmanian and Sabatier, and others who have used th e ir fram ework, are 
interested in  explaining variance in  the dependent variables. For th is purpose 
a m u ltip le  comparative p o licy  research m ethod has been developed. The 
com parative m ethod has been used to illu s tra te  im plem entation va ria b ility , 
ranging from  successful im plem entation o f coastal land-use regulation in  
C alifom ia to the re la tive ly  unsuccessful New Communities Program. Overall 
the Mazmanian and Sabatier fram ework has been em p irica lly  tested, by 
themselves and others, over tw enty times (table 5).
2.2.3 Em pirical tests o f the Sabatier and Mazmanian fram ework
Several em pirical studies have addressed the Sabatier and Mazmanian 
fram ework, testing the basic hypothesis tha t the success o f the 
im plem entation o f a statute is a function  o f certain sta tu tory and non-statutory 
variables (figure 3). The studies provided evidence to support the basic
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hypothesis. They also expanded o r c la rifie d  the conceptual fram ework and 
contributed to the development o f m ethodology.
Browning et al (1981) u tilise  the Sabatier and Mazmanian fram ework fo r th e ir 
study on the local im plem entation o f federal grants fo r social po licy and the 
range o f va ria tion  in  local im plem entation practices o f s im ila r federal 
programmes. In  other words they concentrate on d is trib u to ry  po licy aimed at 
changing the behaviour o f local governm ent. They assessed im plem entation 
in  terms o f c ity  governm ent responsiveness to the in terest o f m in o rity  groups. 
By comparing five  cities tha t had a Model Cities programme to five  cities tha t 
d id  not, they firs t established th a t the programme created by th is  federal 
statute contribu ted to m in o rity  m obilisation, b u t was ne ither 'necessary' no r 
'su ffic ie n t' to achieve th is leg islative goal.
In  the second pa rt o f the study, they tested w hether the strength o f the statute 
influenced local im plem entation by com paring the outputs o f im plem entation 
o f three grant programmes, each o f w hich was im plem ented in  five  cities. 
Their find ings support the hypothesis tha t sta tu tory and non-statutory 
variables influence the im plem entation success o f a statute:
... grants characterised by strong statutes directed toward benefiting minorities ... 
result in more local targeting of benefits to minorities and more minority 
mobilization (Browning et al, 1981; 142).
In  terms o f the en tire  fram ework, Browning points ou t "th a t non-statu tory 
local variables are frequen tly  stronger and more d iffic u lt to overcome than 
Sabatier and Mazmanian im p ly  and are no t adequately treated in  th e ir 
conceptualization" (Browning et al, 1981; 129).
H jem  reaches a s im ila r conclusion w ith  regard to the non-sta tu tory factors:
with big variations found in local implementation practices the main explanatory 
factors are bound to become the non-statutory local ones (Hjern, 1982; 305).
Rosenbaum (1981) sets out a way to assess statutory structures, to define the 
characteristics o f these and to investigate th e ir im pact on im plem entation 
outcomes. According to H jem :
the last, of course, is a formidable task ... Rosenbaum quite ingeniously devises a 
systematic evaluation framework with appealing conceptual and statistical stringency 
(Hjern, 1982; 304).
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Table 5: Empirical Applications o f the Sabatier and M azmanian Framework
Author(s) Year Title/Subject
Original Research by Sabatier 
an d /o r Mazmanian
Sabatier 1984 French Coastal Decrees o f 1976 and 1979
Sabatier and Mazmanian 1983 C aliforn ia Coastal Conservation Act, 1972-80
Sabatier and Klosterman 1981 Bay Conservation and Development Act, 1965-72
Secondary Analysis o f  Others' 
Research by Sabatier a n d /o r  
Mazmanian
Cerych and Sabatier 1986 British Open U niversity, 1969-79
Cerych and Sabatier 1986 French Institu ts Universitaires de Technologie, 1967- 79
Cerych and Sabatier 1986 Norwegian Regional Colleges, 1970-79
Cerych and Sabatier 1986 U niversity o f Tromso, Norway. 1969-79
Cerych and Sabatier 1986 German Gesamthochschule, 1970-79Cerych and Sabatier 1986 Swedish 25/5 Scheme
Cerych and Sabatier 1986 Pohsh Preferential U niversity Admissions
Sabatier and Mazmanian 1983 1970 U.S. Clean A ir Act
Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983 U.S. School Desegregation, South and North, 1955- - 75
Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983 1965 U.S. Elementary and Secondary Education Act, T itle  1, 1966-67Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983 1970 New Towns Act (U.S.), 1970-78
Sabatier and Klosterman * 1981 A Comparative Analysis o f Policy Im plem entation under D iffe rent S tatutory RegimesUtilization by other Authors
Lester and Bowman 1989 Im plementing Intergovernm ental Policy: Testing the Sabatier and Mazmanian ModelMcFarlane * 1989 U.S. Family Planning Legislation
Bowman and Lester 1986 Subnational Policy Im plem entation: Testing the Sabatier and Mazmanian modelLester, Davis, W iley 1985 U.S. Hazardous Waste Policy
Lowry 1985 U.S. Coastal Zone Management
Jones 1984 Groundwater Management in  Several New York CountiesMann 1982 Environm ental Policy
Browning et.al. * 1981 Model Cities, Revenue Sharing, and Block Grants in  SF Bay Area
Bullock * 1981 hiplem entation o f Equal Education O pportunity Yogram: A Comparative AnalysisGoodwin and Moen 1981 Evolution o f US Welfare (AFDC) Policy since 1935K irst and Jung 1981 1965 ESEA, T itle  1, 1966-79
Rosenbaum * 1981 Wetlands RegulationBaum 1981 Im plem entation o f Court Decisions
source: Sabatièr,1986a;26. 
notes: * Examined in  2.3.3
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His focus is on p ractica l m ethodological issues, Le. "are d iffe re n t components 
o f s ta tu tory structure "scaleable?" and "is there su ffic ien t va ria tion  in  
sta tu tory structure among re lated enactments to expect a difference in  
programme outcomes?". However he recognises tha t even the most tig h tly  
crafted statute is no t a su ffic ien t cond ition  o f effective im plem entation, and 
a tten tion  should be focused on legislative craftm anship as a necessary 
condition. In  his study the find ings o f the sta tu tory comparisons are 
in te rpre ted  w ith  data from  case studies o f state wetlands regulation laws. 
O rdinal scales fo r 8 sta tutory variables were constructed and used to rate 16 
state laws. Rosenbaum concludes th a t i t  is feasible to develop a systematic, 
quantita tive  approach to  the com parative assessment o f sta tu tory stringency:
the approach is based on a conceptual framework that posits a necessary relationship 
between implementation outcomes and two key components of statutory structure: 
specificity and enforceability (Rosenbaum, 1981; 79).
His study d id  not test the re la tionsh ip  between the sta tu tory structure and the 
va ria tion  in  im plem entation outcomes, "th is  task remains fo r fu tu re  research 
efforts" (Rosenbaum, 1981; 80). He commented fu rth e r tha t
... based on impressionistic evidence from recent case studies, the statutory structure 
indices do appear to identify implementation problems and deserve to be 
incorporated in a general theory of effective implementation (Rosenbaum, 1981; 80).
Sabatier and Klosterman (1981) tested the sta tu tory hypothesis in  a contro lled 
comparison o f the im plem entation o f the o rig ina l McAteer-Petris Act ( 1965- 
1968) and its  amended version (1970-1972), which authorised the San Francisco 
Bay and Conservation Development Commission. The non-statutory variables 
rem ained constant during  both  periods, thus allow ing fo r a contro lled  
comparison design. They researched to what degree the dependent variable 
had been affected by three sta tu tory factors, c la rity , adequate causal theory 
and sta tu tory structuring. The dependent variable were the actual (sta tu tory) 
objective(s) o f the McAteer-Petris Act, i.e. m in im ising f il l,  m in im ising 
dredging and prom oting access to the bay. The results o f the case study 
showed th a t s ta tu to ry factors can be im po rtan t in  achieving im plem entation. 
Bullock (1981) tested the Sabatier and Mazmanian model w ith in  the context o f 
fo u r d iffe re n t (US) federal programmes concerned w ith  equal education 
opportun ities in  the public schools. Bullock tested several sta tu tory and non-
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sta tu to ry  variables and acknowledged the re la tive  im portance o f the 
independent variables:
This analysis ... sheds light on aspects of the Sabatier and Mazmanian implementation 
model. For a number of variables that they identify as potentially important there 
does appear to be at least a rough relationship in the hypothesized direction with 
implementation success (Bullock, 1981;119).
Bullock concluded tha t fo u r variables appear to be most c ritica l to successful 
im plem entation: clear standards o r objectives; agency support; favourable 
decision rules; and com m itted agency o ffic ia ls.
McFarlane (1989) used the Sabatier and Mazmanian fram ework to test the so- 
called ’sta tu tory coherence hypothesis'. This hypothesis states tha t effective 
im plem entation is a function  o f the extent to which the sta tu tory conditions o f 
the Sabatier and Mazmanian fram ework are met. Effective im plem entation is 
operationalised in  terms o f in te rsta te  va ria tion  in  per capita fa m ily  p lanning 
expenditures under each o f the fo u r grant programmes encompassing the 
(US) nationa l fa m ily  p lanning program m e. In  order to enable em pirica l 
analysis o f whether in terstate va ria tion  in  po licy  outputs was related d ire c tly  
to sta tu tory coherence, sta tu tory coherence scores were developed fo r each o f 
the fo u r grant programmes:
The findings of the study support the statutory coherence hypothesis, specifically 
that the extent of interstate variation in the implementation of federal statutes is a 
function of the extent to which different statutes have coherently structured the 
implementation process (McFarlane, 1989; 417).
These em pirica l studies support the usefulness o f the Sabatier and Mazmanian 
fram ework and con firm  the im portance the fram ework attaches to legal 
s tructu ring  o f the im plem entation process. The ir six ’conditions’ fo r effective 
im plem entation have proven to be c ritica l factors in  understanding varia tions 
in  perform ance o f the studied programmes, and in  understanding the 
strategies o f programme proponents over tim e.
One o f the more frequent critic ism s o f the Mazmanian and Sabatier fram ework 
relates to th e ir emphasis on s tructu ring  w hich is seen as unrea listic (Barret 
and Fudge, 1981). Sabatier and Mazmanian argue tha t w ith  reference to 
em p irica l testing:
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fairly coherent structuring is difficult however it occurs more frequently than 
critics realize and, when present, proves to be very im portant... perhaps the best 
evidence of the potential importance of legal structuring is that the two most 
successful cases studied to date - the California coastal commissions and the British 
Open University - were also the best designed institutions ... they structured the 
process to provide reasonably consistent objectives, a good causal theory, relatively 
few veto points, sympathetic implementing officials, access of supporters to most 
decisions, and adequate financial resources (Sabatier, 1986a;28).
More fundam ental m ethodological critic ism s on the Sabatier and Mazmanian 
fram ework and the 'top-dow n' approach in  general comes from  adherents o f 
the 'bottom -up ' approach.
2.2.4 The 'Bottom -up' approach
As a response to criticism s and perceived weaknesses o f top-down research at 
large, a new approach to the study o f im plem entation emerged in  the early 
1980s. Authors critic is ing  the top-down approach (H jem  and H ull, 1982; Hanf, 
1982; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Elmore, 1979) developed a "bottom -up" view o f 
im plem entation. The criticism s the top-down studies received relate to the 
"top-down" d e fin itio n  o f the im plem entation process. Barrett and Fudge (1981) 
comment on th is at some length because i t  "... embodies assumptions most 
commonly held about im plem entation" (Barrett et al, 1981;10). According to 
Barrett, the three m ain and erroneous assumptions are:
- firs t, "the d is tinction  between the fo rm u la tion  and adoption o f a po licy  and 
its  im plem entation by one o r more adm in istra tive agencies ... im plem entation 
is conceptualised as a non-po litica l process tha t could be optim ised according 
to  the princip les o f organisation theory" (Barrett et al, 1981;10);
- secondly, "a tig h t program m ing o f the adm in istra tion  process" (Barrett et al, 
1981; 10). Im plem entation is the end resu lt o f a sequence o f logical steps:
In te n t io n    D ec is io n  -------------------  A c t i o n
Finally, "the assumption tha t p o licy  im plem entation should be characterised 
by an effective h ierarch ica l con tro l system ... top-down studies began w ith  
examining the objectives o f a pohcy and assessing the extent to  which these 
objectives had been achieved" (Barrett et al, 1981;11). According to Barrett, 
these studies tended to explain p o licy  fa ilu re  in  terms o f the in a b ility  o f po licy 
makers to con tro l those responsible fo r im plem entation.
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Instead o f being based on rationalism , the methodologies used in  the bottom -up 
approach emphasise the analysis o f subjective accounts tha t can be generated 
by 'getting inside ' situations. The ir m ethodology involves w orking w ith  a co­
operative dem ocratic model where the fo rm u la tion  and realisation o f po licy 
unfo lds through in te raction  between actors (e.g. group decision-m aking):
The ordening principle of implementation research is policy problems as defined by
relevant actors, the unit-of-analysis problem becomes a central issue in, and a .
defining characteristic of, implementation research (Hjern and Hull, 1982; 114).
I t is argued tha t th is m ethodology w ill not, un like top-down approaches, lead to 
neglecting strategic in itia tive s  com ing from  the p riva te  sector, from  street- 
leve l bureaucrats or local im plem enting o ffic ia ls . Instead o f beginning w ith  
an iden tifiab le  p o licy  decision, the bottom -up approach starts w ith  an analysis 
o f the actors which in te ract at the local level on a p a rticu la r problem  or issue. 
Im p lic it in  th is approach is the no tion  tha t policies are best form ulated by 
actors at the local level ra the r than contro lled  by centra l decision-makers 
removed from  the needs o f pa rticu la r loca lities and the consequences o f 
policies "on the ground".
Barrett and Fudge press fo r the need to develop theory from  an em pirical base: 
a grounded theory approach to the study o f im plem entation (Barrett and 
Fudge, 1981; 250). They argue tha t much o f the theoretical w ork on 
organisations and adm in istra tions is inadequate fo r explaining both the 
in fo rm a l networks o f linkages and the broader social re lations. Instead they 
re fe r to Weber whose concept o f 'Verstehen' provided an a lternative to the 
pos itiv is t ideal o f causal explanation. 'Verstehen' in  the Weber sense is the 
understanding o f one another's m otivations and in terpre ta tions.
The top-down approach has been fu rth e r critic ised  fo r the fact th a t i t  is 
d iffic u lt to em ploy in  situations where there is no dom inant po licy, bu t ra ther 
a m u ltitude  o f governm ental regulations and actors.
In view  o f th is critic ism  by proponents o f the bottom -up approach, the 
question arises what (viable) alternatives to the top-down approach have been 
developed.
One o f the proponents o f the bottom -up approach, H jem , started w ith  
ide n tify in g  the netw ork o f actors invo lved in  service de live ry in  one o r more 
local areas. He subsequently asked them  about th e ir goals, strategies, activities 
and contacts. From the contacts a netw ork technique is developed to id e n tify  
the local, regional and na tiona l actors invo lved in  the p lanning, financing
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and executing o f the re levant governm ental programme. In  one study, fo r 
example, H u ll and H jem  (1982) started w ith  a random  sample o f firm s in  an 
area, and then interview ed key o ffic ia ls  in  each firm  to ascertain th e ir c ritica l 
problems, the strategies developed to deal w ith  each, and the persons contacted 
to execute each o f those strategies. They then used those contacts v ia  a 
netw orking technique to id e n tify  the 'im plem entation structu re '.
Sabatier has acknowledged th a t the bottom -up approach has some advantages. 
He comments tha t because the bottom -up approach starts w ith  actors' 
perceived problems and strategies developed fo r dealing w ith  them, i t  is able to 
assess the re la tive  im portance o f a va rie ty  o f governm ental programmes vis- 
a-vis p riva te  organisations and m arket forces in  solving those problem s 
(Sabatier, 1986a; 33). Hanf showed in  one o f his studies tha t a top-down 
approach m ight overestim ate the im portance o f the govem m ental programme 
w hich is its focus:
Hanfs (1982) bottom-up analysis of pollution control in the Netherlands concluded 
that energy policies and the market price of alternative fuels had more effect on 
firms' pollution control programmes than did governmental pollution control 
programmes - a conclusion which would have been difficult for a top-downer to reach 
(Sabatier, 1986a;34).
However the bottom -up approach has its  lim ita tions, as Sabatier argues:
bottom-uppers are likely to overemphasize the ability of the Periphery to frustrate 
the Center ... they also take the present distribution of preferences and resources as 
given, without ever inquiring into the efforts of other actors to structure the rules of 
the game ... finally the bottom-up approach fails to start from an explicit theory of 
the factors affecting its subject of interest, because it relies heavily on the 
perceptions and activities of participants, it is their prisoner ... the bottom-up 
approach is a useful starting point for identifying many of the actors involved in a 
policy area, but it needs to be related via an explicit theory to social, economic and 
legal factors which structure the perceptions, resources and participation of those 
actors (Sabatier, 1986^34-35).
Barrett and Fudge (1981) and Barret and HiU (1984) have trie d  to employ 
bargaining theory w ith in  the bottom -up approach, bu t th is has no t yet 
resulted in  an exp lic it conceptual fram ework. H jem 's netw ork analysis also 
d id  no t resu lt in  a "viable causal model which incorporates the often ind irec t
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effects w hich legal and socio-economic factors can have on in d iv id u a l 
behaviour" (Sabatier, 1986a; 315).
The d is tinction  between the top-down and bottom -up approaches is no t the 
on ly dem arcation lin e  between a lte rna tive  approaches in  the im plem entation 
lite ra tu re . Lane (1987) poin ts ou t tha t the body o f lite ra tu re  offers a va rie ty  o f 
a lternative approaches. For example Hood (1976,1986) suggested hypotheses 
about what type o f im plem entation process would 'produce perfect po licy 
im plem entation' (Hood, 1976; 6). Such a process would satisfy the conditions o f 
'perfect adm in istra tion '. The m odel o f ‘perfect adm in istra tion ’ suggested by 
Hood is intended as an ideal-type, however the model ha rd ly  leaves any room  
fo r w hat a specific im plem entation process fu lfills . A nyth ing th a t does no t 
satisfy the ‘ideal model’ is by d e fin itio n  'w rong', however i t  m ight w ell be tha t 
the ‘perfect im plem entation’ model needs its e lf fu rth e r developm ent.
Another approach is 'im plem entation as evo lu tion ' which has been discussed 
earlier. This approach conceptualises im plem entation as a 'learn ing  process'. 
The concept is an interesting one, bu t leaves room  fo r am biguity, fo r example 
no t every po licy  change can be qua lified  as learning. The concept o f a 
learning process o r a feedback process is p a rt o f the overall systems model 
used by i.e. Sabatier and Mazmanian and Van Meter and Van Horn.
2.2.5 Conclusion
Academic in terest in  general p o licy  analysis has concerned its e lf w ith  both 
prescriptive and descriptive propositions: how does i t  happen and how should 
i t  happen. W riters have proposed ideal type models, re lying upon ra tiona l 
means o f isolating objectives and selecting the most appropriate means to 
secure ends. Others have looked at how policies would be made i f  a ll actors 
were capable o f perfect ra tio n a lity . "To the ra tiona list, abstract form al logic is 
a norm ative master science th a t makes i t  possible to separate scientific 
propositions from  unsound th ink ing " (Nachmias, 1992; 5). The proponents o f 
the o rig ina l top-down approach w ould agree w ith  Nachmias; they emphasise 
the im portance o f basing research upon scientific  methods. This involves 
em ploying an explanatory theory and deductions, using quantified  
operationalisation o f concepts in  w hich the element o f m otive, purpose and 
meaning is lost, because o f the need fo r precise models and hypotheses fo r 
testing (G ill and Johnson, 1991; 36). Rationalists have been critic ised  fo r the 
fact tha t they apply methods and assumptions o f the na tura l sciences to the 
study o f human behaviour and pay insu ffic ien t a ttention to the claims o f 
sense-experience.
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Proponents o f the bottom -up approach on the other hand emphasise the 
analysis o f subjective accounts o f actors invo lved w ith  im plem entation. Such 
an em p irica lly  based m ethodology however runs in to  d ifficu ltie s  as unbiased 
observation is hiard to obtain. The observer m ight no t on ly see what he wants 
to see, bu t also add a value statement to it. Further the lin k in g  o f the 
phenomenon to be explained to earlie r occurence (inductive  explanation) has 
been criticised. Popper argues that inductive  methods do no t lead to tru th  o r 
probabilities (Popper, 1959; 29).
Sabatier and Mazmanian argue tha t the ro le  o f im plem entation analysis is to 
in d e n tify  the p rinc ipa l factors affecting po licy  outputs and impacts. The ir 
conceptual fram ework, in  w hich im plem entation is considered to be a dynam ic 
process, lacks the h ierarchy o f the ea rlie r top-down approaches and has been 
em p irica lly  tested by themselves and others. H jern comments:
Since methodological clarity and replicability is the very first step towards 
cumulative research, one of the declared aims of the Sabatier/Mazmanian 1981 volume 
is certainly approached. By indirectly shedding some light on the inter- 
organisational twilight zone between implementation and public-administration 
research the volume also helps to define the necessary analytic tools and the 
particular remit of implementation research, A legalistic perspective is necessary 
but an inter-organisational structuring is indispensible in implementation analysis 
(Hjern, 1982; 308).
Sabatier and Mazmanian's w ork has been critic ised  by sympathisers o f the 
bottom -up appraoch fo r the fact tha t th e ir conceptual fram ework is d iffic u lt to 
use in  situations where there is no dom inant po licy o r statute. In  such 
circumstances a bottom -up approach m ight be more appropriate. Another 
critic ism  has been tha t the top-down approach starts from  the perspective o f 
centra l decision-makers and thus neglects other actors, i.e. in itia tive s  coming 
from  the priva te  sector, from  street-level bureaucrats o r loca l im plem enting 
o ffic ia ls. This critic ism  has been answered by Sabatier who argues tha t 
Sabatier and Mazmanian's focus:
... on causal theory and their emphasis on hierarchical integration encourages the 
analyst to examine the perspectives of other actors (Sabatier, 1986a; 29).
The bottom -up approach does focus on as many involved actors and parties as 
possible, many no t regarded as im po rtan t in  the top-down approach. Policy
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processes are seen as dom inated by networks in  which actors in te ract and 
communicate. The actors are m u tua lly  dependent and in  the netw ork there is 
no central body w hich can dom inate others. The existence o f m u ltip le  po licy 
networks in  w hich d iffe re n t actors are w orking together, determ ines the 
lim its  to the steering capacity o f governm ent. This approach has been 
critic ised by Wamsley (1985), who argues tha t netw ork analysis does no t get 
beyond mapping who participates in  networks. "Network analysis m erely tells 
us who interre lates; not why they in te ract, on what basis, fo r what purposes, 
o r th e ir points o f agreement and issue" (Wamsley, 1985; 86).
Sabatier critic ised  the bottom -up approach fo r having a fundam ental 
lim ita tio n . This is the fa ilu re  to sta rt from  an e xp lic it explanatory theory o f 
the factors affecting its  subject o f interest. Barrett and Fudge (1981) and 
Barrett and HiU (1984) have trie d  to app ly bargaining theory. But thus fa r 
none have come close to an exp lic it conceptual fram ework w ith  the 
ide n tifica tio n  o f specific variables and causal re lationships tha t make 
predictions possible. Sabatier (1986a) argues tha t consequently the bottom -up 
approach is poorly  equipped to  make useful predictions. Linder and Peters 
(1990) argue tha t there has been a tendency in  im plem entation, pa rticu la rly  
in  the bottom -up perspective, to blend em pirica l and norm ative statements, i t  
is 'w rong' they say
... to take empirical findings about the importance of street-level workers in
implementation, and build this into a normative theory about how implementation
should proceed (Linder and Peters, 1990;51).
Thus, both top-down and bottom -up approaches have th e ir strengths and 
weaknesses and im portan t insights can be gained from  both. Generally 
speaking the top-down approach appears to have a com parative advantage in  
situations in  which there is a dom inant piece o f legislation, o r where one is 
p rim a rily  interested in  mean responses. In  contrast, the bottom -up approach 
is more appropriate in  situations where there is no dom inant piece o f 
leg islation bu t ra ther large numbers o f actors w ithou t power dependency, and 
one is p rim a rily  interested in  the dynamics o f d iffe ren t local situations.
More recently a "th ird-generation approach" (Goggin,1990; 181) has been 
id e n tifie d  in  im plem entation studies:
... examining systematically the dynamics of implementation, especially in settings of
multilevel intergovernmental action, means that researchers must make observations
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at several locations over many time points regarding a number of cases. Only 
recently has a new "third generation" of studies begun to emerge, empirical and 
theoretical research that concentrates on comparative, diachronic methods of policy 
analysis (Gdggin, 1990; 182).
The im portance on collecting data over tim e has also been emphasised by 
Sabatier and Mazmanian. Many o f Goggin's testable hypotheses are no t very 
new, e.g. "whether o r no t a state actua lly transform s intended po licy ... is 
system atically related to organizational capacity" is also one o f the 
propositions p u t forw ard by Sabatier and Mazmanian. F ina lly, although 
Goggin m entions the im portance o f concept c la rifica tio n  and 
operationalisation several times, he does no t actually embark on i t  him self. An 
interesting p o in t o f Goggin's th ird  generation approach is the com parative 
element. This has been m entioned by others: "Going beyond tests o f single 
factors, attem pts to operationalize the m u ltiva ria te  fram ework in  successive 
case studies should provide additional useful insights" (DiMento, 1989; 129).
In the next Chapter the lite ra tu re  o f in te rna tiona l organisations and 
im plem entation, includ ing  the European Com m unity, is examined.
2.3 In te rn a tio n a l O rg a n isa tio n s  and Im p le m e n ta tio n
2.3.1 In te rna tiona l Organisations and Im plem entation Studies
Both lawyers and p o litica l scientists have theorised about how in te rna tiona l 
law  can influence behaviour and w hy in  practice i t  often does no t (Chayes, 
1993; Young, 1979 and 1992). For centuries, nations have negotiated treaties in  
the hope tha t they w ould produce be tter collective outcomes. However 
scepticism exists about the a b ility  o f treaties to influence the way 
governments o r ind iv idua ls  act.
Studies o f compliance w ith  in te rna tiona l law  have been carried ou t on nuclear 
arms contro l, the A ntarctic Treaty and o il p o llu tio n  at sea. More recently, 
research has concentrated on environm ental treaties and how they can be 
made more effective a t achieving th e ir goals (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993; 
Sands, 1989 and 1990; Bemauer, 1995; Boyle, 1991; Lykke, 1992).
The increased in terest in  im plem entation and compliance w ith  in te rna tiona l 
agreements in  the lite ra tu re  on in te rna tio n a l organisations and in te rna tio na l 
law has been noted by Chayes (1993). Varying theories, m ostly using the 
ra tiona l actor approach (e.g. G arlla ro tti, 1991), have been proposed to explain 
the reasons fo r poor im plem entation and the way to im prove im plem entation
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and compliance. G alla ro tti (1991) argues that, in  the lig h t o f fa ilures o f 
in te rna tiona l organisations, a reassessment o f the ro le  o f m u ltila te ra l 
management is necessary. A m anagerial v is ion  o f in te rna tio n a l organisations 
o ffe rs :
a more general theoretical approach to understanding the destabilizing effects of 
multilateral management than has commonly been taken in the critical international 
organizations literature (Gallarotti, 1991; 185).
In  presenting a typology o f systematic fa ilures, he brings the processes and 
ins titu tion s  o f m u ltila te ra l management in to  focus. However, h is fo u r 
'general* ways o f systematical fa ilu re  are vague and too general:
international organizations fail when they attempt to manage complex systems, ... 
because these complex systems are difficult to understand and therefore manage 
successfully, there are inherent possibilities for destabilizing management 
(Gallarotti, 1991; 192).
According to Ness and Brechin (1988) there is a gap between the study o f 
in te rna tiona l organisations and the sociology o f organisations. W ith  a few 
exceptions (Haas, 1964; Cox, 1969) each appears to run  its  own course, largely 
un in form ed by the other. Ness et al argue tha t in te rna tiona l organisations 
need to  be approached w ith  somewhat more specialised and pow erful 
conceptual tools. These tools usually gauge 'perform ance', a large concern in  
organisational sociology:
Some of the major advances in organizational sociology have resulted from two 
strategic developments. One focuses on organizational performance - effectiveness or 
efficinecy. This emphasis had provided the field with a dependent variable, which 
spawned the second major development: the recognition of an interraleted set of 
conditions that affect performance (Ness and Brechin, 1988; 248).
Attem pts have been made to develop these 'conditions' as variables, bu t Ness 
and Brechin argue " it  w ould be be tter to  see them as sensitizing concepts". 
These 'sensitizing concepts' are organisational environm ents, technology, 
structure and goals. As Scott (1987) has shown, a ll o f these concepts have 
provided im portan t insights, bu t a ll have also been found to have much 
variance. They are no t easy to operationalise, and u ltim ate ly, they are ra ther
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d iffic u lt to p in  down as real variables. Nevertheless Ness and Brechin claim  
tha t they
are important sensitizing concepts on which there has been research (Ness and 
Brechin, 1988; 248).
Ness and Brechin themselves do no t succeed in  defin ing and operationalising 
the sensitising concepts, fo r example w ith  regard to "organizational 
environm ent" they suggest "to  tu rn  dichotomous attributes, like  autonom y in to  
variables" bu t do no t rea lly  per sue the fu rth e r operationalisation o f the 
variables (Ness and Brechin, 1988; 253). Regarding the concept "technology" 
they m ention tha t the use o f technology fo r m on itoring  environm ental 
pro tection is no t w ell developed bu t do no t pursue the issue fu rthe r. Kay and 
Jacobson (1983) also m ention m on itoring  in  th e ir study on twelve case-studies 
o f in te rna tiona l environm ental regimes. They id e n tifie d  a num ber o f 
functions tha t must be fu lfille d  by a regime in  order fo r i t  to  function  
e ffective ly. Problem id e n tifica tio n , m on ito ring , in fo rm a tion  dissem ination, 
standard setting and supervision are the most im portant. M onitoring is also an 
im portan t aspect in  Boyle's (1991) a rtic le  on im plem entation and enforcem ent 
o f in te rna tio n a l environm ental law  through in te rna tiona l in s titu tio n s . Boyle 
concentrates on the ro le  o f in tergovernm enta l ins titu tion s  in  fa c ilita tin g  the 
im plem entation and enforcem ent o f in te rna tion a l environm ental law. 
According to Boyle, effective supervision o f the operation and im plem entation 
o f trea ty regimes depends on the a va ila b ility  o f adequate in fo rm ation . This can 
be obtained in  several ways: reporting , fact find ing  and research and 
inspection. He adds tha t in  ensuring compliance w ith  trea ty obligations, the 
ins titu tions should have a measure o f independence from  the States 
concerned:
environmental monitoring, scientific recommendations and inspection regimes will 
not be successful if  they are wholly under control of Member States (Boyle, 1991;
245).
Young (1992) argues tha t he and many other students o f in te rna tiona l 
in s titu tion s  believe tha t
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institutions are driving forces in the sense that it is possible to explain or predict a 
sizable proportion of the variance in individual and collective behaviour in terms of 
the operation of institutional arrangements (Young, 1992; 160).
And:
the effectiveness of international institutions, like their domestic counterparts, can 
be measured in terms of their success in the areas of implementation, compliance and 
persistence (Young, 1992; 163).
A num ber o f factors o rd in a rily  exert an influence on in te rna tiona l behaviour. 
The re la tive  im portance o f each facto r in  derm ining the content o f ind iv id u a l 
and collective behaviour consequently becomes a m atter fo r investigation. 
Such investigation, according to  Young, takes place th rough the fo rm u la tion  
o f hypotheses about the relationships in  question and the application o f these 
hypotheses to actual cases. Focusing on in s titu tio n a l arrangements tha t deal 
w ith  specific issue areas (regimes) he poin ts out factors th a t con tro l the 
effectiveness o f in te rna tiona l ins titu tion s . These factors tha t contro l the 
extent to  w hich in s titu tio n a l arrangements determ ine behaviour at the 
in te rna tio n a l level are fo r example transparency, transform ation rules, 
capacity o f governments and interdependence.
Weale (1992) proposes six causes o f im plem entation fa ilu re : the po licy in  
question is on ly  re lu c tan tly  embarked upon by governments, the lim ite d  
means tha t governments have to achieve th e ir ends, the considerable 
in fo rm ationa l asymmetries w ith in  a po licy  system, the m istaken assumptions 
about relationships o f cause and effect upon which policies may rest, and 
fin a lly  the com plexity o f the psychology o f enforcement (Weale, 1992; 48). 
A lthough Weale does no t m ention Mazmanian and Sabatier, his six causes are 
very s im ila r to the variables Mazmanian and Sabatier (1992) em ploy in  th e ir 
conceptual fram ework (Section 2.2.2).
In  endeavoring to explain non-com pliance in  in te rna tio n a l organisations, 
Chayes (1993) discusses three circumstances o r factors. He argues tha t "these 
factors m ight be considered 'causes' o f non-compliance, bu t from  a lawyer's 
perspective, i t  is illum in a ting  to th in k  o f them  as 'defenses' - m atters p u t fo rth  
to excuse o r ju s tify  o r extenuate a prim a facie case o f breach" (Chayes, 1993; 
188). These causes are: am biguity and indeterm inacy o f trea ty language, 
lim ita tions on the capacity o f parties to  carry out th e ir undertakings and 
fin a lly  the tem poral dim ension o f the social and economic changes 
contemplated by regulatory treaties (Chayes, 1993; 188). Chayes concludes tha t 
non-com pliance is deviant ra the r than expected behaviour. Such an
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acceptance o f non-com plince leads to de-emphasise fo rm a l enforcem ent 
measures and sh ift a tten tion  to sources o f non-compliance tha t can be 
managed by rou tine  in te rna tiona l p o litica l processes. Thus, a tten tion  should 
be focused on the problem  o f am biguity, technical and financia l d ifficu ltie s . 
Research on non-com pliance and effectiveness o f in te rna tio n a l organisations, 
is, according to Bemauer (1995):
... still in its infancy, not least because it involves daunting evaluative and analytical 
problems, every analyst who has tried knows that it is difficult to conceptualize and 
measure institutions as explanatory variables; do the same for the effect of 
institutions on behavior, the environment, or some other outcome; evaluate and 
measure the success or failure of institutions in some reliable and meaningful way; 
and develop and test theories to distinguish when and why different types of 
institutions are more successful (Bemauer, 1995; 352).
His p o in t is underlined by the studies m entioned above, in  which authors have 
d ifficu ltie s  operationalising variables thought to be responsible fo r non­
im plem entation and non-com pliance. Bemauer claims that:
the existing literature on the subject is quite weak from theoretical and 
methodological standpoints; positive theorizing, based on rigorous empirical 
research, is still the most fruiful way of advancing our knowledge ... of institutions in 
international politics (Bemauer, 1995; 352).
He outlines a rational-choice based research strategy tha t may serve as a 
starting p o in t fo r fu tu re  research. He firs t focuses on the extent to which 
variations in  goal a tta inm ent can be explained by the existence o r operation o f 
institu tions. Secondly he focuses on the question on the degree to  which 
p a rticu la r features o f in s titu tio n s  are responsible fo r va ria tion  in  the 
perform ance o f these ins titu tion s. To render m eaningful quan tita tive  or 
qua lita tive  inference about the consequences o f in s titu tio n a l design possible, 
Bemauer proposes to focus on a small num ber o f in s titu tio n a l design 
variab les:
depending on the available data, our assessment may rely on statistical analysis or on 
process tracing ... decision rules, membership conditions and the compliance system 
of institutions are among the more important institutional design dimensions 
(Bemauer, 1995; 374).
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2.3.2 European Com m unity and Im plem entation studies
In  the 1980s the firs t im plem entation studies were carried out in  the European 
Community. Rehbinder and Stewart’s (1985) study on European environm ental 
law  and its im plem entation is one o f the firs t o f its  kind. They argue tha t a 
legal study, an analysis o f the norm ative content o f legal rules and policies:
... while still central, can give only a partial picture of the function and shortcomings 
of the law in its societal context. Normative analysis is but one layer of analysis: the 
effective (or otherwise) reach of the law, its implementation and enforcement, its 
accessibility to subjects to whom it is addressed ... is a second no less important 
layer (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985; vii).
They state tha t problem s o f im plem entation and enforcement are notorious in  
the fie ld  o f environm ental pro tection, since they are "aggravated in  the 
European transnational system w hich has its  own inheren t d ifficu ltie s  o f 
supervision and com pliance" (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985; v ii). A recurren t 
theme in  EC im plem entation lite ra tu re  is the involvem ent and pa rtic ipa tion  
(o r ra ther the lack o f it)  o f low er governm ent and other nationa l and local 
actors. Others emphasise the effectiveness o f Com m unity legislation (Snyder, 
1993b). One o f the firs t studies on partic ipa tion  from  sub-national and local 
actors is by Rhodes (1986). His study on im plem entation in  the Com m unity 
underlines the dependence o f po licy  makers fo r im plem entation on the actors 
and organisations and th e ir com m itm ent and w illingness to co-operate.
Rhodes argues th a t sub-central governm ent (SCG) is responsible fo r 
im plem enting m ajor parts o f EC po licy. The exact extent o f th is is o f course 
dependent upon the d iv is ion  o f responsib ilities between d iffe re n t tie rs o f 
governm ent in  each Member State. National governments and SCG have 
d iffe re n t needs according to Rhodes, and in  cases where the needs o f the SCGs 
were no t adequately represented in  the decision-m aking process by central 
governm ent, SCG pa rtic ip a tion  has been d iffic u lt to achieve. The reason w hy 
SCGs were no t adequately represented in  the firs t place is resistance by 
national governments. Rhodes describes th is dilemma:
Whichever means is preferred, they all encounter a recurrent problem: the tension 
between the need for information and expertise, especially on the implementation of 
policy, and the determination of national governments to reserve supranational 
negotiations unto themselves (Rhodes, 1986; 29).
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F ina lly Rhodes lists three ways in  w hich such p a rtic ipa tion  can take place:
• D irect contact between the Com m unity and the SCGs. In th is case, the SCGs 
become an in tegra l p a rt o f the Com m unity;
• Contact w ith  national governments concerning EC policies. One im portan t 
aim  o f the SCGs in  such discussions and negotiations w ill be to  influence 
the national governments to take in to  account the needs o f the SCGs as 
im plem enting au tho rities;
• Participation in  Com m unity w ide associations. These associations have 
fa irly  easy access to the Commission.
In his study on the im plem entation o f EC directives Rasmussen(1988) draws 
s im ila r conclusions to  Rhodes:
... application agencies are often associated with the preparatory phase ... Yet that 
method could not be used in a number of Directives. Indeed, in 11 out of the 17 
Directives, a large number of locally or regionally placed officials were seen to 
handle the day-to-day application without any possibility existing of integrating 
them and their insight into the process of adoption and implementation (Rasmussen, 
1988; 113-114).
According to From (1993), the consequence o f national resistance to d irect SCG 
p a rtic ipa tion  "has been to keep im po rtan t in fo rm a tion  away from  EC decision­
makers and probably also to keep im plem entation low  on the Com m unity 
agenda" (From, 1993; 66). There are signs tha t SCG partic ipa tion  is now forcing 
its way in to  the form al EC system. The Treaty on European Union establishes 
Regional Committees w hich are expected to  partic ipa te  in  policy-m aking. 
However, Ludwig Kramer, speaking a t the UCL conference on the im pact o f EC 
environm ental law  in  the U nited Kingdom  (November 3 *^^  1995, London), made 
i t  clear tha t any tighten ing o f links between the EC and sub-national 
in s titu tio n s  is ’d iffic u lt’ .
One o f the most comprehensive studies on im plem entation o f Com m unity law is 
by Siedentopf and Züler (1988). Their study is a comparative research pro ject 
on the im plem entation o f Com m unity law, aimed sim ultaneously at aU Member 
States. There is a b rie f chapter on the ro le  o f Community ins titu tions in  
m on itoring  com pliance and con tro l. The subsequent conclusions recognise 
and emphasise the im portance o f the Commission’s ro le  in  th is area . However 
the Commission is restricted in  th is area and m onitors m ain ly con form ity o f 
legal im plem entation measures w ith  the d irective. Regarding compliance m d
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con tro l i t  concludes tha t w itho u t in fo rm a tion  on how w ell EC law  is practised 
by Member States' adm inistrations and to  what effect, i t  is d iffic u lt to  learn 
from  past experience and im prove lawm aking.
2.3.3 Conclusion
O rganisation lite ra tu re  published in  the last five  years shows an increased 
preoccupation w ith  im plem entation o f and compliance w ith  legislative rules 
o rig ina ting  from  in te rna tio na l organisations. This lite ra tu re  includes 
em pirica lly oriented studies on the actual im pact and effectiveness o f 
in te rna tiona l organisations. M any o f the studies examined o ffe r in teresting 
concepts, however there are some im portan t shortcomings. First, most o f the 
studies u ltim a te ly  focus on e ffe c tiv ity  and success o f an in te rna tiona l trea ty o r 
organisation as th e ir dependent variable. The exact d e fin in itio n  o f 'success' or 
o ther such norm ative concepts is e ither avoided or not achieved. The second 
problem  tha t underm ines the usefulness o f these studies is that, although 
they propose very in teresting (independent) variables, these no t defined nor 
em p irica lly  tested; they rem ain as 'concepts' o r 'functions'. F ina lly  the lack o f 
e xp lic it theoretica l standpoints o r m ethodological approaches makes the 
studies quite vague. The fact th a t the existing lite ra tu re  regarding 
im plem entation in  in te rna tion a l organisations thus fa r has been 
m ethodologically and theo re tica lly  weak has been fu rth e r h igh ligh ted  by 
Bemauer (1995; 374).
In th is Section, the lite ra tu re  has also been examined fo r previous attem pts at 
seeking a theoretica l perspective on po licy  im plem entation in  the European 
Community. I t  is clear tha t no t many studies have been carried out on the 
subject o f im plem entation in  the European Com m unity. M oreover these 
studies have a sim ila r problem  to the earlie r discussed studies on in te rna tiona l 
organisations and im plem entation, the lack o f a clear theoretica l standpoint.
2 .4 C onclusion  and F u rth e r O b jectives
In  th is Chapter the lite ra tu re  has been examined fo r theoretica l perspectives 
on po licy  im plem entation. A lthough the relevant lite ra tu re  on 
im plem entation is p le n tifu l, re la tive ly  lit t le  analytica l o r com parative 
em pirica l w ork has been done on im plem entation in  the European Com m unity; 
i t  is th is 'gap' in  the lite ra tu re  tha t the present w ork seeks to address. W ith 
th is background, the m ain objective o f th is thesis can be defined as the 
d e fin itio n  and testing o f a model o f environm ental im plem entation which is
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based on an e?q)licit theo retica l basis. This model is intended in itia lly  to 
provide an explanation o f the im plem entation problems in  the European 
Com m unity and, hope fu lly  fo r analytica l and predictive purposes. The 
theoretica l basis w ill be fu rth e r developed in  Chapter VI, capturing relevant 
aspects o f previously tested theories as discussed in  th is Chapter. The model o f 
EC im plem entation subsequently developed w ill be adapted to  re flect the 
unique structure o f the European Com m unity.
Previous w ork by Sabatier and Mazmanian (Section 2.2.2) deserves pa rticu la r 
m ention as i t  provides a synthesis o f w ork w hich has progressed from  a 
theoretica l fram ework to m odel-build ing, and has been em p irica lly  tested in  a 
num ber o f po licy  areas, inc lud ing  environm ental regulation. Therefore, i t  is 
believed to  be p a rticu la rly  suitable fo r adaptation and application to the study 
o f environm ental im plem entation in  the European Com m unity.
Evidence from  the lite ra tu re  review  shows tha t w hile the ra tio na lis t top-down 
approach has been critic ised  m ethodologically, these critic ism s are not 
insurm ountable; the criticism s o f the bottom -up approach are more severe. 
The bottom -up approach is less suitable to  the study o f im plem entation in  the 
EC fo r several reasons. First, the subject o f investigation o f th is thesis, 
spanning as it  does no t ony the centra l EC institu tions bu t also the Member 
States, is not amenable to investigation by this route, which is more suited to 
"situations where there is no dom inant piece o f legislation b u t ra ther large 
numbers o f actors w ithou t power dependency, and one is p rim a rily  interested 
in  the dynamics o f d iffe ren t local situations" (Section 2.2.5; 46). Secondly, 
em pirica l observations and in te rpre ta tions centra l in  the bottom -up approach 
are biased and w ill contain value-statements; in  an area o f research where 
operationalisation o f variables is already complex, in tro du ctio n  o f such 
fu rth e r uncertainties w ill no t contribu te  towards testing o f a model o r theory. 
In  the words o f Sabatier and Mazmanian (Section 2.2.4; 43) "the bottom -up 
approach fa ils  to sta rt from  an e xp lic it theory o f the factors affecting its  
subject o f interest because i t  relies heavily on the perceptions and activ ities o f 
pa rtic ipan ts ...it is th e ir prisoner". T h ird ly , the problems o f inductive  
reasoning im p lic itly  applied in  the bottom -up approach are d iffic u lt to 
overcome and severely critic ised (Popper, 1959; 29). W ith in  a fram ework 
based on induction , generalisations and predictions cannot be drawn on the 
im plem entation system as a whole based on the investigation o f specific 
im plem entation cases.
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The present w ork m ight best be id e n tifie d  by the "th ird -genera tion  approach" 
commented on by Goggin (Section 2.2.5). W hile leaning in  preference towards 
the 'm odem ' top-down approach, emphasis is placed on "em pirica l and 
theoretica l research tha t concentrates on com parative, d iachronic methods o f 
po licy  analysis" (Goggin, 1990; 182).
In concluding, some comment is necessary on the adap tab ility  o f top-down 
studies, p a rticu la rly  the Sabatier and Mazmanian fram ework, to the European 
Com m unity and on the extent to  w hich these theories have been em pirica lly 
tested.
The development o f the Sabatier and Mazmanian fram ework, and the m a jo rity  
o f the em pirical tests o f th is fram ework, have been carried ou t in  the United 
States. From a perspective o f po licy  im plem entation, the U nited States' federal 
structure is d iffe re n t from  the structure  o f the European Com m unity. In  the 
EC, directives have to be incorporated in  the légal system o f nation states, a 
process which w ill be examined in  the next Chapters in  greater deta il. 
Moreover, federal agencies w ith  powers such as those o f the Environm ental 
Protection Agency in  the U nited States are not to be found at Com m unity level 
in  the environm ental sector. The EC intergovernm ental structure  is much 
more subtle and the issues o f subsid ia rity  and sovereignty are im portan t 
obstacles to the transfer o f (more) powers to the intergovernm ental level.
This difference in  structure between the U nited States and the European 
Com m unity must be e xp lic itly  recognised in  any model o f im plem entation in  
the European Community.
Before such a model is developed in  greater deta il, the background to the 
development o f the im plem entation problem  in  the European Com m unity is 
discussed in  the next Chapter, fo llow ed by a review o f the legal instrum ents 
and adm inistrative processes invo lved in  im plem entation. These items 
constitute the essential background fo r understanding the issues invo lved in  
EC environm ental leg isla tion .
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CHAPTER III; DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND RESPONSES TO NON-IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 In tro d u c tio n
The cu rren t d ifficu ltie s  invo lv ing  im plem entation o f EC environm ental 
directives were h igh ligh ted  in  Chapter I. The background o f the problem  is 
fu rth e r explored in  the fo llow ing  three Chapters. This Chapter focuses on the 
development o f EC environm ental law  and po licy. O rig ina lly  the EC Treaty 
contained no provisions fo r the pro tection  o f the environm ent. In  the 1980s 
and early 1990s EC Environm ental legislation developed in to  a substantial body 
o f law. Q ualitative and quantita tive  aspects o f EC Environm ental law  and the 
im plications regarding im plem entation are examined.
Further, possible conflicts between economic and environm ental policies are 
discussed. A com m only held view  is th a t economic grow th is necessarily 
achieved at the expense o f the environm ent. Since the EC has p rim a rily  been 
driven by economic im peratives such as the establishment o f the Common 
M arket since its  inception in  1957, a co n flic t between these im peratives and 
the la te r environm ental objectives in  the EC is a theme tlia t, as discussed in  
Section 3.3, is a continuous facto r in  the development o f EC environm ental 
po licy. F iaa liy m ajor developments such as the Treaty on European Union and 
o ther recent developments and th e ir im pact and relevance regarding 
im plem entation o f EC environm ental leg isla tion  are assessed.
3.2 The d eve lopm en t o f European E n v iro n m e n ta l Law
The legal developm ent o f the EC’s environm ental po licy may use fu lly be 
d ivided in to  three phases: a firs t pre-1987 developmental phase, a 1987 to 1993 
phase in  which the legal basis was consolidated, and a th ird  post-1993 phase in  
w hich the EC's environm ental objectives were fu rth e r re in forced.
3.2.1 The firs t phase ( 1957-1987) : Environm ental Awareness and The Treatv o f 
Rome
The environm ental po licy o f the Com m unity was no t one o f the fou r common 
policies in itia lly  established under the Treaties o f Rome (1957). The European 
Treaties, and p a rticu la rly  the Treaty o f Rome which established the European 
Economic Com m unity (named the European Com m unity since the Treaty on 
European Union), do no t expressly p e rm it Com m unity ins titu tions to  act in  the
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in te rest o f environm ental pro tection. The u ltim ate  purpose o f the Treaty o f 
Rome is to  create an economic com m unity by establishing a Common Market. 
This purpose is to  be achieved through im plem entation o f the fo u r freedoms 
(free c ircu la tion  o f goods, services, persons and capital), a customs union, a 
system o f free com petition and certa in common co-ordinated policies.
In  the late 1960s and early 1970s a w orld-w ide recognition o f the 
interdependence o f the environm ent and economic developm ent gained 
im petus. The firs t pressures fo r change came from  outside o f the Community. 
The 1972 United Nations Conference in  Stockholm stim ulated m any European 
governments to take seriously the whole question o f the pro tection o f the 
human environm ent. In te rna l pressures were also grow ing in  the Com m unity. 
The rap id  growth o f dedicated 'green' p o litica l parties in  the late 1970s and 
early to  m id 1980s, such as the Gnmen in  Germany, forced mainstream 
p o litica l parties and governments to 'green' th e ir own policies and to become 
more environm entally aware. W ith  m any ide n tifie d  problem s being o f a 
transnational nature, action through a com m only determ ined po licy, cu tting  
across national boundaries seemed the most obvious and appropriate course o f 
action:
Pollution carried by air or water does not recognise frontiers, so Member States have 
a common interest in its mutual control. As ecological deterioration has become 
aggravated and public concern correspondingly sharpened, this aspect of Community 
activity has become increasingly important (Finder, 1991;111).
Since 1972, Com m unity po licy and leg islation on the environm ent has 
expanded considerably not on ly in  terms o f the num ber o f d irectives but also 
o f the num ber o f areas covered. More than 200 EC environm ental directives 
cu rren tly  exist. In  the lig h t o f the substantial num ber o f EC environm ental 
laws, Richardson (1994) argues th a t the EC's poor im plem entation and 
enforcem ent record is re levant as i t  may have actually fac ilita ted  much o f the 
rap id  po licy developm ent in  the environm ental fie ld . The re la tive  lack o f 
strong and effective resistance to the considerable am ount o f environm ental 
leg islation during  the developm ental phase may have much to do w ith  the 
perception o f many po ten tia l actors at the tim e tha t much o f the legislation 
could be ignored in  practice:
If  implementation and enforcement are lax, why get exercised about the legislation in 
the first place? Under such circumstances, it is relatively easy to sign up to new
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regulations, in the knowledge that there are so many opportunities for policy erosion 
at the implementation stage that it is not worth the risk of being seen as a bad 
European by opposing the process of European integration. Only now as the 
Commission^ European Court of Justice and public pressure develop for more effective 
implementation, is a wider network of actors realising the true cost implications 
(Richardson, 1994; 143).
Articles 100 and 235
D uring the early years, EC environm ental legislation was subject to  a tw ofo ld  
restric tion . F irst there were no exp lic it, fo rm a l legal provisions to support any 
Com m unity-wide action, and secondly, whatever action could be taken under 
the available general provisions had to be d ire c tly  related to the objective o f 
economic eind Com m unity harm onisation (McGrory, 1990;304). Articles 100 and 
235 were the most im portan t legal basis fo r the in itia l development o f 
environm ental po licy. "The num erous environm ental measures taken by the 
Com m unity most often in  the fo rm  o f a d irective ... were generally based on 
A rtic le  100 often in  com bination w ith  A rtic le  235" (Vandermeersch, 1987;409). 
A rtic le  100 authorises Com m unity directives "fo r the approxim ation" o f 
Member State laws, regulations, and adm in istra tive actions th a t "d ire c tly  affect 
the establishm ent o r function ing  o f the common m arket". A rtic le  235 provides 
tha t the Council, also by unanimous action, may take "appropriate measures" to 
"atta in , in  the course o f the operation o f the common m arket, one o f the 
objectives o f the Com m unity" when the Treaty has n o t provided the necessary 
powers to do so. Com m unity ins titu tions, and specifically the Commission have 
in te rpre ted  these 'powers' broadly.
The ju s tifica tio n  fo r using these two A rticles as the foundation o f a common 
environm ental po licy  depends u ltim a te ly  on basic EC goals as la id  down in  
A rtic le  2 o f the Treaty. Consequently, understanding the goals o f the EC is 
necessary to appreciate the nature o f EC powers fo r environm ental protection. 
The Preamble and A rtic le  2 o f the Treaty o f Rome declared th a t the "constant 
im provem ent o f ... liv in g  and w orking conditions" and "the harm onious 
developm ent o f economic activ ities" were Com m unity goals. Im proving the 
q u a lity  o f life  o f the citizens o f Europe was always one o f the aspirations o f the 
po litic ians behind the early moves fo r European un ity . The EC institu tions 
tended to in te rp re t th is mandate to include no t on ly an im proved standard o f 
liv in g  b u t also an im proved qu a lity  o f life  (Rehbinder and Steward, 1985;21). 
A lthough th is  in te rp re ta tio n , w hich suggested tha t environm ental p ro tection
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was among the Com m unity's o rig ina l objectives, has been debated, the general 
view  was tha t i t  was:
... reasonable to interpret the Preamble and Article 2 of the EEC Treaty as including 
economic concepts of environmental pollution, such as those of external cost and of 
the environment as a common good (Rehbinder and Steward, 1985;21).
According to Rehbinder and Steward, the most serious challenge to the use o f 
A rtic le  100 as a basis fo r the developm ent o f common environm ental po licy 
was a requirem ent in  A rtic le  100 itse lf. A rtic le  100 states tha t directives fo r 
the approxim ation o f the laws o f the Member States are on ly  ju s tifie d  i f  these 
laws d ire c tly  affect the establishm ent o r function ing  o f the Common Market. 
This requirem ent was designed to prevent a lim itless expansion o f Com m unity 
legislation and therefore had to be taken seriously. D iffe ren t national 
provisions concerning the design o r com position o f cars, fuels o r detergents 
are technical barriers to trade and clearly affect the Common M arket d irectly . 
However i t  is "controversial whether the same is true o f emission standards, 
am bient qu a lity  standards, the regulation o f waste d isposa l... o r the regulation 
o f land use. National differences in  such standard o r regulations do not 
d ire c tly  affect the exchange o f goods between member states; they are at best a 
production cost facto r like  other p roduction cost factors, w hich vary due to 
d iffe ring  na tura l conditions, such as location in  popu la tion centres, or 
govemmental policies, such as tax levels" (Rehbinder and Steward, 1985: 24).
In 1985 the European Court o f Justice c la rified  th is am biguity. In  a key 
decision, the Court fo r tlie  " firs t tim e undertook to balance the interests o f 
environm ental p ro tection  against the interests o f the in te rna l m arket" 
(Koppen,1992;14). The Court o f Justice stated tha t "environm ental protection is 
one o f the Com m unity's essential objectives" which could even ju s tify  
derogations from  such basic legal princip les as the freedom  and o f trade and o f 
com petition (Case 240/83 [1985] ECR 531).
3.2.2 1986 : The Single European Act as a Legal Basis fo r Environm ental Policy 
Articles 130 R,S, and T
Legal recognition fo r EC environm ental p o licy  became exp lic it w ith  the 1986 
Single European Act (SEA), and this was strengthened by the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) in  1993. The SEA o f February 1986, w hich entered in to  
force on the 1®^  o f July 1987 (OJ L 169, 29 /6 /87 ) introduced Articles 130 R, S and 
T w hich concern the environm ent, in to  the EC Treaty. Vandermeersch
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describes these A rticles as "g iving a constitu tiona l base to  the Com m unity's 
environm ental po licy", and as "de fin ing  its  objectives" (Vandermeersch, 1987; 
407). These Articles state the object o f EC action in  the environm ental fie ld :
... to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment, to contribute 
towards protecting human health, to ensure a prudent and rational utilisation of 
natural resources. Action by the Community is to be based on the principles that 
preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay (130R(3)).
The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the extent to which 
the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at Community level 
than at the level of individual Member States. Without prejudice to certain measures 
of a Community nature, the Member States shall finance and implement the other 
measures (130R(4)).
The drafters o f the Single European Act lim ite d  Com m unity involvem ent in  
environm ental m atters by res tric ting  EC involvem ent to  measures of 
"Com m unity nature" (A rtic le  130R(4)). Concerns regarding the subsid iarity 
p rin c ip le  in troduced in  A rtic le  130R(4) have been expressed. Arguments have 
been pu t forw ard tha t from  a EC perspective, i t  is clearly a step backwards 
(Vandermeersch, 1987;422). H ildebrand argues that
... the Single European Act has widened the possibilities for challenging EC 
environmental action which could result in an overall weakened and less effective 
Community environmental policy (Hildebrand, 1993; 36).
Nevertheless, environm ental considerations have come to enjoy an unique 
status in  Community po licy as a m andatory component o f decisions in  a ll 
po licy  areas by v irtu e  o f A rtic le  130R(2): "Environm ental p ro tection 
requirem ents m ust be integrated in to  the d e fin itio n  and im plem entation o f 
other Com m unity policies". F inally, A rtic le  130T allows Member States to 
m ainta in  o r adopt more stringent p ro tective  environm ental measures.
An a lternative basis fo r leg islation on the environm ent is to be found in  the 
Single European Act amendment o f the o rig ina l A rtic le  100 by 100 A, the basic 
provision under w hich the Single M arket leg islation is enacted. This allows fo r 
qua lified  m a jo rity  vo ting  fo r a ll proposals concerning health, safety, 
environm ental pro tection and consumer protection. The Com m unity must 
"take as a base a h igh level o f pro tection" (A rtic le  100A(3)).
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In  the negotiations leading to  the Single European Act a num ber o f ‘green’ 
Member States expressed strong concerns about m a jo rity  voting on 
harm onisation policies and questions. They feared tha t m a jo rity  voting could 
resu lt in  the low ering o f standards in  a num ber o f sensitive areas such as the 
pro tection o f the environm ent. To accommodate these fears a num ber o f 
provisions were inserted in  the Single European Act such as A rtic le  100A(3). 
However these were the resu lt o f compromises and contain open and 
ambiguous phrases. The meaning o f to "take as a base" and "a h igh level o f 
protection" rem ain open to  in te rp re ta tion  and debate.
The im pact o f the "h igh level o f pro tection" clause may be fu rth e r reduced in  
practice by the fact tha t A rtic le  100A(4) allows a Member State to derogate 
from  a Com m unity measure tha t was adopted by qualified  m a jo rity  vote "on 
grounds o f m ajor needs ... re lated to the pro tection  o f the environm ent". In  
o ther words i f  a Com m unity measure fa ils  to re flect the "h igh level o f 
protection" favoured by a Member State, i t  s till has a way out and may, under 
certain conditions, continue to apply the more stringent nationa l rules. There 
is an obvious con flic t between th is p rovision and the free movement o f goods 
as la id  down in  A rtic le  30 o f the Treaty. This provision was p u t to the test when 
Denmark voted against a Commission proposal on car emission and made i t  
clear tha t i t  was to in troduce more stringent standards, by availing itse lf o f 
A rtic le  100A(4). However, a compromise was reached and "the much critic ised 
derogation clause contained in  A rt. 100A(4) has so fa r never been used ... this 
however does not am ount to saying tha t i t  is meaningless: the mere fact tha t 
one Member State m ight have sought a derogation on th is basis, and thus 
isolated its  own m arket, may have played a ro le  in  some negotiations"
(Dehousse, 1992;397).
The in troduction  o f A rticles lOOA and Articles 13OR, S and T led to some 
confusion in  deciding on the legal basis o f pohcy concerning the 
environm ent; po licy could be based e ither on A rtic le  lOOA o r on A rtic le  130$. 
The question is im portan t in  re la tion  to the adoption o f a directive. A rtic le  
13 OS calls fo r a unanimous Council decision, the European Parliam ent has the 
rig h t to be consulted on the fo rm u la tion  o f the d irective. A rtic le  130T allows 
Member States to m ainta in  o r adopt more stringent protective environm ental 
measures. Moreover, i f  action is taken on the basis o f A rtic le  13 OS, the 
Com m unity may on ly act i f  the objectives sought can be better attained at 
Com m unity level than at the level o f the Member States (the subsid iarity 
p rin c ip le  o f A rtic le  130R(4)).
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A rtic le  lOOA on the other hand allows fo r qua lified  m a jo rity  decisions in  the 
Council, the d irective  is form ulated in  co-operation w ith  the European 
Parliam ent (A rtic le  149). The co-operation procedure, an im po rtan t 
innovation in troduced by the SEA, provides the European Parliam ent w ith  the 
im portan t rig h t o f pa rtic ip a tio n  in  the legislative process. F ina lly A rtic le  100A 
measures are subject to the safeguard clauses in  Articles 100A(4) and (5).
The Single European Act does not provide a d irect answer to  the question and 
the issue has been p u t before the Court o f Justice. The C ourt o f Justice 
developed c rite ria  whether a measure concerning the environm ent m ust be 
taken on the basis o f A rtic le  lOOA o r on the basis o f A rtic le  130S.
In  the titan ium  dioxide case (Case C-300/89 [1991] IECR 2867) the Court o f 
Justice c learly gave preference to A rtic le  lOOA. It  found tha t the d irective  
should have been based on A rtic le  100A and therefore annulled the d irective. 
The Court o f Justice decided tha t the d irective  no t on ly represented an 
environm ental measure b u t also a harm onising measure fo r the establishm ent 
o f the In te rna l Market. The Court ru led  th a t in  th is case the goals o f 
environm ental pro tection  and the rem oval o f m arket d is to rtions were 
ind iv is ib le ; a measure d id  n o t autom atica lly fa ll w ith in  A rtic le  13 OS sim ply 
because i t  was aimed equally at environm ental protection. In  its  ru lin g  on the 
fram ework d irective  on waste, however, the Court o f Justice favoured A rtic le  
130S. Here the Court held tha t the Council correctly chose A rtic le  130S as the 
legal base. Contrary to  the Commission's (p la in tiffs ) view, the Court stated tha t 
the mere fact tha t a legislative act affects the creation o r operation o f the 
In te rna l M arket does no t in  its e lf ju s tify  the use o f A rtic le  lOOA, and tha t 
A rtic le  lOOA was no t the appropriate legal basis when leg islation  on ly had 
harm onisation o f conditions o f the In te rna l M arket as a secondary effect.
3.3 H is to ric a l and  c o n tin u in g  c o n flic t: Econom y and E n v iro n m e n t
Much o f the environm ental concerns regarding the effects o f the In te rna l 
M arket on environm ental objectives centred around the conviction  tha t 
com pletion o f the Common M arket w ould resu lt in  accelerated economic 
growth, and th a t such grow th w ould have s ign ificant environm ental im pacts. 
A com m only held view  is tha t economic grow th is necessarily achieved at the 
expense o f the environm ent. Build ing roads and build ings destroys forests and 
moors and disfigures the landscape; emissions from  in d u s tria l processes 
po llu te  the water and the a ir; space needed fo r build ings and crops decrease 
the area available fo r plants and animals. A European Commission Task Force
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found tha t economic progress achieved by 1992 was like ly  to  resu lt in  
increases in  emissions o f su lphur dioxide and n itrogen oxides and a jum p in  
transboundaiy transporta tion  (Commission Task Force, 1992;v). A t the same 
tim e i t  can also be argued tha t these very processes are necessary to create 
economic growth, which on most accounts is desirable.
Environm ental p ro tection  organisations have shown am bivalent feelings 
towards the environm ental po licy  o f the EC, in  pa rticu la r in  Member States 
where h igh standards o f p ro tection already existed (Dehousse, 1992; 393). The 
debate centred around two specific issues. F irst the re la tion  between A rtic le  
130T (specifica lly incorporated in  the Single European Act to accommodate 
Member States to pu rsu it more stringent environm ental standards) and the 
Common Market. Secondly the Com m unity's m utual recognition po licy  aimed 
at achieving the Common M arket, w hich was seen by some environm entalists 
as starting a 'race to the bottom '.
A rticles 130T, allow ing Member States to issue stric te r standards on the one 
hand, and A rtic le  30 ensuring free trade throughout the Com m unity on the 
other, meet head-on, posing a basic dilemma. This dilemma was p u t to the test 
when the European Commission brought Denmark before the European Court 
o f Justice (Case 302/86 [1989] 1 CMLR 619). The Commission argued that the 
declaration in  a Danish law requ iring  a ll beer and soft d rinks containers to be 
returnable was in  breach o f A rtic le  30 o f the Treaty. Since the sorting and 
transporting  o f em pty containers w ould be more burdensome fo r fore ign 
producers o f beer and soft d rinks than fo r domestic producers, domestic 
producers w ould have a com petitive advantage. The Danish law  thus presented 
a trade barrie r, w hich vio la ted the Treaty o f Rome.
In  his O pinion Advocate General Slynn supported the Commission's argum ent 
and found the com pulsory deposit-and-retum  system to be in  breach o f A rtic le  
30. The European Court o f Justice d id  no t fo llow  the Advocate General's 
O pinion, ho ld ing the deposit-and-retum  system to be com patible w ith  A rtic le  
30, since "the pro tection  o f the environm ent is a m andatory requirem ent 
w hich may lim it the application o f A rtic le  30 o f the Treaty". The Court o f 
Justice reasoned w ith  what i t  regarded as being 'd isproportiona l' to the goal o f 
environm enta l p ro tection .
The Com m unity's m utual recognition po licy, aimed at achieving the In te rna l 
Market, im plied  tha t Member States could re ta in  th e ir own standards, and it  
was feared tha t th is w ould start a 'com petition between ru les'. The 
'com petition between ru les' theory subsequently suggested th a t a ‘race to the 
bottom ' m ight resu lt in  w hich governments competed to deregulate in  order to
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accommodate companies, a ffo rd ing  economic advantage to  countries w ith  less 
stringen t environm enta l leg is la tion .
Even though, as predicted, costs added by environm ental regulation are 
s ign ificant (in  the case o f the Netherlands, fo r example, to ta l costs o f 
environm ental regulation in  1995 were estimated at 2.7% o f GDP (OECD, 1995; 
113) thus fa r such a ‘race to  the bottom ’ has no t m aterialised.
It  can be argued tha t a d ire c t co rre la tion  between environm ental regulation 
and economic competitiveness w ith in  the EC is not possible, as in  the 'real 
w orld ' business behaviour is complex and unpredictable, so m uch so tha t "the 
process o f regula tory com petition in  the EU cannot be generalised by way o f 
overly s im plified  models" (Sun and Pelkmans, 1995;82). W ilks (1996) argues 
tha t the ‘com petition among ru les’ theory o f ra tiona l responses by 
governments to m arket forces is unrea listic because o f the above, and is 
fu rth e r com plicated by the com petition  between governments o f Member 
States to impose th e ir regulatory preferences on the EC (W ilks, 1996;548).
Porter and van der Linde (1995) o ffe r another perspective on w hy such 
behaviour d id  no t m aterialise, a perspective w hich is gaining more c re d ib ility  
w ith in  m odem  in d u s tria l businesses.
In  his w ork ‘The Com petitive Advantage o f Nations (1990)’ Porter argues tha t 
tough standards by one ju risd ic tio n  do no t necessarily lead to an opting-out o f 
firm s from  the ju risd ic tio n , therefore provoking a ‘negative com petition 
between legal ru les’. On the contrary, such standards may encourage the sta rt­
up o f specialised m anufacturers and service firm s to help address them, w hich 
can develop strong in te rna tiona l positions. To some degree, th is effect can be 
observed w ith in  the EC, in  w hich the stronger economies have been those in  
w hich environm ental regulation has been more stringent. In  o ther words i t  is 
argued tha t i t  is possible to un ite  the pro tection o f the environm ent, resource 
p ro du c tiv ity , innovation, and com petitiveness w ith in  a single po licy  
fram ework. Examples are found in  recycling standards adopted in  Germany, 
which forced producers to take back used packaging, and have led to firs t- 
m over advantages fo r German companies in  developing less package­
intensive products which are both  low er in  cost and more sought a fte r in  the 
marketplace (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; 127).
Reich (1992) argues tha t com petition between legal orders may include an 
element o f workable com petition bu t i t  may also d is to rt com petition:
This will especially be the case in an area where the Community has tried to set
certain substantive standards by enacting directives, which however have not been
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implemented at all, or only incorrectly, by Member States ... a negative competition 
between legal orders may be the resu lt... harmonization efforts of the Community will 
thus offer a fringe benefit to non-complying Member States and provoke windfall 
profits to undertakings doing business under these conditions. Competitive advantage 
will not be created by efficient market performance which is the basis of the Porter 
hypothesis, but by non-compliance to regulations (Reich, 1992;878-79).
This argum ent p u t forw ard by Reich has been m entioned earlie r (Section 1.2). 
The possible d is to rtion  o f the Common M arket by non-im plem entation was one 
o f the reasons fo r draw ing a tten tion  to  the problem .
Regarding the second phase o f Com m unity environm ental p o licy  several 
conclusion can be form ulated. W ith  the provision o f a legal base fo r the EC’s 
environm ental po licy  in  the Single European Act, the Com m unity 
demonstrated tha t i t  took the environm ent seriously. I t  also form alised the 
existing doctrine o f the European C ourt o f Justice tha t environm ental 
p ro tection is one o f the Com m unity’s essential objectives. However, 
compromises to the extent o f EC environm ental po licy, especially regarding 
the In te rna l M arket programme, were made. Noticeable is tha t EC 
environm ental po licy  was no t made subject to qua lified  m a jo rity  voting no r to 
the co-operation procedure invo lv ing  the European Parliam ent, the two 
im portan t in s titu tio n a l reform s made by the Single European Act. The fact 
tha t qu a lity  m a jo rity  vo ting d id  no t include environm ental policies and 
possible im plications fo r the q u a lity  o f EC environm ental law  are discussed 
fu rth e r in  Section 3.5.
In  fo rm ula ting  the derogations and restrictions to the Com m unity's 
ju risd ic tio n  in  environm ental m atters the Single European A ct is less than 
precise and has given rise to  controversy, notab ly invo lv ing  the setting o f 
(more stringent) standards by Member States and the im plications fo r the 
function ing o f the Common M arket. The issue o f Com m unity competence 
regarding the environm ent resulted in  a subsid iarity  clause (A rtic le  130R(4). 
However as long as the concept o f subsid ia rity  remains unclear, there w ill be 
much debate and confusion as to the extent o f the Commission's a b ility  to 
legislate environm ental po licy  and con tro l its  im plem entation. Apart from  
A rtic le  130R(4) im plem entation is n o t m entioned specifica lly in  the Treaty. 
A lthough the European Court o f Justice developed extensive doctrine 
regarding unclear o r con flic ting  issues le ft open in  the Single European Act, 
there are lim its  to the clarifica tions by the Court o f Justice.
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A logical question is w hether the Treaty on European Union addresses the 
issues le ft open or raised by the Single European Act, and whether the 
im plem entation issue is addressed more specifically.
3.4 1993: The T re a ty  on European U n ion , re in fo rce m e n t o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l o b je c tive s  and  responses to  n o n -im p le m e n ta tio n
3.4.1 The Treaty on European Union
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) introduced several changes to the EC 
Environm ental po licy. The EC objective to  pro tect the environm ent is 
re inforced and the Treaty provides fo r a Cohesion Fund fo r the fo u r poorest 
Member States in  the sphere o f transport and the environm ent. T itle  I, A rtic le  
B sets the objective to prom ote economic and social progress which is to be 
'balanced and sustainable'., A rticles 2 and 3 o f the Treaty o f Rome have been 
amended. They no longer sim ply re fe r to  a 'continuous and balanced 
expansion', bu t 'a harmonious and balanced development o f economic 
activ ities, sustainable and n o n -in fia tio n a ry  grow th respecting the 
environm ent'. A rtic le  3(k) stipulates th a t the activities o f the Com m unity 
shall include a po licy in  the 'sphere o f the environm ent'.
The amended A rtic le  13OS provides fo r m a jo rity  voting in  the Council when 
adopting environm ental po licy  (unan im ity  is s till required in  certa in cases) 
and environm ental leg islative proposals have become subject to  extra 
Parliam entary influence. A rtic le  lOOA proposals become subject to the new co­
decision procedure (w ith  three Parliam entary Readings and a "veto").
The Treaty on European Union has also in troduced the poss ib ility  o f tem porary 
derogations from  leg islation in to  its  environm ental policies, in  those 
situations where Member States are like ly  to  occur substantial costs due to 
im plem entation (A rtic le  130S(5)).
Focusing on the non-im plem entation issue, the European Commission favoured 
an expansion o f A rtic le  5 o f the Treaty by specifying w hat rules must be la id  
down in  in te rna l legal systems to deal w ith  fa ilures to com ply w ith  Com m unity 
obligations and to redress th e ir consequences. "This suggestion never seems 
to have been seriously taken on board by the negotiators" (C urtin , 1993;31). 
Instead centralised enforcem ent a t Com m unity level was pursued by the 1992 
In te r Governmental Conference as the chosen means o f tackling the fa u lty  
application o f Com m unity law  by Member States. A rtic le  171 o f the Treaty was 
amended so as to confer the Court o f Justice w ith  ju risd ic tio n  to impose 
sanctions (in  the fo rm  o f lum p sum and penalty payment) on Member States
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fo r a persistent breach o f th e ir Com m unity law  obligations. W ith  th is 
amendment the “ legal gap in  the Treaty o f Rome in  the sense tha t i t  does no t 
expressly provide fo r any effective sanction against a Member State w hich 
fa ils to respect its  obhgations” (C urtin , 1992;33) seems to have been remedied. 
Further a separate ‘Declaration on the Im plem entation o f Com m unity Law’ was 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union. In  th is declaration a d is tinc tion  is 
drawn between non-transposition o f Com m unity directives on the one hand 
and non-apphcation and non-enforcem ent on the other. Emphasis is placed on 
the fact tha t a para lle l m ust be drawn w ith  the manner in  w hich nationa l law 
is applied and enforced: "... w hile recognizing tha t i t  m ust be fo r each Member 
State to determ ine how the provisions o f Com m unity law can be best enforced 
in  the lig h t o f its  own pa rticu la r ins titu tions, legal system and other 
circumstances ... considers i t  essential fo r the proper function ing  o f the 
Com m unity tha t the measures taken by the d iffe ren t Member States should 
resu lt in  Com m unity law  being applied w ith  the same effectiveness and rig o u r 
as in  the application o f th e ir nationa l law "(D eclaration on the Im plem entation 
o f Com m unity Law).
According to C urtin  and Mortelmans (1994) the d iffe re n t language versions o f 
the Declaration show tha t the Treaty drafters had no clear de fin itions in  m ind 
regarding im plem entation :
Implementation is translated by ‘application’ in French and ‘Anwendung’ in German 
whereas the term enforce is translated identically as respectively ‘appliquer’ and 
‘Anwenden’. When it comes to the use of the term apply we are again confronted with 
the poverty of language employed: respectively once more ‘appliquer’, ‘Anwenden’ and 
finally in one instance only ‘durchfuhren’. Surely a Community that is sophisticated 
enough to make clear and precise distinctions between day-old chicks, breeding 
poultry, productive poultry and slaughter poultry in its secondary legislation, must 
be able to follow a coherent terminology in different languages of the basic concepts 
of the legislative process itself (Curtin and Mortelmans, 1994; 427).
Debating whether the Treaty on European Union clarifies some o f the 
controversies o f the Single European Act, and addresses the problem  on non­
im plem entation, some rem ain sceptical (Tupper, 1992; W ilkinson, 1992; Lane, 
1993; C urtin , 1993). The changes made by the Treaty on European Union and 
the lack o f progress towards strengthening EC environm ental p o licy  and its 
im plem entation are critic ised. According to Bames (1996), an outstanding 
issue which has no t been p roperly  addressed by the Treaty on European Union
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is "the problem  o f unequal na tiona l governm ent im plem entation o f 
environm ental po licy" (Barnes, 1996;4). The amended subsid iarity clause is 
also critic ised ; the new A rtic le  3B (replacing the subsid ia rity  clause o f A rtic le  
130R(4)), states:
... in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if  and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community.
The December 1992 Edinburgh Council made an attem pt c la rify ing  the issue. It 
declared that:
... the principle of subsidiarity does not relate to and cannot question the powers 
conferred on the European Community ... it provides a guide as to how those powers 
are to be exercised at Community leve l... subsidiarity is a dynamic concept [allowing] 
Community action to be expanded where circumstances so require, and conversely, to 
be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer justified ... where the Community 
acts in an area falling under shared powers the type of measures to apply has to be 
decided on a case by case basis (Edinburgh Declaration, 1992).
According to Snyder (1993 a) the concept o f subsid iarity was proposed as an 
answer to the EC's legitim acy crisis. "Yet the way in  w hich the p rin c ip le  has 
been in te rpre ted  may lead to  im plem entation by means o f an in te r- 
in s titu tio n a l agreement, a s ingu la rly  untransparent Com m unity instrum ent. It 
thus may sim ply worsen the problem  o f legitim acy" (Snyder, 1993a;7).
Another controversial issue is the amended A rtic le  130S(5). The A rtic le  
provides fo r a derogation in  case o f substantial costs due to im plem entation o f 
EC environm ental leg islation. I t  rem ains unclear when costs are 'substantia l' 
and how th is provision relates to e xp lic it European Court o f Justice doctrine 
(Case C-42/89 [1990] Commission v Belgium ECR 1-2821 and Case 254/83 [1984] 
Commission v Ita ly  ECR 3395) tha t im plem entation costs fo rm  no legitim ate 
reason fo r non-im plem entation by a Member State. Moreover, th is provision 
could lead to greater va ria b ility  in  the environm ental standards applied by 
Member States and sanction some Member States not to im plem ent Com m unity 
leg isla tion  w hile others do.
67
Finally, although the amendment to A rtic le  171 seems an im portan t step to 
combat non-im plem entation, the p ractica l significance and long term  
effectiveness o f a Com m unity penal sanction against Member States in  
ensuring the proper and tim e ly  application o f Com m unity law  can be doubted. 
A rtic le  171 provides tha t the Commission shall specify the am ount o f the lum p 
sum or penalty paym ent to be paid by the Member States concerned.
According to C urtin  th is "may be in te rpre ted  as meaning tha t the Court cannot 
impose sanctions on an on-going o r period ic basis u n til i t  has been quite 
satisfied tha t the infringem ents o f Com m unity law  in  question has indeed been 
term inated" (C urtin , 1993;33). Further i t  may be d iffic u lt in  practice to arrive 
at a figure  w hich w ill have a real de terrent effect. Steiner (1995) argues 
"there is no provision, as in  the com petition provisions (e.g. Regulation 17/62, 
A rtic le  16) fo r period ic payments, o r fo r the enforcement o f fines and 
penalties" (Steiner, 1995;12). Moreover the capabilities o f the European Court 
o f Justice to secure im plem entation are lim ited . Arguments regarding the 
lim ite d  capabilities o f courts to im plem ent public po licy have been pu t 
forw ard, i.e. Scheingold (1974), com m enting on the general a p p lica b ility  o f 
litig a tio n  as a too l fo r closing the gap between the promises and the re a lity  o f 
American public po licy, argues "there are form idable obstacles to using courts 
fo r the im plem entation o f pub lic  po licy" (Scheingold, 1974;96). Regarding 
environm ental leg islation, he specifica lly m entions that:
... courts only reluctant will intrude into the enforcement process ... the 
reluctance of the judges to take on administrative burdens is certainly 
understandable ... The judges do not have at their disposal the independent 
investigatory and fact-finding capabilities of the efficient administrative 
apparatus. Indeed, they do not really have the time to function simultaneously 
as administrators and judges (Scheingold, 1974;123).
3.4.2 Developments in  EC Environm ental Policv since the TEU
Several directives and policies have been issued and p u t in  place by the 
Commission to prom ote greater con fo rm ity  w ith  European environm ental 
directives. The public access to environm ental in fo rm ation  d irective  (OJ L 
9 0 /3 13/EEC, 1990), the Eco A ud it regulation (1836/93/EEC,1993) and the Eco 
label award scheme (880/92/EEC OJ L 99,1992) are im portant developments, but 
constitute an 'end o f p ipe ' approach. The ir practical significance may be 
lim ite d , given fo r example the fact tha t environm ental in fo rm a tion  'm ay be 
restricted in  order to prevent the disclosure o f business secrets' and the fact
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tha t eco audits are vo lun ta ry. The frequen tly  m entioned Green Paper on 
rem edying environm ental damage (COM(93)47, 1993), regarding lia b ility  fo r 
environm ental damage, is s till under discussion. Business w ill be strongly 
affected by the outcome w hich is the establishm ent o f an environm ental 
lia b ility  scheme. Member States have found i t  d iffic u lt to  define c iv il lia b ility  
fo r environm ental damage. The p rin c ip le  is d iffic u lt where damage is caused 
by negligence, and where no in d iv id u a l p o llu te r is p rin c ip a lly  responsible. 
The March 1993 Paper is in  favour o f s tric t lia b ility , at least fo r fu tu re  damage, 
and some k ind  o f jo in t compensation scheme.
The Commission’s F ifth  Environm ental Action Programme (COM(92)23, 1992) 
covering the years 1992-2000, has also been adopted. In  th is programme, the 
need fo r a satisfactory im plem entation o f Com m unity rules is emphasised:
... which will require better preparation of measures, more effective co-ordination 
with and integration into policies, more systematic follow up and stricter compliance 
checking and enforcement (COM(92)23, 1992;9).
A Consultative Forum on the environm ent and sustainable development, 
invo lv ing  m ajor in te rest groups, companies and specialists organisations, has 
been established, as was prom ised in  the EC's F ifth  Environm ental Action 
Programme (OJ L 328/53, 1993). The Forum began meeting in  1994. Members o f 
the Forum have access to  the Commission's th ink ing  on the issues in  question, 
inc lud ing  legislative proposals. There is, however, no fo rm a l mechanism 
oblig ing the Commission to respond to  the Forum's recommendations.
F ina lly  the establishm ent o f the European Environm ental Agency (Regulation 
1210/90/EEC, OJ L 120,1990) has been seen by some as an im portant step 
forw ard to in troduce the m uch needed con tro l at inter-governm ental level, 
and by others as a weak compromise. D uring the negotiations both the 
Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliam ent proposed tha t the 
European Environm ental Agency (EEA) should be given the tasks o f assessing 
Member States’ compliance w ith  leg islation  and the environm ental im pact o f 
th e ir application o f EC funds. The European Parliament, pressing fo r more 
powers fo r the European Environm ental Agency, adopted a reso lution in  1994 
recommending the establishm ent o f a coherent system o f environm ental 
statistics, inc lud ing  key ind icators re la ting  the environm ent to the economy, 
and called fo r a tighten ing-up o f the m on itoring  o f the im plem entation o f 
environm ental directives. To th is end i t  advocated setting up a corps o f 
Community inspectors (OJ C 91, 28th March 1994). However, the Member States
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d id  no t suppo rt these ideas and the European Environm ental Agency's task was 
form ulated as provid ing  EC ins titu tion s  and Member States w ith  in fo rm a tion  to 
enable them  to take measures to p ro tect the environm ent.
I t  took fo u r years before the European Environm ental Agency was fin a lly  
established in  Copenhagen; a m ajor delay was due to the refusal o f the French 
government to agree to its  perm anent location u n til the fu tu re  seat o f the 
European Parliam ent was determ ined. According to Dehousse "the d ifficu ltie s  
which surrounded the creation in  1990 o f the European Environm ental 
Agency have confirm ed tha t the US agency model is fa r from  being com m only 
accepted in  the Community" (Dehousse, 1992;389). In  the lite ra tu re , 
com parison w ith  and reference to  the Am erican Environm ental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Am erican regu la to ry fram ework in  general have been 
made (Majone, 1993). Several obseiyations should be made on th is subject.
F irst, the cu rren t European Environm ental Agency is a very d iffe re n t body 
from  the Environm ental Protection Agency, since the Environm ental 
Protection Agency has an annual budget o f $ 5 b illio n , about 25% o f which is 
devoted to enforcem ent and compliance m onitoring. By comparison the 
European Environm ental Agency's to ta l budget fo r its  firs t year is $ 15 m illio n  
(£9.4 m illio n  fo r 1994, ENDS, 1995a). The European Environm ental Agency does 
no t have a u th o rity  to issue regulations, a power granted by the American 
Congress to  the Environm ental Protection Agency, no r does i t  have the rig h t 
to propose legislation. Moreover, the delegation to an autonomous body o f 
w ide-ranging law-m aking and enforcem ent powers s im ila r to  those enjoyed 
by US regulatory agencies, is " like ly  to  be resented by the Member States as 
more in trusive , since i t  w ould a lte r the delicate balance o f power which has 
presided over the growth o f Com m unity competence" (Dehousse, 1992;391). 
These concerns clearly played a ro le  in  fo rm ula ting  the task o f the European 
Environm ental Agency, w hich is predom inantly data collection. A key 
function  o f the Agency is to b u ild  up the Environm ental In fo rm ation  and 
Observation netw ork (EIONET). This w ill en ta il co-ord inating the w ork and 
forg ing links between existing research and p o licy  in s titu tio n s  in  Member 
States: more than 400 organisations are expected to be hnked under EIONET.
The European Environm ental Agency's firs t key pro ject has been the 1995 
repo rt on the State o f Europe's Environm ent (the Dobris Assessment, Section 
1.1). The European Environm ental Agency w ill publish updated state o f the 
environm ent reports every three years. The lim ited  task and in fo rm ation  
provisions o f the European Environm ental Agency has been questioned by the 
House o f Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1995). The
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Select Committee concludes tha t the European Environm ental Agency is almost 
e n tire ly  re lia n t on in fo rm ation  passed on to i t  by the governments o f the 
Member States. Two im plications are m entioned, firs t governments can censor 
data which they do not w ish to  have exposed. Secondly, the qua lity  o f 
environm ental data passed on to  the European Environm ental Agency is 
uneven.
A lthough i t  is in teresting to compare the European Environm ental Agency 
w ith  fo re ign  Agencies such as the Am erican Environm ental Protection 
Agency, i t  can be argued tha t i t  m ight be more useful to compare the tasks and 
function ing  o f the cu rren t European Environm ental Agency w ith  existing 
in te rna l Com m unity supervision o f o ther sectors. Supervision regimes o f the 
common ag ricu ltu ra l and fisheries policies operate w ith in  the same (delicate) 
Com m unity environm ent. The in te rna l supervision procedure fo r the Common 
agricu lture and fisheries policies entails a d u ty  imposed on the Member States 
to provide in fo rm ation  regu la rly . "This in fo rm a tion  no t on ly  concerns the 
way in  w hich they apply Com m unity rules themselves, bu t can also involve 
the way in  which they supervise the observance o f Com m unity rules by 
companies and ind iv idua ls, and the results o f th is supervision" (van R ijn, 
1994;414). Moreover the Commission can request the Member State authorities 
to conduct certain types o f inspection o f enterprises or can decide to have its 
o ffic ia ls  conduct th e ir own inspection o f enterprises in  the Member States 
(A rtic le  9(2) regulation 729/70).
3.5 Q u a n tita tive  and q u a lita tiv e  aspects o f EC E n v iro n m e n ta l Law
In  quantita tive  terms the developm ent o f EC environm ental leg islation has 
been impressive. However from  a qua lita tive  po in t o f view  EC environm ental 
leg islation has been critic ised  and th is  has a d irect bearing on the 
im plem entation o f EC environm ental legislation. One o f the aspects tha t is 
critic ised is the lack o f co-ord ination between EC directives. Jans (1990a) 
mentions tha t "directives usually on ly  apply to sectors, general environm ental 
directives are d iffic u lt to  fin d " (Jans, 1990a; 67). Environm ental directives 
concerning water fo r example include d irectives regarding emissions to 
ground water (groundwater d irective ), d irectives regarding emissions as w ell 
as water quahty norms (cadm ium  d irective ), directives re la ting  to the 
production  norm  (b io logica l degradable washing powders), d irectives 
regarding the specific function  o f waters (fish ing and bathing d irectives) and 
fin a lly  d irectives regulating on ly  one in d u s tria l sector (e.g. the tita n ium
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dioxide d irective) (Jans, 1990a; 68). The M o lito r Group concludes tha t "the 
piecemeal approach o f the past has le ft a legacy o f overlapping and related 
directives w hich may have an onerous im pact when taken together" (M o lito r 
Group, 1995; 53).
Besides the lack o f co-ordination, the q u a lity  o f EC directives has been 
questioned and criticised in  the lite ra tu re  (Jans, 1990a & 1990b; Geelhoed, 1990; 
Macrory, 1992; Barents, 1994; Kellermann, 1994). Scharpf (1988) m entioned the 
"jo in t-decision trap" w hich leads to  problem s o f c la rity  and specific ity. He 
argued tha t because o f the need to obta in  agreement between at least two 
levels o f governm ent, European policy-m aking, like  tha t o f Germany and 
other European federal systems, tends to produce sub-optim al decisions.
Barents (1994) pointed out tha t u n til recently little  a tten tion  has been given to 
the q u a lity  problem  o f Com m unity legislation:
... that a problem exists in this respect is confirmed by the Council Resolution of 8 
June 1993 on the quality of drafting of Community legislation (Barents, 1994; 101).
This resolution (OJ C 166/1, 1993) form ulates guidelines which concern the 
q u a lity  w ith  which Com m unity leg islation  is drafted. Texts have to be clear, 
consistent and w ell-structured and 'euro-speak* has to be avoided. Barents sees 
the q u a lity  problem  not on ly as a d ra fting  problem , but extending to o ther 
underly ing  issues and problem s:
Clear and reliable legislation is not exclusively a matter of drafting. Instead, lack of 
clarity and reliability often results from the particular features of the policies which 
the legislation is trying to implement and from policies which are frequently a result 
of political compromises and the setting of priorities in a variety of rapidly changing 
circumstances (Barents, 1994; 102).
Jans ( 1990b) pointed out tha t the use o f open and unspecified de fin itions 
leaves room  fo r d iffe re n t in te rpre ta tions when im plem ented by Member 
States. This was the case w ith  the bathing water directive (OJ L 31 /1 , 1976). In 
A rtic le  2 o f the bathing water d irective , bathing water is defined as "water in  
which bathing is perm itted  by the authorities o f the Member States" and "is 
usually v is ited  by a great num ber o f people". The term  a 'great num ber o f 
people' has been in te rpre ted  d iffe re n tly  by Member States. In  the Netherlands 
10 bathers at one spot was deemed to  be a threshold, w hile in  Ire land the 
general ru le  was 10.000 persons per kilom etre. Consequently the
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im plem entation o f the bathing w ater d irective  has varied between the 
Member States. Luxembourg established 39 bathing zones, w hile the United 
Kingdom in  firs t instance d id  n o t come fu rth e r then 27 bathing zones. S im ilar 
d ifficu ltie s  are attached to concepts such as eutrophication and sensitive areas 
contained in  the Urban Waste W ater d irective (OJ L 135, 1991) and the N itrate 
d irective (OJ L 375, 1991) w hich are Ukely to resu lt in  d iffe re n t de fin itions 
when given effect in  each Member State. The im plem entation o f the EC 
Environm ental Im pact Assessment d irective  d iffe rs  w ide ly between Member 
States, w ith  some applying the d irective  more w idely o r less deeply than others 
(COM(95)288, 1995; 56). Businesses com plain tha t this is damaging th e ir 
competitiveness and calls have been made to  the Commission to specify the 
im pact assessment using the closest possible de fin itio n  o f projects like ly  to 
have s ign ificant effects on the environm ent and hence subject to an 
assessment under the d irective.
Further questions have been directed at the technical basis o f EC directives 
(HL Paper 73, 1988-89; HL Paper 37, 1986-87). Apart from  the qua lity  and 
technical basis o f environm ental d irectives, the substantial am ount o f EC 
environm ental leg islation and the subsequent costs o f im plem enting them has 
been the object o f considerable critic ism . The compliance w ith  environm ental 
directives can pose a great burden on businesses:
... some economists argue that the gradual decline in productivity growth in An?erica 
and other western countries since the m id-1970s is partly attribu table to the spread 
of regulation (Economist, 1996; 19).
Regarding the costs o f im plem enting environm ental leg isla tion , Majone 
(1990) argues:
It is d ifficult to overstate the significance of this structural difference between 
regulatory policies and policies involving the direct expenditure of public funds. The 
distinction is particularly im portant for the analysis of Community policy-making, 
since not only the economic, bu t also the political and adm inistrative costs of 
enforcing EC regulations are borne by the Member States (Majone, 1990;32).
C urrent environm ental leg islation, according to Chayes (1993) poses d iffic u lty  
in  acute form :
... the treaties form ally are among states, and the obligations are cast as state
73
obligations, - i.e. to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 30 % - here however 
the real object of the treaty is not to affect state behaviour but to regulate the 
behaviour of non-state actors carrying out activities that produce sulphur 
dioxide. Thus the ultim ate impact on the private behaviour w ithin a state 
depends on a complex series of interm ediate steps. It w ill norm ally require 
im plementation in the form  of national legislation, followed by detailed 
administrative regulations. In essence the state w ill have to establish and 
enforce a full-blown domestic regime designed to secure the necessary 
reduction in emissions (Chayes, 1993; 193).
To accommodate criticism s regarding the costs o f im plem enting EC 
environm ental leg islation, the Commission developed several policies such as 
financia l instrum ents to  prom ote environm ental schemes and 
im plem entation. The Financial Instrum ent fo r the Environm ent (LIFE), w ith  a 
budget o f 400 m illio n  ECUs fo r 1993-1995, was adopted fo r various in itia tives 
prom oting the use o f 'clean' technologies, waste management, restoration o f 
contam inated sites, and the in tegra tion  o f the environm ent and the urban 
environm ent. The Cohesion Fund, w ith  14 b illio n  ECUs fo r the period 1993- 
1999, was set up to finance projects in  the fie lds o f transport and the 
environm ent in  the fo u r recip ien t Member States (Portugal, Spain, Ire land 
and Greece). A fu rth e r stated objective o f the S tructural Funds is to ensure 
th a t greater account is taken o f the environm ent in  regional economic 
development. F inally the Commission has com m itted itse lf to  add a statement 
on subsid iarity and costs to each new ly issued environm ental d irective. From 
the firs t statements i t  is clear tha t the Commission has great d ifficu ltie s  in  
qua lify ing  costs: "Health risks and confidence o f consumers are d iffic u lt to 
valuate in  m onetary terms"(COM(94)612 fin a l, 1995), m oreover "the estim ation 
o f compliance costs resulting from  the proposal is based on the lim ited  
in fo rm ation  available to the Commission at p re sen t..." (COM(94)612 fin a l, 
1995;10).
3.6 C onclusion
In th is Chapter the developm ent o f EC environm ental law  and po licy  has been 
discussed. Environm ental po licy has been added to the lis t o f Community 
competencies, firs t by the Single European Act and la te r re-enforced by the 
Treaty on European Union. Com m unity environm ental po licy  evolved in  
response to pressures from  outside and inside the Com m unity and was a
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natu ra l response to what in  many instances is a transboundary problem . The 
rea lisation tha t d iffe re n t environm ental standards could fo rm  a b a rrie r to 
trade and free movement o f goods necessitated legislative action at Com m unity 
level. Conflicts ensued between 'greener' Member States w anting to issue 
s tric te r environm ental leg isla tion  and the Common M arket programme. The 
Common M arket programme and the m utual recognition po licy  were in  tu rn  
expected to start a 'race to the bottom '. This fear has so fa r no t m aterialised.
The decisions o f the European Court o f Justice have had a s ign ificant im pact on 
the development o f environm ental po licy  in  the EC. The C ourt o f Justice has 
consistently supported the view  tha t the Com m unity should have legislative 
competence in  th is dom ain and c la rifie d  controversies and unclarities as set 
out in  the Single European Act.
EC environm ental law  has been critic ised  from  a qua lita tive  p o in t o f view; 
open unspecified de fin itions leave room  fo r d iffe re n t in te rpre ta tions when 
im plem ented by Member States. In  answering w hether the Treaty on European 
Union c la rified  the issues le ft open in  the Single European Act some rem ain 
sceptical. A lthough i t  is early to comment on the effect o f the changes 
introduced by the Treaty on European Union, several comments can be made. 
The Treaty on European Union provides fo r qua lified  m a jo rity  voting 
regarding environm ental po licy. This is lik e ly  to lead to im provem ents in  the 
qu a lity  o f Com m unity environm ental d irectives. The p rin c ip le  o f subsid iarity 
is s till an issue needing fu rth e r c la rifica tion . A lack o f c la rity  regarding the 
practica l application o f the p rin c ip le  remains. The case by case approach 
preferred by the Member States does n o t im prove the situation.
Further, several instrum ents such as the amended Articles 171 and 130S(5), 
and the establishm ent o f the European Environm ental Agency, have been p u t 
in  place to address the problem s o f enforcing and m onitoring EC legislation. It 
can be questioned w hether these provisions are su ffic ient to address problems 
regarding im plem entation, enforcem ent and m onitoring o f EC environm ental 
po licy in  a satisfactory manner. A rtic le  171 provides fo r a lum p sum to be 
imposed on Member States fo r breach o f th e ir Com m unity law  obligations. 
However the figure  has to be substantial to have a real de terrent effect. 
Moreover the application o f the lum p sum or penalty paym ent involves going 
through a second procedure firs t.
The European Environm ental Agency’s curren t task is lim ite d  to the collection 
o f in fo rm a tion  tha t Member States provide on a vo lun ta ry basis. I t  has no 
powers to order or collect desired in fo rm ation  itse lf no r has i t  enforcement 
and compliance m on itoring  powers. A substantial problem  exists regarding
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the fo rm  and q u a lity  o f environm ental data collected by d iffe re n t Member 
States.
F ina lly the derogation under A rtic le  130S{5) was added to accommodate some 
Member States^ concerns regarding the costs o f im plem enting EC 
environm ental leg isla tion . It rem ains unclear how th is  A rtic le  applies in  
practice, the decision tha t one Member State has to im plem ent an EC 
environm ental d irective  w hile another does no t m ight be d iffic u lt to ju s tify . 
Moreover such a decision m igh t lead to d iffe re n t environm ental standards 
between the Member States, d is to rting  the In te rna l Market.
The Treaty on European Union has been critic ised fo r such a d iffe rentia ted  
approach. One o f the m ain considerations behind the establishm ent o f a 
p o litica l un ion was the desire to  assure u n ity  and coherence. In  addition  to a 
log ica lly  structured e n tity , a single in s titu tio n a l fram ework and un ifo rm  
app licab ility , a u n ita ry  approach im plies un ifo rm  im plem entation o f EC law. 
However the d iffe re n t Protocols and policies included in  the Treaty on 
European Union such as the European M onetary Union and Social Policy 
Agreement ‘opt-outs’ fo r the U nited Kingdom allows fo r d iffe ren tia ted  
ap p licab ility  o f Com m unity law.
In practice th is could threaten the cohesiveness o f the Com m unity system. For 
example, adopting directives under the Social Policy Agreement, signed by 
eleven Member States, means in  practice tha t directives are no longer 
applicable in  the entire Com m unity bu t on ly in  those Member States who have 
decided to adopt them. According to C urtin:
The result of the Maastricht summit is an umbrella Union threatening to lead to 
constitutional chaos; the potential victims are the cohesiveness and the unity and the 
concomitant power o f a legal system painstakingly constructed over the course of 
some 30 odd years (Curtin, 1993;67).
The im plications fo r im plem entation are substantial: beside the fact tha t 
uneven im plem entation hinders the establishm ent o f the Common M arket and 
d istorts com petition, the d irective  as an instrum ent, and the duties and righ ts 
associated w ith  it, are threatened. I t  could mean tha t an in d iv idu a l in  one 
Member State has certa in righ ts w hile  a citizen o f another Member State does 
not. Such im plications defy one o f the m ain princip les o f the Com m unity, tha t 
o f non-d iscrim ination and equality. The next Chapter explores the directive, 
the dom inant legal instrum ent used in  the EC fo r the enactment o f its 
environm ental policies.
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CHAPTER IV: EC INSTRUMENTS AND COMMUNITY DEMANDS 
REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION
Im plem entation problems o f EC environm ental law  have been discussed in  the 
previous Chapter. The h isto rica l developments, the methods used and the 
problems re la ting  to EC environm ental law  and po licy  have been explored. The 
Com m unity instrum ent most frequen tly  used fo r enactment o f environm ental 
po licy is the directive. This Chapter examines the duties and obligations 
o rig ina ting  from  the Treaty regarding the im plem entation o f d irectives. The 
European Court o f Justice has fu rth e r amended and specified these duties and 
obligations in  jurisprudence regarding im plem entation. The d irective  itse lf, 
in  its  cu rren t position  as the p rim a ry  Com m unity environm ental instrum ent, 
has come under increasing critic ism  and proposals fo r its  replacem ent are 
examined. The increasing num ber o f cases regarding non-im plem entation 
have enabled the Court o f Justice to ru le  on a great varie ty o f excuses which 
the Member States have p u t forw ard to ju s tify  th e ir fa ilu re  to im plem ent EC 
legislation. Moreover the Court o f Justice has developed a set o f increasingly 
s tric t requirem ents w hich adequate im plem entation must satisfy. No fo rm a l 
h ierarchy exists, e ither between Com m unity law  and national law  o r between 
the European Court and national courts. The p rio rity  o f Com m unity law over 
national law  stems from  the transfer o f certa in powers from  the Member 
States to the Com m unity w hich created a ‘new legal order’ in  w hich sovereign 
nationa l competences are restricted  (Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat, 
1989;36). Enforcement routes and a lternative enforcement routes available to 
the Com m unity and Member States , as developed by the Court o f Justice, are 
explored.
4.1 P rinc ip les  o f EC Law
Several EC legal p rincip les are im portan t in  re la tion  to im plem entation. The 
princip les o f equa lity and legal ce rta in ty  are two o f the most basic princip les 
(Steiner, 1995; 11). It is o f fundam ental im portance fo r the Com m unity tha t its  
policies are carried out equally in  a ll Member States. A necessity fo r the 
creation o f the In te rna l M arket is th a t EC law  guarantees s im ila r righ ts and 
duties fo r the citizens o f a ll the Member States. Another im portan t p rinc ip le  
in  re la tion  to im plem entation, is the p rin c ip le  o f 'com m unity lo ya lty '. This 
p rin c ip le  is also to  be found in  in te rna tiona l law {'pacta sunt servanda').
W ith in  the Treaty th is p rinc ip le  is la id  down in  A rtic le  5. The text o f the
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A rtic le  has been discussed in  Section 1.5. A rtic le  5 brings w ith  i t  obligations 
fo r Member States and the Com m unity w hich w ill be fu rth e r assessed in  this 
Chapter.
4.2 EC le g is la tiv e  in s tru m e n ts
The legal instrum ents tha t Com m unity institu tions have access to, in  order to 
carry out th e ir tasks, are la id  down in  A rtic le  189 o f the Treaty. A rtic le  189 sets 
ou t five  d iffe re n t types o f legal instrum ents:
... in order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in  
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take 
decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
Recommendations and opinions have no b ind ing force and should therefore 
no t p roperly  be regarded as legislative instrum ents. A rtic le  189 o f the Treaty 
distinguishes between regulations and directives as follows:
A regulation shall be binding in its en tirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States. A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of 
form and methods.
4.2.1 Regulations
A regula tion has general application and is 'b ind ing  in  its e n tire ty  and 
d ire c tly  applicable in  a ll Member States' (A rtic le  189 (2 )). I t  has generally 
been used fo r ra the r precise purposes such as financia l m atters o r the d a ily  
management o f the Common A g ricu ltu ra l Policy. Only ra re ly  has i t  been used 
fo r environm ental m atters (Haigh, 1990; 2). Regulations are d ire c tly  
applicable w hich means tha t they are b ind ing  w ith in  the na tiona l legal orders 
which are p a rt o f the Community. They need no t to be im plem ented by the 
Member States in to  th e ir national legal order. On the contrary: in  its 
jurisprudence, the European Court o f Justice e xp lic itly  does no t a llow  
regulations to be im plem ented in to  nationa l legislation. The reason fo r th is, 
according to  the Court o f Justice, is th a t th is m ight disguise the fact tha t the 
measure originates from  the Community. There is also the poss ib ility  that 
the national substitute o f the regulation m igh t d iffe r in  contents and tim e o f 
effect (ECJ February 7, 1973, 39/72, Commission v Ita ly; ECJ October 10,1973,
78
34/73, Variola; ECJ January 3, 1978, 94 /77 , Zerbone). This does no t mean tha t 
Member States are no t allowed to, o r should no t have to  make national 
provisions. Member States are required to p u t the necessary adm in istra tive 
procedures in  place to ensure practica l im plem entation o f the regulation. The 
decision on how these provisions are carried out is le ft to the Member States, 
however the Member States are expected to  change or suspend any existing 
na tiona l law  w hich is incom patib le  w ith  the regulation.
4.2.2 Directives
A d irective  is ’b ind ing, as to the resu lt to  be achieved’, w hile  the Com m unity 
leaves i t  to the national authorities to decide on the 'choice o f fo rm  and 
m ethod' (A rtic le  189(3)). As the choice o f fo rm  and m ethod is le ft to  the 
na tiona l au thorities:
... it is the most appropriate instrum ent for more general purposes particularly where 
some flexib ility is required to accommodate existing national procedures and, for 
this reason, is the instrum ent most commonly used for environm ental matters"
(Haigh, 1990;2).
Directives "are not intended to be ‘d ire c tly  applicable’, they are designed to 
achieve the harm onisation or approxim ation o f nationa l leg isla tion  "(S teiner, 
1995; 9). D irectives are used e.g. fo r the creation o f the Common M arket 
(A rtic le  100 o f the Treaty), m utual recognition o f diplom as (A rtic le  57), and on 
harm onisation o f safety demands fo r workers (A rtic le  118A).
4.2.3 Decisions
According to A rtic le  189(4) a decision is "b ind ing  in  its  en tire ty  upon those to 
whom i t  is addressed". W ith  respect to  environm ental protection, decisions 
have been used in  connection w ith  in te rna tio n a l conventions and w ith  
certa in procedural matters. Decisions can be addressed to ind iv idua ls or 
Member States. In  the la tte r s ituation, w hich is very rare, i t  can be necessary 
fo r the Member State to im plem ent the decision in  order to  secure its 
execution.
4.2.4 Environm ental Legislation: Regulations o r Directives?
Less than one-tenth o f a ll Com m unity environm ental leg islation is in  the fo rm  
o f a regulation. There are several reasons why Com m unity environm ental
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leg islation is p redom inantly in  the fo rm  o f directives.
First, as discussed in  Chapter III, A rtic le  100 was the o rig ina l basis o f 
Com m unity environm ental leg islation  u n til the Single European Act. The 
A rtic le  specifies the fo rm  o f measures taken on its  basis: “ the Council shall, 
acting unanim ously on a proposal from  the Commission, issue directives fo r 
the approxim ation o f such provisions ... as d ire c tly  affect the establishm ent or 
function ing  o f the Common M arket” . Moreover Member States p re fe r the use 
o f d irectives fo r Com m unity environm ental leg islation. This preference has 
been emphasised by the Council in  the Edinburgh Declaration:
Community measures should leave as much scope for national decisions as possible ... 
O ther things being equal, directives should be preferred to regulations and 
framework directives to detailed measures. Non- binding measures such as 
recommendations should be preferred where appropriate. Consideration should also 
be given where appropriate to the use of voluntary codes of conduct (Edinburgh 
Declaration, 1992, Annex 1 Part A of the conclusions;3).
In  terms o f content and effect, the d is tin c tion  between regulations and 
directives has dim inished (Hawke, 1996;97). This has been brought on by a 
num ber o f practica l and ju risp ru d e n tia l developments, such as the 
jurisprudence by the European Court o f Justice on d irect effect o f directives, 
w hich is dealt w ith  la te r in  more deta il. O ther examples are that, although 
regulations require  no incorpora tion  in to  nationa l law, in  practice adoption o f 
nationa l leg islation is often necessary in  order to  give effect to the regulation. 
F inally, there has been a developm ent towards more detailed directives. This 
trend ,w hich leaves less room  fo r in te rp re ta tio n  by nationa l authorities, 
contributes to  the growing s im ila rity  between directives and regulations.
This thesis focuses on EC environm ental leg islation and from  the above i t  is 
clear tha t existing EC environm ental leg islation  is predom inantly in  the fo rm  
o f directives. Therefore the im plem entation duties and obligations o f 
directives on ly w ill be fu rth e r examined. In  section 4.6 the fu tu re  o f the 
d irective  as a Com m unity instrum ent w ill be discussed.
4.3 D uties and o b lig a tio n s  in  re la tio n  to  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f 
d ire c t iv e s
4.3.1 Member States' obligations
The b ind ing force o f directives requires no t on ly  tha t d irectives have to be
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im plem ented (A rtic le  189(3)), bu t th a t they have to be im plem ented correctly 
and punctually. The obhgation to adopt na tiona l leg islation fo r 
im plem entation w ith in  the period  prescribed by the d irective  is a rigorous 
obligation. Each d irective  incorporates a date fo r its  en try  in to  force, typ ica lly  
two years a fte r the date o f adoption by the Council. Three months a fte r the 
d irective  has been agreed by the Council, the Commission w rites to  each 
Member State. The purpose o f th is w ritin g  is to  in fo rm  the Member States o f 
the tim e scale and to  draw a tten tion  fo r the need to  adopt the appropriate 
na tiona l im plem enting leg islation. A second le tte r is sent three m onths before 
the en try  in to  force o f the d irective .
The Commission takes the tim e -lim its  fo r im plem entation o f d irectives very 
seriously. The fact tha t Im plem entation has no t been carried out w ith in  the 
tim e lim it set ou t in  the d irective, is enough fo r the Commission to sta rt an 
A rtic le  169 procedure, even i f  the d irective  was correctly im plem ented after 
the im plem entation deadline.
The European Court o f Justice adopts a s im ila rly  s tric t stance. W ith respect to 
the fa ilu re  to adopt the necessary measures w ith in  the specified tim e, various 
excuses have been offered by the Member States. These excuses have no t been 
accepted by the C ourt o f Justice. According to  the jurisprudence, a Member 
State cannot ju s tify  non-com pliance w ith  the obligations and tim e-lim its , by 
re fe rring  to na tiona l adm in istra tive  circumstances, o r financ ia l o r legal 
d ifficu lties. In  Case C-42/89 (Commission v Belgium [1990] ECR 1-2821) fo r 
example, the Belgian authorities claim ed th a t costs and com plexities associated 
w ith  im plem entation o f the d irective  concerned had led to  im plem entation 
fa ilu re . In  Case C-45/91 (Commission v Greece [1992] ECR 1-2509), the Greek 
governm ent defended its  fa ilu re  by quoting local opposition against 
im plem entation. In  ne ithe r case were the protestations accepted by the Court 
o f Justice as va lid  reasons fo r non-im plem entation. The na tiona l governments 
are responsible fo r tim e ly  and correct im plem entation (Case 227-230/85 
Commission v Belgium [1988] ECRl) and Member States cannot ju s tify  th e ir 
fa ilu re  to im plem ent by arguing th a t o ther Member States have also no t 
im plem ented the d irective. The argum ent th a t low er nationa l adm in istra tive  
bodies have no t im plem ented the d irective  is also no t accepted. Moreover 
directives frequen tly  contain extra obligations from  the Member States. 
D irectives can request fo r example th a t Member States in fo rm  the Commission 
on the application o f the d irective  on a regular basis.
The choice o f fo rm  and methods when im plem enting a d irective , which is 
lagely le ft to the Member States, has been fu rth e r defined and restricted by
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the jurisprudence o f the European Court o f Justice. The Court o f Justice has 
defined lim its , such as the fact tha t a Member State has to choose:
...the most suitable form  and method to ensure the useful effect of the directive (Case
48 /75 , Royer [1976]).
In  practice th is means tha t the Member States are restricted in  th e ir choice o f 
instrum ents used fo r im plem entation. The Court o f Justice decided tha t the 
instrum ents used fo r im plem entation have to be recognisable and have to 
o ffe r legal security. Full im plem entation o f directives in  law  and no t on ly in  
fact is required (Case 102/79, Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR1486, Case 96/81 
[1982] ECR1804, Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR 1-2567). This 
means tha t im plem entation v ia  M in is te ria l notes and circulars in  not 
recognised by the C ourt o f Justice.
The second requirem ent o f complete and correct im plem entation by Member 
States is equally un forg iving: policies o f the d irective may no t be altered o r 
on ly  p a rtia lly  im plem ented. A consequence o f im plem enting a d irective  fo r a 
Member State is tha t i t  cannot apply o r enforce national law  w hich is in  
co n flic t w ith  the content o f a d irective  (re fe rred  to as negative in tegra tion ). 
The ob ligation to adjust national law  (past o r fu tu re ) tha t is inconsistent w ith  
the im plem ented directive(s) rests w ith  the governments o f the Member 
States. This was decided in  the Marleasing case (Case C-106/89 [1990] ECR I- 
4135). In  the Marleasing case, the Court o f Justice established the sympathetic 
in te rp re ta tion  doctrine: national leg isla tion  must be consistent w ith  EC 
legislation. This clearly applies to  national laws intended to im plem ent an EC 
directive, bu t in  the Marleasing case the Court o f Justice went a step fu rth e r 
by ru lin g  th a t nationa l courts m ust in te rp re t a ll national leg islation  in  
con form ity w ith  the d irective concerned. This du ty does no t exist solely fo r 
national courts, b u t fo r a ll national authorities o f the Member States (Case 
14/83 Von Colson [1984] ECR 1891).
As stated in  the de fin itio n  o f im plem entation used in  th is thesis (Section 1.5) 
im plem entation no t on ly refers to correct application o f Com m unity directives 
in to  the national legal system. Member States also have to ensure tha t the new 
leg islation is apphed in  practice. For th is the executive process m ust be 
adequate.
This means tha t Member States are to organise the appropriate authorities to 
im plem ent Com m unity po licy and to provide the necessary staff, equipm ent
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and funding (Case C 71/76 [1977] Th ie ffrey v Conseil de Torde des avocats a la  
cour de Paris) fo r the enforcem ent and the legal pro tection o f the righ ts fo r 
ind ividua ls as stipulated in  the d irective. C ontrol and prosecution o f 
infringem ents are to be carried out to  ensure im plem entation o f directives 
(ECJ 10 July 1990, C-217/88, Commission v. Germany, Jur. 1990; 1-2879). Mere 
adm in istra tive measures unsupported by the force o f law  w ill represent 
insu ffic ien t im plem entation o f d irective  requirem ents (Case 160/82, 
Commission v Netherlands [1984], CMLR 230).
From the above i t  is clear tha t the Com m unity obligations on the governments 
o f the Member States are substantial. Some argue tha t these obligations create 
centralisation. D a in tith  (1995) argues th a t the pressure fo r centra lisation at 
national level is "embedded in  the Com m unity scheme" (D ain tith , 1995;147). 
Since: "States w ill pu t in  place certa in centralised chains o f command. The 
State must do more than sim ply empower a local level o f government; i t  must 
have at its  disposal an effective means o f ensuring compliance" (D a in tith , 
1995; 147).
Having discussed the substantial obligations fo r Member States regarding the 
im plem entation o f directives, the enforcem ent routes available to the 
Com m unity and Member States to secure im plem entation are now examined.
4.4 E nforcem ent p rocedures : The European C ou rt o f Justice
4.4.1 The non-con ten tious European Court o f Tustice procedure
The so-called p re lim ina ry ru lin g  (A rtic le  177 o f the Treaty) is a m atter o f co­
operation between the European C ourt o f Justice and the national courts in  the 
Member States. The A rtic le  177 provides fo r "a procedure whereby a national 
judge, faced w ith  a question o f in te rp re ta tion  o f EC law, can, and in  some cases 
must, re fe r to the Court o f Justice fo r a p re lim ina ry ru lin g  on the 
in te rp re ta tion  o f tha t law  p rio r to h im se lf applying the ru lin g  in  the case 
before him " (Steiner, 1995;32). The p re lim in a ry  procedure foresees in  a Court 
o f Justice decision where a gap exists in  Com m unity rules (legislative and 
jud ic ia l) and as such brings w ith  i t  th a t the subject m atter is frequently 
h ig h ly  p o litic a lly  sensitive.
The ju risd ic tio n  o f the European Court o f Justice in  re la tion  to th is procedure 
concerns e ither questions regarding the in te rp re ta tion  o r v a lid ity  o f 
Community law. This means tha t the Court o f Justice has no powers to 
in te rp re t domestic law  o r pass judgem ent on the com patib ility  o f domestic law
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w ith  Com m unity law. The Court o f Justice has no power to compel national 
courts to re fe r and no contro l over the application o f its  ru lings.
A p re lim in a ry  ru lin g  is b ind ing on the national court and is recognised by the 
national legal order o f each Member State as i f  i t  were issued by a national 
court (Articles 187 and 192).
4.4.2 The contentious European Court o f Tustice procedure
As opposed to  the non-contentious Court o f Justice procedure, the contentious 
procedures provide fo r d irect access to  the Court o f Justice, and can be in itia te d  
by a Com m unity ins titu tion , by one o f the Member States (A rtic le  170) and to a 
lesser degree by private persons (A rtic le  176). Articles 173, 175, 178, 184 and 
215(2) provide fo r d irect action before the Court o f Justice fo r actions fo r 
annulm ent; in d ire c t challenge, action fo r fa ilu re  to act, and Com m unity 
lia b ility  in  damages.
The enforcem ent procedure th a t is applied most frequen tly  to  environm ental 
cases o f non-im plem entation is the in fringem ent procedure (A rtic le  169). The 
in fringem ent procedure is in itia te d  by the Commission against a Member State 
tha t fa ils to  fu lf il its  obligations under the Treaty.
The Treaty specifies tha t the Commission as ’guardian’ o f the Treaty, is 
responsible fo r ensuring proper function ing  and developm ent o f the Common 
M arket, and shall:
... ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the 
institutions pursuant are applied; ... exercise the powers conferred on it by the 
Council for the im plem entation of the rules laid down by the la tter (Article 155).
W ith the Member States rest a n o tifica tio n  duty. Member States are required, 
once a d irective  has been incorporated in to  th e ir nationa l legal system, 
to n o tify  the European Commission o f the national legislative measures adopted 
and forw ard the relevant texts to Brussels. I f  so specified in  the d irective, 
p rio r agreement fo r the national adopted legislative texts from  the Commission 
can be required.
The n o tifica tion  system is an im po rtan t source o f in fo rm a tion  fo r the 
Commission w ith  regard to national im plem entation measures. The Commission 
consequently w ill ve rify  the lawfulness o f the im plem entation measures. In  
case o f non-no tifica tion  o r when non-im plem entation has been brought to the 
attention o f the Commission, the Commission can start an A rtic le  169 
in fringem en t procedure:
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If  the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fu lfil an obligation 
under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the m atter after giving the 
State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If  the State concerned 
does not comply with the opinion w ithin the period laid down by the Commission, the 
la tter may bring the m atter before the Court o f Justice (Article 169).
The procedure o f A rtic le  169 consists o f three phases o r procedures and starts 
w ith  an in fo rm ation  gathering phase (Kram er, 1992a;221). A fte r the 
Commission has been inform ed o f problem s regarding the application o f 
Com m unity law, i t  proceeds to gather in fo rm ation  from  the Member State 
concerned. Under A rtic le  5 o f the Treaty the Member State is obliged to  supply 
the in form ation requested by the Commission (Case 192/84 [1985] Commission v 
Greece, ECR 3973). The Commission has no means to enforce th a t obligation. 
Upon the acquired in fo rm a tion  the Commission can then decide to in itia te  the 
form al (and second) phase o f the in fringem ent procedure. This decision is 
made at the discretion o f the Commission which is generally taken i f  a Member 
State does no t co-operate during  the in fo rm ation  phase and, i f  the Commission 
finds p ro o f o f in fringem ent o f Com m unity law.
Dialogue between the Commission and the Member State, on the question o f the 
conform ity o f the Member State’s action o r inaction w ith  respect to 
Com m unity law, takes place during  the in fringem ent procedure. The 
in fringem ent procedure consists o f two stages: firs t a le tte r o f form al notice 
( A rtic le  169 le tte r ) is send to  the Member State followed, i f  deemed necessary, 
by a reasoned opin ion. F inally, i f  a Member State s till fa ils  to  satisfy the 
Commission tha t i t  is in  compliance w ith  EC law, the Commission can start a 
procedure before the European Court o f Justice. This is the th ird  o r ju d ic ia l 
phase. As a means fo r enforcing EC leg islation, the A rtic le  169 in fringem ent 
procedure has been w ide ly critic ised  fo r having several defects (van R ijn,
1994; Timmermans, 1994). In  Section 1.1 several comments were made 
regarding the patchy and incom plete in fo rm a tio n  gathering:
Assessing the compliance record of differen t Member States is not straightforward 
because the likelihood that infringements w ill be detected remains something of a 
lottery, resting largely as it does on public complaints and Member States' 
responsiveness to the Commission's requests for inform ation (ENDS Report 213,
1992b; 35).
85
Timmermans argues tha t in  cases o f incorrect application o f Com m unity law 
the A rtic le  169 procedure reveals some inherent weaknesses: “as it  is an 
“ in te rna tiona l” procedure, the object o f w hich is not in  the firs t place to 
ensure legal pro tection o f in d iv id u a l interests o f the Com m unity citizen”
( Timmermans,1994;397).
For purposes o f legal pro tection o f ind iv idu a l interests the A rtic le  169 
procedure is de fic ient in  several aspects. Ind iv idua l com plainants have no 
standing in  the procedure no r can they in itia te  the procedure, fo r tha t 
purpose they depend en tire ly  on the Commission.
This is underlined by the difference between the (h igh) figures re la ting  to 
non-transposition o f Com m unity d irectives in to  national law  and other kinds 
o f fa ilures. It is as Timmermans argues, "re la tive ly  simple to in itia te  
in fringem ent procedures more o f less autom atically as soon as the period 
provided fo r im plem entation has expired and no national im plem entation 
measures have been n o tified . However i f  they have been no tified , noth ing is 
said about th e ir qua lity  o r enforcem ent in  practice" (Timmermans, 1994;395). 
According to Jans (1991b) the emphasis on the transposition o f a d irective  in to  
national law has sometimes lead to the fo llow ing situation. On the one hand 
Member States tha t do not (com pletely) transpose an environm ental d irective 
in to  national law, bu t achieve the required  level o f environm ental pro tection  
in  practice, are prosecuted by the Commission fo r incom plete im plem entation. 
W hile on the other hand Member States tha t have transposed the d irective 
com pletely in to  national law, bu t have no t achieved the level o f p ro tection  as 
stated in  the d irective in  practice, are not prosecuted (Jans, 1991b;158).
The 1991 Court o f Justice decision regarding the qua lity  o f d rinkw ater in  
Belgium (Case-42/89 [1991] ECR 1-2821) is "the firs t European Court o f Justice 
decision regarding its  environm ental p o licy  where a Member State was 
prosecuted fo r its  fa ilu re  to achieve the actual standards set in  the d irective" 
(translated from  Jans, 199lb ; 158). Other such Court o f Justice decisions have 
since followed. In  Case C-337/89 (Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR I- 
6103), an excessively h igh concentration o f n itrates was found in  d rink ing  
water and in  Case C-56/90 (Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR 1-4109) 
the q ua lity  o f bathing water d id  no t reach proscribed standards.
C riticism  is fu rtherm ore d irected at the lack o f a clear procedure fo r starting 
an A rtic le  169 procedure; negotiations between the Commission and the 
Member State in  question usually take place behind closed doors. Such 
practice is reflected in  C urtin ’s rem ark:
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It is sadly a truism that the Commission is unable (in terms of available staff) or 
unwilling (fo r political reasons) to in itiate infringem ent actions systematically in all 
those cases where Community law has been violated by a Member State. It clearly 
operates a selective litigation strategy (Curtin, 1992;34).
Moreover the enforcem ent procedure under A rtic le  169 has been critic ised  fo r 
being "slow, and has too m any possib ilities fo r being spun ou t year a fter year" 
(van Rijn,1994;413).
From the exam ination above i t  can be concluded tha t the provisions under the 
Treaty fo r legal action by the Commission o r Member States against States 
w hich have fa iled  to fu lf il th e ir obligations under Com m unity law  suffer 
deficiencies. They;
proved insufficient on their own to secure the effective enforcement o f EC law 
(Steiner, 1995;12).
Several a lte rnative  enforcem ent routes, w hich have become crucia l fo r 
securing im plem entation o f EC directives, have been (fu rth e r) developed by 
the European Court o f Justice.
4.5 A lte rn a tiv e  e n fo rce m e n t ro u te s
In  the absence o f an effective and comprehensive Com m unity enforcem ent 
system (and thus a system o f combating non-im plem entation) the Court o f 
Justice developed a lternative routes whereby ind iv idua ls ’ Com m unity righ ts 
could be protected in  legal action before th e ir national courts. This was 
achieved w ith  the in tro du c tio n  of: the d irect effect doctrine, the sympathetic 
in te rp re ta tion  doctrine established in  the Marleasing case (Section 4.3.1), and 
State lia b ility  in  damages on the princip les la id  down in  Francovich v Ita lian  
State (Cases C-6 and 9 /90).
4.5.1 D irect effect o f directives
A d irective  in  p rin c ip le  on ly  gives righ ts to  ind iv idua ls and businesses once i t  
has been correctly im plem ented in to  national law. There has been 
uncerta in ty concerning the degree to w hich a priva te  in d iv id u a l o r business 
may re ly  on a non-im plem ented, delayed o r p a rtia lly  im plem ented directive.
To resolve this issue, the European Court o f Justice has developed a p rinc ip le  
known as the d irect effect doctrine (Case 26/62 [1962] Van Gend en Loos).
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In  the 1970s the Court o f Justice extended a lim ited  d irect effect to  provisions o f 
directives. Thus i f  an ind iv id u a l asserts before a national court a rig h t vis a vis 
the Member State, w hich is no t available under national law  b u t w hich w ould 
have been available i f  the Member State had im plem ented the d irective  in to  
national law, then the ind iv idu a l is en titled  to have the case adjudged as i f  the 
Member State had perform ed its  Treaty obligations (Case C-208/90 [1991]
Emmott V M in ister fo r Social W elfare).
The d irect effect doctrine developed by the Court o f Justice holds tha t precise 
and unambiguous provisions o f EC directives which are n o t im plem ented, can 
be re lied  upon by citizens in  legal actions against the Member State (Case 8/81 
Becker [1982] ECR 53) .
The d e fin itio n  o f 'Member State' has been given a w ide in te rp re ta tion  by the 
Court o f Justice. Decentralised o r m unicipal bodies (Case 103/88 Fratelh 
Costanze [1989] ECR 1839), certa in public undertakings o r ‘any organ o r 
‘emanation’ o f the State’ (Case C-188/89 Foster [1990] ECR 1-3313) have been 
brought under the d e fin itio n  o f Member State.
There are several lim ita tio n s to the d ire c t effect doctrine ’s app licab ility .
F irstly, a d irective  cannot be re lied  upon by ind iv idua ls before the period 
prescribed fo r its  im plem entation has expired (Case 148/78 Ratti [1979] ECR 
1629, Cases C-140/91, C-279/91 S u ffritti [1992] ECR 1-6337). Secondly the d irect 
effect doctrine is no t enforceable ho rizon ta lly , i.e. a person versus a private 
party. To circum vent th is omission, the Court o f Justice developed the earlie r 
discussed sym pathetic in te rp re ta tio n  doctrine. This im plies th a t the nationa l 
courts have to in te rp re t th e ir na tiona l law  in  the lig h t o f the requirem ents o f 
Com m unity law. "In  practice i t  is the pe rtinen t provisions o f the national law  
which, in te rpre ted  in  con fo rm ity  w ith  Com m unity law, w ill have d irec t effect 
in  horizon ta l h tigation" (C urtin , 1992;39).
4.5 .2 State lia b ilitv  fo r breach o f Com m unity law
As discussed above directives can n o t be applied horizon ta lly , however the 
Court o f Justice in troduced the poss ib ility  o f an alternative route v ia  the 
p rin c ip le  o f state lia b ility  under Francovich. Under th is  p rin c ip le  three 
conditions have to be met:
(1) the resu lt required by the d irective  m ust include the conferring o f righ ts 
fo r the benefit o f ind iv idua ls;
(2) the content o f these righ ts m ust be determ inable by reference to the 
d irective ; and
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(3) there m ust be a causal lin k  between the reach o f the ob ligation o f the state 
and the damage suffered by the person affected.
"Thus in  Francovich the C ourt la id  down a new p rinc ip le  o f state lia b ility  
w ho lly  independent o f the p rin c ip le  o f d ire c t and in d ire c t effect ... the 
decision in  Francovich does however raise many problems e.g. on what 
princip les should damages be awarded ... to  what extent w ill Francovich 
supplement o r supplant remedies based on d ire c t o f in d ire c t effect?" (Steiner, 
1995;21).
An essential component o f the Com m unity’s centralised enforcem ent 
provisions (e.g. A rtic le  169) is the system o f decentralised con tro l: "every 
national judge is considered to be a Com m unity judge ... no t on ly  does th is 
system have the advantage the C ourt recognised in  Van Gent en Loos (Case 
26/62 [1963] ECR 1) o f placing every in d iv id u a l affected by Com m unity law in  
the position  o f a vig ilan te  bu t i t  removes the poss ib ility  o f non-com pliance 
since a State cannot defy its  own courts" (C urtin , 1992;34). However there are 
draw backs "... sometimes legal remedies o r the conditions fo r th e ir use are 
de fic ient ... in  some sectors - th a t o f environm ental law  fo r instance - access to 
justice is no t granted in  a ll Member States on comparable conditions. Other 
problem s fo r access could resu lt from  h igh costs o f litig a tio n , o r the excessive 
length o f ju d ic ia l proceedings" (Timmermans, 1994;403). According to W ils 
(1994) "most o f the provisions o f the d irective  have d irect effect, and could 
thus be re lied  upon by ind iv idua ls  o r environm ental p ro tection  groups, 
against public au thorities before na tiona l courts", however " in  some Member 
States especially the U nited Kingdom, h igh legal costs may constitute an 
obstacle to the enforcem ent o f the Birds D irective through nationa l courts. 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands are a ll countries in  w hich legal costs are 
su ffic ie n tly  low  as to a llow  environm ental p ro tection  groups to  engage in  
h tiga tion  against pubhc authorities. This adds another dim ension to the debate 
on the even-handedness o f the cu rren t system fo r the enforcem ent o f EC 
environm ental law, questioning in  pa rticu la r the UK's claim  to be among the 
Member States where enforcem ent is more effective" (W ils, 1994; 242). 
M oreover uncerta in ty remains w hy a Member State should be hable in  
damages fo r its  Treaty vio la tions as specified in  Francovich, bu t private 
ind iv idua ls should no t be liab le . These and other criticism s regarding the 
d irective  and its  centrahsed and decentrahsed enforcem ent problem s and 
uncertainties, caused Com m unity authorities and Member States authorities to 
reconsider the prim acy o f the d irective  as a Com m unity instrum ent.
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4 .6  The fu ture o f the d irective  and oth er Com m unity instrum ents
D uring the run-up to  the Treaty on European Union propositions were 
made to review  and renew the Com m unity's legal instrum ents. Both the 
Commission and the European Parliam ent proposed to  abolish the d irective. 
The European Parliam ent o rig in a lly  had the fo llow ing  in  m ind: a system w ith  
a 'constitu tiona l law ' as its  highest law, fo llow ed by a regulative law. The la tte r 
one is to  be a 'fram ew ork' law, fo r w hich the im plem entation w ill be delegated 
to the Member States o r the Commission ( EP, resolution December 12, 1990, 
artic le  46). The European Commission proposed to have a law  ('la  lo i') as the 
highest fo rm  o f regula tion  w ith in  the Com m unity, w hich i t  described as 
fo llow s:
The law has a general application. It  is compulsory in  a ll its elements. Those of its 
provisions which do not necessitate enforcement measures are directly applicable in 
every Member State (Europe no 1694/95, 5 March 1991).
This new A rtic le  189 may seem n o t tha t d iffe ren t, however the description o f 
the new A rtic le  paints a d iffe re n t p ic tu re :
The action to be undertaken for the application of the provisions o f the present treaty  
are defined by the law. The law determines the fundamental principles, the general 
guidelines and the essential elements of the measures to be taken for its 
implementation. The law notably fixes the rights and obligations o f private persons 
and firm s as well as the nature o f guarantees they must enjoy in each Member State.
Its implementation may be entrusted to a ll or part of the Member States, acting in 
compliance w ith their in ternal constitutional regulations (Europe no 1694 /95 , 5 
March 1991),
A lthough the law  can delegate im plem entation and execution to the Member 
States, i t  w ill contain the most im po rta n t elements concerning 
im plem entation, the righ ts  i t  guarantees fo r citizens and firm s inc lud ing  
obligations fo r those liab le  and i t  w ill be d ire c tly  applicable. The Commission 
thus in troduced the h ie rarchy o f norm s p rinc ip le . The new category o f 
Com m unity acts, the law, is at the top o f the h ierarchy o f legal acts. 
Luxembourg, w hile  ho ld ing the Presidency o f the Com m unity chose fo r a 
proposal contain ing elements o f both  the Commission’s and the European 
Parliam ent’s proposals, however the d irective  as an instrum ent was there to
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stay. The so called non-paper tha t the Presidency sent to the national 
delegations on A p ril the 12* 1991 contained supplements to the proposed 
A rtic le  189, form ulated as follows:
In the cases provided for in this Treaty, the European Parliament and the Council 
shall adopt Community laws, hereinafter referred to as 'laws', according to the jo in t 
decision-making procedure. A law shall define the fundam ental principles or general 
rules applicable to a m atter. It shall be o f general application. A law shall have 
greater legal status than any other Community act. A law shall empower the Council 
or the Commission to adopt the texts necessary for its implementation." (Europe no. 
1709/1710, 3"  ^M ay 1991).
The subsequent Dutch Presidency d id  no t proceed w ith  the Luxembourg 
proposal (Europe no. 1734, 3^^  October 1991). In  the fin a l text o f the Treaty on 
European Union no th ing has been changed concerning the Com m unity's 
instrum ents, except the firs t sentence o f A rtic le  189 w hich states that:
In  order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, 
the European Parliament acting jo in tly  w ith the Council, the Council and the 
Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make 
recommendations or deliver opinions.
The amended A rtic le  189 now refers to  the new decision-m aking procedure, 
the co-decision procedure, in troduced in  the Treaty on European Union. The 
cu rren t non-h ie rarch ica l re la tio n  between the d iffe re n t C om m unity 
instrum ents rem ains unchanged.
However, a Declaration o f the H ierarchy o f Com m unity Acts has been annexed 
to the Treaty on European Union: "the Intergovernm ental Conference to be 
convened in  1996 w ill examine to w hat extent i t  m ight be possible to review 
the classification o f Com m unity acts w ith  a view  to establishing h ierarchy 
between the d iffe re n t categories o f acts".
Others also contribu ted to the proposals to change o r replace the d irective. The 
Sutherland re p o rt recommended tha t directives be converted in to  d ire c tly  
applicable regulations a fte r a satisfactory degree o f approxim ation o f nationa l 
laws by means o f d irectives had been achieved. The conversion o f directives 
in to  regulations w ould enhance the transparency o f Com m unity leg islation, 
meeting the needs on the p a rt o f ind iv idua ls  and national enforcem ent 
authorities (Sutherland report, 1992;33-34).
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There is no end to the debate and fo r the moment the decision regarding the 
reta inm ent o r replacem ent o f the d irective  remains to  be discussed in  the 
cu rren t Intergovernm ental Conference, as the Commission states in  its  re p o rt 
to the European Council on the adaptation o f Com m unity legislation to  the 
su bs id ia rity  p rin c ip le :
... the Commission is still convinced that the real answer to the problem of complex 
rules lies in  the introduction of a hierarchy of Community norms to be examined, as 
required by the Maastricht Treaty, a t the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
(COM (93)545, 1993;7).
4.7 C onclusion
Directives are the m ain instrum ents used by the Com m unity fo r the enactment 
o f its  environm ental policies. The d irective  as specified in  A rtic le  189(3) is a 
complex Com m unity instrum ent. The most essential characteristic o f the 
d irective  (as compared to the regulation) is the fact th a t i t  is n o t se lf-sufficient 
and requires im plem entation. The im plem entation o f d irectives is "asserted in  
the general fram ework o f perm anent ru les o f procedure" (Legal, 1991;46a).
The autonom y o f the Member States regarding im plem entation is greatly 
restricted and the obligations to  w hich national measures are subm itted are:
• directives need to be im plem ented law fu lly , com pletely and w ith in  the 
proscribed tim e. Member States’ governments carry the fin a l 
responsib ility  fo r the im plem entation o f Com m unity directives. The 
nationa l governm ent cannot sh ift its  responsib ility  to loca l governm ent o r 
any o ther nationa l in s titu tio n s  fo r non-im plem entation;
• Member States m ust n o tify  the Commission o f th e ir im plem entation 
measures and send (regular) reports on the application o f the d irective  i f  
specified in  the d irective ;
• con trad icto ry nationa l measures created before o r a fte r the d irective  m ust 
be abolished o r amended;
• Member States m ust provide fo r the national execution and enforcem ent 
system. I t  is th e ir task to  issue the appropriate substantive and procedural 
provisions fo r im plem entation o f a pa rticu la r d irective, to  translate the 
d irective  in to  requirem ents fo r in d iv id u a l po llu ters, to  m on ito r the 
activ ities o f po llu ters, and to  take enforcem ent action in  case o f non- 
com pliance.
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The examined deficiencies o f the Commission's enforcem ent capacities and the 
lim ite d  scope o f its  in fringem ent procedures, makes decentralised 
enforcem ent through nationa l courts a viable a lternative. The d ire c t effect 
doctrine and the sym pathetic in te rp re ta tio n  doctrine are in tended to  give 
directives the w idest possible effect. However both doctrines have th e ir lim its  
such as the absence o f horizon ta l d ire c t effect. The in tro du c tio n  o f State 
lia b ility  in  case o f non-im plem entation and the awarding o f damages to  the 
ind iv idu a l suffering loses is an im portan t development (case C -6/90 and C- 
9 /90 , [1991] Francovich and Bonifaci ECR 1-5357). However the scope o f 
Francovich is uncertain and its  application by national courts is no t yet 
guaranteed (Steiner, 1995; 172)
European Court o f Justice decisions such as these and the overa ll in flu e n tia l 
ro le o f the Court o f Justice has come under attack. Strong pressure, especially 
from  the United Kingdom, is being brought to  bear to re fo rm  the Court o f 
Justice at the cu rren t Intergovernm ental Conference. The U nited Kingdom  has 
been studying:
... ways to lim it the power o f the Luxembourg judges to make decisions with  
unforeseen or disproportionate financial implications for Member States (Financial 
Times, 21®^  August 1995; 2).
The d irective  as a Com m unity instrum ent provoked a whole series o f questions 
leading some to propose the abolishm ent o f the instrum ent o r to replace the 
d irective  by a d iffe re n t Com m unity instrum ent. D uring the preparations fo r 
the Intergovernm ental Conference on European Union, proposals were p u t 
forw ard to  abolish the d irective. The m ain purpose was to in troduce a clear 
h ierarchy o f norms. Both the European Parliam ent and the Commission 
proposed to introduce a new Com m unity instrum ent: the law  (o r 'lo i') . The new 
instrum ent could provide im plem enting powers to the Commission and 
Member States. The proposed changes were not adopted b u t a Declaration o f the 
H ierarchy o f Com m unity Acts has been annexed in  the Treaty on European 
Union, stating that:
the In ter Governmental Conference to be convened in 1996 w ill examine to what extent 
it m ight be possible to review the classification of Community acts w ith a view to 
establishing an appropriate hierarchy between the differen t categories of acts.
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CHAPTER V: THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
5.1 The fo rm u la tio n  o f d ire c tive s
5.1.1 In troduction
The preceding Chapters have provided evidence fo r the existence o f an 
im plem entation problem  w ith  EC environm ental directives. The duties and 
obligations o f d irectives have been examined. In  th is Chapter an exam ination 
w ill be carried ou t in to  w hat actua lly happens when a d irective  is 
im plem ented.
h i determ ining what the starting p o in t o f the EC im plem entation process is, 
Pag and Wessels ( 1988) argue tha t the preparatory process o f fo rm ula ting a 
d irective  has a d ire c t bearing and influence on im plem entation:
... what went on before has to be taken into account when examining implementation 
(Pag and Wessels, 1988; 165).
In  o ther words, im plem entation is affected n o t on ly by what happens a fte r the 
legislative phase, b u t by w hat transp ired before and during po licy d ra fting  as 
w ell. In  th e ir policy-m aking and im plem entation fram ework, Pag and Wessels 
sub-divide the policy-m aking and im plem entation process in to  five  stages 
(fig u re  4).
When exam ining the fo rm u la tion  and im plem entation o f EC directives in  th is 
Chapter, Pag and Wessels’ five  stages are used. This starts at the preparation 
stage, invo lv ing  d ra fting  o f an EC proposal, and is follow ed by the decision, 
transposition, application, and con tro l stages. In  the decision stage the 
proposal is adopted; in  the transposition stage, an EC directive is passed in to  
national legislation, and in  the application and con tro l stages the im plem ented 
EC directives are enforced and contro lled.
The d iffe re n t stages are examined at EC and Member State level w ith  the aim  o f 
assessing what possible causes lead to  im plem entation problems. The five  
stages are examined in  deta il in  two Member States: the Netherlands and the 
U nited Kingdom, in  w hich countries the la te r em pirica l research is 
concentrated. Im plem entation problem s and the efforts being made to combat 
i t  are investigated.
F inally, the im plem entation processes in  some other Member States (Denmark, 
Germany and France) are examined in  order to  p u t the im plem entation process 
o f the Netherlands and the U nited Kingdom in to  perspective.
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5.1.2 Drafting and Preparation of directives
One o f the p rincip les tha t is crucia l fo r the fo rm u la tion  o f directives is the 
p rin c ip le  o f 'competences d 'a ttrib u tio n '. This p rinc ip le , to  be found in  A rtic le  
4 o f the Treaty, refers to  the fact th a t Com m unity institu tions can on ly act 
w ith in  the legal boundaries o f delegated competence. The legal base 
o f th e ir actions does no t on ly  dictate th e ir actions bu t may also indicate the 
fo rm  (i.e. d irective  o r regulation) and the decision-making procedure to  be 
followed. However, the fo rm  o f Com m unity action is no t always decided by the 
Treaty; the Com m unity leg islator is le ft to  decide. Research has been carried 
out to  define the c rite ria  from  w hich the choice o f the fo rm  o f Com m unity law  
could be tested (Kangis, 1990).
The Council can, and frequen tly  does delegate decision making powers to the 
European Commission (Ludlow, 1991):
To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Council shall, in  
accordance w ith the provisions of this Treaty ... have power to take decisions, and 
confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the 
im plementation o f the rules which the Council lays down (Article 145 o f the Treaty).
This delegation to the Commission can be seen in  conjunction w ith  A rtic le  155 
o f the Treaty which states:
In  order to ensure the proper functioning and development o f the common market, the 
Commission shall: ... exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the 
im plementation of the rules laid down by the latter.
The Commission has a fo rm al rig h t o f in itia tive , no t on ly in  re la tion  to 
legislation bu t regarding any p o licy  th a t can be defined as being in  the 
general European interest. A rtic le  145 gives the Council the rig h t to  "impose 
certa in requirem ents in  respect o f the exercise o f these powers". An example 
o f the Council laying down 'certa in  requirem ents' is Council decision OJ L 
197/33 (13 July, 1987). This Council Decision, based on A rtic le  124 o f the Treaty, 
states tha t the Council can make the fo llow ing  o f selected procedures 
m entioned in  the Decision obhgatory. These procedures are also re ferred to as 
"com itology", and have one aspect in  common. In  the d ra fting  stage, the 
Commission has to  seek the advice o f a committee consisting o f experts from  
the Member States and chaired by a representative from  the Commission.
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Since the T reaty remains s ilen t regarding specific procedures th a t need to be 
fo llow ed during the fo rm u la tion  o f a proposal, the Commission is free in  the 
way i t  goes about it. In  practice, and w ith  the Council decision OJ L 197/33 in  
m ind, the Commission consults the nationa l experts, usually from  the relevant 
m inistries o r re lated governm ent agencies. Those experts can be p u t forw ard 
by the Member States, bu t the Commission can also inv ite  others to comment 
on the technical aspects o f a proposal and to take pa rt in  the several kinds o f 
committees, the so called ’com itology’.
The influence o f these committees on the Commission’s policies and proposals 
varies, from  a non-binding advice procedure to  a management and regulation 
procedure. The regulation com m ittee procedure provides Member States w ith  
maximum influence on Commission’s proposals. The regulation com m ittee's 
advice is based on the views o f a quahfied m a jo rity  o f its  members, however i f  
the advice does no t correspond w ith  the Commission's d ra ft proposal the 
Commission postpones a fin a l decision and sends the d ra ft proposal to the 
Council. The Council can, by qua lified  m a jo rity , take a decision on the d ra ft 
proposal. I f  the Council does not take a decision on the d ra ft proposal the 
Commission w ill take the decision (M inisterie  Verkeer en W aterstaat &  PIVOT, 
1995; 135 and O JL197/33,1987 ).
Another way in  w hich the Commission's policies are influenced is through 
various types o f w ritte n  statements and resolutions w hich are then presented 
to  the Environm ental Pohcy Review Group. This group was set up in  the early 
1990s in  order to im prove the com m unication between the Member States and 
the Commission and brings together the Directors-General o f the Environm ent 
from  a ll Member States and the European Community. A docum ent tha t is w ell 
received by th is fo rum  can on ly  be neglected by the European Commission 
w ith  d iffic u lty .
The Commission’s procedures leave room  fo r contribu tions and influences 
from  experts in  its  com itology. The emphasis in  the com m ittee discussions by 
national experts o f the Member States is on technical details. This in p u t is 
expected to lead to  clearer and techn ica lly sounder directives w hich in  tu rn  
suggests a better reception and consequently better im plem entation in  the 
Member States.
There are lim its  to the effectiveness w ith  w hich the Commission has its  
proposals and policies adopted. Golub ( 1996) argues tha t the influence o f the 
Commission to set the agenda and to have its  d ra ft proposals adopted is lim ited . 
In  his study on the fo rm u la tion  and adoption o f the packaging waste d irective 
(94/62/EC) Golub concludes that;
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... the development of the directive m ight illustrate the relative importance or 
irrelevance of the Commission's agenda setting powers... Even if  one assumes a certain 
amount of gamesmanship, whereby the Commission habitually puts forward extremely 
ambitious proposals and targets which it  knows w ill be sacrificed during subsequent 
negotiations w ith the Council, the weakness of the Commission as an agenda-setter is 
striking {Golub, 1996; 16-17).
5.1.3 Adoption o f a proposal
Once the Commission puts forw ard a proposal fo r a d irective the decision­
m aking procedure starts. There are m any d iffe re n t decision-m aking 
procedures defined in  the Treaty. The Council can decide w ith  unan im ity (e.g. 
on basis o f A rtic le  235 Treaty), qua lified  m a jo rity  (e.g. A rtic le  lOOA) or 
common m a jo rity  (e.g. A rtic le  153). The European Parliam ent (EP) can e ither 
be ignored (e.g. A rtic le  217), be consulted (e.g. A rtic le  130S), ’considered' (e.g.
C 89/1, 1975), have to be 'co-operated w ith ' (e.g. A rtic le  118A) o r has co­
decision powers (A rtic le  189b). The Economic and Social Committee is in  some 
eases to be consulted (e.g. A rtic le  124 to  127) and in  others no t (e.g. A rtic le  
130E).
Preparatory w ork fo r the Council is carried out by the Committee o f 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper). The Council is organised fo r the 
oversight and analysis o f d ra ft proposals through a large num ber o f 'w orking 
groups'. These Council w orking groups are set up by Coreper and consist o f 
members o f the perm anent m issions (perm anent representatives) o f the 
Member States as w ell as nationa l c iv il servants who fly  back and fo rth  to 
Brussels. The c iv il servants o f the C ouncil w orking groups are under 
ins tru c tion  o f th e ir Member States and are therefore n o t independent: 
nationa l preferences p lay an im po rta n t ro le.
When a proposal is su ffic ien tly  m ature, Coreper sends the proposal to  the 
Council. I f  the proposal has reached to ta l agreement in  Coreper, the proposal 
w ill be marked as an A -po in t on the Council's agenda. The proposal can then 
be dealt w ith  as a form ahty. I f  no agreement has been reached, fu rth e r 
negotiations w ill take place in  the Council. Council meetings used to be closed 
bu t critic ism  has led to the adoption o f a code o f conduct, regulating public 
access to documents o f specific Commission and Council meetings (OJ L 340/41, 
42 and 43, 1993). Meetings 'o f common p o litica l im portance', the crite ria  o f 
w hich are to be decided by the Presidency o f the European Council, are 
excluded.
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According to Siedentopf (1988), i t  is ha rd ly  possible to d istingu ish between the 
preparatory phase in  the Commission (e.g. the com itology) and the negotiating 
phase in  the Council due to the increased influence o f the national 
governments o f the Member States. A steady stream o f new suggestions is 
con tinua lly  received fro m  Coreper’s committees and w orking groups, from  
governm ent representatives and from  experts in  order to achieve a change in  
the Commission's in itia tives (Siedentopf, 1988; 37).
The Commission has a representative on each Council w orking group to  defend 
its  position  and to present d ra ft texts, therefore when national positions are 
voiced in  opposition to  specific Commission proposals, the Commission 
representatives are in  a position  to  defend the proposal. The Commission can 
change o r w ithdraw  its  proposal up u n til the po in t tha t the Council makes a 
d e fin ite  decision.
A fte r the d ra ft proposal has been approved by the Commission, the text o f the 
Commission proposal is sent to  the Council o f M inisters and the European 
Parliam ent fo r adoption. One o f the three cu rren t legislative procedures w ill 
apply. Under the consultation procedure the Council is obliged to  request an 
"op in ion" from  the European Parliam ent and from  the Economic and Social 
Committee before the Council deliberations o ffic ia lly  begin. A fte r Parliam ent 
has considered the proposal, the Commission can subm it an amended proposal 
to the Council, based on the amendments p u t forw ard by the European 
Parliam ent. I t  can a lte rna tive ly  choose to ignore the op in ion  o f the European 
Parliam ent. The proposal then passes to  the Council o f M inisters fo r form al 
consideration.
The last w ord on any Com m unity leg islation rests w ith  the Council, w hich may 
adopt Commission proposals as drafted, request the Commission to amend them, 
amend then itse lf, re ject them  or sim ply take no decision.
In  the tra d itio n a l consulta tion procedure, bargaining dynam ics inheren t to  
the Luxembourg Compromise o ften prevented Com m unity environm ental 
standards from  surpassing the lowest common denom inator (W eller, 1991; 
Haigh, 1992). This has been amended by the 1986 Single European Act, which 
introduced the co-operation procedure. The co-operation procedure on ly 
applies to some 10 articles o f the Treaty, bu t they include im portan t areas, 
notab ly most o f the legislative harm onisation necessary fo r the com pletion o f 
the Common M arket as w ell as decisions on research programmes and the 
structu ra l funds. Under the co-operation procedure proposals have two 
readings in  the European Parliam ent and agreement in  the Council o f
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M inisters is by qua lified  m a jo rity  vo ting (QMV). I f  the Commission accepts a 
Parhamentary amendment the Council can on ly  change the revised proposal 
by unanimous vote.
Legislative procedures a fte r the Treaty on European Union (TEU) are even 
more complex. The existing co-operation procedure w ill henceforth apply to 
most environm ental leg islation. The tra d itio n a l legislative consultation 
procedure, w ith  its  lim its  on Parliam ent's influence, w ill on ly apply to  fiscal 
measures, town and country p lanning, and land use (w ith  the exception of 
waste management and measures o f a general nature).
A new procedure, co-decision, is in troduced  fo r leg islation  concerning the 
establishm ent and w orking o f the common m arket (A rtic le  189B). For the very 
firs t tim e, i t  allows the European Parliam ent to  re ject proposed legislation. 
Previously, under the co-operation procedure. Parliam entary amendments 
w ould be adopted by m a jo rity  vote in  the Council when the Commission 
supported them, and by unan im ity i f  the Commission opposed the amendments. 
Now i f  the Council is unable to  approve the Parhament’s amendments w ith in  
three months the new co-decision procedure comes in to  play. This new 
procedure then provides fo r the convening (a fte r two "second Reading" votes, 
each requ iring  an absolute m a jo rity  o f the Parliament) o f a "concilia tion  
com m ittee" o f equal representation from  the Council and the Parliament. Its 
task is to reach agreement, by m a jo rity  vote in  the Council and by a m a jo rity  
in  the Parliament. Should both sides fa il to  agree, Parliam ent can re ject the 
proposal by another (absolute m a jo rity ) vote.
This th rea t o f re jection  has given the European Parliam ent greater 
negotiating power. However, an absolute m a jo rity  requires the support o f 
more than one o f the two m ajor p o litica l groupings o f the European 
Parliam ent and the European Parliam ent is often itse lf d iv ided. The increase 
o f the powers o f the European Parliam ent has been p a rticu la rly  apparent in  
the fie ld  o f the environm ent where the European Parliam ent has altered o r 
rejected a sign ificant num ber o f m ajor directives.
The change to  qua lified  m a jo rity  vo ting in  the Council has been welcomed.
Ken C ollins’ (MEP) view  is tha t unanim ous decision-m aking is more lik e ly  to 
resu lt in  leg islation w ith  m ajor loopholes and shortcom ings. The in troduc tio n  
o f qua lified  m a jo rity  vo ting, now agreed fo r most environm ental leg islation in  
the Treaty on European Union, was "absolutely essential" (Collins, 1992; 11). 
Others are less certa in regarding the positive effects o f qua lified  m a jo rity  
voting. W eiler (1991) argues tha t the mere possib ility  o f voting in  case o f a 
deadlock enhances the pressure to make concessions fo r the sake o f reaching
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a compromise. M oreover the extension o f qua lified  m a jo rity  voting could mean 
tha t Member States are more frequen tly  obliged to  adopt and im plem ent 
policies to  which they are opposed. As W ilkinson (1992) notes, th is could lead to 
non-im plem entation becom ing:
... a problem even more serious than it already is (Wilkinson, 1992; 14).
Finally, a fte r the proposal has been decided on by the Council, i t  is published 
in  the O ffic ia l Journal o f the Com m unity (A rtic le  191), and has legal effect 
from  the date m entioned in  the d irective  and otherwise on the tw entieth day 
a fte r publication.
5.1.4 Conclusion
It  has been argued th a t the fo rm u la tion  and dra fting  process o f Com m unity 
directives has a d irec t bearing on the im plem entation o f the d irective. The 
Commission is the in itia to r o f Com m unity legislation; its  d ra ft proposals are 
prepared in  conjunction w ith  d iffe re n t committees in  w hich nationa l experts 
have a voice.
Experts are given a chance to contribu te  to and influence the Commission's 
d ra ft proposals; th is is thought to  have a positive effect on im plem entation.
A Commission proposal, discussed and amended by national experts, is thought 
to lead to be tter acceptance and consequently im plem entation in  those 
Member States. The influence o f the Commission to set the agenda and have its  
d ra ft proposals adopted however, is lim ite d  (Golub, 1996). The Commission 
frequently has to change and w ater down its  proposals to ensure a positive 
reception in  the Council. Golub concludes tha t in  terms o f in s titu tio n a l 
influence, the Commission can provide a reperto ire  o f p o licy  options
... but in terms of power they can not prescribe specific policy outcomes (Golub,
1996; 25).
The Member States are no t inc lined  to  give up th e ir central position  (the 
Council takes the fin a l decision) and secure th e ir interests in  the Council 
w orking groups and Coreper discussions. Here national preferences p lay an 
overrid ing ro le; c la rity  and technical specific ity  o f the proposed d irective  is 
frequen tly  compromised in  o rder to  reach agreement. The in tro du c tio n  o f 
qua lified  m a jo rity  vo ting, cu rre n tly  also covering the environm ent, has
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reduced the num ber o f compromises and thus unclear and watered down 
proposals tha t are adopted.
Collins (MEP) saw the extended qua lified  m a jo rity  voting as an im portan t step 
forw ard, leading to  be tte r legislation. Others questioned the positive effects o f 
qua lified  m a jo rity  voting. The loss o f the veto meant tha t some Member States 
were re luctan t to im plem ent a d irective  they d id  n o t agree w ith , bu t had been 
adopted under qua lified  m a jo rity  voting.
Concluding on the im portance and relevance o f the above regarding 
im plem entation the fo llow ing  comments can be made. F irst, by its  very nature 
leg isla tion  constitutes the resu lt o f p o litica l negotiations and compromises. 
Secondly a fte r exam ining the d ra ftin g  and preparatory process up to  the fin a l 
adoption o f a directive by the Council, i t  seems tha t Com m unity problems w ith  
im plem entation are worsened th rough  its  decision-m aking processes. 
D ifferences in  pohtica l attitudes and interests between the Member States p lay 
a p rom inent ro le . M oreover Member States have considerable influence 
during the preparatory stage on d ra ft proposals o f Com m unity legislation, 
especially through the Council w orking groups. There are lim its  to the 
effectiveness w ith  which the Commission has its  proposals and policies adopted 
(Golub, 1996). In  order to reach agreement on its  d ra ft proposals, the 
Commission has no t on ly  to  acquire agreement in  a ll the Council w orking 
groups bu t is like ly  to have to m od ify  and change its proposals in  order to 
reach agreement. Such practice is thought to  have a negative effect on the 
c la rity  and consistency o f Com m unity legislation.
5.2 N a tio n a l a d m in is tra tiv e  p rocedu res fo r  the  p re p a ra tio n  and 
im p le m e n ta tio n  o f EC d ire c tiv e s  in  th e  N etherlands
5.2.1 In troduction
This Section examines the processes and d ifficu ltie s  encountered in  
im plem enting EC demands and obligations o f EC directives in  the Netherlands. 
Im plem entation o f Com m unity d irectives in  general has had a somewhat 
problem atic past in  the Netherlands: in  1991 the European Commission 
inform ed the governm ent o f the Netherlands that, as regards water pro tection 
directives 80/778/EEC fo r d rink ing  water, 76/160/EEC fo r bathing water,
79 /869/EEC and 85/440/EEC fo r surface water, had no t been transposed in  a 
satisfactory manner. The Netherlands had also fa iled  to ensure the correct or 
complete transposed o f directives 82/501/EEC m ajor-accident hazards o f
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certain ind u stria l activities, 85/337/EEC im pact assessment and 79/409/EEC 
regarding the pro tection  o f wüd b irds.
Before assessing the extent o f the im plem entation problem s in  the 
Netherlands and the response o f the Dutch government, an overview o f the 
the Dutch legal and adm in istra tive  system includ ing its  p o litica l cu ltu re  is 
presented.
5.2.2 The Dutch Legal and A dm in istra tive  system and C ultu ra l specificities
The Netherlands has a m onist constitu tiona l m onarchy based on a 
parliam entary democracy. A m onist constitu tion  accepts
... that international law obligations are o f the same nature as, or are even superior to, 
national law obligations (Freestoneand Davidson, 1988; 15).
Government in  the Netherlands is at three levels: the State, the province and 
local adm in istra tion  o r m unicipa lities. Both central and local or other 
functiona l au thorities possess regu la to ry and adm in istra tive  a u th o rity  in  
d iffe re n t areas. The precise competence o f centra l and functiona l 
governmental bodies is ha rd ly  m entioned in  the Dutch constitu tion  o r 
Grondwet. Competences are on ly vaguely defined as 'to  regulate and adm inister 
th e ir own in te rna l a ffa irs '. According to  Kooiman:
This line of thinking is the result of the concept, that public interest should be 
promoted by the most suitable authority, that is at the lowest possible level 
(translated from  Kooiman, 1988; 577).
A lthough decentra lisation is the gu id ing p rin c ip le  fo r centra l governm ent, 
involvem ent and centra l governm ent exercise o f regula to ry and 
adm in istra tive  a u th o rity , is w hat has taken place in  re a lity  (Kam erstukken II
1989-90, 21 109 no 22; 71). The growth o f the welfare state, the need to contro l 
the budget a t centra l level, the organisation o f centra l governm ent its e lf and 
numerous other centralising tendencies have made and continue to  make 
effective decentra lisation d iffic u lt. The cen tra lis t effect o f the governm ent is 
also present during the im plem entation process o f EC D irectives and starts 
during the fo rm u la tion  and negotia tion  process in  Brussels where 
predom inan tly  h igher ranked c iv il servants partic ipa te .
The Netherlands have a fu lly  developed body o f adm inistrative law. In  cases 
where regulations or decisions o f local or functiona l governm ental bodies
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con trad ict h igher regulations o r pub lic  interest, they can be quashed by 
centra l government (e.g. the Crown). Disputes between loca l au thorities o r 
between local authorities and centra l governm ent can be resolved by non- 
contenüous procedures in  w hich h igher-ranking  governm ental bodies 
adm inister justice (T ijde lijke  Wet Kroongeschillen). In  some cases, citizens 
resort to  these adm in istra tive legal procedures i f  they want to  resolve th e ir 
disputes on m atters invo lv ing  governm ental bodies.
T rad itiona lly , the Netherlands has had a great d ive rs ity  o f organisations, 
possessing equal (constitu tiona l) righ ts  and m any o f w hich are lin ke d  to one 
another. Lawrence (1991) characterises the Netherlands as heterogenic 
(Lawrence, 1991;9). "This heterogeneity is m anifest in  the ’organisational 
geography' o f the Netherlands" (Lawrence, 1991;36). D iversity is to be found 
throughout the society from  a w ide va rie ty  in  p o litica l parties to a wide va rie ty  
o f action and in terest organisations. Lawrence emphasises:
"The Netherlands is marked not only by organisational complexity but also by 
articulation and conditionality. Organisations and systems connect w ith each 
other, balance each other, depend on or constrain each other" (Lawrence,
1991:36)
Regarding Dutch m anagerial style, Lawrence adds:
"Dutch style ... is about bargaining without bludgeoning, persuasion not 
dynamism, manoeuvring w ithout menace ..." (Lawrence, 1991; 111).
These ideas w ill be given fu rth e r content in  the next sections, where the focus 
w ill be on the Dutch na tiona l processes o f fo rm u la tion  and im plem entation, 
the pa rtic ipa tion  o f the various in te rest groups, and balances between 
d iffe re n t c iv il departm ents.
5.2.3 Form ulation o f directives
The op in ion  o f the Dutch governm ent as expressed in  contribu tions and 
amendments, is expressed in  the Council w orking groups and during  the 
Coreper negotiations. In  July 1989, an Interdepartm ental Committee on the 
assessment o f new EC proposals (W erkgroep beoordeling nieuwe 
Commissievoorstellen) was set up to  discuss and form ulate these contributions 
and amendments at m in is te ria l level. A ll m in is te ria l departm ents are  ^
represented in  th is Committee w hich is chaired by the M in is try  o f Foreign
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Affairs, The Committee meets once a m onth in  order to discuss the latests 
Commission proposals. In  th is Committee problem s w hich m ay arise la te r 
during the im plem entation process (e.g. in terdepartm enta l disputes o r 
controversies over (unclear) term inology) are discussed.
Once a proposal has been adopted by the European Commission and has been 
p u t forw ard to the Council, every M in is try  invo lved w ith  its  im plem entation 
has to  complete a certa in fo rm  (fiche). In  the fiches the responsible M in is try  
must indicate what the contents o f the EC d irective is, w hat the consequences 
are fo r nationa l law  and w hich legal instrum ent possibly w ill be used fo r 
im plem entation. The fiches m ust be reported to the M in is try  o f Foreign 
A ffa irs  (D irectorate European In tegra tion) and are taken in to  account during  
negotiations o f the proposal in  the Council.
When negotiations are being conducted w ith in  the Council, the o ffic ia l Dutch 
stand w ith  respect to  a proposal is form ulated by the Dutch Cabinet. The 
o ffic ia l Dutch op in ion  is prepared in  the Interdepartm ental C o-ordination 
Committee fo r European In tegra tion and Association Problems (CoCo). The 
chairm an o f the Committee is the M in iste r o f Foreign A ffa irs. The other 
members o f CoCo are high-ranking departm ental o ffic ia ls. The CoCo evaluates 
and discusses the contribu tions from  the Committee on the assessment o f new 
EC Commission proposals (figure  5).
Since 1989, the preparatory stages in  the Netherlands have taken place in  the 
Interdepartm ental Committee fo r the Assessment o f new EC proposals. The 
Interdepartm ental Committee's task is to discuss and form ulate governm ental 
contribu tions and amendments in  m on th ly  meetings. Each m in is te ria l 
departm ent also completes 'fiches' in  w hich la te r im plem entation measures 
are stated, these fiches are sent to  the M in is try  o f Foreign A ffa irs. The fiches 
are on ly  sent to Parliam ent, by the M in is try  o f Foreign A ffa irs, when 
proposals have substantial im plications. The contributions from  the 
Interdepartm ental Committee fo r the Assessment o f new EC proposals together 
w ith  the fiches are sent to the C o-ordination Committee on European 
integra tion (CoCo). The CoCo prepares the o ffic ia l Dutch stand and op in ion  in  
the Council o f M inisters. The contribu tions during  the fo rm u la tion  and 
negotiation stages o f EC proposals are, a lthough m ain ly m in iste ria l, im portan t. 
A much heard com plaint from  Dutch m in iste ria l departm ents is tha t directives 
are from  a q u a lity  p o in t o f view  unclear, com plicated o r confusing, w hich can 
in  tu rn  lead to d ifficu lties w ith  im plem entation (CTW 90/22, 1990; 10). During 
the fo rm u la tion  phase questions concerning legal com plications can be asked 
and a ttention can be paid to possible problems o r ambiguous term inology.
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Anothe r critic ism  is the lack o f invo lvem ent o f Departm ental lawyers du ring  
the negotiation o f Com m unity leg islation  (Kreveld, 1991).
F igure  5: In flu e n ce  d iag ram : th e  P rep ara tio n  and  A d o p tio n  
o f EC proposals in  th e  N etherlands
P arliam ent
A
Council o f State
Council o f M inisters 1
I
The Crown
Coordination Commission 
fo r European Integration 
(CoCo); Chairm an:M inister 
o f Foreign A ffa irs
Council o f State
Council fo r European
A ffairs (Chairman: Prime M inister)
Interdepartm ental Committee
fo r the Assessment o f New Proposals '
from  the Commission (Chairman: M inister o f Foreign A ffa irs)t
Various M inisters
Interest Groups Consultative Councils
source: Pappas et a l,1995; 42.
The Dutch Parliam ent (Tweede Kamer) plays a m inim al ro le  during  the 
fo rm u la tion  and negotiation process (Vermeulen, 1993; Besselink, 1993; 
Jurgens, 1993). This is due to way in  w hich Parliam ent is in form ed regarding 
new EC proposals and the fact tha t C ouncil meetings are behind closed doors. 
Parliam ent is predom inantly dependent on the governm ent fo r in fo rm a tion  
regarding Commission proposals o r C ouncil policies and asks frequen tly  fo r 
earlie r and more in fo rm ation  (Kamerstukken n  1990/91, 21 109, no 17). 
Parliam ent is kept in form ed by the governm ent on Com m unity developments 
in  several ways. I t  receives the C ouncil’s agenda (Kamerstukken 21 501), 
however often by the tim e Parliam ent receives the agenda, i t  is too late to 
organise a parliam entary debate. Each M in iste r sends his o r her agenda and 
reports o f the Council o f M inisters meetings in  which he o r she was present.
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Finally, the fiches made by the m in istries are sent to Parliam ent i f  the adopted 
Com m unity leg islation  has im po rtan t consequences fo r the na tiona l legal 
fram ework. This is the case fo r example i f  the im plem entation o f the new 
Com m unity leg islation takes the fo rm  o f a statute. Parhament can o f course 
always ask a M in iste r fo r explanations and more in fo rm a tion  concerning EC 
proposals. Parliam ent no t on ly  com plains regarding late in fo rm a tion  bu t also 
regarding the q u a lity  o f the fiches i t  receives, the contents o f w hich often 
fa ils  to explain whether the proposal has im portan t consequences fo r nationa l 
law (Besselink, 1993; 630).
In  general the lack o f Parliam ent’s p a rtic ip a tio n  during  the preparation and 
adoption process o f Com m unity d irectives has been critic ised  in  the 
Netherlands. I t  has been argued th a t i f  Parliam ent was more invo lved w ith  
the preparation o f Com m unity leg islation and d id  no t w ait u n til the proposals 
had passed through the m in is te ria l departm ents, irrita tio n s  w ith  and d is like  o f 
the fin a l proposal as p u t fo rw ard to  Parliam ent could be reduced (van R ijn, 
1990;55).
Parliam ent’s m inim um  p a rtic ip a tio n  and involvem ent w ith  Com m unity 
legislative proposals and policies can also be explained from  a h is to ric  and 
constitu tiona l p o in t o f view. The fact tha t the Netherlands have a m onist 
constitu tion  im plies tha t in te rna tiona l Treaties need no t ra tifie d  by Parliam ent 
bu t take im m ediate effect a fte r governm ent has signed them. It was on ly  in  
1991 tha t Parliament demanded tha t i t  should be inform ed on p o litica lly  
im portan t Treaties before the governm ent had com m itted its e lf 
(Kamerstukken 1990-91, 21 214, no 8; 2-3). Moreover, i t  took a long tim e before 
the governm ent started to  in fo rm  Parliam ent on Commission proposals under 
discussion in  the Council. U n til 1991, Parliam ent was sent on ly  a summary o f 
proposals lis ted  fo r adoption in  the Council. Since 1991 Parliam ent receives 
in fo rm ation  on Commission proposals w hich are sent to  the Council fo r 
fu rth e r negotiation and adoption. However, Parliam ent on ly  receives those 
Commission proposals tha t have been sent to  the Council, w hich the 
Interdepartm ental Committee fo r the Assessment o f New Proposals from  the 
Commission th inks have im po rta n t consequences. As a result. Parliam ent is 
w ho lly  dependent on governm ent (the Interdepartm ental Committee fo r the 
Assessment o f New Proposals) fo r the Commission proposals i t  receives.
Van Dis, member o f Parliament, trie d  to  change the m inim um  ro le  o f 
Parliam ent during  the fo rm u la tion  and adoption process o f Com m unity 
legislation and proposed the in tro du c tio n  o f a process sim ila r to  the one 
employed by Denmark. Van Dis’ amendment (Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 647
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(R 1437), no 27) obliged the Dutch governm ent, before voting in  an unan im ity 
Council decision, to ask fo r Parliam ent's approval. The amendment was 
rejected by Parliam ent.
In  re a lity  a developm ent in  the opposite d irection  is taking place, e.g. away 
from  Parliam entary influence. A Committee looking in to  the Cabinet's 
procedural decision-m aking rules, proposed the in troduc tio n  o f a po licy  w hich 
relieves the M in iste r President from  its  com m itm ent to  a mandate from  the 
Cabinet itse lf. This w ould resu lt in  a fu rth e r distance fro m  Parliam entary 
contro l (Besselink, 1993; 550).
5.2.4 The Im plem entation Process o f a d irective
The European Court o f Justice requires tha t im plem entation m ust create safe 
and certa in legal situations by way o f perm anent and publicised measures.
The Grondwet does no t include any specific provisions fo r the im plem entation 
o f EC directives. Nor does any specific Act regarding the im plem entation o f EC 
leg islation in to  the Dutch legal system exist. Im plem entation is therefore 
governed by the general p rinc ip les underly ing  the Dutch constitu tiona l 
system and the provisions o f the Grondwet itse lf.
Consequently, in  order to address the question as to which types o f legislative 
instrum ents are used to im plem ent EC directives, it  m ust firs t be determ ined 
w hich d iffe re n t types o f leg islation  and regulation the Dutch constitu tiona l 
system recognises.
In  A rtic le  81 o f the Grondwet, legislative power is assigned to  the Crown 
(o ffic ia lly  the governm ent in  co-operation w ith  the Qpeen) and Parliam ent, 
acting in  co-operation. In  practice, as in  o ther European constitu tiona l 
monarchies, the Qpeen is o n ly  a figu re  head. When acting together according 
to the procedure la id  down in  A rticles 81-88 o f the Grondwet, government and 
Parliam ent have the power to enact statutes.
A rtic le  89 o f the Grondwet empowers government to draw up legislation o f its  
own, called 'Orders in  C ouncil' (algemene maatregelen van bestuur o r amvb), 
according to  a certa in procedure. Government is empowered to  enact these 
Orders in  Council, e ither on the basis o f statutes which delegate legislative 
competence o r on the basis o f the Grondwet itse lf.
F ina lly, a th ird  legislative instrum ent is the M in iste ria l order. The M in is te ria l 
o rder is based on A rtic le  89 o f the Grondwet and is issued by one o r more 
m in iste rs.
A part from  a ttrib u tin g  legislative powers to bodies o f the centra l government, 
the Grondwet a ttributes such powers to  decentralised authorities as weh.
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Autonomous regulations produced by decentralised authorities are not, 
however, suitable fo r the im plem entation o f EC directives fo r several reasons. 
By its  ve ry nature, sub-central leg is la tion  w ill no t be u n ifo rm  th roughout the 
country. Further, shortcom ings in  the im plem entation o f EC directives by 
decentralised governm ental bodies cannot be invoked by governments to 
ju s tify  non-compliance w ith  EC directives (Case 28/81, 1981, Commission v 
Ita ly , ECR 2577). Moreover, i t  w ill be d iffic u lt fo r central governm ent to 
con tro l the exercise o f autonomous a u th o rity  com pletely, and i t  is therefore 
unable to meet its  responsib ilities fo r correct and tim e ly  im plem entation. 
Consequently, from  the perspective o f centra l governm ent delegation o f 
im plem entation o f EC directives to decentralised authorities m ight be a less 
a ttractive  option.
A fte r the above assessment o f the available and suitable instrum ents fo r 
im plem entation o f EC directives in  the Netherlands, the respective processes o f 
adoption and im plem entation o f these instrum ents (statute, order in  Council 
and M in is te ria l order) are fu rth e r examined (figu re  6). Specifically 
investigated is w hether and in  w hat way Dutch adm in istra tive  and legal 
processes affect im plem entation o f Com m unity directives.
Im m ediately a fter a D irective has been adopted by the Council, preparations 
start in  m in is te ria l departm ents fo r the im plem entation o f th a t D irective. The 
preparations usually take place in  several m in iste ria l departm ents and are co­
ordinated by the CoCo. Part o f these preparations is the decision how  the 
proposal w in  be im plem ented.
The choice to propose a new o r to amend an existing statute depends on several 
issues. F irst, the contents o f the d irective  itse lf. Any penal sanctions fo r 
example must, according to the Grondwet, be enacted by statute. Further the 
princip les o f democracy and the ru le  o f law  (legaliteitsbeginsel), fundam ental 
to the Dutch constitu tiona l system, stipulate tha t 'any im portan t subject m atter 
m ust be dealt w ith  by the Crown and Parliam ent acting together and cannot be 
delegated'. This im plies tha t at least a m in im al outline  o f a certain po licy 
should be la id  down in  statutes. They must at least define the scope, structura l 
elements and standards o f the problem  area to be regulated. The fillin g  in  and 
elaboration o f technical m atters and provisions o f a s tric tly  executive nature 
can be delegated to the Crown o r (sub)delegated to a m inister.
Statutes are enacted by the governm ent (Crown) and Parliam ent acting in  co­
operation (Articles 81-88 Grondwet). The preparatory stage fo r statues o r its  
amendments takes place w ith in  the m in is te ria l departments, w ith  the
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F igu re  6: P rocess-flow  D iagram  o f the  Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f 
C om m un ity  D ire c tive s  in  th e  N e th e rla nds: suggested o r 
o n g o in g  g o v e rn m e n ta l m o d ific a tio n s
national legislation EC directives
Departmental
phase
Consultation
Council of State
Parliam en tary
Statute:
* new proposals implementing directives to be 
developed within specific time-table (one-third 
of the time-limit stated in the directive)
* clearer overview required regarding 
legislation prepaired for implementation 
purposes
* clearer language and form of proposed 
legislation
Order in Council:
* new proposals implementing directives to be 
developed within specific time-table (two-thirds 
of the time-limit stated in the directive)
* clearer overview and language required
Ministerial order:
* clearer overview and language required
T
Statute/ Order in Council and 
Ministerial order:
* mandatory consultation changed to 
discretionary
* no advice when Parllamentarv hearing 
and/or debate follows
I
Statutes/ Order in Council:
* advice from the Council of Stale remains 
mandatory
* Council of State is asked to limit the time it 
takes to prepare its advise
Ministerial order:
* no involvement of Council of State
Statutes:
* Parliament asked to simplilÿ and shorten its 
procedure
* proposal for 'silent' adoption (in the case 
that no more than one fifth of the Members of 
Parliament ask for a debate)
* overview of legislative initiatives and 
future policies regarding implementation is 
discussed with Parliament on a regular basis
Order in Council/Ministerial order:
* procedures for these legislative instruments 
not to involve a Parliamentary phase
source: Kamerstukken II 1993-94, 23 462, n r . l;  31.
110
exception o f leg islation tha t is in itia te d  by Parliam ent itse lf. However at the 
m in is te ria l departm ents the b lueprin ts fo r most (legislative) policies and the 
proposals fo r statutes are drawn up. A t th is stage, interest groups and 
advisory boards are consulted by o ffic ia ls  from  the m in is te ria l departm ent, fo r 
th e ir (speciahst) advice concerning the d ra ft statute. These advisory bodies 
and research ins titu tio n s  regarding the environm ent include the Central 
Council on Environm ental Protection, w hich advises the M in iste r fo r the 
Environm ent; the independent Environm ental Im pact Assessment Commission, 
the nationa l In s titu te  o f Public Health and Environm ental P rotection (RIVM) 
w hich carries ou t m any o f the sc ien tific  studies underp inn ing the 
environm ental policies form ulated by VROM, and the Central Bureau o f 
Statistics. These consultations are m andatory since M inisters are 
constitu tiona lly  obliged to obta in  the op in ion  o f advisory boards in  order to 
ensure a careful preparation o f the statute. It is common that, apart from  the 
vo lun ta ry consultations, two o r more advisory boards have to be heard before 
a statute can be brought to  Parliam ent. These m andatory consultations greatly 
delay the legislative process and consequently the im plem entation o f EC 
directives. Here professor Geelhoed comments that:
... the national legislative procedure is a labyrinthine decision making process, in 
which all departments and interest groups take p a r t... everything is taken into  
consideration. The Brussels decision making process is more focussed: the opinions of 
the Member States are the main inputs, and compromises are made towards Member 
States’ interests ... the Community can not and does not take into account the Dutch 
system of departmental legislation, we must be more flexible and acknowledge that 
this is one of the main causes of delay ... (translated from Geelhoed, 1990; 30).
When a proposed statute has passed through the rounds o f consultation, i t  is 
scrutinised fo r its  overall leg islative q u a lity  by the Committee fo r the Review 
o f Legislative Projects o r by  the special d iv is ion  o f the M in is try  fo r Justice, 
and discussed in  the CoCo. I t  is also discussed in  the Cabinet. Following th is, 
there is fu rth e r consultation on the proposed statute, because the Grondwet 
stipulates tha t the Council o f State (Raad van State, comparable to  the French 
Conseil d ’Etat) must be heard before statutes are passed on to both Chambers o f 
Parliam ent and can be adopted according to  the procedure described in  
A rticles 82-88 o f the Grondwet. Parliam ent (Tweede Kamer) receives the 
proposed statute w ith  the advice and op in ion  o f the Council o f State, however 
i t  is in form ed earlie r on EC proposals v ia  m in iste ria l fiches and overviews
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from  the M in is try  o f Foreign A ffa irs. The ro le  o f the Eerste Kamer (F irst 
Chamber) is m inim um  to  non existent regarding the scru tin isa tion  Com m unity 
legislation: to date the Eerste Kamer has no t contribu ted to  the im plem entation 
o f EC legislation and is u n like ly  to  do so in  the fu tu re . M oreover i t  is the 
Tweede Kamer tha t has the fin a l vote and say in  the adoption o f leg islation in  
the Netherlands. A fte r Parliam ent receives the proposed statute, the 
Parliam entary procedure starts. This includes (more) consultation: advice 
boards, pressure groups and specialist organisations are asked to  give th e ir 
advice and op in ion. Subsequently Parhament o r a parliam entary committee 
can decide to  amend the proposal o r ask questions to  the m in iste ria l 
departm ent. Follow ing the answers, debate and adoptions o f Parliam entaiy 
amendments, Parliament votes on the proposed or amended statute.
The adoption and im plem entation o f Orders in  Council is less time-consum ing 
than i t  is fo r statutes. The in itia l procedure is sim ilar; a fte r a d irective  has 
been adopted by the Council, preparations sta rt at m in is te ria l departm ents fo r 
the im plem entation o f tha t d irective. When the decision has been made to  
im plem ent by Order o f Council, the procedure is the fo llow ing . Orders in  
Council are prepared by the M inistries and are adopted by the Crown (A rtic le  
89 o f the Grondwet), S im ilar to  the procedure fo r statutes, m andatory 
consultation w ith  advisory boards takes place and advice from  the Council o f 
State is m andatory. However, there is no Parliam entary procedure since Orders 
in  Council are made by way o f delegation o f Parliam entary au tho rity .
Proposals fo r Orders in  Council are discussed in  the Cabinet, adopted by the 
Qpeen in  Council and then published in  the o ffic ia l gazette, the Staatsblad. The 
Cabinet and the in d iv id u a l M inisters are constitu tiona lly  responsible to 
Parliam ent fo r a ll th e ir actions. On the basis o f th is responsib ility  the Cabinet 
has to in fo rm  Parliam ent when asked a n d /o r defend the adopted Orders in  
Council. Orders in  Council m ust be based on statutes, in  w hich Parliament has 
delegated its  legislative power to the Crown so tha t Orders in  Council may be 
adopted. However, a ll proposed Orders o f Council are sent to Parliam ent which 
can decide i t  must be consulted on these proposals whenever i t  considers th is 
to  be necessary. This procedure has been devised in  order to give Parliament 
advance notice o f and a substantial con tro l over the subject dealt w ith  in  the 
Orders in  Council. The procedure weakens the fle x ib ility  o f the O rder in  
Council as an instrum ent and slows down the legislative process and 
consequently the im plem entation process o f EC directives.
F ina lly  when, during the preparations at m in is te ria l departm ents fo r the 
im plem entation o f a directive, the decision has been made to im plem ent by
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way o f M in iste ria l order the fo llow ing  procedure applies. The power to adopt 
M in iste ria l orders is based in  (sub)delegation, the Grondwet does no t 
prescribe any procedure and consultations are less frequent, no advice from  
the Council o f State is required. Also no ParUamentary co-operation is 
required. The p rin c ip le  o f prim acy o f the legislature im plies tha t on ly  w ith  
regard to m ino r subjects like  pu re ly  executive prescriptions, th is legislative 
a u th o rity  can be delegated to  a m inister. M inisters are responsible to 
Parliam ent fo r a ll th e ir activ ities, however Parliam entary invo lvem ent in  the 
preparation and adoption o f M in is te ria l orders is very rare. This instrum ent 
appears to be suitable fo r the im plem entation o f EC directives fo r the fact tha t 
a m inim um  am ount o f tim e is invo lved fo r its  enactment therefore ensuring 
im plem entation w ith in  the set tim e lim its  o f a d irective (Bekkers, 1992;
Bekkers, 1993). The M in iste r o f Foreign A ffa irs  is responsible to n o tify  the 
European Commission o f an adopted statute. Order in  Council o r M in isteria l 
order fo r purposes o f im plem entation o f a directive,
5.2.5 C riticism  on Dutch im plem entation and reforms
In 1988 one o f the firs t studies on im plem entation o f EC directives in  the 
Netherlands was published. The study by Kooiman and Yntema (1988) is 
c ritica l regarding the way the Dutch governm ent has fu lfille d  its  
im plem entation tasks. Kooiman and Yntema id e n tifie d  the factors involved in  
the im plem entation process and analysed some crucia l problem s regarding 
im plem entation in  the Netherlands. The very d iffe re n t nature o f the process 
o f fo rm u la ting  Com m unity leg islation  in  'Brussels' and im plem enting EC 
leg islation  in  the Netherlands has been emphasised by Kooiman and Yntema. 
D iffe ren t actors take pa rt in  the two processes and im portan t actors involved 
w ith  im plem enting EC leg islation are le ft ou t in  the fo rm u la tion  and 
negotiation process in  Brussels.
In  add ition  to the large differences between the preparation o f an EC d irective  
and its  im plem entation in  the na tiona l context Kooiman and Yntema concluded 
tha t problems related to  im plem entation are found in  the sphere o f co­
o rd ina tion  between governm ental bodies (Kooiman and Yntema, 1988; 601- 
602). Not long a fte r Kooiman's and Yntems's c ritica l study, the extent and 
seriousness o f Dutch problem s w ith  im plem entation o f EC directives emerged. 
In  1991, the issue o f delayed and non-im plem entation o f Com m unity directives 
suddenly moved up on the Dutch p o litica l agenda. The combined efforts o f the 
European Commission and the European C ourt o f Justice to ensure compliance 
w ith  EC In te rna l M arket leg isla tion  and the upcom ing Dutch Presidency o f the
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Council o f M inisters in  1992 contribu ted towards the sudden im portance o f and 
a tten tion  to im plem entation. The issue became even more urgent when the 
extent o f the substantial delays was realised: in  1992 the average delay fo r 
im plem entation o f Com m unity environm ental directives was 55 months (table 
6). Table 6 is based on in fo rm ation  sent by m in iste ria l departments to 
Parliam ent regarding the progress o f im plem entation. I t  shows tha t the 
im plem entation o f EC directives in  the Netherlands is hampered by serious 
delays.
The issue o f non-im plem entation evolved in to  a p o litica l issue in  the 
Netherlands and its  seriousness was underlined  by the fact tha t the 
Commission had started o r was preparing to start a considerable num ber o f 
new infringem ent procedures (Section 5.2.1). The subsequent p o litica l debate 
regarding problems w ith  delayed and non-im plem entation o f Com m unity 
d irectives evolved around the length o f the form al legislative procedure in  the 
Netherlands. The reason w hy emphasis was la id  on the fo rm al legislative 
procedure was because o f the conclusions o f a Committee set up to review the 
im plem entation process o f EC legislation. The Committee, ‘Commissie voor de 
toetsing van wetgevingsprojecten’ (CTW 90/22), concluded in  its  find ings in  
1991 tha t one o f the m ain causes fo r late im plem entation is the length and 
com plexity o f the national leg is la tion  procedure. This conclusion is d iffe re n t 
from  Kooiman's and Yntema's (1988) conclusions. They specifica lly state fo r 
example, tha t the nature o f the national legislative process d id  not appear to  
affect im plem entation greatly (Kooimans and Yntema, 1988; 601). Other 
causes, such as the fact tha t the EC legislative structure and the Dutch national 
legislative structure are very d iffe ren t, are also named in  the CTW 90/22 
report. The m a jo rity  o f Dutch environm ental leg islation is in  the fo rm  o f 
fram ework laws, which state general objectives but need to be backed up by 
more specific measures fo r im plem entation. The a u tho rity  to  issue such 
measures is delegated to the appropriate level by way o f various types o f 
Decree (i.e. Orders in  Council and M in iste ria l orders). This is in  contrast to  
C om m unity environm ental leg isla tion , w hich is specific and norm ative. Jans 
(1991a) agrgues tha t " these are clearly two d iffe re n t ways o f legislating... 
w hich could w ell con tribu te  to the delays occurring in  im plem entation in  the 
Netherlands..." (translated from  Jans, 1991a; 65).
Further m entioned in  the report are the short tim e lim its  allowed fo r the 
im plem entation o f EC directives and the fact tha t the Common M arket 
programme brought w ith  i t  a substantial am ount o f directives, a ll needing to 
be implemented. The CTW 90/22 report not on ly mentions causes fo r
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im plem entation delays but also gives advice regarding im proving 
im plem entation o f EC directives in  the Netherlands.
The m ain proposals are that:
• an earlie r s ta rt should be made w ith  the preparations o f im plem entation 
w ith in  the Netherlands;
• Dutch comments and amendments regarding proposed EC legislation should 
be brought fo rw ard more strong ly du ring  the Council negotiations;
Tab le 6: Im p lem en ta tio n  delays  
N e therlands (1 9 8 9 -1 9 9 4 )
regard ing d irec tives in  the
Country; The Netherlands 
Directive : All Directives
Year
Number of 
Directives for which 
implementation 
date has passed
Average delay in 
implementation 
(months)
1989 57 26
1990 66 23
1991 70 21
1992 64 25
1993 88 13
1994 64 18
Country: The Netherlands 
Directive : Environmental Directives
Year
Number of 
Directives for which 
implementation 
date has passed
Average delay in 
implementation 
(months)
1989 12 40
1990 16 43
1991 22 41
1992 15 55
1993 18 40
1994 5 19
source : Tweede Kamer, (Second Chamber of Parliament, Progress reports on implementation) 
uitvoering EG richtlijnen, Kamerstukken: 1989-90, 21 109,nr 12;
1990-91,21 109,nr 32; 1991-92,21 109,nr 49; 1992-93,21 109,nr 61; 1993-94,
21 109,nr71; 1994-95,21 109,nr 79.
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•  unnecessary obstacles in  the im plem entation process o f EC D irectives such 
as the m andatory consultation rounds, should disappear;
• more use should be made o f a lternative ways o f im plem entation and 
decentra lisation;
•  technical im provem ent o f im plem entation techniques such as a 
s im p lifica tion  o f the ParUamentary procedure should be made.
The CTW 90/22 report received considerable critic ism . Mortelmans and van 
R ijn (1992) critic ised the report as "too narrow " (Mortelmans et al., 1992; 74), 
as i t  concentrated m ain ly on causes o f delays at the national level such as the 
extended process o f m andatory advice. Maas and van Haersholte (1994) argue 
tha t the report is too vague and lacking a clear analysis o f the im plem entation 
process in  the Netherlands.
Parallel to  the CTW 90/22 report, the ParUamentary Committee on EC affairs 
held a hearing on the problems and delays w ith  im plem entation o f EC 
directives (Vaste Commissie voor EG zaken, Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 109 no. 
22). In  its  report the ParUamentary Committee on EC affa irs pointed out 
several causes fo r the Dutch problem s and delays regarding im plem entation:
• The fact tha t the European leg islation process was perceived as something 
on the periphery (Geelhoed, Kamerstukken I I 1990/91, 21 109 no. 22; 30). 
The general lack o f in terest in  the leg islation process in  Brussels lead to an 
absence o f alertness o f the Dutch adm in istra tion  in  re la tion  to  early 
fo rm u la tion  and prepara tion o f leg islation  in  Brussels.
This in  tu rn  lead to  the fact tha t a s ta rt w ith  the preparation o f 
im plem entation o f d irectives was on ly  made when the d irective  had been 
adopted by the Council:
... in Brussels it is felt that problems concentrate around the lack o f civil and 
political interest in the im plem entation of community legislation ... administrations 
are reluctant to put much time into implementation of community legislation ... 
understandably creating new legislation is more creative than implementing EC 
legislation (translated from  van Rijn, Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 109 no. 22; 51).
• The sometimes poor quaUty o f EC directives and the vague terms used in  EC 
directives were m entioned (Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 109 was no. 22; 15 
and 94 see also Kamerstukken I I 1990, 22 008, n r. 1-2; 25).
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• Fu rther m entioned a t the hearing was the d iffic u lty  o f accurately 
translating  environem ental d irectives in to  o ther C om m unity languages. In  
many cases the exact meaning was lost, w ith  c ritica l differences in  one or 
two words (Tazelaar, Kamerstukken n  1990/91, 21 109 no. 22 ; 29).
• F ina lly, the fact tha t D utch environm ental leg islation is ve ry substantial 
and complex im p lied  fo r example th a t fo r the im plem entation o f EC 
directives often several Acts needed to  be amended. Even the evaluation o f 
which Acts o r Orders in  Council needed to be amended is a complex and tim e 
consuming task (Kamerstukken H 1990/91, 21 109 no. 22; 52).
A lthough the CTW 90/22 report has been critic ised fo r its  narrow  and lim ite d  
view  and scope, i t  was a tu rn ing  p o in t in  the a ttitude  regarding 
im plem entation o f EC directives in  the Netherlands. Im plem entation has been 
given a h igher p ro file  and in  the years a fte r the report, several proposals 
were p u t forw ard to im prove im plem entation (Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 
008, no 4-5) (E ijlander, 1993; Flier, 1994).
The Dutch governm ent agreed to im plem ent most o f the recommendations o f 
the CTW 90/22 report as i t  stated in  its  answer to  Parliament regarding the 
findings o f the CTW 90/22 committee (Kamerstukken,1991-92, 21 109, no 34-43). 
Recent changes tha t have been made invo lve m am ly the im plem entation 
processes o f leg islative instrum ents (figu re  6). First, the com pulsory advisory 
consultation during the fo rm u la tion  o f leg isla tion  has changed. In  the 1993 
amendments to the statute on general p o licy  conditions (W ijzig ing van de 
Algemene Wet bestuursrecht en de Bekendmakings wet in  verband m et 
im plem entatie EG regelgeving, Stb.1993, 671) w hich took effect in  1994, 
governm ental com pulsory consulta tion o f various advisory boards regarding 
leg islation  form ulated fo r the im plem entation o f EC D irectives, was changed to 
vo lun ta ry (Kamerstukken II 1991-92, 22 690, no 1-3). Advice from  the Council 
o f State remains com pulsory.
Further agreements were made concerning the adoption o f leg isla tion  
im plem enting EC Directives (Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 008, no 4-5 and 
Aawijzingen voor de regelgeving, 1992, Stcrt.230). The Cabinet was asked to 
lay down im plem entation measures w ith in  one-th ird  o f the d irective 's tim e­
lim it and M inistries were asked to  la y  down measures w ith in  tw o-th irds o f the 
directive 's tim e-hm it. The Council o f State was also asked to lim it the tim e it  
took to advise on new legislation, and Parliam ent was asked to  fo llo w  the advice 
o f the CTW 90/22 Commission and to  speed up and s im p lify  the debate on 
im plem entation measures.
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Two controversial proposals have been p u t fo rw ard bu t fo r the m oment 
rem ain undecided. The firs t o f these is th a t sta tu tory proposals im plem enting 
directives are agreed upon by Parliam ent w itho u t w ritte n  preparation, and the 
second is tha t in  case no debate is requested by at least one fifth  o f the 
members o f Parliam ent w ith in  th ir ty  days a fte r subm itting the sta tu tory 
proposal, th is proposal be accepted (by ’ham erstuk’) (Kamerstukken II 
1993/94,23 462, no 1; 5-6).
A lthough i t  is too early to asses whether the in troduced changes to the form al 
legislative process in  the Netherlands have had the desired effect, i t  is possible 
to  make several comments regarding the chzinges introduced in  1994. These 
comments are based on the statistics shown in  table 6 and the considerable 
a tten tion  given to  the issue o f delayed and non-im plem entation in  the early 
1990s.
The data in  table 6 shows an overall decreasing trend in  the average delay tim e 
fo r im plem entation o f environm ental directives from  1992 to  1994. The m ain 
cause o f th is overall decrease was the im plem entation in  1994 o f two 
environm ental d irectives w hich had taken a p a rticu la rly  long tim e to 
im plem ent: the Birds D irective (w hich took 15 years to  im plem ent) and the 
Groundwater D irective (w hich took 8 years to im plem ent). The im plem entation 
o f these two directives and others, was p a rt o f the Dutch governm ental e ffo rt 
to  ‘clean up ’ the backlog o f non-im plem ented directives. A nother explanation 
fo r the drop in  average delay in  im plem entation o f environm ental directives 
is the re la tive ly  low  num ber o f new environm ental d irectives adopted by the 
Council in  1994, which was 5 compared to 18 in  1993.
The nationa l auditing  com m ittee (Algemene Rekenkamer) reports tha t a t least 
some M in istries s till experience d iffic u ltie s  im plem enting d irectives 
(Algemene Rekenkamer, Kamerstukken n 1993/94, 23 710, nrs. 1-2;14-15).
In  its  repo rt the nationa l aud iting  com m ittee examines the e ffo rts o f 
governm ent since 1992 to  im prove im plem entation. I t  is argued tha t although 
the departm ental lawyers who prepare the statutes and Orders in  Council 
necessary fo r the im plem entation o f EC directives, are given a greater p ro file  
and ro le, M in iste ria l departm ents have no t (yet) succeeded in  im proving the 
speed o f fo rm ula ting  statues in  order to  w ork away the backlog o f directives 
w aiting  im plem entation.
5.2.6 Conclusion
From the q u arte rly  overviews regarding im plem entation th a t the M in is try  o f 
Foreign A ffa irs sends to Parliam ent i t  is clear th a t there were substantial
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problem s w ith  im plem entation in  the Netherlands. This was recognised by the 
Dutch governm ent and a Committee was given the task to investigate the 
problems and to  form ulate recommendations. From the exam ination o f the 
im plem entation process in  the Netherlands several causes can be id e n tifie d  
leading to im plem entation problem s:
• The Dutch constitu tiona l system;
Com m unity case law  holds tha t im plem entation o f Com m unity directives must 
create safe and certa in legal situations by way o f perm anent and published 
measures. These demands leave lit t le  room  fo r im plem entation by means o f 
self-regulation, adm in istra tive  d irections o r autonomous leg is la tion  o f 
decentralised authorities in  the Netherlands. Im plem entation m ust be 
conducted at central governm ental level and m ust make use o f measures tha t 
are lega lly b ind ing . No specific regula tion  exists fo r the im plem entation o f EC 
legislation and measures are used w hich are stipulated in  the Grondwet. 
Statutes are used frequen tly  fo r the im plem entation o f Com m unity directives. 
The Grondwet lays down an onerous procedure fo r the preparation o f sta tu tory 
law, especially the consulta tion process, w hich means th a t years may elapse 
between a proposal o f p rim ary d ra ft leg islation and its  u ltim ate  adoption by 
Parliament. Geelhoed concluded that:
... there is a great difference in speed between the Community and the Dutch 
legislation process... making a law in the Netherlands can easily take around 10 years 
... at the moment the Community decision making process takes on average 1.5 years 
(translated from Geelhoed, 1990; 33).
M oreover Kortm ann concluded tha t "the Dutch constitu tiona l system 
especially the m andatory consulta tion rounds deeply affect the way in  which 
Com m unity directives are im plem ented" (Kortm ann, 1991;47). The usefulness 
o f the consultation rounds has been questioned since they cannot contribu te  
much to  the d irective w hich has already been decided upon. However, were 
the advice to  be given at a much earher stage during the d ra fting  at 
Com m unity level its  im pact and usefulness could be m uch greater.
Nevertheless, the m ajor constitu tiona l change o f m andatory consulta tion in to  
vo lun ta ry has been critic ised  (Sewandono, 1992). Sewandono argues th a t such 
a m ajor re form  should have been more specific e.g. at least should have been 
stipulated in  which situations advice can be le ft ou t (Sewandono, 1992;1174).
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• The differences in  leg isla tive  techniques;
Apart from  the speed o f developing and adopting legislation in  the 
Netherlands, the Dutch legal system, in  connection w ith  d iscre tionary powers, 
recognises a du ty  on the adm in istra tive authorities to  make adm in istra tive 
rules. Geelhoed m entions the differences in  legislative techniques in  the 
Com m unity and the Netherlands;
... in the Netherlands you w ill find open framework laws and perm it systems, 
working on a case by case basis ... Community legislation works on a different 
principle ... harmonisation is on the basis of norms, not procedures ... these 
explicit (m aterial) norms laid down in directives can lead to problems 
(translated from Geelhoed, 1990; 33).
• The Dutch Parliam entary procedure;
Proposed leg islation  is sent by  governm ent and m inistries to  the Parhament 
fo r fu rth e r consideration and adoption. D uring its  deliberations, Parhament 
can and usuahy does ask the op in ion  o f several advice groups thus adding 
more tim e to the im plem entation process.
The fact tha t Parliam ent usuahy sees the d ra ft statutes at a late stage are 
frequent causes fo r irr ita tio n  and delays and does no t con tribu te  to sw ift 
im plem entation .
The effectiveness o f Parhament’s co n tribu tio n  at the stage when i t  receives 
sta tu tory proposals have been questioned. The d irective has e ffective ly been 
decided upon and there is h ttle  Parhament can do to change it. Involvem ent 
and co n tribu tio n  at an earher stage, during  the dra fting  and fo rm u la tion  
process o f Com m unity directives w ould be more effective. In  tha t case 
unpleasant surprises and irr ita tio n  occurring when na tiona l im plem entation 
proposals are sent to Parhament can be avoided.
In conclusion, the fact tha t the legislative and adm in istra tive process in  the 
Netherlands is based on the w ish to  achieve consensus w ith in  the Dutch 
society as a whole, includ ing  w ith in  the various parts o f the governm ent and 
w ith in  the governm ental and Parliam entary re la tionsh ip , causes problem s 
regarding the im plem entation o f Com m unity directives. The tim e consuming 
consensus process, in  w hich m any actors p lay a ro le  and are given the 
o p po rtu n ity  to express themselves, is no t very suitable fo r the re la tive ly  short 
im plem entation tim e lim its  set in  directives.
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The aim  to have a ‘perfect’ legislative process form s an obstacle fo r 
im plem enting Com m unity directives on tim e. Arguably, sta tu tory law  and 
Orders in  council are no suitable instrum ents fo r the purpose o f im plem enting 
Com m unity directives. I t  was concluded tha t the consultation procedure fo r 
the adoption o f leg islative measures im plem enting Com m unity leg islation 
needed changing. Subsequently m andatory consultation changed to 
discretionary, and tim e lim its  have been set fo r M in is try ’s fo rm u la tion  o f 
im plem entation measures.
These changes brought on by European Com m unity obligations, invo lv ing  
d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tio n  and even restructu ring  o f constitu tiona l rules, are 
substantial, especially considering the fact tha t the Dutch society operates via  
consensus and pa rtic ipa tion . The changes received some critic ism  bu t were 
adopted w ithou t much delay o r objections.
However from  the above analysis is i t  clear tha t the m andatory advice rounds 
during the legislative process do no t fo rm  the on ly obstacle towards 
im plem entation in  the Netherlands and other im portan t issues should also be 
addressed by the governm ent. The fact tha t environm ental legislation in  the 
Netherlands takes the fo rm  o f fram ework laws form s an obstacle towards the 
im plem entation o f the detailed and norm ative Com m unity environm ental 
directives. M oreover the re la tive ly  lit t le  in terest and sense o f urgency some 
m in istries have shown regarding im plem enting Com m unity leg is la tion  is 
reason fo r some concern. The fact tha t Parliam ent is more and more excluded 
from  the preparation and im plem entation process could lead to even fu rth e r 
distance o f and less debate on European Com m unity issues and legislation, 
w hich does no t enhance the overall awareness and knowledge o f Com m unity 
d irectives.
5.3 N a tio n a l a d m in is tra tiv e  p rocedures fo r  the  p re p a ra tio n  and 
im p le m e n ta tio n  o f EC d ire c tive s  in  the  U n ite d  K ingdom
5.3.1 The U nited Kingdom's Legal and A dm in istra tive system and C ultural 
sp e c ific itie s
Several issues have to  be considered before examining the U nited Kingdom 's 
legal and adm in istra tive system. F irst, laws and procedures in  the U nited 
Kingdom  d iffe r between England, Wales, Scotland, and N orthern Ireland. 
B roadly speaking environm ental regu la tion  is s im ila r in  a ll parts, the 
difference being the greatest between Scotland and the rest. England and 
Wales are effective ly one state fo r th is purpose and there are no provinces.
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Also another issue should be considered. A cross-national analysis o f d iffe re n t 
nationa l im plem entation procedures m ust take h isto rica l and cu ltu ra l 
differences in to  account.
The U nited Kingdom d id  no t jo in  the EC u n til January 1973, by which tim e the 
Com m unity was fifteen  years in to  its  evo lu tionary cycle and had already 
developed its  own in s titu tio n a l structure  and in te rna l cu ltu re. The 
consequences o f late en try  and the h is to rica l differences between B ritish  
practices and cu lture  and those o f its  European partners s till have im portan t 
im plications. The decision to jo in  the Com m unity was deeply controversia l and 
p o litic a lly  d ivisive:
For some ten years after British accession to the EC on 1 January 1973 the 
characteristic profile o f British political debate remained locked in the conditional 
mode, that is to say focused still on the underlying question of whether membership 
itself was the appropriate policy for any British government to pursue ... The 
consequence was that much of the public discussion on EC issues was confined to 
'Anglo-British' introversion, w ith a vocabulary and themes that were virtually  
incomprehensible to commentators in other member states, apart from  Denmark and 
Greece, where sim ilar factors were in evidence (Wallace, 1990; 150).
These in itia l controversies have no t evaporated as events such as the ‘opt ou t’ 
clause on the European M onetary Union and general d is like  o f some B ritish  
po litic ians w ith  ‘Brussels’. One reason w hy the Netherlands is such a 
com m itted Com m unity member in  contrast to B rita in  is because i t  has seen 
Europe as a means o f achieving na tiona l objectives.
C ontrary to Dutch society, the U nited Kingdom has been characterised as much 
more homogeneous, although th is is cu rre n tly  changing and the U nited 
Kingdom is becoming a more complex society (Maidment, 1993;1). The United 
Kingdom ’s b ipartisan po litics  (compounded by its  simple m a jo rity  electoral 
system, qu ite  d iffe re n t from  systems found elsewhere in  Europe), sustains an 
adversarial and confronta tiona l style o f p o litica l debate w hich is d issim ila r to 
the m ore consensus-seeking trad itions o f coa lition  po litics  in  many other 
Member States. B ritish  p o litica l parties themselves do not f i t  read ily  in to  the 
m ould o f European p a rty  po litics. This applies in  pa rticu la r to the Conservative 
party, w hich has found its e lf at odds w ith  European C hristian Democrats over 
im portan t issues such as the environm ent and the Social Chapter.
F inally, there are d iffe ren t models o f capitalism  practiced in  Europe (W ilks, 
1996;536). The prevailing Anglo-Am erican tra d itio n  o f economics tends to
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regard the m arket as separate, na tu ra l and self-regulating (W ilks, 1996;538). 
The Anglo-Saxon view  o f the economic environm ent emphasises the 
com petition between markets (Begg, 1996,’5 29). A m ajor issue fo r example fo r 
(privatised) ind u s try  in  B rita in  is the costs o f EC environm ental leg islation.
In 1991 the United Kingdom governm ent found itse lf in  a bad position  
regarding im plem entation o f EC directives. According to the Commission, there 
were re la tive ly  s ign ifican t fa ilu res in  transposing d irectives fu lly  and 
com pletely. The fo llow ing directives had no t been adequately transposed in  
1991: d irective 85/337 regarding im pact assessment, 85/203 on n itrogen 
dioxide, 84/360 on adoption o f existing plants to the best available 
technologies, 79/409 regarding w ild  b irds, 76/464 on dangerous substances in  
the aquatic environm ent and d irective  80/778 regarding d rin k in g  water. 
In fringem ent proceedings were commenced in  respect o f each o f these 
(COM(92)136,1992;232).
The U nited Kingdom is a constitu tiona l m onarchy. The B ritish  C onstitution is 
u n ita ry  in  the sense tha t i t  is applicable to a Union consisting o f England, 
Wales, Scotland and N orthern Ireland, as opposed to a federal system, and i t  is 
centralised. The local authorities o n ly  possess legislative powers w hich have 
been conferred upon them  by Parliam ent and are subject to  centra l- 
government con tro l as w ell as to ju d ic ia ry  contro l. Contrary to the 
C onstitutions o f the other Member States, the B ritish C onstitution is m ostly 
unw ritten , is flexib le  and has a dua lis t tra d ition . This means tha t on ly lim ite d  
status is given to rules o f in te rna tiona l law  unless and u n til they have been 
transform ed in to  national law  (Freestone &  Davidson, 1988;15).
The C onstitution relies on a tra d itio n  o f common law  as w ell as the legislative 
precedence (o r sovereignty) o f Parliam ent consisting o f two chambers, the 
House o f Commons and the House o f Lords.
This doctrine, which rules tha t there is no superior law w hich can be b ind ing 
upon Parliam ent and tha t Parliam ent can no t be b ind ing upon its  successors, 
has been called in to  question by the accession to the European Com m unity.
The EC Treaties and the provisions o f Com m unity law, w hich are d irec tly  
effective and applicable have therefore been brought in to  force in  the U nited 
Kingdom by an Act o f Parliament. The 1972 European Communities Act (as 
subsequently amended) provides fo r the fu lfilm e n t o f a ll Com m unity 
obligations arising by o r under the Treaties. The 1972 Act states tha t a ll EC 
leg islation having d ire c t effect is autom atica lly applicable in  the U nited 
Kingdom. The 1972 Act also states tha t every Community law  can be
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im plem ented by O rder in  Council o r M in iste ria l order. The 1972 Act names a 
few regulations w hich may no t be based on the Act.
5 .3 .3  Form ulation o f d irec tives
For dealing w ith  Com m unity a ffa irs many M in iste ria l departm ents have set up 
European Sections, and c iv il servants o f these European Sections are involved 
in  the negotiations in  Brussels tha t precede the proposal o f d ra ft EC directives 
by the Commission. The ir w ork is cen tra lly  co-ordinated, so as to avoid 
contrad iction  and overlap between d iffe re n t departm ental positions, by a 
special adm inistrative body set up fo r tha t purpose in  the Cabinet Office: the 
European Secretariat.
The Cabinet O ffice is a t the heart o f collective responsib ility  and government 
in  B rita in  and presides over a large netw ork o f Cabinet committees w hich are 
responsible fo r decision-m aking, p o licy  co-ord ination and leg is la tion  on 
im portan t issues. Routine EC pohcy co-ord ination is entrusted to a high- 
powered Cabinet Committee, OD(E), chaired by the Foreign Secretary and 
includ ing about h a lf o f a ll Cabinet m inisters. This Committee comprises two 
other o ffic ia l committees, the EQS and EQp (themselves d ivided in to  the EQP(P) 
and EQP(L)) which deal w ith  European issues.
The Foreign and Commonwealth O ffice has two European Com m unity 
Departments, one EC Departm ent is responsible fo r external policies and 
another EC Departm ent is responsible fo r in te rna l EC policies (figure  7). A lead 
M in iste ria l Departm ent in  the UK has usually been ide n tifie d  at the 
negotia tion stage:
the lead Department takes part in the discussions of the draft instrum ent in Brussels, 
with members of the Office of the Permanent Representatives to the European 
Community (Jeffreys, 1991;40).
Most Parliam entary procedure in  the U nited Kingdom is founded on the 
assumption tha t M inisters b ring to Parliam ent proposals th a t they and th e ir 
departments have form ulated and then defend them in  debate. However, in  
the case o f European Com m unity legal documents such as proposed directives, 
the situation is d iffe ren t. Extensive debate and discussions have been going on 
since B rita in  firs t jo ined the Com m unity about how Parliam ent can best 
handle EC proposals where rules o f m in is te ria l responsib ility  do no t apply.
Since the United Kingdom jo ined the EC in  1972 a system o f 'scru tiny ' has been 
developed and consolidated in  a 1980 resolution (House o f Commons Journals
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1979-1980; 819) vriüch has recently been amended and extended in  a 1990 
resolution (Hansard,1989-90,Vol 178 col 388; 646). The scru tiny system has two 
m ain strengths: i t  is thorough and covers every leg islative proposal com ing
F igure  7: In flu e n ce  d ia g ra m : th e  P re p a ra tio n  and A d o p tio n  o f 
EC proposa ls in  the  U n ite d  K ingdom
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source: Pappas,1995;49.
from  the Com m unity, and secondly the governm ent is constrained when a 
Com m unity proposal is subject to scrutiny. Government is com m itted to  deposit 
a copy o f every Com m unity legal document to  Parliament's Select Committee on 
European Legislation:
i. any proposal under the Community Treaties for legislation by the Council o f 
M inisters;
ii any document which is published for submission to the European Council or the 
Council o f Ministers;
iii any document which is published by one Community institution for or with a view  
to submission to another Community institutions and which does not relate 
exclusively to consideration of any proposal for legislation;
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iv any other document relating to European Community matters deposited in the 
House by Ministers of Crown (House of Commons Standing Order no 127).
Since 1989 a ll Com m unity proposals are received by the Commons Select 
Committee on European Legislation (o r scru tiny committee) and scrutinised on 
th e ir im portance. The Select Committee decides whether to send a proposal to 
European Standing Committees w hich fu rth e r decide i f  and what motions 
should be p u t fo r the House (HC Standing Order no 102 (1,6 and 8) and no 127 
(1 )). W ith in  10 w orking days governm ent m ust produce an Explanatory 
Memorandum regarding a Com m unity proposal which is sent to the Select 
Committee on European Legislation. The Explanatory Memorandum is the 
starting p o in t fo r scru tiny, i t  covers the proposal's subject m atter, defines 
w hich m in iste r is responsible, addresses legal and procedural issues 
(includ ing  the Treaty base), examines the proposal against the subsid iarity 
c rite ria  and gives Government's view  o f the financia l and p o licy  im plications 
(figure  8). The Commons Select Committee on European Legislation can 
request a debate w hich can no t on ly take place in  the Commons, bu t also in  one 
o f the specialised Committees o r in  one o f the two European Standing 
Committees. I f  one o f the Committees embarked on a debate on a EC proposal o r 
started scrutin ising the proposal. Government has agreed that, w ith  the 
exception o f special urgent circumstances, i t  w ill not decide on a proposal in  
the Council u n til i t  has passed scrutiny, th is is the so called scru tiny reserve o f 
Parliam ent (4 th  Report, Select Committee on Procedure, 1988-89, 622-1; vü i). It 
is possible tha t the scru tiny com m ittee negotiates a p a rtly  l i f t  o f the 'scru tiny 
reserve' w ith  the governm ent in  order to  prevent too much delay in  the 
Council negotiations.
The key functions o f the scru tiny com m ittee are:
• "To decide on the legal and p o litica l im portance o f a proposal, and whether 
i t  should be debated by the House;
• To pursue w ith  the governm ent areas o f doubt and controversy in  order to 
be able to in fo rm  the House and the pub lic, and
• To police the w orking o f the system and the government's discharge o f its 
obligations, as w ell as in s titu tio n a l developments o f the Union" (Rogers, 
1995;101).
The scru tiny committee deals w ith  nearly one thousand documents a year, i t  
publishes a detailed report to the House every s itting  week covering every 
document o f im portance tha t week (Rogers, 1995;101). Each year about 50 or 60
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debates on proposals fo r Com m unity leg islation take place in  Parliam ent and 
the reports o f the scru tiny com m ittee are considered care fu lly  by the 
government (Jeffreys, 1991). M inisters have found the scru tiny committees 
the most demanding type o f Parliam entary proceeding (Rogers, 1995; 104).
O nly when a proposed d irective  is o ffic ia lly  p u t forw ard to the Council by the 
Commission, does the B ritish  governm ent in fo rm  both Houses o f Parliam ent. 
Parliam ent has asked to  be inform ed earher (2"^ Special Report, Select 
Committee on European Legislation, HC 1974-1975 251, paras. 26 and 40), but 
governm ent refuses on the basis tha t earher documents are in te rna l non­
published Commission documents and therefore i t  is not the task to fo r the 
governm ent to send those to  Parhament.
Nevertheless, the House o f Commons has via  the House o f Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities, access to in fo rm ation  on Commission 
proposals. The House o f Lords Select Committee has in fo rm a l contacts w ith  the 
Com m unity ins titu tion s in'Brussels and can sometimes influence the 
Commission’s proposal th rough these contacts.
The coming in to  force o f the Treaty on European Union has led to a re­
exam ination o f the way the Parliam entary scru tiny operates. Regarding the 
scru tiny o f the new intergovernm enta l piUars, there are two p rin c ip a l 
requirem ents: firs t in fo rm a tion  on w hich scru tiny can take place and 
secondly, an in p u t in to  the decision-m aking o f a national governm ent in  the 
fo rm  o f a scru tiny reserve w hich prevents the governm ent agreeing before 
Parliam ent has had its  say. According to Rogers, both are causing d iffic u lty :
Government's response on the two key areas of information and a reserve has been 
lim ited ... at the moment we have a situation in which our scrutiny opportunities may 
be largely post hoc (Rogers, 1995;97).
Recent reports from  the scru tiny com m ittee show dismay and irr ita tio n  w ith  
the long tim e is takes to get in fo rm a tion  regarding proposed Com m unity 
legislation. I t  is argued tha t th is endangers the accountability o f Com m unity 
legislation to Parliament. Com m unity proposals sometimes a rrive  weeks, o r 
even months late and sometimes in  French. According to Rogers:
Of course there are circumstances where rapid decision-making is required for the 
public good ... but time and time again, the subject m atter provides no justification 
but proposals nevertheless emerge from the Commission days or even hours before 
they are due to be taken by the Council ... it is to say the least very strange that the
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Council is prepared to operate in this way - even to the extent that official texts, not 
of what the Council decided but of what it was being asked to decide, are sometimes 
prepared only after the relevant meeting ... of course for national parliaments matters 
are very much worse. We have to wait for the transmission of documents to our 
capitals and to our parliaments, delays are exacerbated, and all too often no effective 
scrutiny is possible (Rogers, 1995; 105).
The scru tiny com m ittee threatens tha t i f  these trends continue tha t is i t  forced 
to block Com m unity leg isla tion  and impose a Parliam entary scru tiny reserve 
on an EC proposal. This w ill prevent a Departm ental m in iste r from  voting in  
the Council on tha t proposal. F ina lly, the growing practice o f reaching 
in fo rm a l 'p o litica l agreement' is a fu rth e r problem , i t  lim its  the subsequent 
freedom  o f action o f national m inisters and erode the scru tiny righ ts o f 
national Parliam ent (Rogers, 1995; 106).
The House o f Lords scru tiny com m ittee operates under an identica l 
Parliam entary scru tiny reserve, however the ro le  and w ork o f the House o f 
Lords European Communities Committee is fundam entally d iffe re n t from  the 
Commons scru tiny committee. The House o f Lords reports are in-depth 
considerations o f the m erits o f a small num ber o f selected proposals.
A lthough a non-elected second chamber, the House o f Lords Select Committee 
on the European Communities (also a scru tiny committee) gained a lo t o f 
respect both in  the United Kingdom and in  the Community. This is due to the 
qu a lity  o f th e ir reports in  w hich a thorough investigation by the Select 
Committee is carried out using witnesses and specialists fo rm  no t on ly the 
U nited Kingdom b u t also other Member States. Their investigative work, 
w hich takes up to six m onths is done by five  subject-oriented and largely 
autonomous sub-committees. Regarding the influence and effectiveness o f the 
Committee reports Pownall argues tha t "there are clear examples where the 
fin a l European leg islation d id  appear to fo llo w  in  certa in respects the 
Committee's recommendations" (Pownall, 1995; 146).
The d ivision  o f w ork developed between both Houses seems to  work. The House 
o f Commons concentrates on the broad outlines, w hile the House o f Lords 
concentrates on the legal side o f Com m unity proposals, looking at issues such 
as the carrying ou t o f the proposal, the enforceab ility and financia l 
consequences. For example, in  the past i t  questioned the technical basis o f a 
num ber o f environm ental d irectives (HL Paper 73, 1988-89, 16th report,
N itrate in  Water; HL Paper 37, 1986-87, 2nd report. Water Q uality Objectives; HL
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Paper 135, 1986-87, 8th Report). Both Houses acknowledge each others opinions 
bu t the House o f Parliam ent has the last word.
5.3.4 The im plem entation process o f a d irective
In  the U nited Kingdom  much use has been made o f quasi-legislative devices in  
giving effect to domestic p o licy  objectives:
... there has been an exponential growth of statutory and extra-statutory rules in  
plethora of forms. Codes of practice, guidance, guidelines, W hite Papers,... codes of 
conduct... (Ganz, 1987;2).
Supplementary documentation of this nature could have a profound impact on EC law  
at the im plementation stage and, in theory, open up possibilities for variances to 
occur between actual practice and the original directive (Butt, Philip and Baron, 
1988).
Time and tim e again the question arises w hether these rules have ’legal 
a u th o rity ' i.e. whether they are s ta tu tory instrum ents (B roring, 1994). The 
question has been answered by the European Court o f Justice, w hich ru led  
that, im plem entation o f d irectives by adm in istra tive means was inadequate 
(Case 61/81, Commission v United Kingdom, 1982 ECR 2601).
The European Communities Act 1972 decides tha t rules proposed on its basis 
have the status o f s ta tu to ry instrum ents. Subsequently the European 
Communities Act delegates the competence to form ulate these sta tu tory 
instrum ents to 'Her Majesty by O rder in  Council' and 'any designated M inister 
or departm ent' (Section 2(2) ECA 1972). Jeffreys argues that:
... it is not essential to use the powers in section 2(2) when making regulations which 
give effect to a Community obligation: there may be powers in another piece of 
legislation which perm it this to be done ... however, it is extremely convenient to have 
section 2(2) available to be able to give effect to a Community obligation (Jeffreys, 
1991;40).
Statutory instrum ents are form ulated m ain ly by c iv il servants and dra fted by 
departm ental lawyers, w orking in  Central Government Departments under the 
form al constitu tiona l d irection  o f p o litic a lly  appointed m inisters, who are 
answerable to Parliam ent. O ther instrum ents available fo r im plem entation 
apart from  sta tu tory instrum ents w hich invo lve delegated legislation, are Acts 
o f Parliam ent com patible w ith  the Dutch statutes (wet in  form ele zin).
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Since the rules based on the European Communities Act have the status o f 
sta tu tory instrum ents, the decision m aking procedure fo r statutes is follow ed 
(S tatutory Instrum ents Act 1964 and the S tatutory Instrum ents Regulations 
1974). This means tha t a fte r a M in iste ria l departm ent prepared the proposal, 
the a ffirm ative  o r negative reso lu tion  procedure can be fo llow ed. Both 
procedures have in  common th a t Parliam ent can not amend the proposed 
statute once they have been made: they can on ly be approved o r not approved 
by Parliament. The proposed statute has to be pu t forw ard to both Houses o f 
Parliament, w ith  the exception o f statutes on financia l issues, those can be p u t 
forw ard to  the House o f Commons only. Government decides w hich procedure 
in  firs t instance is fo llow ed.
In  the a ffirm ative  reso lution procedure, the proposed statute has the force o f 
law  on ly a fte r Parliam ent gives its  agreement. The government is allowed to 
p u t a tim e lim it w ith in  w hich the Parliam ent must make a decision. Parhament 
asks always fo r three weeks m inim um . When one o f the houses takes no 
decision w ith in  the tim e h m it set out, then the negative reso lu tion  procedure 
applies. In  the negative reso lu tion  procedure, the proposed statute has effect 
o f law  im m ediately. However both Houses o f Parhament can w ith in  40 days, p u t 
forw ard a resolution to annul the sta tu tory proposal. I f  tha t is the case then 
the sta tu tory ru le  has to be w ithdraw n by Order in  Council. The two procedures 
d iffe r in  the way th a t Parliam ent is invo lved. The a ffirm ative  procedure 
allows fo r more Parhamentary influence, no t on ly because o f the character o f 
the procedure bu t also due to the tim e Parhament has to prepare. The 
government has in  the case o f an a ffirm ative  procedure to make tim e on the 
Parhamentary agenda, in  the case o f the negative resolution procedure, 
Parhament i t  self has to fin d  tim e fo r the decision making.
Several issues influence the choice between the two procedures, fo r example 
governm ent chooses the a ffirm a tive  procedure when existing law  needs to be 
amended. Also the pohtical im portance given to a Com m unity proposal plays a 
role. A lthough Parhament does very seldom reject the proposed statute, its  
involvem ent does have effect. Government as a ru le  w ould want to  avoid a 
re jection by Parhament and wiU adjust the proposal according Parhamentary 
commence in  fo r example the Jo in t Committee on S tatutory Instrum ents.
From the exam inations above several b u ilt- in  processes are safe-guarding 
im plem entation o f EC directives w ith in  the tim e hm its given in  the d irective. 
First, the fact tha t Parhament is invo lved at an early stage in  the preparation 
o f Com m unity proposals is crucial. Secondly, sta tu tory instrum ents involve 
extensive delegation to government, w hich means tha t most detaiied
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regulations w ill take place at a la te r tim e leaving less to debate on regarding 
in  the sta tu tory instrum ent itse lf. Moreover, s ta tu tory instrum ents are usually 
adopted by Parliam ent w itho u t problem s o r extensive exam ination:
Getting a statutory instrument through Parliament is normally a matter of weeks
(Jeffreys, 1991;41).
An Act o f Parliament (named a B ill in  the firs t stages) w hich can be amended, 
takes longer to get through Parliam ent. It needs in  each House, a Second 
Reading, a Committee Stage and Report Stage, and T h ird  Reading. Then follows 
a consideration by whichever House the B ill started o f the o ther House's 
amendments. A B ill m ust however, receive Royal Assent in  the same session as 
that in  which i t  receives its  firs t reading: i f  i t  does no t i t  has to start its  
Parliam entary stages a ll over again. A B ill m ust therefore, receive Royal 
Assent in  about a year o r is lost - the b ill 'd ies' in  Parliament.
5.3.5 Conclusion
In 1991 the European Commission started several in fringem ent procedures 
against the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom fo r fa ilin g  to im plem ent 
several directives; the decrease in  num ber o f im plem ented directives (to 81.6% 
in  1994, Section 1.1) indicates tha t problem s regarding im plem entation were 
present. However, the problem s o f extrem ely long im plem entation delays 
experienced in  the Netherlands are no t common in  the U nited Kingdom.
From .the above exam ination several factors explain why such long delays are 
no t occurring in  the U nited Kingdom.
First, the so lid a rity  w ith in  the c iv il servants corps. Those who were in  Brussels 
negotiating and form ing the d irective 's contents, were also p rim a rily  
responsible fo r the im plem entation in  the national system. This is no t the case 
in  the Netherlands where d iffe re n t c iv il servants negotiate in  Brussels and 
prepare nationa l leg isla tion  im plem enting the d irective . Secondly the 
Parliam entary scru tiny plays an im portan t role. The fo rm u la tion  and adoption 
process o f Com m unity directives has a fo rm u la tion  phase and a decision 
m aking phase in  the Council. From the evidence above i t  is clear tha t during 
the fo rm u la tion  phase the B ritish  governm ent does n o t in fo rm  Parliam ent 
since th is is an in te rna l non-published Commission document. However some 
in fo rm ation  is provided through the in fo rm a l contacts o f the House o f Lords 
w ith  the Com m unity ins titu tion s in  Brussels. In  the second phase, the decision­
making phase in  the Council, Parliam ent plays an im portan t role.
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Parliam entary scru tiny starts at the tim e the Commission adopts a proposal. 
This is fundam enta lly d iffe re n t to the Dutch Parliam entary involvem ent w ith  
Com m unity proposals, w hich usually starts when the adopted directives are 
sent to Parliament. The requirem ent fo r a B ill to  receive Royal Assent in  the 
same session as tha t in  w hich i t  receives its  firs t reading (e.g. w ith in  a years 
tim e) puts pressure on the governm ent to make sure a B ill gets through 
Parliam ent w ithou t much delay.
F inally, sta tu tory legislation is predom inantly used in  the U nited Kingdom and 
since Parliam ent has been invo lved in  the adoption stage o f Com m unity 
proposals, im plem entation in to  nationa l leg islation takes place re la tive ly  
qu ick ly  and w ithou t many problem s. This is in  contrast to  the Dutch 
im plem entation process, where Parliam ent often sees an adopted Com m unity 
d irective  fo r the firs t tim e when the na tiona l im plem entation measures are 
pu t forw ard fo r adoption. The Commons European Legislation Select 
Committee’s competence was lim ite d  to scrutin ising EC legislative proposals, in  
contrast to the House o f Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
whose competence concerns no t on ly  EC legislation bu t much broader EC 
po licy and other ’European a ffa irs ’. A lthough i t  has lim ite d  competence, the 
House o f Commons Select Committee on European Legislation has commented 
on almost every proposed d irective  fo r the Council, sometimes on ly in  ou tline  
(Bates, 1991;122). In  1990 the task o f the Select Committee changed to:
... consider any issue arising upon such document or group of documents (Standing
Order no. 127, HC Debs 24 October 1990, col. 397, para. 1 (c).
This extended task seems to o ffe r more room  fo r the Select Committee in  the 
sense tha t no t on ly legal documents o f the Commission, b u t a ll issues arising 
from  a ll Com m unity documents can be scrutinised. This seems an enormous 
task fo r the Select Committee, and calls have been made on other Select 
Committees to share the burden o f m on itoring  European leg islation (Kinnock, 
1995).
The Scrutiny Committee com plained recently on the lateness and lack o f 
transla tion  o f the in fo rm a tion  i t  receives, preventing i t  from  effective 
exam ination. It threatens tha t i f  th is continues it  is forced to p u t a scru tiny 
reserve on a ll EC proposals, thus causing serious delays in  the adoption o f 
leg islation  in  the Council. C u ltu ra l differences and resistance to influence 
from  the European Com m unity have been ide n tifie d  by Begg (1996) as possible 
obstacles to im plem entation:
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“A ... facet of European regulation is that there are entrenched cultural 
variations in receptiveness to regulation, especially where the style of 
regulation is alien to the society ... resistance to the ‘regulatory state’ is 
greatest in the southern member states ...” (Begg, 1996,532)
As discussed ea rlie r, a lthough there are cu ltu ra l differences between the 
Netherlands and the U nited Kingdom, these are no t thought to be o f such 
magnitude tha t they fo rm  an obstacle to an evaluation and comparison o f the 
im plem entation in  the two countries (Section 6.7).
5,4 N a tio n a l a d m in is tra tiv e  p rocedu res fo r  th e  p re p a ra tio n  and 
im p le m e n ta tio n  o f EC d ire c tive s  in  some o th e r M em ber States
In  th is Chapter a short exam ination is made o f the adoption and 
im plem entation o f EC directives in  some other Member States, in  order to set 
the preceding Chapters in  perspective and establish the extent to which the 
cases o f the U nited Kingdom  and the Netherlands are representative fo r the 
Com m unity as a whole.
5.4.1 Preparation and Im plem entation o f EC directives in  Denmark. Germanv 
and France
The Danish Parliam ent, especially the M arket Relations Committee has 
substantial influence during the preparation and adoption process o f EC 
legislation, which is unique among the Member States.
W ith its membership o f the EC in  1972, i t  was decided tha t the Danish 
governm ent w ould keep the Danish Parliam ent (the Folketing) in form ed on 
the developements in  the Com m unity. In  1973 the governm ent announced 
tha t before i t  w ill take a stand in  the Council i t  w ill consult the Folketing 
(Rasmussen, 1988;95). In  practice the ru le  im plied  tha t im portan t Com m unity 
proposals were send to the Parliam ent's M arket Relations Committee before 
Danish m inisters could accept a proposal at a meeting o f the Council o f 
M inisters. I f  there is a m a jo rity  against the proposal w ith in  the Committee, 
the governm ent was p o litic a lly  obliged to express its e lf against th is proposal 
in  the Council.
Preparations regarding EC proposals sta rt early in  the Danish adm in istra tion. 
As soon as the Com m unity issues a proposal, the governmental Special 
Committees discuss these and prepaire the Danish government's Com m unity 
position on them. This is fo llow ed by other governmental Committees, the EC
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Committee o f senior o ffic ia ls and the Common Market Committee, fin a lly  the 
Danish Cabinet takes a p o litica l decision. The EC proposals and the Cabinet’s 
decisions regarding the Danish Com m unity’s position  are then sent to the 
Parliam ent’s M arket Relations Committee, where Parliam entary con tro l takes 
place. I f  the M arket Relations Committee expresses no objection then th is 
position  w ül be the mandate fo r the Danish m inisters fo r the negotiations in  
the Council o f M inisters. The mandate counts during the whole negotiation 
process, bu t is very s tric t: any new proposal or amendment tha t comes up in  
the Council negotiations, needs a new mandate from  the Markets Relations 
Committee. Once an EC directive has been adopted by the Council, its  
im plem entation in  Denmark is carried ou t w ith in  the tim e-hm its set and 
su ffic ie n tly  enforced.
The speedy im plem entation is possible because the Danish legal system in  
many instances delegates the decision w hether to deviate from  existing laws 
fo r the purpose o f im plem enting EC legislation to the M inisters.
Denmark has the best im plem entation record o f a ll Member States as each 
Commission report on the im plem entation in  the Member States shows 
(ta b le l).
Germany is a federal state, and federal leg islation is the jo in t w ork o f the 
federal members o f Parliam ent, the federal government, the federal 
adm inistrations as weU as the Lânder. As regards the apphcation o f 
Com m unity law, the d is trib u tio n  o f competences between the federal State and 
the Lander is very im portant. In  1992 the German constitu tion  was adapted 
w ith  A rtic le  23 o r the 'Europe A rtic le '. A rtic le  23 obliges the Bundesrat (federal 
governm ent) to in fo rm  the Bundestag (federal Parliam ent) com prehensively 
and to involve i t  in  m atters concerning the EC as qu ickly as possible. Also it  
guarantees the Lander righ ts to  add itiona l pa rtic ipa tion  at Com m unity level.
In  areas w hich invo lve  the exclusive powers o f the Lander, they are granted 
the poss ib ility  o f taking over the d irection  o f the negotiations on behalf o f the 
Federal Republic o f Germany.
As soon as an EC proposal has been published the federal government o f 
Germany prepares its  position. The governm ental position  and (earlie r) 
instructions to  the German perm anent representatives in  Brussels are 
prepared by a committee o f state secretaries fo r European questions. The 
decisions o f th is committee are b ind ing on the departments involved. Members 
o f the com m ittee are the M in is try  o f Foreign A ffa irs, the federal chancellery, 
the M in is try  fo r Economic A ffa irs , and the M in is try  fo r A gricu ltu re . 
In form ation on im portan t European dossiers is sent to the Bundestag, the
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Bundesrat and representatives o f the Lànder in  Bonn. Depending on the issue 
the various parties reach agreement on w hich departm ent w ill be responsible 
and w ill defend the German po in t o f view  in  the Council. Herein lies the 
uniqueness o f the German decision-m aking system: the fact tha t a large 
num ber o f actors is involved in  the task o f co-ord ination, both at horizonta l 
level (federa l chancellor, state secretary. M in is try  fo r Foreign A ffa irs, 
M in is try  fo r Economic A ffa irs and th e ir m in is te ria l departm ents) as w ell as at 
the ve rtica l level (federal governm ent. Lander representatives and Lânder 
governm ents). Equally unique is the fact th a t the Lànder have considerable 
influence on European policies, and take p a rt in  the lobby process in  Brussels 
where they have th e ir own offices, separate fro m  those o f Germany. 
Disagreement w ith  the federal State on European issues underm ines the 
position  o f the federal State in  the Council substantially.
Table 7: Overview o f the involvement o f national parliam ents regarding form ulation, 
adoption and im plem entation o f EC directives
Countries
Involvement of Parliament regarding formulation and adoption of EC
directives
Germany France United Kingdom Denmark Netherlands
Information given to 
Parliament before Council 
decision
yes yes yes yes yes
Parliament's opinion has 
political consequences
yes sometimes yes yes sometimes
Parliament's opinion has 
legalistic consequences
sometimes no no no no
Involvement of Parliament regarding transpos
legislation
ition of directives into national
yes no yes rare yes
Source: present writer
In  France, the governm ent and the President have the power and legal 
competence to  b ind  France in to  EC policies (A rticles 20 and 52 o f the French 
constitu tion  o f 1958). U n til recently the C onstitution d id  not give the French 
Parliam ent a ro le  in  th is. A ll decisions taken by the Council o f M inisters 
require  the approval o f the President, and the governm ent may legislate by 
decree and can assume responsib ility  fo r n o t going to  Parliament.
This cen tra lisa tion  also characterises the fo rm u la tion  and decision-m aking 
process o f Com m unity legislation. Each M in is try  prepares its  own position on a 
Com m unity proposal and negotiates on the basis o f th is in  the specific Council
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meetings. There is a weak involvem ent o f the French Parliam ent at th is 
preparatory stage. Government submits some proposals fo r Community 
legislation (containing provisions o f a legal nature) to Parliam ent when these 
proposals are sent to the Council. Parliam ent can express its  op in ion in  the 
fo rm  o f a resolution. This resolution does not b ind  the government. The 
government can take a position  in  the Council when i t  has no t received an 
op in ion and also can take a d iffe re n t position  than the opinion(s) received.
5.4.2 Conclusion
It is clear from  the short discussion regarding the fo rm u la tion  and 
im plem entation process o f three other Member States tha t th is process has a 
unique character and qualities and experiences varying d ifficu ltie s  in  each 
Member State (table 7). Denmark has been often referred to as an example 
both fo r its  extensive dem ocratic approach in  le ttin g  its  Parliam ent decide on 
European matters and fo r its  excellent im plem entation record. Recently 
(September 1996) the Scrutiny Committee (the House o f Commons a ll-pa rty  
European leg islation com m ittee) indicated tha t the Danish system, where 
Parliam ent discusses a European proposal before a m in iste r starts negotiations 
in  the Council, should be followed.
It is because o f the involvem ent o f the Danish Parliam entary M arket Relations 
committee and the fo rm u la tion  o f a mandate before a m h iiste r starts 
negotiations in  the Council, tha t the (la te r) im plem entation o f EC directives 
can take place p ractica lly  w itho u t the involvem ent o f the Danish Folketing. 
The m in iste r then has extensive delegation powers fo r amending existing 
legislation. This obviously had a positive effect and contributed to smooth 
im plem entation in  Denmark. Relatively problem  free im plem entation is 
achieved in  Germany through the intensive p a rtic ipa tion  o f the regional level 
(Lander) regarding the fo rm u la tion  o f EC legislation; th is ensures tha t 
practica l adm in istra tive  problem s concerning im plem entation are taken in to  
consideration.
5.5 C onclusion
This Chapter started by emphasising tha t the policy-m aking and 
im plem entation processes are closely linked. Both processes, together w ith  
the EC demands and obligations invo lv ing  im plem entation, have been 
examined at Com m unity and Member State levels in  Chapters IV and V so as to
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p rovide a background to the problem s regarding non-im plem entation o f EC 
environm enta l d irectives.
From the exam ination o f the d ra fting  and preparatory process up to the fin a l 
adoption o f a d irective by the Council, i t  has emerged tha t Member States have 
considerable influence on the proposal during  the preparatory stage. The 
Commission’s capacity to get its  proposal adopted by the Council is lim ited  in  
tha t i t  frequently has to m odify and amend its  proposals in  order to obtain 
agreement in. the Council w orking groups. This is thought to negatively 
in fluence the c la rity  and consistency o f Com m unity legislation.
Both the Netherlands and the U nited Kingdom  have encountered d ifficu ltie s  in  
im plem enting EC environm ental d irectives. In  the Netherlands the issue o f 
non-im plem entation has become a p o litica l issue. In the early 1990s the 
European Commission was starting o r preparing to sta rt a considerable 
num ber o f in fringem ent procedures against the Netherlands: the quarte rly  
overview  regarding im plem entation, sent to Parliam ent by the M in is try  o f 
Foreign A ffa irs, indicates tha t in  1992 the average delay fo r im plem entation o f 
Com m unity environm ental d irectives was 55 months (table 6). The ensuing 
p o litica l debate concentrated m ain ly on the in trica te  and lengthy form al 
legislative procedure. The demands o f the Dutch constitu tiona l system, 
especially the m andatory consulta tional rounds, have been specifica lly 
targeted in  this debate. A Committee (CTW 90/22) was set up to review the 
im plem entation procedure. The Dutch government adopted most o f the 
recommendations o f the Committee and recent changes tha t have been made 
invo lve m a in ly the im plem entation processes o f legislative instrum ents. The 
com pulsory advisory consultation du ring  the fo rm u la tion  o f leg islation has 
been changed. The Cabinet has been asked to lay down im plem entation 
measures w ith in  one-th ird  o f the d irective ’s tim e -lim it and M inistries have 
been asked to  lay down measures w ith in  tw o-th irds o f the d irective ’s tim e­
lim it. The Council o f State has had to shorten the tim e i t  takes to advise on new 
legislation, and Parliament has been asked to speed up and s im p lify  the debate 
on im plem entation measures. The am ount o f change tha t has already taken 
place as a resu lt o f the im plem entation debate over the last few years, 
invo lv ing  d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tions o f existing leg is la tion  and even 
restructu ring  o f constitu tiona l rules, is substantial. Several o ther issues 
form ing an obstacle to im plem entation have been ide n tifie d  in  add ition  to the 
m andatory advice rounds. These issues are differences in  legislative 
techniques in  the Netherlands and at European level, the lack o f knowledge 
and sense o f urgency in  im plem enting Com m unity leg islation at some
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M inistries, and the absence o f a Parliamentar>' debate during the preparatory 
process o f directives. Contrary to the situation in  the Netherlands, Parliament 
in  the United Kingdom is involved at an early stage in  the preparation o f 
Com m unity proposals. This in itia l Parliam entary scru tiny is an im portant 
reason why the long delays w ith  im plem entation d id  not occur in  the United 
Kingdom. Other reasons are also given, such as the requirem ent fo r Royal 
Assent and the extensive use o f sta tu tory legislation. C u ltu ra lly  and 
h is to rica lly  the United Kingdom has been w ary o f and resisted the influence 
o f the European Com m unity. The United Kingdom finds more than most 
Member States to object to  in  European rules (Begg, 1996;533).
The above Chapters constitu te  the necessary background fo r understanding 
the issues involved in  EC environm ental im plem entation. As discussed in  
Chapter II, the objective o f th is thesis is stated as the de fin ition  and testing o f a 
model o f environm ental im plem entation w hich is based on an exp lic it 
theoretical basis. This model w ill be fu rth e r developed in  the next Chapter and 
can be viewed as p rovid ing  an add itiona l th ird  o r A na lytica l Dimension to the 
two dimensions already provided by the Member States (the National 
D imension) and the p a rticu la r environm ental d irectives being investigated 
(term ed the Sector D imension). These three dimensions o f im plem entation are 
shown in  figure  9.
F igure  9: Im p le m e n ta tio n : D im ensions o f A na lys is
Sec tor  .An.ihsis
\ c i r i a h le  A i i a h s i s
Source : present w rite r
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CHAPTER VI: DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK
6.1 O b jectives and d e ve lopm en t o f th e  th e o re tic a l fra m e w o rk
The m ain research problem  in  th is thesis has been stated as the analysis o f the 
orig ins o f the environm ental im plem entation problem  and the developm ent 
and testing o f a model o f EC environm ental im plem entation.
In  the lite ra tu re  review  o f Chapter II previous attem pts at seeking theoretica l 
perspectives on p o licy  im plem entation have been examined. A lthough the 
re levant lite ra tu re  on im plem entation is p le n tifu l, lit t le  analytica l o r 
com parative w ork has been done on im plem entation in  the European 
Community; this ‘gap’ is addressed in  th is thesis.
Previous w ork by Sabatier and Mazmanian has been ide n tifie d  and defended as 
suitable fo r adaptation to the study o f environm ental im plem entation in  the 
European Com m unity. The theoretica l basis from  which Sabatier and 
Mazmanian developed th e ir m odel is systems theory; in  order to  adapt th e ir 
w ork to the EC the underly ing  theoretica l fram ework ‘systems th in k in g ’ o r 
the systems paradigm  itse lf is analysed in  more detail, as i t  has been the 
subject o f previous critic ism . It  is argued th a t there are, however, many 
theoretica l and more practica l facets w hich recommend th is general 
theoretica l paradigm . Systems theory is flex ib le  enough to  allow  the capture o f 
necessary elements o f EC legislative structures and processes as w ell as 
essential and relevant elements o f previous im plem entation research and case 
studies.
An adaptation o f David Easton’s o rig ina l (1965a,1965b) systems analysis o f 
p o litica l life  to the EC policy-m aking and im plem entation process provides a 
starting po in t fo r the development, bu t is lim ite d  by its  h igh  level o f 
abstraction and lack o f deta il, in h ib itin g  operationalisation. The unique 
structure o f the EC's im plem entation system is modelled as consisting o f fo u r 
h ie ra rch ica lly  linked  sub-systems, which together make up the EC legislative 
system and the Member States’ legislative and im plem entation system.
Elements o f Sabatier and Mazmanian’s im plem entation model are u tilised  in  
param etrising the sub-systems. General hypotheses fo llo w  d ire c tly  from  the 
model. The end resu lt is a model o f the European Com m unity’s policy-m aking 
and im plem entation system, w hich is both theoretica lly complete and 
su ffic ie n tly  detailed to make i t  em p irica lly  testable.
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A tw o-fo ld  approach fo r systematic measurement and analysis o f the degree o f 
im plem entation success is then devised. F irst, causal linkages regarding 
inputs, process and outcomes are iden tified . The sub-systems are param etrised 
by fo u r summary variables which measure key aspects o f both  structure and 
process. Each o f these summary variables is a composite measure o f an aspect 
o f the system. The operationalisation o f these variables is the subject o f some 
de libera tion .
Subsequently, the model is applied in  an em pirica l analysis using the case 
method. A com parative approach is pursued in  Chapter V II w hich employs 
fo u r case studies in  w hich the im plem entation o f two separate environm ental 
directives in  both the U nited Kingdom and the Netherlands are investigated. 
The curren t Chapter and the case studies in  Chapter V II con tribu te  to a fu rth e r 
understanding o f the nature o f the im plem entation process in  the EC.
Sabatier and Mazmanian have been critic ised  fo r the essentially ra tiona lis t 
basis o f th e ir approach (Section 2.2). They adopt a ‘top-down’ approach to 
im plem entation, starting w ith  a statute as the expression o f a po licy  decision 
and exploring the extent to w hich its  objectives are achieved (Mazmanian and 
Sabatier, 1992). Sabatier and Mazmanian developed variables hypothesised to 
have a bearing on im plem entation. In  th e ir em pirica l w ork case studies 
compare the expression o f po licy  in  the statute w ith  what has been carried out. 
Under th is approach, legal structures (sta tu to ry variables) and other factors 
(non-sta tu tory variables) emerged as key determ inants in  the way 
im plem entation had been carried out.
The present w ork m ight best be id e n tifie d  by the "th ird -genera tion  approach" 
(Section 2.2.5). W hile leaning in  preference towards the 'm odern’ top-down 
approach, emphasis is placed on "em pirica l and theoretica l research tha t 
concentrates on com parative, d iachronic methods o f po licy  analysis" (Goggin, 
1990;182). C ritics o f the ‘top-down’ approach to im plem entation (e.g. the 
‘bottom -up’ school, Section 2.2.4) id e n tify  two m ajor d ifficu ltie s  w ith  th is 
approach to im plem entation; these criticism s are addressed here as they are 
fundam entally m ethodological and discussion wiU make more exp lic it the 
m ethodological basis o f th is  study. First, the classic ‘top-dow n’ determ in istic 
and m echanistic a rticu la tio n  o f p o licy  v ia  linea r processes from  po licy • 
creation to fo rm u la tion , legal a rticu la tion , im plem entation and evaluation is 
critic ised. This, i t  is alleged, triv ia lises the problems o f im plem enting a ru le  
from  one legal order, (e.g. the Com m unity) in to  another (e.g. the Member
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States) and does no t re flect the rea l w orld  in  which more complex decision­
m aking processes such as netw orking and feedback contribu te  to  debates.
In  u tilis in g  systems theory, the ob jection to the lin e a rity  o f the 
im plem entation process is m et by in te rna lis ing  the concept o f feedback, 
which allows fo r a more rea listic  representation o f legal processes. 
Furtherm ore, the subject o f investigation o f th is thesis, spanning as i t  does no t 
on ly the central EC institu tions b u t also the Member States, is no t amenable to 
investigation by a route o f the type pre ferred by these critics (e.g. netw ork 
analysis) w hich is p rim a rily  suited to the dynamics o f more local situations 
(e.g. Section 2.2.5).
Secondly, the human facto r is said to  be under emphasised in  the ‘top-down’ 
approach. Policy is not w ho lly  contained in  the ru le ; the roles o f those 
charged w ith  im plem enting i t  and those governed by i t  are ignored. To 
overcome these d ifficu ltie s , close regard has been paid to  the ins titu tio n a l 
setting and the configura tion o f the p o litica l actors at the im plem entation 
stage. Thus im plem entation is seen as a dynam ic process w ith in  the context o f 
con tinua l negotiation o f re la tions between key actors.
The problem s o f inductive  reasoning im p lic itly  applied in  the ‘bottom -up’ 
approach are d iffic u lt to  overcome and can be critic ised (Popper, 1959; 29). 
W ith in  a fram ework based on induction , generalisations and predictions 
cannot be drawn on the im plem entation system as a whole based on the 
investigation o f specific im plem entation cases. The approach presented here 
aims to proceed from  a theoretical basis to an im plem entation model; data from  
specific case studies provide substance fo r em pirical testing o f the hypotheses 
based on tha t model.
6.2 Systems T heory
The concept o f ‘system’ has been w ide ly used w ith in  both the social and the 
na tura l sciences. I t  has also been subject to  critic ism  (Section 6.3.2) such as 
tha t i t  deals w ith  such a h igh level o f abstraction tha t i t  has lit t le  practical 
m erit in  the analysis o f em pirica l data.
This section explores the evolution o f the systems paradigm, and seeks to 
establish whether, and i f  so, what, general aspects o f a system exist, and what 
aspects o f systems th in k in g  may use fu lly be fu rth e r explored fo r the purposes 
o f th is  work.
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6.2.1 The Origins and Uses of Systems Theory
In  considering systems th ink ing  and systems theory, and the very w idespread 
use to which i t  has been pu t, i t  is perhaps useful to see the concept o f system as 
a u n ify in g  paradigm  w hich is:
concerned with, the concept of systemic wholeness, and the working out of the 
implications of the concept in any (or every) one of the arbitrary divisions of human 
knowledge which we presently know as ‘disciplines’... (Checkland, 1985:289).
By a ho lis tic  o r systems approach to any given subject, scholars w ith in  th is 
paradigm  believe tha t the concept system can provide fu rth e r understanding 
and explanation w hich are beyond the reach o f reduction ist science.
Holism in  add ition  im plies adoption o f the view  tha t the whole is more than the 
sum o f its  parts and tha t some o f a system's properties (term ed 'emergent 
properties') cannot be predicted o r explained from  the study o f component 
parts in  isola tion. In  o ther words, properties o f components at certain 
h ierarch ica l levels are due to th e ir very position  in  tha t system, and once 
removed from  the system these properties may change. A lthough systems 
th ink ing  has been im p lic it in  ph ilosoph ica l thought fo r a long tim e, the 
exp lic it statement o f the systems approach as a conscious paradigm  may be 
dated from  Bertalanffy’s w ork in  the 1930s on bio logical organisms as open 
systems w hich creative ly m ain ta in  a degree o f organisation by continuous 
exchange o f energy, m aterials, and in fo rm a tio n  w ith  th e ir environm ent.
Based on th is work, two d is tin c t branches o f application evolved, termed 
Systems Analysis and General Systems Theory (G.S.T.).
Systems Analysis has been regarded as a:
... set of techniques for systematic analysis that facilitates organising of data, but 
which has no theoretical goal... (Banks, 1969;346-7).
Its use has been widespread, in itia lly  concentrated on the design, 
construction, and operation o f complex technical systems in  the post-war 
period, and la te r also developing in to  softer applications such as business 
management systems. A lthough i t  is true to  say tha t Systems Analysis does not 
have ‘theoretica l goals’, i t  has been w idely applied to rea l-w orld  problem s.
The branch o f General Systems Theory, w hich postulates tha t there are 
features o f re lationships common to aH systems, w hether physical, bio logical.
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o r behavioural, and tha t i t  is h e lp fu l to study features o f systems generally 
before seeking to  understand any given system in d iv id u a lly  (B urton,1968; 5). 
I t  is thus concerned w ith  developing a systematic, theoretica l fram ework fo r 
describing general re lationships o f the em pirica l w orld . The value o f th is 
approach to the study o f p o litica l and social science must u ltim a te ly  lie  in  the 
extent to w hich isomorphisms, o r s tructu ra l iden tities among p o litica l 
phenomena and between social, physical, and bio logical systems can be found. 
It is from  th is branch o f systems th ink ing  th a t David Easton eventually 
developed his theory o f p o litica l systems, fo rm  w hich the model developed in  
th is Chapter has evolved.
6.2.2 General Systems Theory and Politica l Science
Systems theory claims to be using the scientific method. The application o f the 
scientific m ethod in  p o litica l science d id  no t occur u n til a fte r W orld War II 
(Easton, 1969). One o f the resu lting methodologies in  p o litica l analysis is 
known as behaviouralism . Behaviouralists' p rim ary concern was and rem ains 
the establishment o f the study o f po litics  as a science. Easton (1953) as a 
behavioura list argued tha t the lack o f explanatory speculation in  p o litica l 
science was the most urgent problem  confronting the d iscip line  m his tim e.
In  po in ting  out the lack o f a general theory o f po litics  in  p o litica l science 
Easton d id  no t claim  to be able to provide one. However he d id  feel capable o f 
m aking a con tribu tion  to the developm ent o f such a theory in  the fo rm  o f 
developing and exploring the u tility  o f the concept o f system fo r the purposes 
o f General Theory.
Since p o litica l science in  the behavioural era lacked a tra d itio n  from  which to 
draw  insp ira tion  fo r theoretica l innovation, p o litica l scientists began to reach 
out to the other social sciences fo r help: decision-making theories from  the 
organisational fie ld , the s tru c tu ra l-fu nctio n a l approach fro m  anthropology 
and sociology, and action theory from  the com m unications sciences were 
explored. Easton's (and other systems analysts such as Robert Kaplan, Gabriel 
A lm ond, and Talcott Parsons) insp ira tion  came from  systems theory which 
originates from  sociological functiona lism  and general systems theory 
(Weltman, 1973; 14).
Because p o litica l science is gradua lly being influenced by scientific  m ethod it  
is now possible to test out em pirica l research by reference to  em pirica lly 
oriented theory. In  o ther words one o f the m ajor tasks o f theory has been to 
id e n tify  a set o f behaviours tha t i t  could describe as p o litica l (the concept o f 
structure), and in  the process, to construct an analytic system o r a theory tha t
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w ould help to explain the behavioural re a lity  (the concept o f function ). 
Behaviouralists argue th a t when people in te ract they create systems. These 
systems are defined by enduring characteristics. Ind iv idua lis ts  may come and 
go b u t the structures o f the system persist. The task o f the social scientist is to  
id e n tify  these structures and determ ine how they affect social action. Because 
o f the degree o f abstraction invo lved in  systems th ink ing , the theoretica l o r 
m etaphysical properties w hich characterise the social system are not 
amenable to d irect inspection.
6.3 P o litic a l Systems T h e o ry
6.3.1 D e fin ition  o f a Politica l System
The theoretica l dispute whether systems are analytica l and abstract o r 
concrete is a continu ing one, and the confusion which surrounds the concept 
o f system in  the social science indicates tha t th is dispute is fa r from  settled.
It is no t re levant fo r th is research to discuss a ll the d iffe re n t concepts o f 
system to be found in  the lite ra tu re , i t  is su ffic ien t to acknowledge tha t there 
are a num ber o f possible ways o f de fin ing  a system, o r more accurately o f 
conceptualising the system no tion  o r m etaphor. A well-established d e fin itio n  
o f a system, comes from  Kaplan, He describes a system as :
...a set of variables so related. In contradistinction to its environment, that 
describable behavioural regularities characterise the internal relationships of the 
variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual 
variables to combinations of external variables (Kaplan, 1957;4).
Easton iden tifies p o litica l life  by delineating the nature o f its  operations: a 
'p o litica l system' to h im  can be ide n tifie d  as:
A set of interactions, abstracted from the totality of social behaviour, through which 
values are authoritatively allocated for a society" (Easton, 1965b;57).
Easton follow s the functiona lis t tra d itio n : the p o litica l is th a t w hich operates 
in  a certa in fashion, has certa in  effects, o r pursues certa in purposes. The 
p o litica l refers to a condition  o r state o f affa irs, no t to a concrete set o f 
behavioural data. Easton held tha t p o litica l hfe is a system o f in terre la ted 
activ ities, which influence the way in  w hich the p o litica l system is cast as an 
adjunct o f the larger system o f com m unity life  and where p o litics  is viewed as
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a sub-system o f the whole w hich, fo r purposes o f scholarly research can be 
isolated and studied as e ffective ly as economists cordon o ff and then analyse 
the subsystem o f prices, supply and demand, and economic choice.
This concern w ith  the transaction processes between the p o litica l system and 
its  environm ent leads Easton to suggest concepts to  deal w ith  the processes, 
whereby environm ental demands and supports are converted in to  the 
a llocative policies w hich are the system's outputs. The theoretica l fram ework 
Easton subsequently constructs begins w ith  a symbolic system, w hich can be 
graph ica lly represented (figu re  10). The focus o f th is approach is on the 
dynamics and processes o f an open p o licy  system operating in  its  
environm ent, and the m ain elements o f Easton’s p o litica l system are:
• Inputs in  the fo rm  o f po licy demands and supports. Demands and supports 
fo r action arise from  both inside and outside the p o litica l system;
• The p o litica l system: conversion and decision processes take place in  the 
system which convert the inputs to  the system in to  the outputs o f the 
system;
• Policy outputs: these are in  the fo rm  o f decisions and actions. These outputs 
can be po ten tia l sources o f stress since they may affect fu tu re  demands and 
supports; Policy outputs may affect outcomes, consequences intended o r 
unintended resu lting  from  p o litica l action o r inaction;
•  The environm ent: includes social, economic and p o litica l influences on 
inputs to the system and on po licy outcomes;
•  Feedback: Easton uses the term  feedback o r feedback loop to  describe the 
process and the channels whereby outputs are subsequently re lated to 
the in p u t phase o f the system:"... feedback has been described as the 
p roperty o f being able to  adjust fu tu re  conduct by past performances" 
(Easton, 1965b;368).
Easton indicates tha t the closing o f the feedback loop depends on the like lihood  
th a t the authorities are w illin g  to  respond to the incom ing in fo rm ation , th a t is 
to say the successful com pletion o f the feedback process must be based upon 
the 'responsiveness' o f the authorities. The above suggests tha t the effective 
operation o f the feedback loop and thus the whole self-adjusting process, 
requires de fin ite  in s titu tio n a l arrangements.
Outputs o f the system may e ither accidentally o r by design be reflected in  
fu rth e r inputs in to  the system. A feedback mechanism may be de liberate ly
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constructed as p a rt o f e ithe r the maintenance mechanisms o r the adaptation 
mechanisms o f the system. Such mechanism provides a v ita l source o f 
in fo rm ation  w hich may in  tu rn  be re la ted to goal-achievement.
F igure 10: Easton’s P o litic a l Systems M odel
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A lthough Easton's no tion  o f systems th ink ing  is related to  the systems concept 
in  sociology and economics, he emphasises his re la tionsh ip  to  the 
com m unications sciences:
In general, systems analysis, as I shall conceive it, takes its departure from the 
notion of political life as a boundary-maintaining set o f interactions imbedded in and 
surrounded by other social systems to the influence of which it is constantly 
exposed. As such, it is helpful to interpret political phenomena as constituting an 
open system', one that must cope with the problems generated by its exposure to 
influences from these environmental systems. I f  a system of this kind is to persist 
through time, it must obtain adequate feedback about its past performances, and it 
must take measures that regulate its future behavior (Easton, 1965a;24-25)
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Easton's p o litica l system is a cohesive system distinguishable from  its 
environm ent and open to  stresses fro m  th a t environm ent. A ll activ ities w hich 
are s ign ifican tly  re lated to  the key processes o f authorative a llocation o f 
values fa ll w ith in  the system. A ll o ther activ ities and factors constitute the 
system's environm ent, w hich is separated from  the system by the boundary. 
The concept boundary therefore has very lit t le  in  common w ith  real m ateria l 
boundaries: in  the use o f systems theory when d istinguishing two com pletely 
d iffe re n t activities they are separated by a boundary. This elim inates any 
m ateria l conception o f a boundary and forces to re ly  s tric tly  on princip les o f 
inclusion  and exclusion.
The concept o f 'au tho rita tive  a llocation o f values fo r a society', enables the 
understanding three central concepts: po licy, a u tho rity  and society.
By p o licy  is meant the decision process by which "certa in things are denied to 
some people and made accessible to others" (Easton, 1953;129-130) - a web o f 
decisions and actions tha t allocates values. The p o litica l scientist must study 
the entire  process o f policy-m aking, both fo rm a l and in fo rm a l. This leads 
beyond the narrow ly conceived p o litica l structure to  a broader concern w ith  
how an entire  society allocates values, as w ell as to a concern w ith  the problem  
o f the nature o f au tho rity . Thus p o litica l science research m ust concern itse lf 
w ith  the study o f po licy  activities.
Easton continues th is process o f conceptual c la rifica tio n  by exam ining the 
terms a u th o rity  and society. His use o f a u tho rity  is s ign ifican tly  d iffe re n t 
from  tha t generally found  in  the d iscip line . P o litica l a u th o rity  generally 
im plies legitim acy and the use o r th rea t o f coercion. Easton rejects the idea 
tha t the legitim ate use o f coercion is necessarily the centra l characteristic o f 
p o litica l au tho rity . Further he advances a psychological ra ther than a m oral 
explanation o f p o litica l ob ligation:
A policy is authoritative when the people to whom it is intended to apply or who are
affected by it consider that they must obey it (Easton, 1953; 132).
W hile Easton agrees tha t i t  w ould be interesting to know why people feel they 
m ust obey, he considers the possible d iffe re n t motives irre levan t in  this 
context. F inally, society is defined sim ply as:
... the broadest grouping of human beings who live together and collectively undertake
to satisfy the minimum prerequisites of group life (Easton, 1953; 135).
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6.3.2 Criticism on Easton's Political Systems Theory
David Easton's p o litica l systems theo ry has been subject to  c ritic ism  (Astin, 
1972; W einstein, 1971; Sorzano, 1975; Evans, 1970; Leslie, 1972; Young, 1968; 
Stephens, 1969).
A standard critic ism  o f Easton is tha t he is at times vague and imprecise, 
leading to  the p o in t tha t the whole enterprise is conducted at such a h igh level 
o f abstraction w ith  such lax d e fin itio n  o f terms tha t i t  has no practica l m erit 
in  the analysis o f em pirica l data. Another more serious critic ism  is tha t his 
system is too heavily dependent upon mechanistic analogies, leading to 
assumptions about the way in  w hich the whole system works w hich may be 
appropriate fo r na tu ra l sciences b u t are to ta lly  un justified  in  dealing w ith  
human and social phenomena (Astin, 1972).
O ther c ritic ism  concerns the re la tionsh ip  between theory and re a lity , the fact 
tha t systems theory is no t achieving p re d ic ta b ility  o r tes tab ility , and the 
weakness o f systems theory in  tha t i t  fa ils  to  recognise the unique character 
o f its  subject m atter - hum an beings. This Section w ill examine critic ism  on 
Easton's p o litica l systems theory fu rth e r.
C riticism  regarding the fact tha t systems theory is too abstract and uses 
unclear de fin itions has been expressed in  d iffe re n t ways. For example 
Jenkins (1978) criticises the 'b lack box' o r the p o litica l system from  which 
policies emerge and argues tha t po licy  analysis needs to disaggregate and 
explore the p o litica l system. One o f the tasks o f the po licy analyst is to explore 
in  more de ta il the nature o f the p o litica l system and the re la tionsh ip  between 
variables as decision processes and outcomes, however Leslie (1972) argues 
tha t:
... it is at least difficult to recognize when a society 'collapses' as when a political 
system 'fails to persist' ... even ignoring this difficulty, how would we know whether 
social collapse had been caused by failure of the political system rather than by 
something else? ... and the choice of certain functions as being requisite or 'vital' is 
inescapably an arbitrary one ... (Leslie, 1972;157).
Nevertheless, i t  can be argued tha t to  critic ise  a theory fo r being too abstract 
is not in  itse lf a critic ism  o r a re jection o f th is theory. In  fact, Easton's express 
in te n tio n  is to rem ain at a h igh level o f abstraction and generality in  his
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theorising. The m ain confusion is n o t the level o f abstraction Easton uses, bu t 
w hat Easton h im self sees as the nature o f h is theory.
He firs t draws a d is tinc tion  between em pirica l and sym bolic systems. Em pirical 
systems are the phenomena themselves, the 'objects o f observation'. Symbolic 
systems are abstractions "the set o f symbols through w hich we hope to 
id e n tify , describe, d e lim it and explain the behavior o f the em pirica l system" 
(Easton, 1965b;26). However the value o f the symbolic system depends upon 
the extent to which " it  corresponds to  the behaving system w hich i t  is 
designed to explain" (Easton, 1965b;26).
Confusion start to  rise regarding the re la tionsh ip  between theory and re a lity . 
Here Easton points out tha t h is choice o f sym bolic system, tha t is systems 
theory, is n o t to prejudge the issue o f whether po litics actua lly is a system o f 
behaviour. Instead Easton prefers to  opt fo r a constructiv ist position  in  which 
systems are regarded as constructs o f the m ind. The problem  is no t whether 
the variables in  some sense 're a lly ' fo rm  a system bu t whether the constructed 
system is an interesting o r a tr iv ia l system. An 'in te resting ' system emerges 
when the conceptualisation o f a set o f variables as a system helps us to 
understand problem s and where the variables show "some degree o f 
interdependence and seem to have a common fate" (Easton, 1965b; 30).
A t th is p o in t i t  begins to be unclear ju s t how an interesting constructive 
system d iffe rs from  a na tu ra l system. U nfortunate ly Easton makes no other 
d istinctions to resolve the confusion. He argues tha t our sense o f what is 
"sign ifican t" and "re levant" m ust guide our construction o f systems and 
clearly he assumes tha t our choice o f elements to include in  a constructed 
system w ill be guided by our knowledge o f the fie ld  o f study and o f the 
concrete entities w ith in  it .  W einstein (1971) sums the issue up as follows:
The political system is said to be an analytic rather than a membership system. It is 
an analytic system because it is not a self contained system capable of existing 
independently of other social systems. Nevertheless it remains an empirical system 
in that it composed of real empirical behaviour. Thus in so far as the components of 
the empirical system show some interdependence and share a common fate it is an 
interesting system. But these are exactly the criteria by which a system would be 
judged a natural system. It seem clear that having rejected the idea of natural systems 
Easton immediately re-imports the idea thinly disguised as an interesting 
constructive system (Weinstein, 1971;187).
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Other critics o f Easton such as Evans (1970) have pointed out tha t defin ing a 
system solely in  terms o f what i t  does removes the no tion  o f system from  the 
realm  o f testab ility . Evans argues th a t i f  Easton's approach aspires to meet the 
rn in im al requirem ent o f scientific status and te s ta b ility  i t  m ust include some 
add itiona l elements in  its  conception o f system. Evans' p o in t has been 
addressed by Sorzano (1975) who argues tha t some critics seem to  have 
overlooked the fact th a t Easton's no tion  o f system includes the element o f self­
regulation: a p o litica l system is a goal-setting, se lf-transform ing and 
creative ly adaptive system. I t  consists o f hum an beings who are capable o f 
an tic ipa ting , evaluating, and acting constructive ly to prevent disturbances in  
the system's environm ent. In  the lig h t o f th e ir goals they may seek to correct 
any disturbances tha t m ight be expected to  occasion stress (Easton, 1965b;132). 
In  conclusion i t  can be argued tha t c ritic ism  has been made w hich does not 
seem to  bare much relevance b u t also some more serious critic ism  has been 
made. The more serious c ritic ism  concern the fact tha t Easton's p o litica l 
systems theory m igh t be too heavily dependent upon m echanistic analogies 
and is somewhat problem atic fo r achieving p re d ic ta b ility  and te s ta b ility  no t 
the least because Easton leaves the "... task fo r re fin ing  concepts and 
theoretica l p ropositions fo r d ire c t em pirica l application-opera tionaliz ing  
them  is a v ita l yet separate enterprise" (Easton, 1965b; 161).
The next two Sections concentrate on the ap p licab ility  o f Easton's p o litica l 
systems theory to  in te rna tio n a l organisations in  general and the European 
Com m unity in  specific.
6.3.3 A p p lica b ility  o f System Theory to In te rna tiona l Organisations and the 
European Com m unity
A lthough some critics have p u t fo rw ard  serious problem s regarding Easton's 
p o litica l systems theory, h is w ork was undoubtedly innovative, because he 
applied his conception o f systems ideas, to  p o litica i phenomena in  a way tha t 
made its  im pact no t on ly in  p o litica l science (Olson, 1992). When considering 
the a p p lica b ility  o f p o litica l systems theory to in te rna tio n a l organisations, i t  
has been argued tha t Easton's d e fin itio n  o f po litics is sim ply n o t suited to  the 
in te rna tio n a l dim ension, since:
... it presupposes the organisation of a society under effective authority able to take 
decisions on values and priorities by way of the budget process, and able to enforce 
its laws by holding in the background the treat of sanctions... at the international
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realm ... there is no effective authority in existence at this level (Dougherty and 
Pfaltsgraff, 1981;27).
When considering application  o f systems th in k in g  to the European Com m unity 
more critic ism  is at hand, because of:
... the unique nature of the EU policy process, almost any firm  characterisations of 
the process are unreliable simply because it is so highly sectorised and segmented, 
different levels of issue are treated in different ways, competing policy models are 
advocated, and there is a degree o f both institutional and procedural instability 
which all make the process singularly difficult to capture (Richardson, 1994;139).
Easton adm its tha t "... decisions and actions perform ed by in te rna tiona l 
systems re ly  fo r th e ir acceptance upon accord w ith  the perceived self-in terest 
o f the pa rtic ipa ting  members among whom  the im pact o f a sense o f leg itim acy 
is s till extrem ely low" (Easton, 1965b;284). However, Easton m aintains tha t at 
the in te rna tiona l level no less than the nationa l level, i t  is possible to  fin d  sets 
o f re la tionships through w hich values are a u th o rita tive ly  allocated. The sense 
o f leg itim acy in  the in te rna tiona l system may be low , b u t its  members may s till 
make demands on the system w ith  the expectation tha t these w ill be converted 
in to  outputs. Moreover Merle (1987) argues tha t the Easton model can be 
w idely applied, and one o f the advantages is tha t i t  provides tools fo r analysis. 
Kangis (1990) fo r example, based h is EC law-making model on systems theory.
6.3.4 Conclusion
A lthough critics  have p u t fo rw ard  ju s tifie d  concerns about Easton’s p o litica l 
systems theory, i t  is believed tha t these critic ism s are n o t serious enough to 
in h ib it the fru itfu l application o f w hat m igh t be called a systems approach to 
the analysis o f the workings o f the EC system. The systems approach adopted in  
th is Chapter, although in itia lly  insp ired  by the w ork o f Easton, is adapted as 
appropria te  by using la te r th ink ing  and experience in  the app lica tion  o f 
systems theory in  o ther than pu re ly  p o litica l systems. In  doing so, some o f the 
more im po rtan t theoretica l objections to the applications o f th is  seemingly 
'm echanistic' m ethodology to  p o litica l or, in  th is  case, a socio-politica l system, 
w ill no t inva lida te  the application o f the m ethod. I t  is believed tha t th is is 
possible in  the case o f EC policy-m aking and im plem entation process. 
Characteristics w hich make th is process a suitable candidate fo r analysis using 
systems theory are the fo llow ing :
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• the EC policy-m aking and im plem entation process is complex, - the 
dependency on the o ther organisations' resources and the uncerta in ty 
about th e ir autonomous decision m aking generate th is com plexity- re ly ing  
on a large num ber o f actors and processes. To make sense o f th is  requires a 
degree o f reduction ism  w hile  re ta in ing  the 'em ergent properties ' w hich 
on ly belong to  the process o r system as a whole;
• the EC policy-m aking and im plem entation process is dynam ic, changing 
through tim e in  response to s tim u li { ’demands and supports') both from  
inside and outside the EC. Systems analysis recognises the im portance o f 
dynam ic adjustments to  such s tim u li using the feedback process;
•  the EC policy-m aking and im plem entation process is h ig h ly  structured, 
w hich perm its detailed m apping o f process flows;
•  the EC, although being an 'in te rna tio n a l organisation ', has considerable 
capacity fo r 'm aking au tho rita tive  a llocations' in  the Easton sense. In  a 
more general systems sense, th is makes d ire c t com m unication through 
h ierarchies possible v ia  in p u t-o u tp u t flows.
In  the rem ainder o f th is Chapter a systems m odel o f the EC policy-m aking and 
im plem entation process wiU be constructed and operationalised using these 
aspects.
6.4 A dapted  Systems M ode l o f the  EC P o licy-M aking  and 
Im p le m e n ta tio n  Process
The system being explored in  th is thesis w ill henceforth be called the 'EC 
policy-m aking and im plem entation system', and may be sym bolica lly 
represented by a summary systems diagram  as shown in  figu re  11. The 
in d iv id u a l sub-systems com prising th is  system and th e ir re la tionships are 
discussed in  greater length  in  subsequent sections after id e n tifica tio n  o f the 
m ain aspects o f the overall system may be iden tified . Where necessary, 
systems term inology is defined.
6.4.1 The EC Policy-Making and Im plem entation System and its  Environm ent
The European Com m unity Policy-M aking and Im plem entation System (o r EC 
System) is its e lf a subsystem o f the In te rna tiona l P olitica l and Economic 
System, w hich form s the environm ent. The surrounding environm ent o f the 
EC policy-m aking and im plem entation system is defined here as tha t w hich 
affects bu t is no t contro lled by the system. The social, economic and p o litica l
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influences o f the environm ent on the EC System are symbolised by Inputs (o r 
in  Easton term inology, demands and supports). The environm ent is in  tu rn  
affected by the EC system via  feedback w ith in , fo r example, in te rna tiona l 
forum s such as NATO and the United Nations.
The EC System is d ivided from  the environm ent by the system boundary, which 
is symbolised by the box surrounding the component sub-systems. Each sub­
system is defined b y  its  own aims and means o f action and is su ffic ien tly  
organised to be able to act consistently. Conversion and decision processes take 
place w ith in  the sub-systems w hich convert the inputs to the sub-systems in to  
the outputs o f the sub-systems. In  the sub-systems regarded here, the po licy  
outcomes w hich are o f in terest, w hich are im plem entation outcomes, actua lly 
occur w ith in  the Member States. In  contrast to the classical Easton p o litica l 
system, therefore, po licy  outcomes in  th is case are no t open to  influences from  
the environm ent, as they w ould be i f  p o licy  outcomes were external to the 
system.
In te rna lly , the EC System is represented by a linear com bination o f fou r 
h ie ra rch ica lly  linked  sub-systems; two o f these sub-systems make up the 
central EC policy-m aking and enforcem ent system, and two make up the 
Member State’s im plem entation and enforcem ent system. The sub-systems are 
connected to each other by in p u t/o u tp u t flows and feedback loops.
The d iv is ion  o f the EC System in to  fo u r sub-systems is a necessary step in  
progressing the operationalisation o f the model in  tha t i t  reflects the actual 
structure  and function  o f the EC System, w hich is h ierarch ica l in  nature from  
the perspective o f p o licy  generation and im plem entation.
The Com m unity sub-systems are p rim a rily  engaged in  converting the system's 
overa ll inputs in to  outputs in  the fo rm  o f au tho rita tive  instrum ents (or, in  the 
a llocation o f au thorita tive  values). These outputs can take the fo rm  o f one o f 
the Com m unity’s legislative instrum ents as m entioned in  A rtic le  189 (Section 
4.2). Central in  th is thesis is one ou tpu t pa rticu la r: the d irective.
The outputs are then pu t in to  the Member States sub-system whose p rim ary 
function  is the generation o f po licy  outcomes. Policy outcomes are defined as 
im plem entation outcomes.
6.4.2 Sub-svstems: Process. S tructure, and Parameters
This in itia l adapted systems model o f the EC poUcy-making and im plem entation 
process fa lls  short o f an explanation o f the im plem entation process. The next 
step is to define th e ir structures and processes, and the way in  which the sub­
systems communicate w ith  each other. A ll th is is to be done in  a way w hich
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reduces the large degree o f com plexity to a manageable num ber o f 
operationalisable key parameters. The in s titu tio n a l and adm in istra tive  
structures and processes at w ork in  the policy-m aking and im plem entation 
process have been investigated at length in  Chapter V and are represented 
schem atically in  figu re  12. The assumption underlying th is schematic 
representation is tha t the process-flow diagrams can be use fu lly  represented 
in  th is systems manner, and tha t the complex processes captured by the 
process-flow diagrams, w hich include such un ique ly socio-po litica l processes 
as bargaining and negotiation, can be summarised in  terms o f the conversion 
o f inputs in to  outputs by each o f the four sub-systems.
The exam ination o f the in te rna l structure and processes in  the relevant parts 
o f Chapter V provide the basis fo r the param etrization o f these sub-systems 
using 's ta tu to ry ' (re la ting  to the a b ility  o f statute o r legal measure to influence 
im plem entation) and 'non-sta tu to ry ' (re la ting  to other factors not re lated to 
statute, in fluencing im plem entation) parameters. These are based p a rtly  on 
the parameters employed by Sabatier and Mazmanian's fram ework, discussed 
in  the previous Chapter. This fram ework provides a basis fo r the lin k in g  o f 
behavioural and structu ra l elements o f organisation theory and systems 
theory, and as such avoids the overly 'm echanistic' approach which lies at the 
heart o f many o f the critic ism s o f the application o f systems theory to socio- 
pohtica l systems. Sabatier and Mazmanian specify the variables invo lved in  
the im plem entation process by synthesising d iffe re n t models w ith in  
organisation theory, and thus show an understanding o f organisations w hich 
is necessary fo r the understanding o f the im plem entation process. Moreover 
th e ir fram ework is unique in  tha t no other im plem entation fram ework to date 
has been as extensively tested em p irica lly . The ir re la tive ly  manageable lis t o f 
variables and the focus in  the fram ew ork on the fo rm ula tion-im plem entation- 
re fo rm u la tion  cycle make the fram ework suitable fo r adaptation in to  this 
work. However as discussed earlier, the m a jo rity  o f the em pirica l tests carried 
ou t o f the Sabatier and Mazmanian fram ework involve d is trib u tive  policies.
The discussion on regulatory policies suggests that, in  order to be applicable to 
the problem  o f non-im plem entation o f EC environm ental policies considered 
here, the theory must be adapted to include more emphasis on the feedback 
and contro l aspects.
In  summary, the com bination o f Easton's systems theory to provide sub-system 
h ierarchy and in fo rm ation  flow  structure , w ith  Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
fram ework fo r the param etrisation o f the in te rna l structure and process o f
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each sub-system, provides a useful basis fo r a theoretica lly complete model 
w hich is fu rth e r amenable to  operationalisation. Before proceeding to 
operationalisation, each sub-system is reviewed.
6.4.3 The EC Pollcv-Making Sub-system
A growing environm ental awareness in  the early 1970s, serious p o llu tio n  
incidents, and public pressure to reduce p o llu tio n  and protect the 
environm ent as discussed in  Chapter II I a ll fo rm  demands to the EC Policy- 
Making sub-system. The response o f the sub-system was the development o f 
an European environm ental po licy , on w hich the Commission subsequently 
developed proposals. The processes taking place in  the EC Policy-Making sub­
system have been examined in  section 5.1, The outputs o f the sub-system 
centra l in  th is thesis are EC environm ental directives: aspects o f the d irective  
embody results o f bargaining and negotiation.
The describing parameters are thus predom inantly sta tu tory and concerned 
w ith  the d irective  contents. However an im portan t aspect o f the decision­
making process is represented by the non-statu tory param eter re la ting  to 
economic im plications.
6.4.4 The EC Enforcement and Control Sub-svstem
Inputs in to  and processes taking place w ith in  the EC Enforcement and Control 
sub-system are examined in  Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Part o f the inputs are form ed 
by w ith inpu ts consisting o f Member States' Enforcement and C ontrol sub­
systems' outputs, thus recognising the in te rna l feedback loop.
The outputs o f the EC Enforcement and C ontrol sub-system are the subsequent 
enforcem ent proceedings. The inclusion  o f th is sub-system in to  the EC Policy- 
Making and Im plem entation system allows the model to take in to  account the 
evo lu tionary processes o f im plem entation: exam ination o f im plem entation 
over tim e, recognised by Sabatier and Mazmanian as im portant, can take place. 
The subsequent parameters are concerned w ith  the measurement o f the most 
im portan t functions o f the sub-system: the sta tu tory legislative and executive 
overview and the non-statutory response from  Member States.
6.4.5 The Member State Im plem entation and A pplication Sub-svstem
The outputs o f the EC Policy-Making sub-system, environm ental directives, 
fo rm  the subsequent inputs o f the Member State Im plem entation and 
Application sub-system. The outputs o f the EC Enforcement and C ontrol sub-
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system also fo rm  inputs in to  the Member State Im plem entation and 
A pplication sub-system, thus allow ing fo r a feedback to  take place. The 
processes taking place in  the Member State Im plem entation and A pp lica tion 
sub-system have been examined in  Section 5.2 regarding the Netherlands 
andin Section 5.3 regarding the U nited Kingdom.
The outputs o f the sub-system consists o f national im plem entation measures, 
w hich should adhere to the obligations and duties set by the Treaty and the 
European Court o f Justice (Section 4.3).
The sta tu tory parameters relate to the legal structu ring  o f the Member State's 
application and im plem entation process. The non-statu tory parameters 
measure the extent o f behavioural change required.
6.4.6 The Member State Enforcement and Control Sub-svstem
The outputs o f the Member State Im plem entation and A pplica tion sub-system, 
consisting o f national im plem entation measures, fo rm  the inputs in to  the 
Member State Enforcement and C ontrol subsystem. Under im plem entation is 
understood, as defined Section 1.5, the application o f directives in to  national 
legislation and the subsequent con tro l and enforcem ent o f these national 
legislative measures. The im portance o f the enforcement and contro l o f 
im plem ented directives has been po in ted out by the European Commission 
(Section 1.1). The outputs o f the sub-system are the im plem entation outcomes 
o f the European Com m unity Policy-Making and Im plem entation System. 
Parameters o f the sub-system measure the structure (s ta tu to ry  param eter) and 
function ing  and extent o f enforcem ent and con tro l activ ities (non-statu tory 
param eter) regarding im plem ented directives in  the Member State.
6.5 M odel V a riab les and H ypotheses
The assumption tha t the model as portrayed in  figure  12 describes necessary 
elements o f the EC Policy-Making and Im plem entation System leads to the 
m ain hypothesis, w hich is:
'the  outcome o f the EC environm ental policy-m aking and im plem entation 
system is determ ined by (and can therefore be explained and predicted by) the 
values o f the model parameters'.
Follow ing on from  this m ain hypothesis, o ther secondary hypotheses evolve, 
suggesting the effects tha t the model parameters are predicted o r expected to 
have on the im plem entation outcomes. It  is suggested tha t the behaviour o f the 
system can be defined as the changes in  tim e in  the param eter values.
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6.5.1 Outcomes: D efin ition  o f the Dependent variable
The desired outcome o f the EC policy-m aking and im plem entation system is the 
achievement o f the objective as stated in  the directive, o r in  o ther words the 
successful im plem entation o f the d irective .
The success and fa ilu re  o f the d iffe re n t possible im plem entation outcomes 
have been defined by the European Commission (Section 1.1). The Commission 
classifies three categories o f non-im plem entation as follows (OJ C 233,1993; 9 
and Annex I and H 2.1.1-2.1.4 ; COM(95)500 fin a l,1995):
• N on-notifica tion  o f na tiona l im plem entation measures: "The Member State 
has to  transpose directives w ith in  the tim e-lim its  tha t they themselves 
accepted in  the Council ... and send a no tifica tion  o f those national 
im plem enting measures to the Commission, late n o tifica tio n  always means 
th a t the Commission must commence infringem ent proceedings (OJ C 
233,1993;41). These infringem ent proceedings consist o f an A rtic le  169 
le tte r, a Reasoned op in ion and in  case the Member State s ill does not 
respond, a re fe rra l to the European Court o f Justice (Section 4.4.2);
• N on-conform ity o f na tiona l im plem entation measures: "A lthough the 
obligations imposed by directives are debated at length before the Council 
adopts them, the Member States s till often transpose some o f them 
incorrectly" (OJ C 233,1993; 42).
•  Incorrect A pp lica tion  o f na tiona l im plem entation measures: "The 
obligations imposed by a d irective  are n o t observed in  practice, despite the 
fact tha t nationa l im plem enting leg is la tion  fu lly  and co rrectly  transposes a 
directive and is m andatory in  its  own righ t" (OJ C 233,1993; 43).
In fringem ent proceedings are s im ila r as in  the case o f n o n -n o tifica tion  o f 
na tiona l im plem entation measures and non-conform ity o f national 
im plem entation measures,
6.5.2 System (IndeoendentJ variables
The set o f sub-system parameters ide n tified  in  Sections 6,4.3-6,4.6 parametrises 
the entire  system, and are comprised of:
Variable 1: C larity and Precision o f  Directives
The firs t variab le  concerns the precision w ith  w hich p o licy  objectives are 
described and ranked. Clear objectives "serve as a resource to  actors both 
inside and outside the im plem enting ins titu tion s  who perceive discrepancies 
between agency outputs and those objectives" (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981;
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25). Effective im plem entation depends on clear, precise specification o f the 
behavioural changes required  o f the adm in istra tion  and the public.
Language is no t always able to  capture meaning w ith  precision. Legislative 
drafters m igh t no t foresee m any o f the possible applications le t alone th e ir 
contextual settings. M oreover bargaining between the regula tor and the 
regulated may invo lve compromises w hich are reflected in  the lack o f c la rity  
and specific ity o f legislative text. These im perfections inherent to the process 
o f po licy  fo rm ation  frequen tly  produce a zone o f am biguity w ith in  which it  is 
d iffic u lt to  say i.e. w ith  precision what is perm itted and w hat is forb idden. 
"Poorly conceptualized, badly d ra fted  and incom plete ly a rticu la ted regulations 
counteract positive responses to environm ental goals" (D iMento, 1989;! 18).
The degree o f c la rity  o f an environm ental d irective  is hypothesised as 
increasing the effectiveness w ith  w hich the d irective  is im plem ented.
Variable 2: The Economic Dimension
The h isto rica l developm ent o f EC environm ental law and the conflicts between 
economic and environm ental objectives suggest tha t the economic 
im plications and possible conflicts o f environm ental d irectives m ust be 
addressed. This variable is also m entioned by Sabatier and Mazmanian 
although in  most im plem entation studies i t  has not been given p a rticu la r 
im portance. The successful im plem entation o f an environm ental d irective  is 
hypothesised to be inversely p roportiona l to the economic costs associated 
w ith  its  im plem entation.
Variable 3: Degree o f ins titu tiona l change
Member States’ im plem entation structure  and th e ir decision-m aking rules and 
h ierarch ica l in tegra tion  are o f great im portance (Sabatier, 1986a; 25).
Complex im plem entation structures consist o f numerous 'veto ' points tha t may 
impede effective im plem entation o f s ta tu tory objectives ( Mazmanian and 
Sabatier, 1992; Pressman and W idavsky, 1973). The im plem entation success o f 
an environm ental d irective  is hypothesised to be inversely related to the 
am ount o f changes tha t m ust be made regarding the in s titu tio n a l structure o f 
the Member State.
Variable 4: Commitment : Enforcement and Control 
No m atter how w ell a statute structures the im plem entation process, the 
atta inm ent o f legal objectives w hich seek to m od ify target group behaviour is 
u n like ly  unless o ffic ia ls  in  the im plem enting agencies are strong ly com m itted
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to the achievement o f those objectives (Rosenbaum, 1981). Any new 
programme requires im plem enters who are com m itted to new regulations and 
standard operating procedures and to enforce them  in  the face o f resistance 
from  target groups. Commitment is embodied by the extent to  which the 
Member State takes the e ffo rt to , n o t on ly transpose the d irective  in to  national 
legislative measures, but also active ly enforce and con tro l the im plem entation 
measures. According to  DiMento:
A sound enforcement policy is necessary to affect corporate and smail-business 
behaviour... Enforcement encompasses ... the certainly of a sanction being 
imposed" (DiMento, 1989; 112).
Such enforcem ent po licy  depends on the presence o f function ing  
enforcem ent and con tro l structures, leading to the fo llow ing  hypothesis: tha t 
the degree o f com m itm ent o f a Member State and its  ins titu tions towards 
enforcem ent and con tro l o f im plem ented directives, results in  successful 
im plem entation o f an environm ental d irective .
V erifica tion  o f most o r a ll o f the hypotheses would confirm  the tru th  o f the 
proposed relationships. On the other hand, th e ir re jection w ill necessitate the 
search fo r a lte rnative  explanations fo r non-im plem entation and ca ll in to  
question the im portance and relevance placed by the present w rite r on them. 
Before continu ing w ith  the em pirica l application o f the system variables i t  
should be recognised th a t several variables (e.g. variable 4 com m itm ent: 
enforcem ent and contro l) are d is trib u te d  over several sub-systems.
6.6  Research S tra tegy
6.6.1 Dimensions o f Analysis
The fram ework fo r the investigation in to  im plem entation can be viewed as 
having three dimensions (figu re  9):
(a) the National Dimension, represented by the 15 Member States o f the 
European Com m unity;
(b) the Sector Dimension, represented by the 200 environm ental directives 
cu rre n tly  in  force;
(c) the A nalytica l D imension, now represented by 4 composite variables 
param etrising the theoretica l m odel o f the EC Policy-Making and 
Im plem entation Process developed in  Sections 6.1-6.5.
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An analysis o f the entire  system ou tlined  by these dimensions would consist o f 
a three-dim ensional m atrix w ith  dimensions 15 by 200 by 4; th is would 
represent a to ta l o f 12,000 m atrix cells. Further analysis is necessarily 
constrained by tim e and resources to a subset o f th is system. The selected 
subset is (figure  13):
(a) two Member States: the United Kingdom  and the Netherlands;
(b) two directives: the D rinking W ater and Birds D irectives;
(c) the fo u r composite variables defined in  Section 6.5.
F igure  13: Im p le m e n ta tio n  : A n a lys is  subset
NATIONAL DIMENSION 
OK Netherlands
Note: 2 such 2x4 
matrices exist,one 
for each of the 2 
Directives; only 
one such matrix 
shown here
Note: 4 such 2x2 
matrices exist,one 
for each of the 4 
System Variables; only 
one such matrix shown 
here
source: present w rite r
This m atrix subset and its  em pirica l operationalisation is fu rth e r described in  
Section 6.7. F irst the em pirica l analysis and the su ita b ility  o f the employed 
em pirical m ethodology are discussed.
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6.6.2 A Comparative Case study approach
According to Yanow (1990) "... im plem entation analysis requires a longer tim e 
perspective than tha t taken by most studies. Research needs to  trace the 
m u ltip le  po licy  in te rpre ta tions made by several stakeholders in  the po licy, to 
explore how the meanings evolve du ring  im plem entation, to  trace the 
h isto rica l development o f the issue cu lture, as well as to explore 
im plem entation across levels o f the im plem enting bureaucracy and across 
intergovernm ental lines" (Yanow, 1990;223). The type o f research questions 
are "how" and "why" and p o in t towards describing, understanding and 
exp la in ing  non-im p lem enta tion.
Hamel (1993) argues tha t "The case study has proven to be in  complete 
harm ony w ith  the qualita tive  m ethod" (Hamel et al, 1993;39). In Yin’s view  the 
case m ethod is p a rticu la rly  suitable if, like  in  th is research , ’how' and ’w hy’ 
questions are asked about contem porary events over which the researcher has 
no contro l (Yin,1994;6). Moreover, Y in argues tha t the case m ethod is suitable 
fo r the systems approach, because:
... it is an empirical research which examines a contemporary phenomenon in its real 
life context when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not 
clear, and when several sources of information are used (Yin, 1994;9).
The case method is also suitable on data collection grounds. A great varie ty o f 
data needs to be collected, through study o f o ffic ia l documents from  many 
d iffe re n t sources, reports, in fo rm a tion  from  media and interview s, a ll o f 
w hich are the basic ways o f gathering in fo rm ation  fo r a case study (Y in 1994; 
79-90), and w hich have been employed in  th is  research. However, no single 
source stands out alone as the best fo r studying im plem entation; one o f the 
m ajor lessons according to Yin is th a t two o r more o f these sources should be 
used in  any study o f im plem entation.
Regarding the d is tinc tion  between quan tita tive  and qua lita tive  or, statistica l 
and analytica l generalisation, Yin (1994;30-32) mentions tha t " in  "sta tistica l 
generalization" an inference is made about a population on the basis o f 
em pirical data collection about a sample ... M ultip le  cases should be considered 
like  m u ltip le  experiments ... the m ethod o f generalization is "ana lytica l 
generalization" in  which a previously developed theory is used as a tem plate 
w ith  which to compare the em pirica l results o f the case study. I f  two o r more
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cases are shown to support the same theory, rep lica tion  may be claimed" (Yin, 
1994;31). In  conclusion Yin believes th a t the case study "like  the experim ent, 
does not represent a 'sample’ and the investigator's goal is to  e?q)and and 
generalize theories (ana lytica l generalization) and no t the enumerate 
frequencies (sta tis tica l generalization)" (Yin, 1994;30-31).
6.6.3 V a lid ity  o f the Method proposed
According to Yin (1994; 33-38) a tten tion  should be paid  to the fo llow ing factors 
when preparing and carrying ou t a case study: construct va lid ity , in te rna l 
va lid ity , external v a lid ity  and re lia b ility .
In  order to strengthen the construct va lid ity , Yin m entions three practices 
tha t should be employed and w hich have been applied in  th is research. The 
firs t is the use o f m u ltip le  source o f evidence, the second is the establishm ent 
o f a chain o f evidence and fin a lly , comments o f inform ants on the results o f 
the case studies.
In te rna l v a lid ity  has been im proved in  a special type o f pattern-m atching: 
explanation bu ild ing , i.e. "patterns m ay be related to  the dependent or 
independent variables o f study (o r both)" (Yin, 1994;106). "To explain a 
phenomenon is to stipulate a set o f causal links about i t  ... whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to  o ther conditions. In  most studies the links may 
be complex and d iffic u lt to  measure in  any precise manner" (Yin, 1994;110). In 
th is research the conceptual fram ework and the hypothetica l paths provided 
one pattern  w hile the em pirica l results form ed another. The two patterns are 
compared and possible matches o r mismatches and explanations fo r th e ir 
occurrence can be ide n tifie d .
W ith regard to the external v a lid ity  Yin argues tha t "the external v a lid ity  
problem  has been a m ajor ba rrie r in  doing case studies. C ritics typ ica lly  state 
tha t single cases o ffe r a poor basis fo r generalizing ... However, such c ritics  
are im p lic itly  contrasting the s itua tion  to survey research, in  w hich a sample 
read ily  generalizes to  a larger universe. This analogy to  samples and universes 
is incorrect when dealing w ith  case studies. This is because survey research 
re ly  on statistica l generalization whereas case studies re ly  on analytica l 
generalization ... in  ana lytica l generalization, the investigator is s triv ing  to 
generalize a pa rticu la r set o f results to some broader theory" (Yin, 1994;36). 
External v a lid ity  was im proved in  th is  research by using rep lica tion  logic. The 
em pirical study was executed in  a consistent way in  both Member States fo r 
both environm ental EC directives.
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6 .7  Em pirical A p p lica tion
To explore the u tility  o f the fram ework described above, com parative and 
em pirica l assessment o f the fo u r variables has been carried out. The find ings 
o f the comparison are in te rpre ted  in  Chapter V III w ith  data from  curren t case 
studies.
6.7.1 The National Dimension
The em pirical cases fo r th is research come from  the Netherlands and the 
U nited Kingdom. These Member States have been selected because:
both have s im ila r state systems, parliam entary democracy and ind u s tria l 
economy w hich a llow  fo r rea lis tic  comparison;
• both have su ffic ie n tly  d iffe re n t policies regarding the environm ent and 
the European Com m unity, a llow ing fo r a sign ificant d ifference in  
leg islative and adm in istra tive  environm ents.
6.7.2 The Sector Dimension
The D rinking W ater D irective and Birds D irective have been selected because:
• both are EC environm ental d irectives w ith  sim ila r aims to  protect the 
env ironm en t;
• bo th  are su ffic ie n tly  d iffe re n t i.e. w ater p ro tection  and hum an health 
im plications as compared to  nature p ro tection, again allow ing fo r 
s ign ificant differences and independence between the sectors;
•  Both directives have substantial im plem entation h is to ry , enabling 
su ffic ien t data co llection.
6.7.3 The Analytica l D imension
The sub-systems o f the EC policy-m aking and im plem entation model have been 
param etrised by fo u r (summary) variables which measure key aspects o f both 
structure and process (Section 6.4.2) and have been defined in  Section 6.5.2. 
Before addressing the operationalisation o f the fo u r variables which are a 
composite o f component index variables, the fo llow ing needs to be emphasised. 
First, the fact tha t the present state o f the lite ra tu re  does n o t a llow  quantita tive  
conclusions such tha t a change o f a certa in  am ount in  a given independent 
variable produces changes in  a dependent variable o f a specified quan tity  
(Rosenbaum; 1981;79).
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M oreover many researchers have stressed the d iffic u lty  o f conceptualising 
and measuring ins titu tions  as explanatory variables (Section 2.2.2; 2.3.2-2.3.5) 
or, as Van M eter argues, "m any o f the variables needed to complete an 
im plém entation study are d iffic u lt i f  no t im possible to  measure" (Van Meter et 
al, 1975;415), However, i t  is believed tha t i t  is possible to report on the 
relevance and nature o f in fluence o f the variables on successful 
im plem entation o f EC environm ental d irectives.
A num ber o f researchers have made attem pts to  operationalise and measure 
variables in  th e ir subsequent im plem entation studies. Based on these studies, 
and w ith  adaptations fo r the param etrising o f the EC policy-m aking and 
im plem entation system (Section 6.4.2) the fo llow ing em pirica l application o f 
the variables has been developed fo r th is study (table 8).
Variable 1 : C larity and Precision o f a directive
For the purposes o f th is thesis the c la rity  and objectives o f an environm ental 
d irective is a summary variable, and is defined as containing standards and 
objectives to be understood by those ind iv idua ls responsible fo r its 
achievem ent.
Researchers who m ention c la rity  and precision o f a po licy  o r statute are 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1992), Van Meter et al (1975), McFarlane (1989), and 
DiMento (1989). McFarlane, fo r example, measures c la rity  o r precision o f 
statute as consisting o f specification o f a target population (score is 1 when the 
answer is yes, 0 when the answer is no), specification o f e lig ib ility  (score is 1 
when the answer is yes, 0 when the answer is no), and fin a lly  i f  the services 
to be provided are specified (score is 1 when the answer is yes, 0 when the 
answer is no). Together w ith  other operationalised variables (a ll w ith  scores 1 
o r 0) a composite score was developed from  the weighted measures o f each o f 
the variables (McFarlane, 1989;411).
In  another study, fo u r variables were defined by Rosenbaum (1981) as 
measures o f the specific ity o f a statute: the c la rity  o f sta tu tory objectives, the 
precision o f pe rm it exemptions, and the precision o f exemptions and pe rm it 
approval c rite ria , each w ith  fo u r o rd ina l measures. For example the c la rity  o f 
sta tu tory objectives has a value 1 when no statement o f objectives is made, a 
value 2 when the pro tection o f general pub lic  interest is stated, a value 3 when 
the preservation and protecting o f wetlands is stated, bu t also the prom otion o f 
social and economic development, and a value o f 4 when the preservation and 
protection o f wetlands is stated.
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Sabatier and Klosterman (1981) assess c la rity  o f statutes on a 1-7 scale ranging 
from  containing very h igh  (+++) (clear and consistent p o licy  directives) to 
very low  (—).
The ind icators and measures fo r the dim ension o f the variable c la rity  and 
precision o f d irectives fo r th is  study are the fo llow ing.
The composite variable consists o f six com ponent variable descriptions:
• the precision o f the statement o f the po licy  objectives (five  p o in t scale, 
value 1 when the p o licy  objective is very unclear to value 5 when the 
p o licy  objective is very clear);
•  the use o f technical standards w hich were ambiguous (value 0 when these 
are present, value 1 when no ambiguous technical standards are present);
» the technical standards form ed an obstacle to im plem entation (value 0 
when the answer is yes, value 1 when the answer is no);
•  the use o f o ther de fin itions w hich are ambiguous (value 0 when these are 
present, value 1 when no ambiguous de fin itions are present);
•  other de fin itions form ed an obstacle to  im plem entation (value 0 when the 
answer is yes, value 1 when the answer is no);
• the necessity fo r fu rth e r explanation, th is can be in  the from  o f a question 
from  the government o f the Member State to the Commission o r a 
p re lim inary question by a national court to the European Court o f Justice 
regarding the im plem entation o f a d irective  (value 0 when the answer is 
yes, value 1 when the answer is no).
Variable 2: The Economic Dimension
The costs invo lved w ith  im plem enting a d irective  have a d ire c t bearing on the 
im plem entation o f the d irective . As h igh costs fo r the im plem enting Member 
State can fo rm  an obstacle leading to  delay w ith  the im plem entation and 
fu rth e r resentm ent w ith  the Commission fo r im posing costly leg islation upon 
the Member States.
Sabatier and Klosterman (1981) measure economic im plications as adequate 
financia l resources available fo r im plem entation, w hich varies on a seven 
p o in t scale from : adequate financia l resources available (+++ very high) to no 
adequate financia l resources available (~  very low ).
The ind icators and the measures fo r the economic dim ension variable fo r th is 
study are the fo llow ing.
The composite variable consists o f two component variable descriptions:
168
® consideration during negotiations o f the d irective at EC level, o f costs 
invo lved w ith  im plem entation(value 1 when the answer is yes, value 0 
when the answer is no);
•  the costs o f compliance (value 1 when the costs o f compliance form ed no 
obstacle fo r im plem entation, value 0 when th is was the case).
Variable 3: Degree o f S tructural change
By structu ra l change is meant the Member State’s im plem entation structure 
and its  decision-m aking rules, the more change tha t is necessary the more 
d iffic u lt im plem entation w ill be.
Four variables have been defined by Sabatier and Klosterman (1981;!76) as 
measures o f s tructu ring  im plem entation: assigning p rin c ip a l respons ib ility  to 
sym pathetic agencies; creating a h ie ra rch ica lly  in tegrated process w ith  few 
veto points and adequate incentives to prom ote compliance from  recalcitrants; 
establishing supportive decision rules; and fin a lly  p rovid ing  adequate fo rm al 
access to  supportive constituency groups. Each variable varies on a seven 
po in t scale from  +++ very h igh to — very low.
The indicators and the measures fo r the degree o f in s titu tio n a l change fo r th is 
study are the fo llow ing.
The composite variable consists o f fo u r component variable descriptions:
•  the degree to  w hich the im plem entation process is lega lly structured to  
enhance im plem entation o f d irectives in to  national law, w hich is measured 
as:
- national system fo r im plem entation o f leg islation (scale from  1 to 5, value 
1 when many decision-m aking points are present, to  value 5 when no 
decision-m aking po in ts are present);
- the presence o f a special Act regulating the im plem entation o f EC 
leg islation (value 1 when the answer is yes, value 0 when the answer is 
no);
- the presence o f an environm ental legal fram ework (value 1 when the 
answer is yes, value 0 when the answer is no);
- the subsid iarity issue and the d irective  (value 1 when subsid iarity was no t 
regarded as an issue by the Member State, value 0 when subsid iarity was 
regarded as an issue by the Member State).
•  the existence o f an environm ental enforcem ent and co n tro l structure 
(score 1 to  5; value 1 in  case no such structure is present, to 5 when a
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structure  o f specialised environm ental con tro l and enforcem ent is 
present);
•  tim e given fo r im plem entation (value 1 when the Member State d id  not 
apply fo r extra tim e i.e. in  the fo rm  o f a tem porary derogation, value 0 
when th is was the case);
• con flic ting  na tiona l p o licy  (value 1 when there is no con flic ting  nationa l 
po licy  present, value 0 when a nationa l po licy con flic ting  the im plem ented 
d ire c tive .is  present).
Variable 4: Commitment: Enforcement and Control 
Under in s titu tio n a l com m itm ent is understood the com m itm ent o f an 
in s titu tio n  as a whole, i.e. governments o r regula tory authorities, in  pursuing 
environm ental objectives w hich is the sum o f personal com m itm ent o f 
ind iv idua ls charged w ith  (key) aspects o f the im plem entation process. 
Commitment is defined as the existence and w orking o f sound enforcem ent and 
contro l structures at EC and Member State level.
Four variables have been defined by Rosenbaum (1981;70) as measures o f 
adequate enforcem ent procedures:
(a) perm it application requirem ents (value 1 in  case no pe rm it application is 
required, value 0 in  case a p e rm it application is required);
(b) m andatory development conditions (value 1 when no m andatory 
developm ent conditions have been imposed; value 2 when general m andatory 
developm ent conditions were imposed; value 3 when quantita tive  m andatory 
developm ent conditions were imposed);
(c) adm in istra tive  penalties (in ju n c tion  o r crease and desist order available 
value 1; pe rm it suspension o r restora tion order available value 2; 
adm in istra tive  fin e  or c rim ina l c ita tio n  available value 3)
(d) and highest available fine  (values from  0 fo r no fine  to 3 fo r a fine  up to 
$10,000 per occurrence^
Burby and Paterson {1993;767-769) measure three aspects o f the enforcem ent 
system:
(1) the c la rity  o f the sediment con tro l p lan (five  po in t scale 5 - very clear to  1 
- ve ry unclear);
(2) the degree to w hich a co-operative approach to enforcem ent was employed 
(tw enty-n ine p o in t scale based on agency adm in istra tor's response to seven 
d iffe re n tia l item s);
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(3) the degree o f deterrence as ind icated by the frequency o f on-site 
inspections and lengths o f tim e spent on site (value based on average num ber 
o f inspections per m onths and average tim e per inspection).
In  the same study, com m itm ent is measured as;
- previously sanctioned (scale: 1- yes, 0 - no sanction imposed);
- beheve fine  like ly  (five  p o in t scale from  5 - very like ly  to  1 - very un like ly );
- believe fine  w ould be costly (three p o in t scale from  0 - not very costly, to 1 - 
moderate and 2 - very costly)
- costs added to pro ject by compliance (fo u r po in t scale);
- concerned i f  public learned reason fo r fine  (three p o in t scale);
- believe con tro l o f sediment is im portan t (five  p o in t scale from  1 - strongly 
disagree to 5 - strongly agree) (Burby and Paterson, 1993;767-769).
The indicators and the measures fo r the enforcement and con tro l variable fo r 
th is study are the fo llow ing.
The composite variable consists o f fo u r component variable descriptions:
® the existence o f legislative and executive overview by the Commission 
(value 1 when the d irective  request the Member State to in fo rm  the 
Commission regu la rly  on the im plem entation, value 0 when the d irective  
does not state such a request);
• Member State action upon feedback from  the Commission (value 1 when the 
Member State undertakes action upon Commission contro l and enforcem ent 
activities, value 0 when a Member State fa ils to  do so);
•  carrying ou t o f nationa l con tro l and enforcem ent procedures (value 1
when these are carried ou t regarding national leg islation im plem enting EC 
directives, value 0 when th is is no t the case);
• response to national contro l and enforcem ent efforts (value 1 when there
is response to nationa l con tro l and enforcement efforts, value 0 when this
is no t the case).
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Table 8 : Component Variables and Assessment
Variable
Nr./Name
System
Level
Component
Variable
Number
Sub­
component
Variable
Number
(Sub-) Component Variable Description MaximumValue
1. Clarit)' and 
Precision of 
Directive
EC la precision of statement of policy objectives 5
EC lb i use of ambiguous technical standards 1
EC ii technical standards formed obstacle to implementation 1
EC iii use of other definitions which are ambiguous 1
EC iv other definitions formed obstacle to implementation 1
EC Ic necessity- for further explanation 1
Total 10
2. The Economic 
Dimension EC 2a
consideration of costs during negotiations 
at EC level 1
MS 2b costs of compliance 1
Total 2
3. Degree of 
Institutional 
Change
MS 3a i national system for implementation of legislation 5
MS ii presence of a special act regulating the implementation of EC legislation 1
MS iii presence of an environmental legal framework 1
MS iv subsidiarity and the directive 1
MS 3b existence of a structure of environment enforcement and control 5
MS 3c time given for implementation 1
MS 3d conflicting national policy I
Total 15
4. Committment:
Enforcement 
and Control
EC 4a legislative and executive overview by Commission 1
EC 4b MS action upon feedback from Commission I
MS 4c national control and enforcement procedures carried out 1
MS 4d response to national control and enforcement efforts 1
Total 4
: Overall Total Points 31
source: present writer
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CHAPTER V II: THE FOUR CASE STUDIES
7.1 The EC D rin k in g  W ater D ire c tive
7.1.1 In troduction
D irective re la ting  to the : 80/778/EEC, Council D irective 15^ ^^  Ju ly
q ua lity  o f water intended fo r 1980, OJ L 229,30 August^h 1930 
hum an consum ption
n o tifica tio n  date : 18 July’^^  1980
fo rm a l com pliance : 18 July^l^ 1982 (laws, regulations and
adm in istra tive provisions necessary to 
com ply w ith  the d irective) 
standards to be m et : 18 July^^ 1985 (w ith  the exception when
derogations have been granted)
The Com m unity's po licy  regarding water p o llu tio n  is one o f the earliest to be 
developed and is at the tim e o f w ritin g  considered to be the most complete 
sector o f the Com m unity's environm ental po licy. I t  has m ajor im plications fo r 
Member States, fo r both the pub lic  and p riva te  water industry, farm ers and 
consumers. The lis t, consists o f some measures which are re la tive ly  m inor and 
narrow  in  scope, such as d irective  82/242/EEC (testing fo r detergents) to 
leg islation w hich is o f m ajor im portance in  the water industry  and beyond, 
such as d irective  80/778/EEC (water fo r human consum ption). Since then, 
fu rth e r legislation, both m ajor and m inor, has been developed. D irectives w ith  
m ajor im plications are fo r example d irective 91/676/EEC on n itra tes from  
ag ricu ltu ra l sources and d irective  91/271/EEC on urban waste water treatm ent. 
Both have substantial regula to ry force as w ell as m ajor financia l im plications 
fo r the au thorities responsible fo r th e ir im plem entation. Follow ing these 
directives, according to ^ e  European Commissioner fo r DG XI R itt Bjerregaard, 
"the tim e has come to  examine where we stand and to  consolidate our position" 
(Wiseman,1996; 10). Since the start o f 1994, the Commission has proposed 
revisions o f the Bathing W ater D irective and the D rinking W ater D irective, the 
development o f a Groundwater Action programme and a new Ecological Q uality 
o f W ater D irective, and fin a lly  a W ater Resources Framework D irective (see 
Appendix 2 fo r an overview o f existing and proposed EC water legislation).
The D rinking W ater D irective took a long tim e to be negotiated: it  was proposed 
m 1975 (COM(75) 394,22^*^ Ju ly 1975). Five years la te r i t  was adopted and 
n o tified  to the Member States (IT^h o f July 1980).
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From the opinions o f the European Parliam ent (OJ C 28, 1976;27), the Economic 
and Social Committee (OJ C 131, 1976;13) and earlier versions o f the proposed 
D irective, no ind ica tion  o r concern regarding the costs im plications o f the 
D irective were shown. However, one o f the reasons fo r the long negotiation 
was the establishm ent o f standards fo r the large num ber o f parameters. Many 
o f these were contentious because o f p reva iling  uncertainties in  effects o f 
many o f the substances on hum an health. The aim  o f the D rinking  W ater 
D irective is to ensure a un ifo rm  q u a lity  o f water fo r human consum ption 
throughout the te rrito ry  o f the European Com m unity. According to Haigh, the 
D irective is:
... a response to mounting concern about the increased reuse of waste water for the 
potable supply and the rising number of new organic and other trace substances 
entering into the water supply (Haigh, 1995; 4.4-3).
7.2 O u tlin e  o f the  C ontents o f the  D rin k in g  W ater D ire c tive
7.2.1 Legal basis
In the absence o f a legal basis in  the Treaty, the D rinking W ater D irective was 
based on A rtic le  100 and 235. Its lin k ing  w ith  and obvious im plications fo r 
health issues made the D rink ing  W ater D irective, one o f the firs t 
environm ental directives, acceptable to the Member States. The European 
Com m unity's F irst Environm ental A ction Programme also specifies actions 
regarding environm ental p o llu tio n  and outlines the necessity fo r setting 
q u a lity  objectives:
... to ensure that health requirements are met, it is necessary to set maximum limits 
for the concentration of pollutants and nuisances in the environment (First Action 
Programme, 1975).
This is repeated in  the pream ble o f the D rinking W ater D irective:
... in view of the importance for public health of water for human consumption, it is 
necessary to lay down quality standards (80/778/EEC, 1980;11).
Another ju s tifica tio n  p u t fo rw ard fo r the D rinking  W ater D irective is the 
operation o f the common market:
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... whereas a disparity between provisions already applicable or in the process of 
being drawn up in the various Member States relating to the quality of water for 
human consumption may create differences in the conditions of competition and, as a 
result, directly affect the operation of the common market {80/778/EEC, 1980; 11).
According to Larre "every European citizen deserves the same level o f 
p ro tection ... in  the W ater fo r Human Consumption D irective, and others, the 
Council comes very close to making th is argunient its  own when i t  argues tha t 
common standards are necessary in  order to  provide fo r the harm onious 
development o f economic activities" (Larre, 1990;80).
7.2.2 General p rincip les o f the D rinking  W ater D irective
Standards fo r the q u a lity  o f water intended fo r d rink ing  o r fo r the use in  food 
and d rin k  m anufacture, are la id  down in  order to protect human health. The 
standards in  the D rinking W ater D irective are based on the W orld Health 
Organisation (WHO) 1970 d rink ing  water standards w hich were no t legally 
b ind ing in  and o f themselves. The D irective has the additional effect o f 
pro tecting  the environm ent, as d rin k in g  w ater sources m ust be su ffic ie n tly  
free from  contam ination to a llow  inexpensive water treatm ent. W ater w hich is 
o ffic ia lly  recognised as na tu ra l m ineral water is covered by a separate 
directive 80/777/EEC (OJ L 229, 30 /8 /80 ), and in  Case C-42/89 ([1990] ECRI-2821) 
the European Court o f Justice fu rth e r excluded waters w hich are p riva te ly  
owned.
The D irective lays down 67 w ater q u a lity  standards and guidelines fo r water 
q u a lity  m onitoring. It contains three Annexes, the firs t o f w hich lis ts  the 67 
parameters w ith  accompanying standards and comments. Three types o f 
standard are used - the Guide Level (GL), the Maximum Adm issible 
Concentration (MAC) and the M inim um  Required Concentration (MRC).
A rtic le  7 o f the D irective requires a ll Member States to fix  values fo r ah the 
parameters w ith  MAC or MRC values w hich must not be greater than the stated 
MAC values, o r less than the MRC values. When the D irective on ly  gives a GL 
standard, a Member State may use its  d iscretion as to whether it  sets a standard 
or not. These water qu a lity  standards were set by the European Com m unity 
a fter the de libera tion o f advisory committees organised by the European 
Commission. The members o f these committees were expert representatives o f 
the Member States. Member States shah take a ll the necessary measures to 
ensure tha t any substances used in  the preparation o f water fo r human 
consum ption does no t rem ain in  concentrations higher than the MAC
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concentration re la ting  to these substances in  water (A rtic le  8 o f the D rinking  
W ater D irective).
A ll water intended fo r human consum ption shall be m onitored at 'the p o in t 
where i t  is made available to  the user' in  order to check w hether i t  meets the 
requirem ents la id  down in  Annex I (A rtic le  12 o f the D rinking W ater 
D irective). For such m on itoring  Member States shall conform  w ith  Annex II. 
The D rinking W ater D irective does not specify the 'p o in t where i t  is made 
available to the user'. According to  M acrory:
It could mean either the tap or the connection to the consumer's service pipe... 
(Macrory, 1989; 94).
Member States may derogate from  the standards set in  the D rinking W ater 
D irective; A rtic le  9 lays down the circumstances:
... in order to take account of (a) the nature of the ground from which the supply 
emanates (b) exceptional meteorological conditions (Article 9 Drinking Water 
Directive).
In  no case shall the derogations made by v irtu e  o f th is A rtic le  relate to toxic o r 
m icro b io logical factors o r constitu te a pub lic health hazard (A rtic le  9(3)). 
Member States grant derogations w ith in  th e ir own boundaries b u t m ust report 
these to the Commission when they relate to a da ily  water supply o f at least 
1000m^ o r a population o f at least 5000.
In  the event o f emergencies, the com petent national authorities may, fo r a 
lim ited  period o f tim e and up to a maximum value to be determ ined by them, 
allow  the maximum admissible concentration shown in  Annex I to be exceeded, 
provided tha t th is does no t constitute an 'unacceptable risk to pub lic  health ' 
and provided tha t the supply o f water cannot be m aintained in  any other way 
(A rtic le  10).
A theme tha t links derogations under A rtic le  9 and 10 is the p rinc ip le  that, in  
the case o f A rtic le  9, derogations shah not 'constitu te  a pub lic  health hazard' 
and in  the case o f A rtic le  10, derogations shall not 'constitu te an unacceptable 
risk to pubhc health '. These terms are n o t defined in  the D irective and are 
examples o f legal concepts tha t are d iffic u lt to p in  down in  scientific terms. 
The lack o f guidelines on what constitutes these 'unacceptable risks to public 
health ' in  emergency situations has been critic ised by the Economic and Social 
Committee. They believed tha t i t  was "absolutely essential tha t some guidelines
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should be given in  o rder to meet w ith  emergency situations and tha t these 
cannot be le ft en tire ly  to  the d iscretion o f local authorities" (OJ C 131, 12 June 
1976).
F inally, Member States may lay down more stringent provisions than those 
provided fo r in  the D irective (A rtic le  16 o f the D rinking W ater D irective).
7.2.3 Im plem entation and enforcem ent o f the D rinking W ater D irective in  
the Com m unity in  general
In  1990, e ight years a fte r the form al compliance date o f the D rinking W ater 
D irective and five  years a fte r the standards o f the D rinking W ater D irective 
had to be met, the European Commission e ither commenced o r continued 
proceedings against the m a jo rity  o f Member States fo r fa ilin g  to im plem ent 
the D rinking Water D irective (OJ C 338, 1991). Action in  the European Court o f 
Justice against France, Belgium and West-Germany was already in  progress, 
w hile  in fringem ent proceedings had started against Luxembourg, Ita ly , Spain, 
Ire land and the Netherlands. Breaches, m entioned by the Commission are:
Several member states Incorporates into their national legislation unauthorised 
exemptions from the provisions of the Directive. Some of them issued 
recommendations to water authorities or companies releasing them from compliance 
with the directive... Several member states' concentrations of polluting substances are 
in excess of the authorised limits (OJ C 338, 1991; 44).
The Commission made an (tem porary) exception fo r the U nited Kingdom. Here 
the p riva tisa tion  o f the water au thorities was in  fu ll progress, and the sale 
prospectuses fo r the in d iv id u a l companies were required to indicate i f  any 
legal actions re la ting  to th e ir activ ities were pending. Therefore, the B ritish  
governm ent was anxious to  reach agreement w ith  the Commission on an 
acceptable tim etable fo r com pliance w ith  the D rinking  W ater D irective tha t 
w ould avoid action in  the European Court o f Justice. According to Haigh:
The negotiations were highly unusual, involving the Commission and a Member State 
in a joint endeavour to arrive at a new implementation timetable for a directive whose 
legally-binding compliance date had long since passed (Haigh, 1995; 4,4-8).
In  1994 the situa tion  regarding non im plem entation o f the D rinking W ater 
D irective was reported as not much better. In  its  eleventh Report on 
Im plem entation the Commission comments tha t Portugal, Spain and Ita ly  a ll
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have problem s concerning non-con fo rm ity w ith  directives re la ting  to w ater 
(OJ C154, 1994; 42-43). More specifically, the Commission states that "a reasoned 
op in ion was addressed to  France on the subject o f the excessive levels o f 
pesticide residues in  d rin k in g  water perm itted  by two adm in istra tive  circulars, 
also reasoned opinions have been addressed to Ita ly  and the Netherlands 
regarding the conform ity o f th e ir legislation" (OJ C 154, 1994; 47).
The Commission emphasises its  d iffic u lty  in  obtaining a clear p ictu re  
concerning the im plem entation o f the D rinking  W ater D irective in  the 
Member States. "Because the Member states are not required by the D irective to 
report on im plem entation, the Commission does not have su ffic ien t 
in fo rm ation  to  assess the degree o f compliance. Any action i t  has taken has 
therefore been based m ain ly on com plaints from  ind iv idua ls concerned about 
the q u a lity  o f th e ir d rink ing  water" (OJ C 338, 1991; 44). This s ituation changed 
due to the in troduction  o f the Reporting D irective (91/692/EEC), which 
obligates Member States to  send the Commission three yearly reports on the 
im plem entation o f environm ental D irectives.
7.2.4 Revision o f the D rinking  W ater D irective
In Edinburgh in  1992 and in  Brussels in  1993, the heads o f State and 
Governments at the European Council asked the European Commission to  re­
examine a ll existing water directives, no t on ly in  the lig h t o f the developm ent 
o f scientific knowledge b u t also in  the lig h t o f the p rin c ip le  o f subsid iarity. 
According to the House o f Lords the revision o f the EC water directives:
... have been seen by some as particularly suitable for revision or even repeal under 
the banner of subsidiarity... (House of Lords, 1996;5).
In  December 1993 the Commission stated its in tention  (COM (93)545,1993) 
regarding proposing and replacing several existing w ater d irectives.
The EC D rinking W ater D irective has been critic ised  fo r its  scientific basis, fo r 
example, K elly (1987) points ou t tha t i t  contains 'sc ientific  flaws', and suggests:
... the easiest alterations to make are where the Directive clearly does not make 
scientific sense, for example, where a reference method of analysis has been set with 
a lowest detection lim it which Is higher than the M.A.C. value of the parameter to 
which it is to be applied ... also some of the parameters that have no known health 
effects at the present time might be omitted ... new knowledge ought to be used to 
change water quality standards as soon as it becomes available (Kelly, 1987; 81-83).
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One reason given fo r the frequent use o f im precise language in  the D irective 
is the inadequate state o f scien tific  knowledge o f the chronic health effects o f 
many substances cu rren tly  found in  water (Gray, 1994). Scientific uncerta in ty 
and p o litica l compromise are responsible fo r the A rtic le  9 and 10 derogations, 
they are no t to constitute a 'pub lic  health hazard'. Guidance on water qua lity  
m on itoring  is also lacking. For example "there is no guidance on sample 
collection and storage, ye t the way in  w hich samples are handled can 
s ign ifican tly  .affect the results o f water q u a lity  analysis" (Kelly, 1987; 85). 
Others call fo r the Commission to abandon the Guide Levels in  the D rinking  
W ater D irective
... as they do not relate to scientific data, in general have no legal significance, and
over-complicate the legislation (Molitor Group, 1995; 60).
The Commission agrees tha t the Guide Levels are unclear and results o f 
p o litica l compromises. Failures to reach agreements on m aximum admissible 
concentration (MAC) values in  the Council, led to compromises in  the fo rm  o f 
these Guide Levels w hich leave Member States to use th e ir d iscretion whether 
or no t to set standards. ELTREAU, the European federation o f water companies 
published reports in  w hich they urge fo r a series o f changes in  order to place 
the D rinking  W ater D irective on a more scientific footing . In  practice these 
changes would am ount to a m ajor re laxation o f the d irective (ENDS Report 210, 
1992a; 36). The European Commission's op in ion could no t be more d iffe rent, its  
com m itm ent to s tric t standards was illus tra ted  by the fact the Commission 
started proceedings against the UK government at the European Court o f 
Justice in  1992 fo r fa ilin g  to im plem ent the D rinking W ater D irective.
A confirm ation fo r m aintain ing s tric t standards came from  the W orld Health 
Organisation (WHO) 1993 review  o f its  d rink ing  water guidelines. The WHO's 
guidelines are incorporated in  the D rinking  W ater D irective as Maximum 
Admissible Concentrations (MACs). In  its  1993 review the WHO tightened 
guidelines fo r lead, metals, arsenic, cadm ium  and pesticides. In  response to the 
WHO's revised d rink ing  water guidelines and the demand fo r revision o f 
several o f the EC water directives, the European Commission organised a 
hearing, which took place in  September 1993 in  Brussels. Here the Commission 
announced its  in te n tio n  to  s im p lify  and stream line existing EC water 
pro tection  leg islation  in  lin e  w ith  basic standards fo r water q u a lity  and 
discharges. The Commission's proposal contains the laying down o f the 
requirem ents fo r compliance w ith  essential qua lity  and health  param eters.
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leaving Member States free to add secondary parameters. In  January 1995 the 
proposed revised DrinM ng W ater D irective was published (COM(94) 612). 
P rincipal amendments proposed are:
• The p o in t where water intended fo r human consum ption is available to 
the consumer (o r the domestic d is trib u tio n  system), has been fu rth e r defined. 
The new A rtic le  2 (2 )  defines the domestic d is trib u tio n  system as "a ll p ipew ork 
and fittin g s  which connect a consumer’s tap to the supply and which, 
according to the relevant nationa l law, are no t the responsib ility  o f the water 
supplier". This d e fin itio n  has c learly great im plications fo r the lead pipes 
used w ide ly in  domestic p ip ing  causing lead p o llu tio n  o f the d rin k in g  water;
• Member States must pub lish  an annual report on the qua lity  o f d rink ing  
water, and such reports must be sent to  the Commission w ith in  three m onths o f 
publication . Member States are also obliged to in fo rm  consumers in  the event 
o f derogations to  the param etric values (pa rt B Annex I) o r o f measures 
concerning the banning o r re s tric tio n  o f d is trib u tio n . These changes have 
been in troduced in  order to  ensure increased transparency regarding the 
im plem entation o f the D irective;
• The proposal makes i t  illega l fo r Member States, to  re s tric t o r p ro h ib it the 
free c ircu la tion  o f d rin k in g  water com plying w ith  the m inim um  standards o f 
the D irective o r food products in  w hich d rink ing  water has been used between 
the Member States. This is seen as necessary in  order to ensure tha t the new 
approach enshrined in  the D irective does no t result in  any obstacle to  trade;
• A revised set o f m inim um  requirem ents fo r m onitoring schemes fo r 
d rink ing  water is included in  the proposal, th is w ill a llow  Member States to 
adapt the am ount and nature o f m on itoring  to local conditions. Furtherm ore a 
revision in  the approach to reference methods o f analysis has been proposed 
pe rm itting  the use o f any m ethod m eeting certa in perform ance standards 
ra ther than requ iring  certa in methods to be used;
• In  the proposal the num ber o f parameters has been reduced from  67 to  48, 
on ly parameters considered essential fo r the pro tection  o f hum an health have 
been retained. Thirteen parameters have been added (i.e. C ryptosporidia and 
giardia) as w ell as the p o ss ib ility  where the local conditions require  it, to fix  
values fo r o ther parameters w ith  a view  to protect human health;
• New, stric te r standards have been set fo r lead: a reduction to 10 m icro gram 
per litre  (down from  50 m icro gram per litre ), the Guide level o f 25 m icro gram 
per litre  fo r n itra tes has been w ithdraw n. Regarding pesticides, the Maximum 
Adm issible Concentration (MAC) o f 0.5 m icro gram per litre  has been
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w ithd raw n, leaving the s tric te r param etric value fo r pesticides o f 0.1 m icro 
gram per litre ;
• The lis t o f chemical parameters in  the proposal is not an exhaustive lis t o f 
substances whose presence in  d rin k in g  w ater could represent a risk . The 
Commission estimates tha t the inclusion o f a ll the poten tia l contam inants 
w ould resu lt in  a d irective w hich w ould be impossible to  im plem ent. Therefore, 
in  add ition  the Member States are obliged to take a ll the necessary measures to 
ensure tha t water may be consumed w ithou t danger;
•  W ith  the exception o f the param eter concerning lead the q u a lity  o f 
d rink ing  water must com ply w ith  the proposal w ith in  five  years o f its  en try  
in to  force. The o ld  D irective 80/778/EEC is repealed w ith  effect from  five  years 
from  the en try  in to  force o f the revised D irective. Member States must 
transpose the D irective in to  th e ir respective nationa l laws w ith in  two years o f 
its en try in to  force. For the lead param eter the deadline fo r con form ity is 15 
years, however a fter 5 years o f en try  in to  force o f the D irective the Member 
States must meet the lim it value o f lead o f 25 m icro gram per litre .
The proposal has been critic ised  fo r both going too fa r and fo r no t going fa r 
enough. The House o f Lords (1996) sees a strong case fo r legally b ind ing 
m inim um  standards fo r d rin k in g  water in  the Com m unity:
To repeal or fail to up-date and improve the drinking water directive would be 
contrary to the promotion of public health in the Community. The Commission's 
proposal draws proper distinctions between matters for action by Member States and 
by the Community (House of Lords, 1996;22).
The European Environm ent Bureau (EEB) points out tha t the p rin c ip le  o f 
reducing p o llu tio n  at source (A rtic le  130R TEU) is no t integrated in to  the 
curren t proposal (EEB, 1995;5). Another p rin c ip le  which the EEB considers 
should be in  the proposal is the p o llu te r pays princ ip le . EEB argues tha t the 
p o llu te r must be held responsible fo r the costs o f restoring the qu a lity  o f 
water in  the event tha t the param etric values are exceeded, because at the 
present tim e i t  is u ltim a te ly  the consumer who has to foo t the b ill (EEB, 1995;7). 
Another p o in t o f c ritic ism  on the revised d rink ing  water proposal is the lack 
o f in tegra tion  o f the quantita tive  management o f water resources. The EEB 
calls fo r a p lan to be drawn up w ith  the aim  o f saving water and to forecome 
excess explo ita tion o f water sources such as groundwater.
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At a pub lic  hearing organised by the Environm ent Committee o f the European 
Parliam ent on June 27th 1995 w hich took the fo rm  o f an open debate on the 
ecological q u a lity  o f water, the European Parliam ent made an analysis o f the 
progress o f the various in itia tive s  o f the EC on water po licy. The emphasis has 
been on the interdependence between the qu a lity  and quan tity  o f water. 
EUREAU fo r example, considers th a t "the lim it o f 0,1 u g /litre  fo r ind iv idu a l 
pesticides should be incorporated in to  the directives linked to the qu a lity  o f 
na tu ra l water, in  p a rticu la r those concerning groundwater, surface w ater and 
pesticides" (EUREAU, 1995;3).
The derogation in  A rtic le  10 o f the proposal has been critic ised  as being too 
wide and imprecise. The EEB argues tha t the poss ib ility  offered to the Member 
States to  foresee derogations fo r a lim ite d  period up to a maximum value they 
determ ine themselves, is too wide (EEB, 1995;9).
Regarding the revision process o f the D rink ing  W ater D irective, several 
observations can be made. First, the fact tha t i t  took the European Commission 
three years to develop and pub lish  a proposal fo r a revised D rinking W ater 
D irective. The delay was "very m uch caused by the chronic shortage o f sta ff at 
the water section o f DGXI"(RiUaerts, 1994; 423). Secondly, the Commission was 
under pressure to apply the subsid ia rity  p rin c ip le  to  the revised D rinking  
W ater D irective. The Commission however d id  not want on ly  the basic health 
parameters in  the D irective bu t thought i t  was necessary to add other 
parameters to  w in  the consumers’ confidence in  the q u a lity  o f d rink ing  water. 
An Explanatory memorandum on subsid iarity and costs was added to the 
revised D rinking W ater D irective. However the Commission was p a rtly  
hampered in  its  task: "the estimate o f compliance costs resu lting from  the 
proposal is based on the lim ite d  in fo rm ation  available to the Commission..." 
(COM(94)612,1995;10).
F ina lly, during  the hearings in  Brussels EUREAU comments tha t i t  was very 
clear tha t the Commission had access to large amounts o f scientific 
in fo rm a tion  on p o llu tio n  standards fo r d rin k in g  water, however concerning 
the costs fo r extracting substances i.e. lead, the Commission had none o r very 
lit t le  in fo rm a tion  (R illaerts, 1994; 423). The proposal fo r the revised D rinking 
W ater D irective together w ith  3 o ther water proposals have been p u t forw ard 
to the Council and the European Parliament and is expected to  be adopted in  
1997. Against th is overall background the im plem entation o f the D rinking 
W ater D irective in  the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are examined in  
greater deta il.
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7.3 Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f the D rin k in g  W ater D ire c tive  in  the  
N e th e rla n d s
7.3.1 Scheme of Regulations
The most w ide ly known water-management ro le o f the governm ent o f the 
Netherlands is probably the pro tection  against flooding. Dutch w ater po licy  
and management have moved from  th is  in itia l p rio rity , p ro tection  against 
flooding, o r the quan tity  aspect o f water management, to the pro tection  o f 
water qua lity . As in  o ther European countries, reconstruction and expansion 
o f ind u s try  and agricu ltu re  a fte r the Second W orld W ar led to increased 
p o llu tion . To combat th is threat, several statutes were introduced.
In  1957 the M in is try  o f Health Care introduced the W ater Supply Act 1957, in  
w hich the responsib ilities o f the w ater supply companies regarding the 
q u a lity  o f p iped d rink ing  w ater were la id  down. W ater supply companies had 
long been responsible fo r the p u rifica tio n  and d is trib u tio n  o f d rin k in g  water, 
and th is Act served on ly to  form alise th is  role.
For the p roduction  o f d rin k in g  w ater in  the Netherlands e ither surface water 
o r groundw ater is used. Both surface water and groundwater are regulated by 
Acts dealing w ith  e ither the q u a lity  o r the quan tity  aspect (Table 9)
Table 9 : O verview  o f W ater Q u a lity  and Q u a n tity  L e g is la tio n  
in  th e  N e the rlands
Surface Water Ground Water Drinking Water
Quality
• Surface Water Act 
(WVO)
• Environmental 
ManagementAct 
(Wm)
• Soil Protection 
Act(Wbb)
• Ent. Mgt. Act 
(Wm)
• Water Supply 
Act(Ww)
• Envt. Mgt. Act 
(Wm)
Quantity • WaterManagement Act 
(Whh)
• Groundwater Act 
(Gww)
source: present w rite r
In  1970 the Surface water Act (W et V erontre in ing ing van Oppervlake water- 
Wvo) came in to  force, it  controls surface water qua lity  and sets up a p e rm it 
and funding system to regulate discharges. The quan tity  aspect o f surface
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water is regulated by the 1989 W ater Management Act (Wet op de Water 
huishouding-W hh). In  1981 the G roundwater Act (Grondwater wet-Gww) was 
introduced, w hich regulates the extraction o f groundwater and a rtific ia l 
recharge and promotes good management o f groundwater. The q u a lity  aspect 
o f groundwater is regulated in  the 1986 Soil Protection Act (Wet Bodem 
bescherming-W bb). The 1993 Environm ental Management Act (Wet M ilieu  
beheer-Wm) introduced a one-perm it system, replacing the perm its fo rm erly  
required under the Nuisance Act, A ir P o llu tion  Act, Noise Abatement Act, Waste 
Substances Act and Chemical Waste Act, bu t no t the Surface Waters Act and the 
Soil Protection Act. However, the Environm ental Management Act is 
im portan t fo r the management o f surface, ground and d rin k in g  water since it  
sets un ifo rm  rules fo r environm ental q u a lity  requirem ents, environm ental 
plans and programmes and enforcem ent (H andler,1994). For the 
im plem entation o f the D rink ing  W ater D irective the fo llow ing steps were 
taken.
The management o f d rink ing  water supplies is the responsib ility  o f water 
supply companies which are regulated by the W ater Supply Act 1957:
A rtic le  4 ( 1 )  "The owner o f a water supply company is responsible fo r the 
continuation and guaranteed de live ry o f good d rink ing  water to the users in  
his d is trib u tio n  area".
A rtic le  4 (2) "... in  the interest o f the pub lic  health water q u a lity  standards 
wiQ be established and documented by O rder in  Council".
The subsequent Order in  Council setting these standards was issued in  1960. The 
W ater Supply Decree (Stb. 345,1960) included Maximum Admissible 
Concentration (MAC) values fo r 7 substances: n itrite , n itra te , cyanide, lead, 
arsenic, selenium and chrom ium . In  add ition  to these norms sampling methods 
and frequencies were also detailed.
The W ater Supply Decree assigned the owner o f the water supply company the 
task o f taking samples o f the d rink ing  water. A rtic le  6 (6) o f the W ater Supply 
Decree sets out the num ber o f places where samples should be taken (Annex B: 
per 10,000 inhabitants, every 14 days a sample from  the tap in  a house and 
add itiona l samples taking in  pum ping stations), w ith  approval by the Regional 
Health Inspector needed fo r the specific sample points. These samples had to 
be sent to laboratory appointed by the M in iste r fo r the Environm ent. W ith in  
six months the results were to be sent to the Regional Health Inspection.
In  practice in  1961, the Association o f Dutch W ater Supply Companies (VEWIN) 
la id  down recommendations fo r 14 more water qua lity  parameters. These 
included guidelines regarding the tem perature, oxygen level , colour, smell.
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taste and hardness o f the d rink ing  water. Further Maximum Adm issible 
Concentrations fo r lead, copper, zinc, potassium, chloride, ammonium, iron  
and manganese were specified (VEWIN Aanbevelingen, 1961). The VEWIN 
recommendations also contained deta iled instructions regarding water pipes 
and mains (w aterle idingen). The VEWIN recommendations have con tinua lly  
been updated since.
In  1984, an amended W ater Supply Decree was published (Staatsblad,1984; 220) 
to im plem ent the D rink ing  W ater D irective. The key provisions o f tlie  new 
Decree required d rink ing  water to com ply w ith  a range o f q u a lity  parameters 
and la id  down in  greater de ta il the m onitoring frequencies and methods o f 
analysis. In  1985 VEWIN's recommendations in  response to the amended W ater 
Supply Act (1984, Stb. 220) and the 1980 EC D rinking Water D irective were 
published (VEWIN Aanbevelingen, 1985). From the 1985 recommendations it  
emerged tha t the parameters o f the EC D rinking  W ater D irective were advised 
in  the 1975 VEWIN recommendations, on ly in  two instances derogations to  the 
EC D rinking  W ater parameters are m entioned: more stringent values are 
recommended fo r organic carbon, sodium  and sulphite-reducing clostrid ia . 
The m aximum value fo r the spores o f sulphite-reducing c lostrid ia  in  the 
D rinking W ater D irective is 1 in  20 m ille  litre . C lostrid ia  are norm ally present 
in  faeces but can be derived from  other sources. The spores o f c lostrid ia  are 
m ore resistant to ch lo rina ting  than the other m icro b io logica l substances in  
the D rinking  W ater D irective. The presence o f the spores may, indicate the 
presence o f Cryptosporidia, a pathogenic parasite, w hich has no t been 
elim inated by treatm ent and filtra tio n  processes. The presence o f c lostrid ia  
may, therefore indicate deficiencies in  filtra tio n  and treatm ent practice. The 
recommended standard fo r c lostrid ia  in  the Netherlands was set a t zero in  100 
m ille  litre , and has ro u tin e ly  been achieved since 1984 in  v irtu a lly  a ll water 
supplies (Havelaar,1996;16).
Subsequently, the parameters o f the D rinking  W ater D irective d id  not pose 
transposition problem s in  the Netherlands and no apparent problems 
regarding the c la rity  o f the EC D rink ing  W ater D irective existed (VEWIN, 
pers.comm., 1996). Nevertheless, the 1984 amendments to the W ater Supply 
Decree came two years a fte r the fo rm a l compliance date o f the D rinking W ater 
D irective and a fte r the European Commission had send an A rtic le  169 le tte r to 
the governm ent o f the Netherlands fo r fa ilin g  to n o tify  nationa l 
im plem entation measures. Further, in  1987 a M in iste ria l o rder amending the 
E isenbesluit Vleeskeuringswet (D utch Decree concerning m eat-qua lity
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checks) (Staatsblad 1987, 181) followed, and in  1988 the Warenwet and 
Zoutbesluit (Dutch Decrees concerning foodstuffs) were amended (Staatsblad 
1988;340).
The amendments were no t seen by the European Commission as effective and 
com pletely im plem enting the EC D rinking  W ater D irective; in  February 1991 
the Commission sent an A rtic le  169 le tte r to the Dutch governm ent fo r non 
con fo rm ity o f na tiona l im plem entation measures w ith  the D rink ing  W ater 
D irective. The Dutch government rep lied  in  August 1991; i t  ou tlined  tha t the 
im plem entation o f the D irective according to  the opin ion o f the Dutch 
governm ent had taken place, co rrectly  and com pletely (Kamerstukken II, 
1992-93, 21 109, no 58; 6). The Commission replied w ith  a Reasoned opin ion fo r 
non con fo rm ity o f nationa l im plem entation measures in  March 1993, In  it  the 
Commission adviced how the im plem entation o f the D irective should be carried 
out. F ina lly in  1994, in  response to the Reasoned opinions o f the Commission, 
the M in is try  o f Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environm ent (VROM) 
amended the W ater Supply Decree (Staatsblad,1994; 202). The 1991 A rtic le  169 
le tte r and 1993 Reasoned opin ion from  the Commission contained examples to 
give an ind ica tion  how Annex II o f the D rinking  W ater D irective regarding 
sampling frequencies and analysis should be interpreted. The 1994 amendment 
to the W ater Supply Decree brings the m entioned sampling methods and 
frequencies dependable on the am ount o f water produced and therefore in  
lin e  w ith  Annex II (analysis C3 table B) o f the D rinking W ater D irective. As 
m entioned in  the Explanatory Memo to the 1994 amended W ater Supply Decree:
... the amendments come down to the adjustment of the sampling frequencies of
drinking water (Nota van Toelichting, Staatsblad 202, 1994;3).
In  the same Explanatory Memo i t  is m entioned tha t in  the negotiations fo r the 
revised D rinking W ater D irective changes should be made to a llow  Member 
States decide fo r themselves fo r w hich parameters d rink ing  water should be 
m onitored pe riod ica lly  and w ith  w hat m inim um  frequencies. Nine years a fte r 
the fin a l compliance date, Dutch statutes and regulations were in  line  w ith  the 
EC D rinking  Water D irective. However in  1994 an other A rtic le  169 le tte r was 
issued to the Dutch government. The Commission questioned the excessive 
levels o f pesticide residues in  d rin k in g  water and subsequently sent the 
A rtic le  159 le tte r fo r incorrect app lica tion  o f nationa l im plem entation 
measures (OJ C 154,1994; 47).
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According to  VEWIN (pers. comm., 1996) these concerns were not based on 
hard  evidence and VEWIN states tha t the levels o f pesticides in  Dutch d rink ing  
water were below the MAC level.
7.3.2 Environm ental management o f d rink in g  water in  the Netherlands
The organisation o f centra l environm ental adm in istra tion  is shared among 
three M inistries: the M in is try  o f Housing, Spatial Planning and Environm ent 
(VROM) is responsible fo r general environm ental po licy  and co-ordinates the 
environm ental po licy o f o ther m inistries. I t  sets national em ission standards 
and q u a lity  objectives and is responsible fo r the p lanning o f the country ’s 
water supplies and its Environm ental Q juality &  Emission Pohcy D ivision is 
responsible, among o ther th ings, fo r d rin k in g  water. The M in is try  o f 
Transport, Public Works and W ater Management (V&W) has a double role: 
general responsib ihty fo r w ater p o llu tio n  fo r a ll waters in  the Netherlands 
and d irect management o f the state waters (large rivers, estuaries, the IJssel 
lake and coastal waters). I t  also oversees the construction o f communal waste 
water treatm ent stations, and is responsible fo r water supply and sewage 
systems. The M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re , Nature Management and Fisheries 
(LNV) is responsible fo r general nature po licy  (forests, landscape and fauna). 
The m anure and pesticides policies also faU under th is M in istry.
The management o f the water sector in  the Netherlands is spread over fo u r 
levels (table 10): the national level where three m inistries set ou t specific 
sections o f water po licy, the p rov inc ia l level, the m un icipa lities (inc lud ing  
the water supply companies) and the w ater boards.
The water sector its e lf is d iv ided between surface water and groundwater. The 
provinces have an executive task in  w ater management: the construction and 
maintenance o f sewage treatm ent plans and the management o f regional 
waters. They also have a general task in  supervising perm its and some o f the 
policies o f m unicipalities and water boards. The way they carry ou t th e ir tasks 
varies w idely. Ten o f the twelve provinces have delegated some o r a ll o f th e ir 
water management functions o f surface waters to  the regional water boards, 
the other two provinces are preparing to  do likew ise. Under th is delegation o f 
qu a lity  tasks are included the construction and maintenance o f p lants fo r 
waste water treatm ent o f m unicipal sewage.
The regional water boards (W aterschappen) have existed fo r many centuries 
in  the Netherlands. They were p rim a rily  responsible from  the end o f the 
M iddle Ages u n til the m iddle o f th is century fo r the pro tection  against
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flooding and fo r water management in  the polders. Since the 1970s several 
water boards have had w ider powers to  combat water po llu tion . Many small 
water boards have been incorporated in to  larger units so tha t the to ta l num ber 
o f water boards has decreased from  several hundred in  the 1960s to around 120
Table 10 : W ater M anagem ent tasks and C onsu lta tion  in  the  
N e th e rla n d s
Administrative Level and 
Process Type Ground Water Surface Water
National
Management Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management (V&W) 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment (VROM)
Consultation
Association of Dutch Water Supply 
Companies (VEWIN)
The Agricultural Board
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Mgt.,
and Fisheiies
Inter-Provincial Consultation
Union of Water Boards 
Association of Industries 
Association of Dutch Municipalities 
Inter-Provincial Consultation
1 Regional |
Management Provinces (represented nationally by the Interprovincial consultation)
Water Supply Companies Water Boards
Consultation Provinces
Water Supply Companies 
Farmers' Associations
Industries
Municipalities
Farmers
1 Local 1
Management Municipalities (responsible for sewerage systems)
Consultation Drinking Water Production Units 
(managed by Water Supply Companies)
Waste Water treatment works 
(managed by the Water boards)
source: Bressers et a l,1994;
in  the m id  1990’s. The water boards grant licences fo r ind u stria l waste w ater 
discharges in to  surface water o r sewerage systems, charge levies on 
households and businesses fo r waste w ater treatm ent and conduct research 
and m onitoring on surface waters. F ina lly  they supervise and carry out 
co n tro l on (illega l) discharges.
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The m unicipa lities are responsible fo r issuing and supervising perm its o f 
several environm ental Acts. They p lay an im portan t ro le  in  the collection o f 
waste and sewage. In  a few  cases the bu ild ing  and operating sewerage 
networks fa lls  under th e ir tasks. They m ust form ulate sewerage plans and are 
also the licensing a u th o rity  fo r in d u s tria l discharges in to  the networks, w ith  
the exception o f 18 more complex categories o f "black lis t" substances fo r 
w hich the water boards are the au tho rity .
As o f end 1995 (VEWIN,1995;9) there were 36 water supply companies, w hich 
are in  charge o f producing and supplying d rink ing  water. 29 are state public 
enterprises (Dutch: 'overheids n v '), 4 are ru n  by m unicipalities, 2 are priva te  
companies w ith  lim ite d  lia b ility , and one is a priva te  company (Dutch: bv).
The num ber o f water supply companies was reduced from  102 in  1980 to the 
current 36 water supply companies. They are represented at the national level 
by the Association o f Dutch W ater Supply Companies (VEWIN).
The Dutch water supply companies are in  a d iffic u lt position, since they are 
both  the generators and the victim s o f environm ental problem s. A very large 
range o f actors such as the ag ricu ltu ra l sector, industry, the bu ild ing  sector, 
and consumers, a ll affect the q u a lity  o f the raw  m ateria l o f the water supply 
companies: surface and ground water. On the other hand, by extracting 
ground water and constructing reservoirs, the water supply companies 
themselves cause water depletion and p o llu tio n  caused by n itra te  in  water. The 
effect o f th is fo rm  o f p o llu tio n  is to cause an enrichm ent o f surface waters, 
termed 'eu troph ica tion ' (defined as the response in  water to enrichm ent by 
nu trien ts HL ,1989;13) and contam ination o f d rink ing  water supplies.
According to the National Environm ental Policy Plan (NEPP 2, 1994), water 
supply companies m ust im prove th e ir environm ental management systems in  
order to reduce p o llu tio n  (Environm ental Policy Plan o f the Netherlands, 1994; 
20). The Association o f w ater supply companies (VEWIN) has therefore 
launched an environm ental management p ro ject (VEWIN M ilieu  Plan o r VMP) 
(Section 7.3.3). This move shows a sh ift in  the role o f VEWIN. T rad itiona lly  the 
Dutch water supply companies are p roud o f th e ir autonomy. However, 
changes in  Dutch society such as industria lisa tion  and intensive farm ing 
methods causing p o llu tio n  and the widespread pubhc support fo r 
environm ental pressure groups and the far-reaching environm ental policies 
created by the government, created a need fo r the water supply companies to 
m anifest themselves a t na tiona l level.
VEWIN was to publicise the e fforts o f the water supply companies in  meeting 
these new environm ental expectations. VEWIN was fu rtherm ore  charged w ith
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representing the water companies a t na tiona l and European environm ental 
levels in  the jo in t organisation o f European water companies EUREAU (Cals, 
1996; 190).
D utch w ater management assigns specific functions to specific levels and 
actors in  the water sector. Subsequently, water management in  the 
Netherlands is negotiated, developed and im plem ented at both the national 
level and at the level o f the provinces, m unicipalities and water boards. The 
piecemeal, layered, occasionally overlapping and complex management 
structure o f the water sector (table 10) causes confusion and delays in  the 
im plem entation and enforcem ent o f bo th  nationa l leg islation and Com m unity 
legislation. The dispersion and p a rtia l overlapping o f powers makes co­
o rd ina tion  very d iffic u lt, especially as p rov inc ia l and m unicipa l bodies also 
have environm ental powers (i.e. regard ing environm ental perm its).
VEWIN (1995) has suggested tha t a connection be made between the po llu ted  
sources fo r d rin k in g  w ater and the governm ent's responsib ihty to counteract 
this. Both the provinces and the d rin k in g  water sector itse lf, as represented 
by VEWIN, agree tha t the structure o f the d rink ing  water industry  in  its  
present fo rm  does no t f i t  the requirem ents fo r securing clean w ater supplies 
fo r the fu tu re  (Bressers,1994; 30).
VEWIN expects a fu rth e r concentration o f the d rin k in g  water sector fo r the 
coming years. Expected is tha t over 5 years on ly 10 o r 15 water supply 
companies w ill exist. The concentrations are caused by the increasing 
environm ental problem s and consequently increasing investm ents necessary 
to acquire and operate advanced w ater p u rifica tio n  insta lla tions.
7.3.3 Environm ental perform ance review  regarding d rin k in g  w ater in  the 
N etherlands
D rink ing  water qu a iity
Most o f the 36 water supply companies w hich are in  charge o f producing and 
supplying d rink ing  water use ground water as th e ir source. About 826 m illio n  
cubic metres o f ground water is pum ped up and 456 m iUion cubic metres o f 
fresh water is w ithdraw n per year, m ostly from  surface waters. O f th is some 
710 m illio n  cubic metres is used by households, w ith  industry  using some 507 
m hhon cubic metres (table 11).
The water supply companies tha t use surface water fo r the production  o f 
d rin k in g  w ater have more problem s w ith  guaranteeing good q u a lity  than 
those w hich use groundwater. The costs to clean the po llu ted  rivers are h igh 
and an extra com phcation is the location o f the Netherlands, w hich is in  a
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Table 11: Origin and use o f  water in  the N etherlands (1 9 9 4 )
Source
Volume 
(millions 
of m3)
Comments
Ground Water 826 (Including dune water)
Surface Water 456 (including infiltrated water)
Total 1282
Users
Household 710 up to 300 m3/yr
Small businesses 266 300-10,000 m3/vr
Industr} 241 more than 10,000 m3/\T.
Leaks, miscellaneous uses 65
Total 1282
source: VEWIN, 1995
downstream location on all the m ajor rivers (the Rhine, W aal, and Lek). The 
Rhine for example passes through a number of other countries which 
discharge their waste (treated and untreated) in to it, before it  fina lly  enters 
the Netherlands.
On the other hand, the w ater supply companies that use groundwater face a 
serious threat in  the presence o f nitrates and phosphates. More than 50 % of 
Dutch ground waters (especially in  the east and south) are like ly  to become 
unsuitable as a drinking w ater source in  the near fu ture due to increasing 
levels o f these pollutants (Bressers, 1994; 31).
Another problem  regarding groundwater and the quality o f drinking w ater is 
contamination o f groundwater w ith pesticides. According to the OECD, out o f 50 
pesticide compounds being m onitored, 35 have been detected in  groundwater, 
33 of them at concentrations exceeding the drinking water standard of 0.1 
micro gram per litre (OECD, 1995; 41). Pesticides have been detected in  ground 
water down to depths o f tens o f meters in  concentrations as high as 25 micro 
gram per litre, which is 250 times the EC drinking water standard.
Exhaustive analysis underline these problems w ith pesticides and nitrates. A 
company called Tauw M ilieu bv from  Deventer was commissioned by the 
province of Noord-Brabant in 1993 to research the quality of the groundwater 
in the province. From its findings it  emerged that 25% of the samples taken did
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not meet the norms o f the EC D rinking W ater D irective regarding pesticides 
(TAUW In fra  consult, 1993). From Kiwa reports (Kiwa 1994 /  SWE gh.007) it  
emerged tha t groundw ater below farm land contains n itra te  concentrations 
above d rink ing  water standards in  the m a jo rity  o f observation points. In  the 
eastern parts o f the Netherlands water supply companies are confronted w ith  
n itra te  concentrations o f some 100 and 200 mg per litre , w hich is as much as 4 
times the allowed Maximum Concentration Allowed in  the D rinking  W ater 
D irective. A dd itiona l treatm ents are now necessary to extract the increased 
amounts o f n itrates and th is w ill lead to an increase in  treatm ent costs fo r the 
w ater supply companies.
In  1995 the Consumers Association investigated the qu a lity  o f d rink ing  water 
regarding hardness and concentrations o f m inerals, pesticides, n itra te , 
chloride, sodium, potassium, cadmium, m ercury, copper, lead, a lum inium , zinc 
and arsenic (Consumenten Bond, 1995). From the 36 water supply companies in  
1995, 6 delivered drink ing  water which d id  no t meet the standards in  the 
categories metals, chlorides and n itra te  according to the tests carried out by 
the Consumenten Bond (Consumenten Bond, 1995; 699).
The W ater Supply Act delegates the con tro l on the water supply companies to 
the Regional Public Heath Inspectors. The RIVM (N ational Ins titu te  o f Public 
Health and Environm ental Protection) publishes since 1986 yearly reports on 
its own tests regarding the qu a lity  o f d rink ing  water (Table 12 and 13). The 
yearly reports are sent to  a lim ite d  group o f persons (m ostly regional health 
inspectors) and ins titu tions  as ind icated in  the reports themselves. For 
purposes o f public in fo rm ation  the reports are send to the depot o f Dutch 
publications and bibliographies. The European Commission was no t on the 
d is trib u tio n  Üst u n til 1992. However, as m entioned in  the 1992 report the new 
Reporting D irective (OJ L 9 1 /6 9 / EEC, 1992) requires Member States to make 
regular reports on im plem entation to  the Commission.
Several comments can be made regarding the results o f Table 12 and 13 and the 
q u a lity  o f d rin k in g  water in  the Netherlands:
• the overa ll trend is an increase in  the num ber o f pum p stations fa ilin g  to 
meet the standards set in  the W ater Supply Decree (in  1994 almost 30 % o f 
the pump stations);
•  A lthough, th is seems a h igh num ber, the RIVM reports emphasise th a t the 
deviations concern m a in ly substances "fo r w hich the Maximal Adm issible 
Concentration is no t based on toxicological or health related standards".
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Table 12: Deviations of drinking water standards in the Netherlands
Years 1986-1994
Threshhold  value  
categories
Year
To ta l N um ber o f devia tions per year
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
nr. o f stations 255 255 254 257 255 258 264 264 270
Table I 3 4 4 5 3 6 ND 33 28
Table II ND ND ND ND 5 3 ND ND ND
Table III 102 71 64 38 37 30 ND ND ND
Table TV 19 8 12 14 18 17 ND ND ND
Total (absolute nrs. of non­
complying tests) 124 83 80 57 63 56 70 87 80
Total (as %, all tables) 48.6 32.5 31.5 22.2 24.7 21.7 26.5 33.0 29.6
Total (as %, only table I) 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.2 2.3 ND 12.5 10.4
source: RIVM reports 'Quality of drinking water in the Netherlands', years 1986-1994  
(Report nrs. 218108005, 1988; 218108006, 1989; 711001001, 1991; 7 1 1001004;1992 
RIVM 1995/97; RIVM 1996, 731011010)
ND: no data available or found 
Notes
Data as set against the requirements of the Water Supply Decree Table I to IV
(Tables I to IV correspond with parameter Table I listed in the Drinking Water Directive)
reporting format changed in 1992:
Until 1991 tests carried out by RIVM on the total number of pumping stations 
After 1991 data of number of deviations as reported by the drinking water companies
Drinking W ater (Quality in the Netherlands
rt3O '
B .5w- %o ^
£3
C
□  Total (as %, all tables) 
■  Total (as %, only table
Year
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Table 13: Deviations of drinking water standards in the Netherlands by results of
sample evaluations (1993-1994)
Dutch Table 
equiva- lent Parameter
1993 1994
total nr. of 
samples 
tested
nr. of 
samples 
exceeding 
norms
% exce 
eding 
norms
total nr. of 
samples 
tested
nr. of 
samples 
exceeding 
norms
% exce 
eding 
norms
Table 1 Conforms 15605 57 0.4 15439 15 0.1
faecal Coliforms ND ND ND ND ND ND
therm ally tolerant' coliforms 12630 12 0.1 2220 4 0.2
sulfite-reducing clostridia 1010 5 0.5 ND ND ND
Nickel ND ND ND 571 2 0.4
Lead ND ND ND ND ND ND
PAH ND ND ND ND ND ND
T rihalomethanes* 593 5 0.8 870 1 0.1
Total pesticides 81451 19 0.0 10599 22 0.2
Individual pesticides ND ND ND ND ND ND
Table II Total 'hardness' ND ND ND 3252 495 15.2
Table III Colour 2001 6 0.3 1745 3 0.2
Turb id ity 15447 9 0.1 15233 13 0.1
Odour ND ND ND 437 7 1.6
Taste 2061 2 0.1 486 3 0.6
Nitrate ND ND ND 1734 2 0.1
N itrite 5401 12 0.2 5879 5 0.1
Ammonia 5895 15 0.3 6169 24 0.4
Aluminium ND ND ND 1590 3 0.2
Potassium ND ND ND 1499 1 0.1
Sodium 2147 2 0.1 ND ND ND
Iron 8935 26 0.3 9478 59 0.6
Manganese 7677 55 0.7 8416 51 0.6
Organically bound oxygen 157 1 0.6 ND ND ND
oxidation by potassium 
permanganate 1525 1 0.1 ND ND ND
Acidity/Hydrogen ion 16304 8 0.0 16466 10 0.1
Sulphate ND ND ND 1910 1 0.1
Table IV Dissolved oxygen 13184 17 0.1 12960 9 0.1
Chloride 3622 5 0.1 3475 3 0.1
Unspecified Other Parameters ND ND ND ND ND ND
Total of all parameters 195645 . 257 0,1 120428 733 0.6
Sub-Total o f specified Dutch 
table I  parameters 111289 98 0.1 29699 44 0.1
source: RTVM reports 'Quality o f drinking water in  the Netherlands', years 1993-1994 
(Report nrs. RIVM 1995/97; RIVM 1996, 731011010)
ND: no data available or found 
Notes
Data categorised as listed in the requirements o f the Water Supply Decree Table I to IV
(Tables 1 to IV correspond w ith parameters in Table I, Annexes A to E, listed in the Drinking Water D ir
reporting format changed in 1992:
U ntil 1991 tests carried out by RIVM on the to ta l number o f pumping stations 
After 1991 data o f number o f deviations as reported by the drinking water companies
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The m a jo rity  o f the deviations concern technical and esthetical parameters 
such as mangaan, iron , ammonium and tu rb ih ty  (RIVM, 1994;55);
•  The numbers o f pum p stations th a t deviate from  toxicological parameters 
such as pesticides are re la tive ly  low , in  1994 on ly 7 pum p stations have a 
too h igh level o f pesticides. However the D rinking W ater D irective does not 
specify in  Table I o f the D irective between substances bu t requires Member 
States "... to ensure tha t water intended fo r human consum ption at least 
meets the requirem ents specified in  Annex I" (A rtic le  7(6) o f the D rinking  
W ater D irective);
•  The RIVM concludes tha t "the results fo r 1992, 1993 and 1994 show tha t the 
d rink ing  water is overall o f good qua lity , and tha t there has been no threat 
to the public health" (RIVM,1994;55).
The changes in  1992 regarding the reporting  o f the deviations o f the standards 
set fo r d rink ing  water in  the W ater Supply Decree were brought on by a 
serious contam ination inc iden t in  Amsterdam. In  1988 the d rink ing  water in  
Amsterdam was contam inated w ith  the pesticide Bentazon and i t  emerged tha t 
the public had no t been in form ed on th is. I t  fu rth e r emerged tha t Bentazon 
had been present in  the Amsterdam d rin k in g  water although below 0.1 m icro 
gram per litre , fo r at least seven years, and tha t th is was known to  both the 
RIVM and the Amsterdam's water supply company. However, the Amsterdam 
w ater supply company, one o f the fo u r water companies ru n  by 
m unicipa lities, was re luctan t to b u ild  an expensive carbon filte rin g  
ins ta lla tion  to extract Bentazon from  its  d rin k in g  water (w hich w ould have 
cost 250 m iUion guilders o r approxim ately 100 m illio n  pounds). Instead, the 
p ro fits  from  the Amsterdam water supply company were flow ing  to the 
Amsterdam council. Parliam ent was appalled tha t the consumer was unaware 
o f the contam ination o f the drinkw ater and demanded openness.
The M in ister o f the Environm ent, Ed N ijpels, stressed tha t water companies 
have a du ty  to make public a ll incidents were the MAC values are surpassed 
(A rtic le  6 W ater Supply Act). In  such a case the health inspector decides 
independently w hether the w ater company should cease water supply and o r 
take other actions and allow  a tem porary surpassing o f the norm  (A rtic le  7 
W ater Supply Act). According to N ijpels, the Amsterdam water supply 
company was preparing to in fo rm  the pub lic  on the tem porary surpassing o f 
the MAC on Bentazon, however due to  circumstances d id  no t published th is 
earlier (Kamerstukken II, 1987-88, 20 560, no 2; 6). The M inister o f the 
Environm ent prom ised to in fo rm  Parliam ent on a yearly basis regarding the
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quality of drinking water (Kamerstukken II, 1989-90, 20 560, no 8). Since 1992 
RIVM reports based on m onitoring results from  the water supply companies 
themselves are sent in  yearly reports to Parliament.
Although the quality of drinking w ater in  the Netherlands is good in general, 
RIVM reports that water supply companies have to increase efforts to 
m aintain this, since the sources fo r drinking water have become seriously 
polluted.
Most of the pollution problems as indicated by the RIVM reports are a direct 
result o f the Dutch farm ing production methods, which are particularly  
intensive in  the use of capital and chemical inputs per unit o f output. The last 
15 years show an uncontrolled, rapid increase in livestock husbandry and 
subsequently an increase in  m anure production, there are currently about 14 
m illion pigs and 98 m illion fowls in  the N e therl^ds (Appendix 3).
Further, measured in  terms of active ingredients per unit of cultivated land, 
the intensiveness of use of pesticides in  the Netherlands, at 17.4 kilograms per 
hectare, is the highest in  the OECD (OECD, 1995; 155) (table 14):
Table 14 : Level o f pesticides used as com pared to several 
o th er M em ber States (1 9 9 3 )
Country
Use o f chemica s
Absolute amount As % of employed chemicals
total kg 
active 
ingredient/ 
ha
total amount of 
cultivated land 
(1000 ha)
Total (*1000 kg 
active 
ingredient)
insecti­
cides
fungicl
des
herbic
ides other
EU
Netherlands 15921 3.5 26.3 18.8 51.4 17.4 915
United Kingdom 26000 ND ND ND ND 3.9 ND
Belgium 9664 8.0 12.0 14.0 66.0 11.8 822
Denmark 4660 3.1 3.1 30.6 63.2 1.8 2558
France 96374 7.4 57.7 35.0 0.0 5.0 19234
Italy 91078 11.8 62.7 11.6 13.9 7.6 12033West Germany 33146 4.6 33.1 51.2 11.1 4.4 7492
source: OEDC,1993.
Although the above illustrated level o f intensive agriculture enabled the 
Netherlands to rank consistently among the w orld’s top exporters of 
agricultural produce, the negative effects have been many. Among others, 
the destruction and fragm entation o f natural flora and fauna habitats and the 
high pressures on water resources. For some of the most persistent pesticides
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i t  could take several generations before concentrations in  deep groundwater 
at many locations w ill once again meet standards fo r d rin k in g  water.
The environm ental pressures fro m  agricu ltu re  were la rge ly unchecked u n til 
the m id-1980s, and on ly in  1991 a specific p lan fo r reducing pesticide use and 
emissions o f pesticides to the environm ent was introduced. The spreading o f 
m anure has also been restricted in  the late 1980s. Achieving environm ental 
p o licy  objectives in  the a g ricu ltu ra l sector however s till relies m a in ly on the 
good fa ith  and co-operation o f the farm ing com m unity since i t  is p a rticu la rly  
d iffic u lt to  con tro l i.e. the spreading o f m anure o r pesticides.
In  the 1993 VEWIN Environm ental management plan, VEWIN commences tha t 
the governm ental policies aimed a t reducing the spreading o f m anure are 
insu ffic ie n t to guarantee clean groundw ater (VEWIN M iheu verslag, 1993; 74). 
The manure po licy  is a continuous issue o f dispute between the M in is try  o f 
A gricu ltu re  setting out the n itra te  and m anure po licy and the M in is try  o f 
Spatial Planning, Housing and the Environm ent w hich is responsible fo r 
d rink ing  water. For years, the M in is try  o f the Environm ent critic ises the 
len ien t manure p o licy  o f the M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re , the latest clash being 
the M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re  setting the norm  o f 40 kg phosphate per hectare 
and the M in is try  o f the Environm ent pressing fo r a 10-20 kg per hectare norm  
(S leurink et al, 1995; 14). In  th is context water supply companies and VEWIN 
stress tha t the governm ent had no t fo rm a lly  im plem ented the Groundwater 
D irective, which form al im plem entation deadline was 1981, u n til 1994 (VEWIN, 
1995;6). The governm ent o f the Netherlands has encountered great d ifficu ltie s  
im plem enting the G roundwater D irective:
... there are cases where failure to transpose Community directives several years after 
their entry into force gives cause for serious concern. The Netherlands, for instance, 
has still not transposed Directive 80/68/EC  (groundwater), despite the judgement 
given by the Court of Justice on 17 December 1987 (Case 291/84) and the second 
referral to the Court of Justice by the Commission (OJ C 233, 1993; 41).
Further, problem s w ith  the im plem entation o f another EC water related 
directive, the 1991 N itrate  D irective were m entioned in  a debate between 
Parliam ent and the m in is try  o f A gricu ltu re , Fisheries and Nature pro tection  
(Kamerstukken II, 1994-95, 23 900 XIV 27;19). The M inister o f A gricu lture 
adm itted tha t the Netherlands is experiencing ’great' d ifficu ltie s  
im plem enting the N itra te  D irective. The d iffe re n t standpoint between the
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M in is try  o f the Environm ent and A gricu ltu re  were again emphasised in  the 
debate, the M in ister o f the Environm ent stressing tha t the bottlenecks are:
•  delays w ith  the in tro du ctio n  o f instrum ents aimed at the reduction o f 
n itra tes ;
• in su ffic ie n t m anure processing capabilities;
•  large discrepancies between environm ental objectives and a g ricu ltu ra l 
standpoint o f what is achievable (Kamerstukken II, 1994-95, 23 900 XIV 27; 
19).
VEWIN points out the discrepancies between the Groundwater D irective and 
the D rinking W ater D irective. And argues tha t the 0.1 m icro gram  per litre  
norm  fo r pesticides in  d rink ing  water should also be in  the Groundwater 
D irective. VEWIN (pers. comm.,1996) is also very c ritica l regarding the 
governments po licy on pesticides. The committee insta lled  to oversee the 
in troduction  o f new pesticides and abolish obsolete and dangerous pesticides, 
the Commissie Toelating Bestrijdings M iddelen (CTB) has been severely 
critic ised. The CTB allowed several pesticides, know to be very harm fu l to the 
environm ent, to be m arketed in  the Netherlands, 'aw aiting fu rth e r research 
o f th e ir harm fu l effects'. These include Bentrazin (a m ix o f bentazon and 
atrazin). VEWIN m entions tha t in  several places bentazon has been found in  
groundwater between 17 and 32 meters deep in  concentrations 4 tim e the 
norm . A trazin  has been found in  surface w ater in  concentrations up to 140 
times the norm . These w orrying facts caused VEWIN to w rite  to  the M inisters 
o f A gricu ltu re  and Environm ent to overru le the CTB and fo rb id  the use o f 
Bentrazin in  the Netherlands (VEWIN, 1995;3). Also the use o f the pesticides 
aidicarb and ch loo rtha lon il is questioned by VEWIN.
Concluding from  Appendix 3 and table 14 i t  is clear w hy the water supply 
companies face serious d ifficu ltie s  producing good q u a lity  d rink ing  water, 
according to the OECD:
These emissions still remain far in excess of sustainable levels. Also due to past 
accumulations and continuing mineral surpluses, eutrophication will continue to 
affect water and soil. Further, trends in water depletion and contamination of 
groundwater by pesticides and nitrates have not been reversed. Targets for the year 
2000 vdll be difficult to achieve, they are more demanding of farmers and regulations 
will be harder to enforce. In order to make further progress, decision makers should 
recognise and accept that the domestic targets and international commitments cannot
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be achieved without structural changes in Dutch agricultural production (OECD,
1995; 204).
Pollution contro l
W ater supply companies and VEWIN have stressed repeatedly tha t the qua lity  
o f d rink ing  water does no t solely depend on the p u rifica tio n  efforts o f water 
supply companies, bu t is very much dependent on the q u a lity  o f the sources o f 
the water industry: ground and surface waters. As indicated above the qua lity  
o f these sources has decreased over the last years. The water companies stress 
th a t i t  is the responsib ility  o f the Dutch government to  h a lt fu rth e r 
degradation o f the q u a lity  o f ground and surface waters. I t  is relevant 
therefore to  discuss the governm ent's e ffo rts  to contro l p o llu tio n  o f d rink ing  
water sources.
Specific environm ental leg islation is m ostly based on the p ro h ib itio n  o f 
actions tha t threaten the environm ent. Exceptions to the p ro h ib itio n  can be 
obtained by means o f a licence, exemption o r dispensation. The Dutch 
approach to the licensing o f discharges in to  water depends on the type o f 
substance being discharged, fo r example discharges o f blackUsted substances 
should be prevented, irrespective o f receiving water q u a lity  standards, 
through the use o f best technical means. To deal w ith  infringem ents o f the 
law, the Dutch authorities have a choice between adm inistrative and penal 
sanctions. Sanctions contained in  the Economic Offences Act also apply in  
general to  environm ental leg is la tion , a lthough several environm ental laws 
conta in specific ru lings on sanctions. Licensing, inspection and enforcem ent 
concerning water p o llu tio n  is carried  ou t by the inspection departm ents o f the 
M in is try  o f Transport, Pubhc Works and W ater Management (V&W ), the 
Provinces and water boards.
In 1989 i t  was established tha t more than one-th ird  o f the 8000 or so activities 
requ iring  a licence fo r discharge in to  state waters under the PoUution o f 
Surface Waters Act were in  fact operating w ithou t one (OECD, 1995; 54). Also a 
report carried out in  1995 by the Regional Environm ental Inspection 
a u th o rity  o f the Province o f Noord-Brabant concluded tha t W vo-perm its 
(regarding discharges o f toxic and dangerous m aterials) are no t su ffic ie n tly  
enforced. Problems range from  h igher discharges than aUowed in  the pe rm it 
(18%) to  faihng to  report discharges and other activities specified in  the 
perm its to the authorities (37%) (Persbericht M inisterie van VROM, 9 mei 
1996). E ffo rt have been made by a ll adm inistrations concerned to im prove
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enforcement and render the law  more effective and a target has been set to 
elim inate the licensing backlog to be m et in  1995.
As fa r as m onitoring and sanctioning the water managers pre fe r the use o f 
adm in istra tive sanctions, in  practice they try  to avoid im posing sanctions 
altogether (Bressers, 1994; 46). Whenever they can water managers try  to 
reach the goal o f compliance by issuing exhortations. The way environm ental 
leg islation is enforced in  the Netherlands is by negotiation, co-operation and 
consultation. Offenders are given the o p po rtun ity  to  make amendments before 
being punished (VROM, 1993; 6). The fact tha t such an approach does lead to 
tolerate illega l action is illu s tra te d  in  a damaging report on the perm it system 
by the Algemene Rekenkamer (N ational Auditors) published in  1996. The 
process o f issuing and enforcing o f perm its, includ ing  environm ental, was 
investigated. From the find ings i t  emerged tha t fo r 35% o f the perm its issued 
no check was made regarding the in fo rm a tion  given by the p e rm it applicant. 
Further fo r 32% o f the issued perm its no enforcem ent o r to le ra tion  o f in  fact 
illega l activ ities (condoning) took place (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1996;5-7). 
These results show a clear lack o f the D utch authorities to enforce th e ir 
environm ental laws. The increase in  p o llu tio n  o f surface and groundwaters 
and the fact tha t po llu te rs go undetected a n d /o r w ithou t fu rth e r prosecution 
cause water companies to increase th e ir e fforts to de liver good qua lity  
d rink ing  water. In  order to  do so expensive p u rifica tio n  ins ta lla tion  have 
been and s till are needed. Consequently water companies have increased the 
costs o f d rink ing  water as discussed below.
7.3.4 Economic aspects o f d rinkh ig  water in  the Netherlands
The M in is try  fo r the Environm ent issued in  1993 a Policy Plan fo r D rinking 
and Industry water ( Beleids Plan D rinkw ater en Industrie  /  VROM, 1993). The 
fact tha t the deterio ra ting q u a lity  o f the sources o f d rink ing  w ater (ground 
and surface water) threaten w ater supplies have been acknowledged and steps 
have been form ulated to combat these. The M inister o f the Environm ent 
emphasises the princip les o f d rin k in g  water p o licy  in  the Netherlands:
... these are that the water supply companies are responsible for purification and 
delivery of drinking water causing minimal damage to the environment. The costs for 
drinking water should not form a obstacle to its use. And water supply companies 
should strive to set cost covering prices, this means that there is no aiming towards 
profits (translated from Policy Plan for drinking and Industry water,VROM,1993;83).
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The governm ent have set ou t the fo llow ing policies fo r the w ater supply 
companies. F irst, extra p u rifica tio n  means are necessary. This is due to 
increased p o llu tio n  fo r example o f n itra tes and pesticides. Secondly the water 
companies have to  dispose the waste products they produce when p u rify in g  
water and come up w ith  a p lan to reduce the accumulated waste cu rren tly  
present in  the Netherlands. Further the water supply companies have to  use 
processes to make the d rin k in g  water less 'ha rd ' (cond itionering).
T h ird ly , the WHO issued new stric te r guidehnes fo r lead in  d rink ing  water, 
these w ill be adopted in  the revised D rinking W ater D irective. A study carried 
out by the RIVM in  1992 concluded tha t in  order to meet the 10 m icro gram per 
litre  the lead pipes need replacement. The costs involved are estimated at 200 
o r 300 m illio n  Guilders fo r water supply pipes and an extra 1 or 2 m illia rd  
Guilders fo r the domestic supply pipes. W ith  VEWIN the M in is try  fo r the 
Environm ent started to discuss how the pipes can be replaced as soon as 
possible.
In  1995 the M in is try  o f Finance introduced a groundwater tax, and water 
supply companies using ground w ater are facing increased costs (table 15) 
Cost consequences per category are:
•  Groundwater supply companies; cost increase o f FI 0,75 to FI 2,10 per cubic 
m eter water. This w ill cause a overall cost increase o f 30 to 200%;
• W ater supply companies using water from  the dunes: a cost increase o f 20 
to  65% may occur;
• W ater supply companies using surface water: a cost increase between 10 
and 60% can be expected.
In  1993 the M in ister o f the Environm ent announced in  the lig h t o f the Policy 
Plan fo r D rinking  and Industria l W ater, th a t in  the com ing 10 years the price 
fo r drinkw ater m ight double (Staatscourant 97, 26 mei 1993). It should be 
realised tha t the price fo r d rink ing  water is no t the same everywhere in  the 
Netherlands. There are price differences depending on the location o f the 
water supply companies and whether they use surface or groundwater. 
Expensive water costs 1,5 to 2 times as much as the cheaper water fo r both 
industry  and households.
In  1995 the price fo r d rinkw ater increased by 16% , m ain ly caused by the 
increased costs fo r water companies to  extract the growing am ount o f n itrates. 
The costs o f d e n itrifica tio n  measures are expected to rise from  40 m illio n  
guilders in  1992 to 212 m illio n  guilders 1998. W ater companies are facing
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Table 15: Estimated A dditional costs in  the Netherlands for drinking w ater (1993 -
2003)
Estimated Additional Cost
Item In Dutch cents per m3 In English pence per m3*
Affected Types 
of Water 
Companies
Low High Average Low High Average
1 Quality Measures and Supph' |
Extra Filtration 2.0 20.0 11.0 0.8 7.5 4.2 Surface Water
10 55 32.5 3.8 20.8 12.3 Ground Water
Replacement of Lead Pipelines NA NA 3 2 j NA NA 12.3 Various
Other: maintenance, increase of 
supply reliability, emergency 
response, introduction of quality 
systems
NA NA 25 NA NA 9.4
All companies: 
large
deviations in 
costs between 
companies
1 Internal Environmental Issues |
Dessication 3.0 25.0 14.0 1.1 9.4 5.3 Ground Water
Effects of artificial infiltration 20.0 30.0 25.0 7.5 11.3 9.4 DuneCompanies
Conditioning 10.0 30.0 20.0 3.8 11.3 7.5 Various
Asbestos cement 2.0 10.0 6.0 0.8 3.8 2.3 Various
Waste from production process 20.0 25.0 22.5 7.5 9.4 8.5 All Companies
Metering 20.0 150.0 85.0 7.5 56.6 32.1 Various
Compensation of farmers for 
extraction NA NA 5 NA NA 1.9 Ground Water
Introduction of reporting 
procedures, water conservation 
initiatives, water and energy 
consen^ation bv water companies
NA NA NA NA IMA NA All Companies
"—f-------
1 External Environmental Issues |
End-of-pipe: extra monitoring, legal 
action, etc. NA NA 2 NA NA 0.8 All Companies
Preventative: mgt. of catchments, 
enhanced planning, extra 
compensationto farmers for exra 
measures
NA NA 2 NA NA 0.8 Ground Water
i Other Costs |
Demand on Ground Water supply NA NA 25 NA NA 9.4 Ground waterNA NA 4 NA NA 1.5 Infiltration
Other NA NA 2 NA NA 0.8 All Companies
Notes
*based on exchange rate: 1 pound = 2.65 guilders
Data source: translated from Policy Plan for Drinking and Industry' Water, 1993, VROM
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Table 16b: Sum m ary Economie S tatistics o f W ater Com panies in  the 
N etherlands
The N etherlands: D e live re d  D rin k in g  W ater 
Volum es and  In ve stm e n t levels, 1984-1995
c
I
•a
a c «.2
E 1
I
1000 □  Invested Capital in Fixed , 
Capital Assets (purchase 
price, mlns of guilders)
■  Volume of delivered 
Drinking Water** (millions 
of m3)
Year
The N etherlands: M easures o f Investm en t in  
D rin k in g  W ater, 1986-1995
250.0
200.0
150.0
100.0
50.0  -
□  per customer household 
(*1000 glders/ household)
■  per m3 of delivered water 
(cents per m3)
Year
source: based on table 16a
enorm ous increases in  investm ents needed to  be made due to  the 
increased p o llu tio n  o f w ate r sources (tab le  16a and b). Table 16 shows: 
• A d o ub lin g  o f investm ent costs over th ree  years (1991-1993) w h ile ,
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® the volume o f delivered water stayed at the same level over the last five  
years.
This indicates tha t the substantial increase o f investments are not due to the 
growing demands o f d rink ing  water, b u t due to the deterio ra ting q u a lity  o f 
both sources o f d rink ing  water. Questions can be p u t forw ard as to what 
consequences th is  has fo r the cost-effectiveness o f the im plem entation o f 
Dutch water po licy. W ater supply companies and VEWIN (pers.com.,1996) fo r 
example, ask whether the considerable investm ent being made to 
dephosphatise and d e n irify  represent equal value fo r money compared w ith  
the cost o f reducing agricu ltu ra l discharges. The water supply companies also 
critic ise  the in tro du c tio n  o f the groundwater tax. They p o in t out tha t water 
supply companies are taxed at 34% , industry  at 17% and agricu ltu re  at 0%. 
VEWIN warns the governm ent th a t the groundwater tax could prove to cause 
even more environm ental problems since companies m ight decide to abstract 
groundw ater themselves.
F inally, the revised D rinking  W ater D irective and the im plications fo r the 
Netherlands. As m entioned above the s tric te r lead param eter w ill have some 
im plications and a programme to remove the rem aining lead pipes was 
embarked upon in  1993. The revised D rinking Water D irective is not regarded 
as very d iffe re n t to the existing one (Havelaar,1996).
The op in ion  in  the Netherlands on the whole is tha t its  d rink ing  water sector 
is very w ell managed. This no t on ly because o f the standards set fo r the qua lity  
o f d rink ing  water (an end-product approach), bu t came about by an integrated 
q ua lity  design o f treatm ent processes and continuous con tro l o f its  
perform ance. C riticism  on the revised D rinking W ater D irective was tha t end- 
o f p ipe qua lity  con tro l was s till chosen is as the m ain q u a lity  con tro l 
philosophy. VEWIN argued tha t h igh standards fo r water pipes, taps etc. and an 
European standard fo r these products are desirable to m aintain  the h igh level 
o f q u a lity  in  the Netherlands.
7.3.5 Infringem ents and ECl cases
In  to ta l, so fa r one A rtic le  169 le tte r regarding non-no tifica tion  o f nationa l 
im plem entation measures, one A rtic le  169 le tte r regarding the non­
con fo rm ity o f nationa l im plem entation measures, one reasoned op in ion 
regarding the non-conform ity o f na tiona l im plem entation measures and one 
A rtic le  169 le tte r regarding the inco rrect application o f nationa l 
im plem entation measures were issued by the European Commission to the 
D utch governm ent.
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7.3.6 Conclusion: Causes for delay and problems with implementation
The problems encountered in  the Netherlands w ith  im plem entation o f the 
D rinking W ater D irective centre on two m ain issues: con fo rm ity o f the W ater 
Supply Decree w ith  the D irective and con flic ting  adm in istra tive  p rio ritie s  
w ith in  the Dutch governm ent.
In  the Netherlands the d rink ing  w ater supply companies were w ell organised 
and regulated before the issue o f the 1980 D rinking W ater D irective. Q uality 
con tro l was carried out by a specific governm ental in s titu tio n  fa ihng under 
the M in is try  o f the Environm ent, loca lly  represented by reg ional health 
inspectors w ith  substantial independent regulative powers. The fact tha t 
leg isla tion  regarding d rin k in g  w ater was already present together w ith  
VEWIN recommendations conta in ing most parameters as set in  the D rinking  
W ater D irective was reason enough fo r expecting a problem  free 
im plem entation o f the D rinking  W ater D irective in  the Netherlands. The 
D rinking W ater D irective's tim e table fo r im plem entation seemed no problem , 
as no extra tim e was requested by the Dutch government.
The Dutch governm ent however, fo rm a lly  im plem ented the D irective five  
years a fte r the fo rm a l im plem entation deadline had passed.
A lthough no specific Act regulating the im plem entation o f EC leg islation in  
the Netherlands exists and the Netherlands have a complex constitu tiona l 
im plem entation process (Section 5.2.4), these facts as such d id  no t contribu te  to 
the delay.
According to the Commission, the 1984 amendments to the W ater Supply Decree 
d id  not correctly im plem ent Table 1 o f the D rinking  W ater D irective.
A difference o f op in ion  between the Commission and the Dutch governm ent 
fo llow ed on w hether or no t the D rink ing  W ater D irective was su ffic ie n tly  
im plem ented. The Dutch governm ent argued th a t the sampling frequencies 
and methods as la id  down in  the W ater Supply Decree, were adequate and need 
not be changed to the d iffe re n t 'European' sampling frequencies as stated in  
the D irective. The Dutch government raised the issue o f subsid iarity in  th is 
context, th is is underlined by the fact th a t it  proposed to change Table I o f the 
D rinking  Water D irective, leaving Member States to decide fo r themselves 
what m in im al frequencies fo r sample taking are used. The dispute ended in  
1994 when the M in is try  fo r Housing, Spatial Planning and Environm ent 
(VROM), facing a European Court case, decided to amend the sampling 
frequencies o f the 1984 W ater Supply Decree.
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What is s trik ing  from  the evidence presented in  the case study is tha t a lthough 
the M in is try  o f the Environm ent (VROM) is responsible fo r the 
im plem entation o f the D rinking  W ater D irective and the setting o f the 
param etric values, i t  is p a rtly  dependent on other M inistries fo r the 
achievement o f these values. The sources fo r d rin k in g  w ater have been 
seriously po llu ted, and to tackle th is the M in is try  o f the Environm ent needs 
the co-operation o f the M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re . The achievement o f the 
targeted environm ental standards needs co-ord ination w ith  the M in is try  o f 
A gricu ltu re  to  reduce o f p o llu tio n  o f surface and groundwaters. However, the 
M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re  has its  own p rio ritie s  and long established interests. 
The agricu ltu ra l lobby has been ve ry effective and th is has been one o f the 
reasons no real action against the p o llu tio n  from  the a g ricu ltu ra l sector was 
undertaken. As the OECD has indicated, great ins titu tio n a l changes in  the 
a g ricu ltu ra l sector are needed.
Against th is overall qua lita tive  background the im plem entation process in  the 
Netherlands may be fu rth e r assessed b y  assigning values to the fo u r composite 
variables tha t param etrise the sub-systems o f the EC po licy making and 
im plem entation model.
A lthough, the po licy  objective o f the D rinking  W ater D irective - to provide 
clean d rin k in g  water - is clear, the D irective has been critic ised  fo r lacking 
c la rity  and creating uncerta in ty regarding the use o f technical standards and 
other de fin itions. W ith  the revision o f the D irective two o f the biggest 
obstacles have been removed o r fu rth e r defined: the Guide Levels have been 
removed and the "po in t where the water is made available to the user" has 
been fu rth e r defined. However, evidence in  th is case study does no t indicate 
th a t a lack o f c la rity  o f technical standards o r o ther de fin itions used in  the 
D rinking W ater D irective has been a s ign ificant obstacle to  im plem entation in  
the Netherlands. In  order to  a rrive  at the overall value o f variable 1, the 
degree o f c la rity  o f the D irective, the values o f the sub-components need to be 
assessed. Based on evidence presented in  the case study these values are 
assessed as follows.
The value o f sub-component la  is 5, since the D rinking W ater D irective has a 
precise and undisputed goal: p rovid ing  suitable d rink ing  water. The value o f 
sub-component Ib i is 0 , since evidence from  th is case study show tha t some 
(technical) standards, such as the lead standard o r the use o f guide levels were 
ambiguous. The value o f sub-component Ib h  is 1, from  the evidence i t  is 
shown tha t these technical standards were no t problem atic to  im plem ent in
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the Netherlands, despite th e ir am biguity. The value o f sub-component Ib iii is 
0, since other de fin itions o f the D rinking  W ater D irective such as the po in t 
where d rink ing  water is made available to the consumer, have proven to be 
ambiguous. The value o f sub-component Ib iv  is 1, since these ambiguous 
de fin itions were no t problem atic to im plem ent in  the Netherlands. F ina lly, 
the value o f sub-component Ic  is 1, since there was no necessity fo r fu rth e r 
in fo rm a tion  regarding the im plem entation o f the D irective.
The overall value o f variable 1, the degree o f c la rity  is therefore 8, out o f a 
to ta l possible maximum value o f 10.
D uring the negotiations o f the D rink ing  W ater D irective, the Netherlands were 
no t p a rticu la rly  concerned w ith  the costs invo lved fo r im plem enting the 
D rinking W ater D irective. This was due to the fact th a t regulations containing 
most o f the parameters in  the D rink ing  W ater D irective were already present 
in  the Netherlands. The costs invo lved fo r p u rifica tio n  are w ho lly  borne by 
the water supply companies themselves, and are funded from  th e ir revenues. 
As the water companies are owned by national and local governm ental bodies, 
which do no t demand a commercial rate o f re tu rn  from  invested capital, water 
companies have been free to concentrate solely on th e ir key function : the 
production  o f d rink ing  water and the generation o f su ffic ien t revenue to 
cover necessary investments. The latest governm ental po licy  sets ou t the need 
fo r fu rth e r p u rifica tio n  insta lla tions brought on by the p o llu tio n  o f the 
sources o f d rink ing  water. Consequently water supply companies are having 
to  invest in  expensive insta lla tions and prices fo r d rin k in g  w ater are going 
up. This has brought on a discussion regarding the costs fo r d rink ing  water 
and the necessity o f expensive insta lla tions w hile  p o llu tio n  at source is no t 
enough acted on. To assess the value o f variable 2, the degree tha t economic 
considerations form ed an obstacle towards im plem entation the values o f the 
sub-components need to be assessed. The value o f sub-component 2a is 0, 
evidence presented in  th is case study show th a t during the negotiations o f the 
D irective, the im plem entation costs were not taken in to  account (Section 7.1.1). 
The value o f sub-component 2b is 1, the costs o f compliance form ed no obstacle 
fo r im plem entation in  the Netherlands. The overall value o f variable 2 is 1, 
out o f a to ta l possible maximum value o f 2.
In  order to arrive  at the overall value o f variable 3, the degree o f in s titu tio n a l 
change, the values o f the in d iv id u a l sub-components have been assessed as 
follow s. Regarding sub-component 3ai, the nationa l legal system fo r the actual 
transform ation o f EC leg islation in to  the national legal system, the fo llow ing 
conclusions can be drawn. As examined in  Chapter IV  the transform ation o f
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EC legislation in to  national Dutch law is a complex and tim e consuming 
process, causing long delays. This is due to constitu tional demands and in  
p a rticu la r the com pulsory advice and pa rtic ipa tion  demands. An Act 
regulating d rin k in g  water was present in  the Netherlands, therefore i t  was 
su ffic ient to amend the W ater Supply Decree w hich is enacted by M in iste ria l 
order. M in iste ria l orders o r the amendments o f M in iste ria l orders involve 
long procedures and m andatory advice hearings (Section 5.2.4).
However, no .evidence in  th is case study suggests tha t the presence o f th is 
com plicated national legislative system contribu ted towards the delay. The 
difference o f op in ion  between the Dutch governm ent and the Commission 
which ended when the Dutch governm ent decided to amend the W ater Supply 
Decree in  1994, was the m ain reason fo r the delay. Consequently the value o f 
sub-component 3 ai can be assessed a t 4, n o t many decision-making points o f 
the national system fo r im plem entation were in  th is case responsible fo r 
delays and non-im plem entation. The value o f sub-component 3a ii is 0, since no 
special Act regulating the im plem entation o f EC legislation exists in  the 
Netherlands. The value o f sub-component 3 a iii is 1, since an extensive 
environm ental fram ework regulating the q u a lity  o f water existed p rio r to the 
im plem entation o f the D rinking  W ater D irective. The value o f sub-component 
3aiv is 0, evidence presented in  th is case study shows tha t subsid iarity was 
clearly an issue. The to ta l value o f variable 3 a, the degree to w hich the 
im plem entation process is lega lly structured to enhance the im plem entation 
o f directives in to  nationa l law, is 5.
The value o f sub-component 3b is 5, since an environm ental agency 
con tro lling  the q u a lity  o f d rin k in g  w ater existed p rio r to  the im plem entation 
o f the D rinking W ater D irective. The value o f sub-component 3c is 1, since the 
Dutch government d id  n o t apply fo r extra tim e to  im plem ent the D rinking 
W ater D irective. From the evidence presented in  this case study the M in is try  
o f the Environm ent and the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  have d iam etrica lly  
opposed interests. A lthough surface and ground waters have been seriously 
po llu ted , the qua lity  o f the d rin k in g  water remains high. This is because 
substantial investments have and are s till being made towards acquiring 
advanced p u rifica tio n  insta lla tions. The value o f sub-component 3d, is 0 since 
nationa l con flic ting  policies were present in  the Netherlands.
The overall value o f variable 3, the degree o f ins titu tio n a l change is 11 out o f a 
possible to ta l o f 15.
F inally, from  the evidence presented in  th is case study the fo llow ing 
assessment o f the value o f variable 4, the existence and w orking o f sound
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enforcement and contro l structures at EC and Member State level can be made. 
The D rinking W ater D irective does no t request Member States to in fo rm  the 
Commission regu la rly  on the q u a lity  o f d rin k in g  water, on ly  in  certa in 
p o llu tio n  incidents specified in  the D irective should the Commission be 
n o tified . Therefore the value o f sub-component 4a, the degree o f legislative 
and executive overview at EC level is 0. Further, from  the evidence presented 
in  th is case study i t  is clear tha t the Dutch governm ent has been slow in  
reacting to  the A rtic le  169 letters and reasoned opinions from  the Commission. 
The Dutch governm ent received an A rtic le  169 le tte r from  Commission 
regarding the non con fo rm ity o f the W ater Supply Decree w ith  the D rinking 
W ater D irective. However, no im m ediate action was taken a fte r the A rtic le  169 
le tte r and a fu rth e r reasoned op in ion  was sent. F inally, when facing a 
possible European Court o f Justice case, d id  the Dutch government amend the 
W ater Supply Decree. The value o f sub-component 4b, on action taken by the 
D utch governm ent regarding con tro l and enforcem ent from  Com m unity 
ins titu tions is 0 .
In  the Netherlands an extensive m on ito ring  and con tro l process regarding the 
q u a lity  o f d rink ing  water was present p rio r to the im plem entation o f the 
D rinking  W ater D irective. The water supply companies themselves take 
samples o f the d rink ing  water and send them to ce rtified  labs fo r q u a lity  
analysis. The results are then sent to the regional health inspector. The 
regional health  inspector is also in fo rm ed by the water supply company in  
case o f an inc ident where one o f the param etric values are exceeded. The 
health inspector has substantial powers, includ ing  orders to cease the supply 
o f d rink ing  water o r the closure o f a pum ping station, w hich happened on 
several occasions in  the past. The value o f sub-component 4c, on whether 
con tro l and enforcem ent o f the im plem ented Directives takes place, is 1. In  
practice as reported in  the yearly RIVM reports on the q u a lity  o f d rink ing  
water, the regional health inspector demands the water supply company to 
tal<e action w ith in  a certa in tim e -lim it to  b ring  the d rin k in g  w ater in  line  
w ith  the standards set in  the W ater Supply Decree. As indicated in  the yearly 
reports the w ater supply companies punctua lly  carry ou t the orders given by 
the regional health  inspector and qu ick ly  re c tify  the situation. The value o f 
sub-component 4d, whether legislative contro l is carried out, is 1. The overall 
value o f variable 4, the degree o f com m itm ent fo r this case study is 2, out o f a 
to ta l possible maximum value o f 4. Table 17 gives a summary o f a ll the values 
o f the composite variables.
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Table 17 : Summary values of the composite variables
Country: The Netherlands
Directive: Drinking Water
Variable
Name Level
Component
Variable
Number
Component Variable Description Value
EC la precision of statement of policy objectives 5
Clarity and 
Precision of 
Directive
EC lb
degree to which ambiguous standards are 
present in the directive: sub-components 
i to iv
2
EC Ic necessity for further explanation 1
• Total 8
Percentage o f possible total 80%
The Economic 
Dimension EC 2a
consideration of costs during 
negotiations at EC level 0
MS 2b costs of compliance 1
• ■ . ■ TOtdl J ..V.
Percentage of possible total 50%
MS 3a
degree to which implementation process 
legally structured to enhance 
implementation of directives into 
national law: sub-comoonents i to iv
5
Degree of 
Institutional 
Change
MS 3b existence of a structure of environment enforcement and control 5
MS 3c time allowd for implementation 1
MS 3d conflicting national policy 0
Total 11
Percentage o f t^ssible total ' 73%
Committment: EC 4a legislative and executive overview by Commission 0
Enforcement EC 4b MS action upon feedback from CQOimi^ siPn _________________________ 0
and Control MS 4c
national control and enforcement 
procedures 1
MS 4d response to national control and enforcement efforts 1
Total
V , Pçrcentageof postiblé total
- Percentage o f possible total #^='71%'':^:%
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7.4 Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f the  D rin k in g  W ater D ire c tiv e  in  the  U n ite d  
K in g d o m
7.4.1 Scheme o f Regulations
From the beginning when the EC D rinking  W ater D irective was negotiated and 
adopted, i t  was acknowledged in  the United Kingdom tha t i t  would have 
d ifficu ltie s  w ith  im plem enting the D irective, especially w ith  the lead standard. 
The House o f Lords Select Committee on the European Communities reported 
tha t between 7 and 10% o f households in  England and Wales, and a higher 
p roportion  in  Scotland, w ould n o t be able to com ply w ith  the proposed lead 
standard: because o f the h igh p ro po rtio n  and the long standing nature o f the 
problem , the Committee beheve th a t two years fo r compliance w ith  the 
D irective is w ho lly  unrea lis tic .
No leg islation regarding the setting o f standards fo r d rink ing  water existed in  
the U nited Kingdom. In  1982 the responsible M in iste ria l departm ent fo r 
im plem enting the EC D rinking  W ater D irective, the Departm ent fo r the 
Environm ent (DoE), send a le tte r to  the European Commission stating tha t the 
d irective w ould be im plem ented fo rm a lly , by an adm in istra tive provision (DoE 
20/82). The European Commission regarded th is as w ho lly  inadequate and an 
A rtic le  169 le tte r regarding n o n -no tifica tion  follow ed, 
in  1985 a week a fte r the deadline by w hich the d irective ’s standards should 
have been met, the Environm ent M in iste r set out details o f the governm ent’s 
approach to  the im plem entation o f the EC D rinking W ater D irective to the 
House o f Commons (HC,1985;cols 455-56). Two parameters o f the D rinking 
W ater D irective appeared p a rticu la rly  problem atic, these are the. pesticide and 
the lead param eter. Regarding the firs t, the Departm ent fo r the Environm ent 
sent a le tte r in  1986 (W PlO/1986) to the water industry, stating tha t water 
suppliers would no t be expected to  com ply w ith  the pesticide standard as stated 
in  the D irective. The Environm ent M inister, Ian Gow had said earlie r tha t the 
single standard (0.1 m icro gram per litre ) was ’now ’ inappropria te , in  the lig h t 
o f the greater d ive rs ity  o f pesticides available and greater knowledge o f th e ir 
effects. He also indicated tha t the U nited Kingdom w ould press the European 
Commission to review  the pesticide param eter (O ffic ia l Report, House o f 
Commons 23 July 1985, w ritten  answers cols 455-56). As regards to the lead 
parameter, the UK government issued on July 23^* ,^ 1985 a form al request 
under A rtic le  20 o f the D rinking  W ater D irective, fo r a delay fo r the lead 
parameter. This was no t granted by the European Commission. The 
Commission's view  was th a t the governm ent’s submission fo r an A rtic le  20
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request was too late: the date fo r compliance w ith  the standards set in  the 
D irective was July 18^^, 1985.
The government o f the U nited Kingdom had hoped to negotiate less stringent 
standards and subsequently lit t le  was done in  1985, when the D rinking W ater 
D irective took effect. Instead, in  November 1985, the governm ent o f the United 
Kingdom  granted w ater suppliers 57 derogations (m ostly fo r n itra tes). 
Moreover, i t  in te rpre ted  the Maximum Adm issible Concentration (MAC) in  the 
D rinking  W ater D irective as meaning an average over three months and no t 
an absolute lim it as stated in  the D rinking  W ater D irective.
in  1986 the firs t steps towards the p riva tisa tion  o f the water indu s try  were 
taken. The governm ent published the 'W hite Paper on P rivatisation o f the 
Water A uthorities in  England and Wales' ( February 1986, Cmnd 9734, HMSO). 
Proposed is the transfer o f the w ater authorities to the p riva te  sector w ith  
nearly  a ll th e ir existing functions in ta c t, inc lud ing  re spons ib ility  fo r 
regulating the q u a lity  o f d rin k in g  water. The proposal was p o litic a lly  
unacceptable to almost a ll parties concerned and would have been open to 
challenge in  the European Court o f Justice on the grounds tha t a priva te  
company could no t p roperly  constitute a 'com petent au th o rity ’ fo r the purpose 
o f im plem enting EC water directives (Maclean, 1991; 47-48). As a result the 
water p riva tisa tion  programme was postponed w hile new proposals were 
developed. Meanwhile, in  August 1987 the European Commission sent a 
Reasoned op in ion fo r non-no tifica tion  to  the UK government, and in  October 
1987 the Commission began in fringem ent proceedings against the 
governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom  fo r fa ilin g  to im plem ent the EC D rinking  
W ater D irective.
An amended W hite Paper on p riva tisa tion  o f the water authorities was 
announced by the UK government in  1987. The amendments included the 
establishm ent o f a new pub lic  N ational Rivers A u th o rity  (NRA) to take over 
the m ain regulatory and w ater management functions o f the water 
authorities, leaving the u tility  roles o f water supply and sewerage services fo r 
priva tisa tion . A new D rinking W ater Inspectorate (DWI) was also to  be 
established w ith in  the DoE to m on ito r d rink ing  water qua lity . Two years later, 
in  1989 the UK government held discussions w ith  the European Commission on 
its regulation o f the privatised w ater companies. The Commission had 
expressed its  concern over section 20 o f the proposed W ater Act, in  which the 
requirem ents fo r enforcem ent action to be taken against undertakers 
supplying water n o t meeting q u a lity  standards, were relaxed. This was seen as
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an attem pt by the governm ent to circum vent the EC D rinking  W ater D irective. 
In  May 1989 the House o f Lords passed an amendment to section 20 o f the 
proposed W ater Act w hich w ould have required water companies to com ply 
w ith  the directive at the latest by September 1993, bu t th is was overturned by 
the government when the W ater Act reached its  Report stage in  the Commons 
in  July 1989. A fte r frequent meetings between the governm ent o f the U nited 
Kingdom and Com m unity o ffic ia ls, section 20 was redrafted. W ater companies 
were to set out plans fo r investm ent to  b ring supphes up to standard, and a 
clearer enforcement procedure was included should these standards not be met 
(Haigh, 1995; 4.4-6).
The European Conunission had begun in  1987 infringem ent procedures against 
the U nited Kingdom governm ent fo r fa ilin g  to im plem ent the D rinking  W ater 
D irective. However, w ith  the p riva tisa tio n  o f the water authorities in  fu ll 
progress, agreed w ith  the UK governm ent to rest the case during  the 
p riva tisa tion  process. Differences regarding the tim e table fo r the water 
ind u s try  to  com ply w ith  the d irective  between the UK governm ent and the 
Commission d id  however rem ain. The fa ilu re  to reach agreement on a more 
rap id  and b ind ing  compliance tim etable fin a lly  prom pted the Commission, by 
the end o f 1989, to start Court proceedings at the European Court o f Justice 
against the government o f the United Kingdom (ECJ Case C-337/89 [1992] 1 ECR 
6103).
In  1989 the W ater Act came in to  force, provid ing  the Secretaries o f State fo r 
the Environm ent and Wales fo r the firs t tim e w ith  powers to establish a system 
o f s ta tu to ry water qu a lity  objectives fo r contro lled  waters, standards fo r 
d rin k in g  water, and b ind ing  plans fo r achieving water q u a lity  im provem ents 
in  England and Wales. Also W ater Supply Regulations (SI 189 no 1147 as 
amended by SI 1989 1384) regarding water qua lity  and the maximum 
perm issible concentrations o f various contam inants entered in to  force in  
England and Wales p a rtly  on September the firs t 1989 and p a rtly  on January 
the firs t 1990.
The W ater Act 1989 brought a m ajor restructuring o f the U nited Kingdom's 
water industry. Private-sector water service companies were established to be 
regulated by the NRA (m onitoring and con tro l o f water p o llu tio n ), DWI 
(m onito ring  d rin k in g  water) and the O ffice o f water services (Ofwat) which 
regulates w ater and sewerage prices.
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A lthough the EC D rinking W ater D irective was fo rm a lly  im plem ented, some 8 
years a fte r the deadline, the im plem entation o f the standards set in  the 
D rinking W ater D irective rem ained a p o in t o f concern fo r the European 
Commission. Based on a 1988 com plaint from  the Friends o f the Earth 
regarding lead in  UK d rink ing  water, the Commission started a second 
European Court o f Justice procedure against the government o f the United 
Kingdom  fo r incorrect application  o f na tiona l measures im plem enting the 
D rinking  W ater D irective. The Commission's com plaint against the 
governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom  regarding lead p o llu tio n  o f d rink ing  water 
in  seventeen supply zones serving some 52,000 people in  Scotland, was no t 
upheld by the European Court o f Justice (Case 56/90 Commission v United 
Kingdom o f Great B rita in  and N orthern Ire land [1994] 6 (1) J Env Law 125).
In  1989, the water service companies published 'A ction Plans' fo r bring ing 
specific water supply zones up to the standards o f the D rinking  W ater 
D irective. In  many cases the A ction Plans anticipate lengthy delays in  
compUance w ith  the D rinking W ater D irective. Thames water p ic fo r example, 
specifies a date as late as 2000 in  the case o f pesticides, wM le other companies 
are no t able to specify any date at a ll in  respect to some parameters. The 
Friends o f the Earth started to  seek ju d ic ia l review  in  the U nited Kingdom in  
1991, claim ing tha t the governments' acceptance o f these Action Plans allowed 
water companies to  breach the Maximum Adm issible Concentration o f 0.1 
m icro gram per litre  fo r pesticides as stated in  the D rinking W ater D irective.
In  1994 the case o f the Friends o f the Earth reached the High Court. The 
Friends o f the Earth argued tha t section 7 o f the W ater Act 1989 (preventing 
enforcem ent action against a w ater services company i f  th is  w ould prevent i t  
from  making a 'reasonable re tu rn ' on its  capita l), is con tra ry to governm ent's 
clear obligation to  com ply w ith  the standards set in  the EC D rinking  W ater 
D irective. Furtherm ore, they were no t satisfied w ith  the legal s itua tion  w hich 
denies o rd ina ry citizens the rig h t to take action over a breach once a (water 
supply) 'undertaking ' has been approved. On March 1994 the H igh Court ru led  
against Friends o f the Earth, arguing th a t th is was no t a legitim ate public 
interest. "By doing so the High Court allowed the government o f the United 
Kingdom to pro tect water companies from  action taken by in d iv id u a l citizens 
over sub-standard d rink in g  w ater" (Friends o f the Earth, 1994).
Lord Justice Roch observed tha t the European Commission and the European 
Court o f Justice had accepted tha t the W ater Act 1989 and associated statutory 
instrum ents, adequately incorporated the aims o f the EC D rinking W ater 
D irective in to  English law, and argued that;
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I do not understand European Law as requiring domestic law to confer on individuals 
enforceable rights which are completely uncircumscribed (R v Secretary of State for 
the Environment ex parte Friends of the Earth , Court of Appeal, 25 May 1995).
Friends o f the Earth subsequently took th e ir com plaint to  the European 
Commission, which announced in  1996 tha t i t  is to  take the governm ent o f the 
United Kingdom to  the European Court o f Justice:
The Commission is taking the UK to the European Court of Justice for not fully 
implementing the drinking water Directive. The reasons are, first, that some of the 
drinking water standards, which became mandatory in 1985, are still not being met in 
the UK, and second, that the system of water company "undertakings", used where 
standards are not being met, are not compatible with the Directive, the Commission 
believes. The undertakings cannot be enforced by individuals who may be affected by 
drinking water that does not meet the standards. The main problem in meeting the 
standards relates to the pesticides parameter ... The Commission has been trying to 
reach a settlement with the UK government since it first opened the case in 1991. 
However, last month the UK government informed the Commission that it could not 
accept the Commission's proposals for ending the dispute. The Commission has 
spared no efforts to reach a settlem en t... but it is unacceptable that the UK is 
unwilling to ensure the legally enforceable rights for its citizens to drinking water of 
a quality that meets EU standards, eleven years after the Directive came into force 
(European Commission, 11 July 1996).
7.4.2 Environm ental management regarding d rink ing  w ater in  the United 
K ingdom
Since 1970, environm ental p ro tection  (inc lud ing  ru ra l a ffa irs and water) has 
been p rim a rily  the responsib ility  o f the Departm ent o f the Environm ent 
(DoE). The Welsh Office, the Scottish O ffice and the N orthern Ire land Office 
have th e ir own environm ental departm ents. The Secretary o f State o f the 
Departm ent o f the.Environm ent has the overa ll adm in istra tive and po licy 
setting responsib ility  fo r water. This includes elaboration o f the regula tory 
fram ework, approval o f codes o f practice and recovery o f reports from  
regulatory bodies. The Secretary o f State fo r the Environm ent is supported, on 
environm ental m atters, by a M in iste r fo r the Environm ent and Countryside 
and a Junior M inister.
The Environm ent Protection Deputy Secretary o f the DoE is responsible fo r 
five  directorates: the Environm ent Agency fo r England and Wales; a ir, clim ate
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and toxic substances; waste; environm ent po licy  and analysis and water 
inc lud ing  d rin k in g  water and the D rink ing  W ater Inspectorate (DWI) and the 
Office fo r water services (O fwat). O ther national departm ent w ith  
environm ental responsib ility  is the Departm ent o f A g ricu ltu re , Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF) w hich is responsible fo r flood  defence, sea dum ping, ag ricu ltu ra l 
p o llu tio n  and forestry.
P rior to the p riva tisa tion  the Regional W ater A uthorities (RWA) were 
responsible fo r the pub lic w ater supply services; sewage disposal services; 
rive r management; flo o d  defence; fisheries and recreation. One o f the m ain 
reasons to priva tise  the w ater services were:
... the RWA's dependence on government for funding of expenditure on water-sector 
projects. The RWAs had to compete for funding with all other public expenditure 
requirements. Reduced funding during the 15 years of existence of the RWAs meant 
that plans for rationalisation and improvement could not be realised; 
that the borrowing requirements was expected to increase in real terms due to 
European Community Directives, which would require large expenditure associated 
with improvements in drinking water quality and in bathing water quality; 
that it is not appropriate for a single body to be responsible for authorising its own 
sewage discharges and abstraction consents as well as being responsible for enforcing 
these authorisations. This tended to result in the RWAs not prosecuting themselves 
for illegal operation, and as a consequence they generally did not prosecute others for 
violation of the discharge and abstraction authorisations ( Sherriff, 1995; 29).
The p riva tisa tion  o f the water ind us try  reorganised the management o f the 
water sector (table 18). In  England and Wales the provision o f water supply 
and sewerage services has been the responsible o f p riva te  companies since 
1989. Ten water companies provide water supply and sewerage services, and 22 
water service companies provide water supply alone. The w ater companies are 
regulated in  England and Wales, by the National Rivers A u th o rity  (NRA), an 
independent sta tu tory body responsible fo r water quantity, p o llu tio n  contro l, 
flood  defence, fisheries, navigation, conservation and recreation. The 
D rinking W ater Inspectorate (DWI) p a rt o f the DoE is responsible fo r d rink ing  
water q u a lity  con tro l in  England and Wales m d  fin a lly  the O ffice fo r water 
services (Ofwat), also pa rt o f the DoE and regulates the p ric ing  o f sewerage and 
d rink ing  water. Since 1996 the Environm ent Agency has been established 
com bining Her M ajesty's Inspectorate o f P o llu tion  (HMIP), the N ational Rivers 
A u th o rity  (NRA) and the waste regulating authorities(W RAs) (Leeson,1995).
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Table 18: Water Management tasks in the UK
O rg a n is a tio n M a in  W a te r-re la te d  R e s p o n s ib ilitie s
C entral
G overnm ent • Departm ent o f the Environm ent (DoE) is responsible fo r in land  waters and aspects o f coastal waters.
• M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re , Fisheries &  Food (MAFF) has 
responsibilties fo r flood  defence and some aspects o f 
coastal water qua lity .
N ational Rivers 
Authority • Non-departm ental public body w ith  accountab ility  to DoE and MAFF.
® Operates in  England and Wales.
• Functional responsib ilities fo r W ater P o llu tion /W ater 
Resources/Flood D efence/Abstraction licensing 
F isheries/R ecreation/C onservation and some 
N avigation.
English Nature; 
English Heritage; 
N ational Parks; 
and Countryside 
Commission
• Non-departm ental public bodies accountable to DoE.
® Various responsib ilities inc lud ing  designation o f sites 
o f special scien tific  in te rest (SSSFs), p ro tection  o f 
w ild life  and heritage, pro tection  o f the countryside.
D rink ing  W ater 
Inspectorate • Reports to DoE.• Responsible fo r ensuring d rin k in g  w ater supplies 
com ply w ith  nationa l standards.
Local A u thorities • Accountable to DoE.
• R esponsibilities include:- land use planning
- waste regulation and waste planning
- mineral planning
Her M ajesty’s 
Inspectorate o f 
P o llu tion  (HMIP)
• Reports to DoE and is concerned m ostly w ith  
in d u s tria l p o llu tio n .
• R esponsibilities include:- licensing discharges to air, land, and water from ‘most 
polluting’ processes under Integrated Pollution Control 
legislation
-regulating discharges o f ‘most polluting’ substances.
Office o f W ater 
Services (OFWAT) • Reports to DoE and is a regulator o f the water companies.
• Ensures the functions o f the water companies are 
p roperly  carried  ou t and tha t d rin k ing  water 
standards are met.
• Controls the companies’ charges.
• Agrees investment plans o f the companies.
W ater Supply and 
Sewage Disposal 
Companies
• P rivatised companies.
• 10 companies cover England and Wales in  p rovid ing
wastewater services. They also supply d rink ing  
water to  a large p a rt o f the country. The rem aining 
d rink ing  water is supplied by a fu rth e r 20 companies.
• Regulated by the NRA as‘ environmental’ regulator and 
OFWAT as ‘ economic’ regulator.
source: present w rite r
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Statuto ry responsib ility  fo r m on itoring  the qu a lity  o f water supplies is placed 
upon the water companies by the requirem ents o f the regulations. This self­
m onitoring  by the w ater companies is subject to checks by loca l authorities 
and the DWI.
The DoE can issue watercompanies notices o f in ten tion  to take enforcem ent 
where d rink ing  water q u a lity  d id  no t com ply fu lly  w ith  requirem ents o f the 
regulations. The water companies use th e ir own laboratories to  check the 
water samples. Recently a q u a lity  system and accreditation o f laboratories 
(NAMAS) has been introduced, a lthough i t  is no t clear how m any labs are 
accredited. According to the most recent 1994 DWI report on the q ua lity  o f 
d rin k in g  w ater:
... a number of companies laboratories are now accredited by NAMAS to the agreed 
drinking water testing specification... (DWI,1994;xii).
7.4.3 Environm ental perform ance review  regarding d rin k in g  w ater in  the 
U nited Kingdom
D rink ing  water q u a lity
Surface water is the m ain source o f supply in  the n o rth  and west o f England 
and Wales, owing to h igh ra in fa ll. Groundwater is im portan t fo r supply in  the 
south, east and M idlands, and accounts fo r 20 % o f abstractions in  England and 
Wales (Table 19). Abstractions from  surface water and groundwater fo r piped 
mains water represented around h a lf o f to ta l abstractions in  England and 
Wales in  1993. E lectric ity generation accounted fo r 36 % other industries 11 % 
and agricu ltu re  1 %. Due to the h igh levels o f abstraction o f surface water and 
groundwater the flow  in  a num ber o f rivers is unacceptably low  at times (w ell 
below the na tu ra l o r h is to ric  leve l). This has severe im plica tions fo r the 
ecology according to the OECD:
... generally the problems are caused by high, though authorised groundwater or 
direct abstractions rather than drought (OECD,1994; 49).
Groundwater is in  most cases suitable fo r d rink ing  a fte r d isin fecting, there 
are however concerns in  some areas about n itra te  levels, often a ttribu ted  to 
farm ing practices and w ith  levels o f pesticides and herbicides. Incidents o f 
specific p o llu tio n  by in d u s tria l chemicals such as ch lo rinated  organics have 
led to  considerable local contam ination and, in  some cases the closure o f wells. 
Friends o f the Earth (FoE) estimated tha t in  1992, supplies to around 14,5
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m illio n  people in  England and Wales exceeded the standard fo r pesticides at 
times (Friend o f the Earth,1996;40). FoE also draw attention to  the fact that 
consumers are cu rren tly  footing the b ill fo r pesticide rem oval, an estimated £1 
b illio n  in  capita l expenditure and clearly in  v io la tion  o f the p o llu te r pays 
p rin c ip le  according to FoE. Public concern regarding the p riva tiza tion  o f the 
water supply companies, the increase in  water prices and the p ro fits  the 
newly p riva tized  companies made, was h igh (Independent,1994; Sunday 
Times,1994).. Moreover the poss ib ility  o f com petition between water supply 
companies has been questioned (F inancial Times,1996).
In  1990 w ith  the establishm ent o f the D rinking W ater Inspectorate (DWI) 
annual reports o f the q u a lity  o f d rin k in g  water are published (table 20).
From the DWI reports i t  can be concluded tha t the overall qua lity  o f d rin ldng 
water since 1990 is increasing.
Several comments can be made regarding the DWI reports, and the 
function ing o f the DWI itse lf. ENDS ( 1994) reported tha t "doubts rem ain about 
the DWI’s a b ility  to police the water industry  effectively" (ENDS,1994;13). Only 
three prosecutions fo r supplying w ater u n fit fo r human consum ption have 
been brought since the DWI was established six years ago. These three 
prosecutions have been brought against Severn Trent W ater,W elsh W ater and 
Wessex Water. The DWI Chief Inspector adm itted that "fo u r o r five " incidents 
were under investigation w ith  such action in  m ind (ENDS, 1994; 14). However, 
the DWI has revealed tha t none o f these cases w ill be taken to court. The DWI 
can on ly recommend a prosecution, the decision lays fin a lly  w ith  the 
Secretary o f State, and in  the cases m entioned above the Secretary o f State d id  
not take the cases to court.
O ther concerns regarding the DWI's regula tory powers is the lack o f sanctions 
against companies th a t fa il to  re p o rt on incidents which affect o r po ten tia lly  
affect d rink ing  water qua lity . The W ater Industry Act 1991 leaves the DWI 
powerless against reporting  fa ilu res (ENDS,1994;14)
Further, the DWI reports show tha t several p o llu tio n  problem s rem ain, a 
sign ificant p ropo rtion  o f samples fa iled  to meet pesticide standards in  1994 
(11%) and another problem  is created by the h igh levels o f lead in  the 
drink ing  water (20% fa iled  to meet the standard). The OECD concludes:
... lead arising principally from household plumbing is a problem in many areas;
pesticides and nitrates are of concern and, in some areas the concentrations exceed
standards (OECD, 1994; 60).
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Friends o f the Earth has on several occasions urged m inisters to take fu rth e r 
action on the lead issue (FoE,1996;38). Despite progress made regarding the 
qu a lity  o f d rink ing  water, the OECD states:
... old facilities based on past standards or subject to deterioration cause problems 
such as water main leaks, lead pollution of drinking water, capacity shortages and 
sewage overflows in storms. A considerable effort is necessary to develop and replace 
facilities in the long run (OECD, 1994; 61).
I t  is d iffic u lt to  comment on the qu a lity  o f the d rink ing  water before the firs t 
yearly DWI reports were published in  1990. This is due to several factors. 
Before the p riva tisa tion , sampling o f d rin k in g  water was carried out by the 
W ater A uthorities (WAs) as la id  down in  the Part II o f the C ontrol o f P ollu tion 
Act 1974 (COPA II) and Part III "The Protection and Management o f River and 
Other Waters" o r the 1983 W ater Act. COPA II regulated public access regarding 
in fo rm ation  on the q u a lity  o f water. This was in  the fo rm  o f registers 
m aintained by the WAs. However there are lim ita tions to the effectiveness o f 
the registers in  practice (Burton, 1989). The registers were firs t opened to 
public inspection in  1985, bu t were on ly  concerned w ith  discharges o f trade 
and sewage e ffluen t. In fo rm ation  regarding the qu a lity  o f d rin k in g  water and 
discharges to sewers were excluded.
In order to get some idea o f the d rink ing  water q ua lity  before the 1990 DWI 
report i t  can be argued th a t several o ther publications can provide useful 
in form ation, i.e. the num ber o f derogations granted to water supply industries. 
In November 1985, the UK governm ent granted water suppliers 57 derogations, 
48 o f them fo r contam ination by n itrates. The n itra te  derogations affected 2% 
o f the population in  the UK (Rose,1990; 81).
A t the same tim e, the governm ent in te rp re ted  the D rinking W ater D irective's 
Maximum Adm issible Concentration (MAC) in  the D rinking W ater D irective as 
meaning an average over three m onths and no t an absolute lim it. The fact 
tha t consumers were d rink ing  water w ith  too h igh levels o f n itra tes was 
recognised in  a governmental study. A 1985 N itrate Co-ordination Group set up 
by the UK government, produced in  1986 a report, 'N itra te  in  W ater' which 
showed tha t 1 m illio n  East Anglian and M idlands consumers regu la rly  drank 
water above the 50 m icro gram per litre  standard, and another 3.8 m illion  
drank water almost as po llu ted during 1984. Rose states tha t the source o f
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n itra te  p o llu tio n  is undisputed: changes in  ag ricu ltu ra l practices, and the 
enormous growth in  the use o f a rtific ia l fe rtilise rs  (Rose,1990; 76).
A fu rth e r ind ica to r o f poor q u a lity  o f d rink ing  water in  the U nited Kingdom 
before 1990, is the fact tha t the European Commission, a fte r fo u r years o f 
dispute, began infringem ents proceedings against the UK governm ent, 
regarding excess n itra te  in  the w ater supply o f Norw ich and Redbridge, and 
fo r illega l levels o f bacteria and a lum in ium  elsewhere. Lean and Pearce 
(1989) commence:
Millions of Britons drink water contaminated above international safety limits with 
poisons. Well over two million people are at risk from excessive concentrations of 
lead, which damages childrens’ brains. Two million people drink water containing 
more than the European Commission's Maximum Admissible Concentration (MAC) of 
aluminium, which is increasingly believed to cause Alzheimer's disease. At least 1.7 
million people consume water that breaks the limits for nitrate, suspected by some 
scientists as a cause of cancer ... Friends of the Earth identified 298 water supplies 
exceeding MACs for dangerous pesticides ... (Lean and Pearce, 1989).
The 57 derogations were w ithdraw n in  1988 and the UK governm ent had 
decided tha t the term  Maximum Adm issible Concentration in  the D rinking 
W ater D irective a fte r a ll, should relate to  ind iv idu a l samples and not the 
averages over a period. However, a lthough the 57 derogations were 
w ithdraw n they were replaced in  1989 by new derogations (Appendix 4). The 
W ater Industry Act 1991 requires the Secretary o f State to  issue an 
enforcem ent order in  the event o f a water company breaching any o f its 
obligations. I f  however the defau lting  company gives "an undertaking to take 
a ll such steps as i t  appears ... appropriate fo r ... the securing o r fa c ilita tin g  
compliance ..." (W ater Industry Act 1991, s .l9 ( l)b ) , then the m in ister is no 
longer obliged to make an enforcem ent order. According to Rose the 
governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom, had by using the undertaking agreement, 
system atically arranged breaches o f the D rink ing  W ater D irective tha t would 
stretch in to  the next century:
During the switch from publicly owned Water Authorities to privately owned water 
companies, the government extracted 'pre-privatisation undertakings' from the 
Authorities. The details of these became apparent in October 1989 after the new Act 
became law. These included exemptions granted to the new water companies by the 
DoE, so that they did not have to comply with EC rules ... exemptions for lead,
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trihalomethanes, coliform. bacteria and pesticides could well be illeg a l...
(Rose,1990;107).
The Commission ce rta in ly  regards these 'undertakings' as illega l and not 
conform  the EC D rinking W ater D irective, and started an European Court o f 
Justice procedure in  July 1996 (Section 7.4.1).
Pollution contro l
The cu rren t W ater Supply Regulations provide m andatory standards fo r 
domestic d rink ing  and water used fo r food production. M onitoring and 
sampling requirem ents are la id  down inc lud ing , as discussed earlier, 
provisions fo r certain relaxations o f standards by the Secretary o f State on an 
application by an undertaker. I t  is an offence fo r an undertaker to supply 
w ater u n fit fo r hum an consum ption, though defences include th a t a ll 
reasonable steps were taken and a ll due diligence exercised to secure tha t the 
water was f i t  a t the p o in t o f leaving the undertaker's pipes (Hughes,1992;405). 
As regards to qu a lity  contro l o f surface water, a ll emissions from  the most 
p o llu tin g  in d u s tria l processes require  p rio r authorisation by the HMIP, now 
the Environm ental Agency. I f  a company breaches the conditions o f its  
authorisation, fa ils  to  obta in the necessary authorisation o r otherwise fa ils  to 
com ply w ith  any sta tu tory ob ligation i t  commits a crim ina l offence and m ight 
be liab le  fo r c iv il lia b ilitie s . In  the past the consequences have o ften been 
lim ite d  fo r a large company: prosecution and enforcem ent were uncommon 
and fines were small. This is no longer the case and i f  a company fa ils to 
obta in an authorisation, perm it, o r a consent under the Environm ental 
Protection Act o f 1990, the W ater Resources Act o f 1991, o r any other law, there 
is no lim it on the fine  tha t may be imposed. Cases such as the NRA's 
prosecution o f Shell UK fo r contam inating the River Mersey w ith  30,000 
gallons o f crude o il and the resu lting  fin e  o f £1 m illio n  received considerable 
p u b lic ity . Regulatory au thorities are since the p riva tisa tion  m ore lik e ly  to  
in itia te  proceedings, usually fo r the recovery o f the costs o f a n ti-po llu tin g  
measures. Private prosecution can also be brought i f  the regula tory 
authorities fa il to  prosecute, a path fo llow ed by environm ental pressure 
groups. Economic instrum ents are not (yet) extensively used in  the U nited 
Kingdom. P ollu tion and emission o f water and water abstraction needs 
licensing and authorisation charges are being paid. However these are cost 
recovery measures to cover adm in istra tive  costs o f regulators such as the 
HMIP and the NRA (now the Environm ental Agency), they are no t intended to
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have an incentive effect. Surface w ater p o llu tio n  incidents are no t 
uncommon: "... m ostly caused by accidental discharges o f po llu tants by 
industry, agricu ltu re  o r waste water treatm ent works. O ther sources are 
leaching from  la n d fills , tra ffic  accidents, illega l dum ping and m ining. The 
num ber o f reported incidents increased from  13000 in  1981 to 32000 in  1992 in  
England and Wales (OECD, 1994; 53).
Six o f the seven most frequen tly  prosecuted water po llu ters are water 
companies according to NRA data (ENDS,1995b;46). Overflows o f sewage 
causing p o llu tio n  o f surface water w ith  phosphate, often stems from  o ld 
sewers and works o f insu ffic ie n t capacity tha t have no t kept pace w ith  the 
growth in  water use:
The sewage system needs further efforts to tackle some problem areas: many facilities 
have insufficient capacity; stormwater overflow causes many pollution incidents; 
discharge treatment in coastal areas is frequently at primary level or less; nutrients 
from sewage need to be reduced (OECD, 1994; 56).
7.4.4 Economic aspects o f d rink ing  w ater in  the United Kingdom
The current environm ental po licy is set out in  the 1990 w hite  paper on the 
environm ent and is updated annually in  fu rth e r w hite papers in  w hich the 
government sets out its  commitments and reports on progress. According to a 
study commissioned by the DoE, to ta l environm ental expenditure was £13.85 
b illio n  in  1990. About 60% was devoted to  po llu tio n  abatement and control, 
w hich represented 1.5% o f GDP. W ater p o llu tio n  abatement is the largest single 
item  o f expenditure am ounting to £3.18 b illio n  or 38% o f to ta l spending on 
p o llu tio n  abatement and contro l.
P rivatisation o f sewerage and water supply in  England and Wales in  1989 
brought a s ign ificant change to the financing system (table 21).
The Regional W ater A uthorities were in  existence 15 years before the water 
industry  services were privatised, they were under the supervision o f the DoE 
which provided capital fund ing . Since the p riva tisa tion  w ater companies are 
required to cover a ll costs through user charges. The lim its  fo r charges are 
set by the Office o f W ater Services (O fwat), which consults regulators such as 
the Environm ental Agency. Ofwat's p rim ary d u ty  is to ensure tha t water 
companies have su ffic ien t means to ca rry ou t th e ir functions p roperly , and 
tha t they do so. It must also protect customers' interests and prom ote economy 
and efficiency. This system has increased the transparency o f price setting
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and p rovided a strong incentive fo r water companies to im prove efficiency 
and reduce costs.
The UK governm ent's estimates o f the costs o f meeting environm ental 
standards inc lud ing  the D rink ing  W ater D irective, renewing sewerage works 
and meeting the Bathing W ater D irective, increased from  £2.500 m illio n  in  
December 1988 to £18.630 m illio n  in  August 1989 (Rose,1990; 64). M inisters 
presented it  as p riva tisa tion  paying fo r h igher standards, bu t th is has been 
questioned by Bowers (1989). Bowers points out tha t the iden tifiab le  
environm ental costs add up to on ly  £5.660 m illion . The extra £13.000 m iUion 
can on ly  be accounted fo r by a wholesale renewal o f neglected in frastructu re , 
inc lud ing  mains, sewers and water treatm ent fac ilities . The costs "are no t the 
consequence o f rising environm ental standards, i t  is not true tha t industry  
faces a new tougher set o f environm ental regulations" (Rose,1990; 64).
Up to 1995 water companies have invested £1.8 b illio n  to meet d rink ing  water 
q u a lity  standards. Programmes include the insta lla tion  o f treatm ent fa c ilities  
to remove pesticides and im provem ent o f the d is trib u tio n  system. Apart from  
the EC D rinking W ater D irective and the need fo r fu rth e r reductions o f 
pesticides and nitrates, the need to com ply w ith  EC directives 7 6 /160/EEC on the 
qu a lity  o f bathing water and 9 1 /2 7 1/EC on urban waste water have obliged the 
water service companies to undertake greatly increased investm ent 
program m es.
Following Ofwat's firs t period ic review  o f water charges (Ofwat, 1994) i t  has 
been announced tha t £11 biU ion has been earmarked fo r im provem ents to 
water qua lity  fo r the period 1995-2005. These costs set about p a rtly  by 
Com m unity legislation, have lead to:
... tension between the need to water pics as private companies to cater for the 
interests of their shareholders and the requirements to meet water quality standards 
by the deadlines set in the directives" (Haigh, 1995; 4.4-8)
In  table 21 some data on d rink ing  water volumes and investm ent programmes 
is presented. Bases on these data i t  may be concluded that:
• The volum e o f delivered d rink ing  water stayed at the same level between 
1986and 1993;
• The level o f investm ent doubled between 1988 and 1993. This is what the 
ju s tifica tio n  o f the increasing price  o f w ater is based on.
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As fo r the fu tu re , the revised D rinking W ater D irective is lik e ly  to  have great 
im pact in  the United Kingdom. This is because the revised D irective lowered 
the MAC level fo r lead at 10 m icro gram per litre . The W ater Service 
Association (WSA) has estimated th a t comphance w ith  the new lead param eter 
w ould almost certa in ly require  wholesale replacement o f lead pipes and 
fittin g s  containing lead (WSA,1996; 10). It has been estimated by the European 
Commission tha t in  the United Kingdom the costs to water suppliers o f 
replacing th e ir lead p ip ing w ould be around £2 b illio n  and costs to consumers 
o f replacing theirs w ould be about £8 b illio n  overall. The House o f Lords, 
recognises tha t:
there are serious health risks from lead in drinking water ... in 1994 the standard of 
50 micro gram per litre for lead was not fully complied with in about 20 per cent of 
the water supply zones in England and Wales. At the present rate of voluntary 
replacement it would take another fifty to sixty years to remove all domestic lead 
piping in this country ... we believe that insufficient sense of urgency in tackling the 
problems of removing lead from drinking water has been shown by the Government... 
we attribute the slow response from consumers to the lack of an effective publicity 
campaign to bring home to them the extent of the dangers to human health ...
(HL,1996; 11).
7.4.5 Infringem ent and EC I cases
In October 1987 the European Commission began its  firs t in fringem ent 
proceedings against the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom, w hich resulted in  
the case brought before the European Court o f Justice in  1992 under A rtic le  
169 o f the EC Treaty (Case C-337/89, [1992] 1 ECR 6103). The Commission's 
com plaints are, firs t, tha t the governm ent o f the United Kingdom fa iled  to 
im plem ent w ith in  the prescribed periods a ll o r pa rt o f the provisions o f the 
d irective (depending on the regions o f the UK concerned). Secondly, tha t 
water supplied in  the United Kingdom had exceeded the Maximum Admissible 
Concentration levels fo r n itrates (in  28 supply zones in  England) and lead, and 
tha t the excessive levels are no t ju s tifie d  by the derogations provided fo r in  
the directive. The governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom argues tha t the 
d irective does no t impose an obhgation to  achieve a resu lt bu t m erely requires 
Member States to take a ll practicable steps to com ply w ith  the standards la id  
down. I t  adds tha t the fa ilu re  to  achieve the objective is due to  extraneous 
factors re la ting  in  p a rticu la r to techniques used in  agricu lture.
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On November 25^^, 1992 the European Court o f Justice ru led tha t the 
government o f the U nited Kingdom had fa iled  to  fu lf il its  obligations under 
the EEC Treaty. In  the Court decision the government o f the U nited Kingdom 
had fa iled  to:
•  Im plem ent in  the regulations applicable in  Scotland and N orthern  Ire land 
Council d irective 80/778/EEC and apply the directive in  the whole o f the UK 
to water used in  the food industry . The governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom 
argued tha t "d ifficu ltie s  re la ting  to  the organisation o f the public 
authorities in  some parts o f the U nited Kingdom explain the delay".
However the European Court o f Justice rules these reasons as no t legitim ate:
... a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances in its internal 
legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with obligations or time-limits 
imposed by directives (ECJ Case C -337/89, Commission v UK, [1992] 1 ECR 6103).
• Adopt su ffic ient measures to  meet the n itra te  standard, leaving 28 water 
supply zones in  England and Wales in  excess o f the 50 m icro gram per litre  
hm it. The Court o f Justice rules that:
... it follows from the directive that the Member States must take the steps necessary 
to ensure that water intended for human consumption at least meets the requirements 
specified in Annex I (ECJ Case C -337/89, [1992] 1 ECR 6103).
The Court o f Justice rejected the governm ent's argum ent o f technical 
d ifficu ltie s  in  meeting the standards, i t  ru led  that:
Member States may not rely upon special circumstances in order to justify a failure to 
discharge that obligation except within the limits of specific derogations provided for 
in the directive (ECJ Case C -337/89, [1992] 1 ECR 6103).
Regarding the argum ent th a t the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom had 
no tified  the European Commission in  October 1985 o f those derogations, the 
Court ru led  that:
... such a request must be made within the period laid down for ... notification of the 
derogations occurred after that period had expired (ECJ Case C -337/89, [1992] 1 ECR 
6103).
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•  F ina lly, the Court rejected the European Commission’s claim  in  respect o f 
lead standards in  Scotland, and c la rifie d  the in te rp re ta tion  to be given to 
the "comments" concerning the param eter fo r lead in  Annex I o f the 
D rinking  W ater D irective. The parties disagree about the in te rp re ta tion  o f 
those comments. The Commission takes the view  tha t the lim it fo r lead is to 
be understood as an absolute h m it o f 50 m icro gram per h tre . The 
defendant, on the other hand argues tha t the comment m odifies the 50 
m icro gram per h tre  MAC. The Court o f Justice states that:
Parameter 51 must be interpreted as referring to the values to be observed in the case 
of lead pipes, for which special rules have been laid down. In such a case the 50 mg/1 
value for lead is for guidance only, and suitable measures are required only where 
samples are taken directly or after flushing and the lead content exceeds 100 mg/1 
frequently or to an appreciable extent" (ECJ Case C-337/89, [1992] 1 ECR 6103).
A fte r the Advocate General's O pinion the DoE issued a news release in  w hich it  
played down the relevance o f the O pinion, stating tha t a ll Member States are 
having d iffic u lty  in  meeting the standards in  the D rinking  W ater D irective 
and tha t the Commission has so fa r taken legal action against 10 other Member 
States (DoE,1992).
In  1990 the European Commission began its  second in fringem ent proceedings 
against the government o f the U nited Kingdom, which resulted in  the case 
brought before the European Court o f Justice in  1994 under A rtic le  169 o f the 
EC Treaty (Case 56/90, [1994] 6 (1) J Env Law 125). The Connnission's com plaint 
against the government o f the U nited Kingdom  in  respect o f lead p o llu tion  o f 
d rink ing  water in  seventeen supply zones serving some 52,000 people in  
Scotland, was no t upheld by the European Court o f Justice. The argument 
hinged upon an in te rp re ta tion  o f the ob ligation to take 'su itable measures' 
where lead concentrations o f 100 m icro grams per litre  are exceeded 
frequently. In  Ju ly 1996, the European Commission began its  th ird  
in fringem ent proceeding against the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom 
based on a com plaint from  the Friends o f the Earth (Section 7.3.1).
7.4.6 Conclusion: Causes fo r delay and problems w ith  im plem entation
Evidence presented in  th is case study shows tha t from  the beginning problem s 
were experienced w ith  the im plem entation o f the D rinking W ater D irective. 
A lthough the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom and the water supply 
companies blame the 'draconian' EC D rinking  Water D irective and other
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related water directives, i t  is clear fro m  the evidence presented in  th is case 
study tha t several o ther m ain causes contribu ted  to the im plem entation 
problem s.
In  the U nited Kingdom p rio r to the im plem entation o f the D rinking  W ater 
D irective there were no w ater q u a lity  standards in  English Law, in  contrast to  
legal systems in  some o f the other EC Member States. In  fact, the contents o f 
the 1989 W ater Act owed much to  EC environm ental legislation (Purdue, 1995). 
The in troduction  o f a more fo rm a l system o f sta tu tory water q u a lity  objectives 
and standards was necessary to com ply p roperly  w ith  the D rinking  W ater 
D irective and other EC directives concerning water. Further, the D rinking 
W ater D irective has opened the door to public scrutiny o f water supplies. 
Form erly, w ith  no q u a lity  standards in  the United Kingdom there was less 
scope fo r pubhc accountability. The quahty contro l was carried out by the 
W ater A uthorities themselves, no pub lic register o f the q u a lity  o f d rink ing  
water existed. In  a ll, these facts are reasons to expect d ifficu ltie s  w ith  
im plem entation.
However, the D rinking  W ater D irective 's tim e table fo r im plem entation 
in itia lly  seemed no problem  fo r the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom. A fte r 
the im plem entation deadline in  1985, i t  apphed fo r a delay fo r one parameter; 
lead. This request was rejected by the European Commission. Only when the 
1989 W ater Act came in to  force had, the government o f the U nited Kingdom 
fo rm a lly  im plem ented the D rinking  W ater D irective, 8 years a fte r the fo rm al 
im plem entation deadline had passed.
A lthough a specific Act regulating the im plem entation o f EC leg islation in  the 
United Kingdom exists (the 1972 European Communities Act) th is d id  not 
prevent the delay in  the transposition o f the D rinking  W ater D irective in to  UK 
law. The form al transposition took such a long tim e to fina lise  because 
domestic changes sim ultaneously took place. The p riva tisa tion  o f the water 
supply companies was under way and was regarded by the governm ent o f the 
U nited Kingdom as a p rio rity .
Two m ain differences between the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom  and the 
Commission regarding the p riva tisa tion  caused extra delays. These were 
firs tly  the fact tha t in itia lly  the governm ent o f the United Kingdom d id  no t 
in tend  to  separate the dual responsib ilities o f regulator and p o llu te r tha t w ould 
fa ll to the new ly p riva tised  w ater companies. A fte r overwhelm ing c ritic ism  
the government was forced to change its  plans, thus delaying the
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p riva tisa tion . The second p riva tisa tion  proposal also was the subject o f debate 
w ith  the European Conunission. The Commission demanded the includ ing  o f 
investments plans, frameworks and tim etables fo r the water companies to 
ensure tha t they worked towards compliance. The dispute ended when section 
20 o f the W ater Act was redrafted.
However, problem s stiU exist regarding the fo rm al im plem entation o f the 
D rinking W ater D irective. The Commission recently started a th ird  
in fringem ent proceeding against the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom. The 
p o in t o f dispute is the provision in  the W ater Act fo r 'undertakings’. A reason 
why the government o f the U nited Kingdom  allowed fo r such undertakings is 
because there are d ifficu ltie s  regarding the actual application o f the D irective. 
Evidence presented in  th is case study shows tha t th is is due to  decades o f 
underfunding o f the sewerage and water supply system; very large 
investm ents are now needed to com ply w ith  the standards set in  the D rinking 
W ater D irective. Secondly, the fact tha t the q u a lity  o f surface water 
deteriorated substantially during the 1980s (Rose,1990; 70) gave the water 
supply companies add itiona l problem s. Surface water is the m ain source o f 
w ater supply companies and its  deterio ra ting q u a lity  has great im plications 
since extra investments are necessary to provide fo r treatm ents.
Against th is overall qua lita tive  background the im plem entation process in  the 
U nited Kingdom may be fu rth e r assessed by assigning values to the fo u r 
composite variables tha t param etrise the sub-systems o f the EC policy-m aking 
and im plem entation model.
From the evidence presented in  th is case study i t  is clear the government o f 
the United Kingdom and the European Commission have differences o f op in ion  
regarding the explanation o f de fin itions and technical standards used in  the 
D rinking W ater D irective. Scientific uncerta in ty and an inadequate state o f 
scientific knowledge o f the chronic health effects o f n itra tes, pesticides and 
lead are frequently cited by the governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom  as 
objections to the standards set in  the D rinking  Water D irective. Problems are 
concentrated specifica lly regarding three issues. These are the use o f the lead 
standard, the use o f derogations and the use o f Maximum Admissible 
Concentrations. However, the governm ent o f the United Kingdom  changed its  
in te rp re ta tion  o f derogations and MAC levels in  1988 bu t regarding the lead 
standard i t  held on to  its  in te rpre ta tion . The European Court o f Justice fin a lly  
decided on the issue and agreed w ith  the government o f the U nited Kingdom
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tha t the lead param eter is fo r guidance on ly. These differences regarding the 
in te rp re ta tion  and u n c la rity  o f technical standards and o ther phrases used in  
the D rinking W ater D irective occurred during  the im plem entation o f the 
D irective in  the U nited Kingdom and form ed p a rt o f the negotiations 
regarding the revision o f the D rinking  W ater D irective. The differences stem 
p a rtly  from  a d iffe re n t approach to scientific  standards in  the U nited 
Kingdom, according to the OECD:
It is a tradition of the UK administration that officials should be given discretion in 
achieving broadly defined objectives ... legislation long avoided standard setting. For 
example until the EC Drinking Water Directive, the only legal requirement was that 
water be wholesome ... reluctance to set quantitative standards has frequently been 
defended on the grounds that scientific justification was not available. Requiring a 
high degree of certainty can result in action being taken at a late stage when the 
problem can be more difficult to address and irreversible damage may have occurred. 
Emission limits and environmental quality standards (EQS) were recently introduced 
to enable the United Kingdom to fulfil its EC obligations. Though further EC^ are 
under preparation for air and water the UK still lags behind many OECD countries in 
this respect (OECD, 1994; 30).
In  order to arrive  at the overall value o f variable 1, the degree o f c la rity  o f the 
D irective, the values o f the sub-components need to be assessed. The value o f 
sub-component la  is 5, since the D rinking  W ater D irective has a clear 
undisputed goal: p rovid ing  suitable d rink ing  water. The value o f sub­
component Ib i regarding the use o f ambiguous technical standards is 0 , since 
evidence from  th is case study show tha t the lead standard has proven to be 
ambiguous. The value o f sub-component Ib ii is 0, from  the evidence in  th is 
case study i t  is shown tha t the lead standard has proven problem atic to 
im plem ent in  the United Kingdom. The value o f sub-component Ib iii is 0, 
since o ther de fin itions o f the D rink ing  W ater D irective such as the p o in t 
where d rink ing  water is made available to the consumer, have proven to be 
ambiguous. The value o f sub-component Ib iv  is 0, since these ambiguous 
de fin itions were problem atic to im plem ent in  the United Kingdom. F ina lly the 
value o f sub-component Ic  is 0 , evidence presented in  this case study show 
tha t the necessity fo r fu rth e r explanation: ambiguous technical terms were 
p u t before the Commission (and la te r the European Court o f Justice which 
subsequently fu rth e r defined the term s). The overall value o f variable 1 the 
degree o f c la rity  is therefore 5, out o f a to ta l possible o f 10.
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W hat is s trik ing  from  the evidence presented in  th is case study is the fact the 
U nited Kingdom is seeking cost-effective solutions to environm ental p o llu tio n . 
This approach is reflected in  the nationa l policies such the application o f best 
available techniques no t en ta iling  excessive cost (BATNEEC) fo r p o llu tio n  
prevention and abatement as stated in  the 1990 Environm ental Protection Act. 
The d e fin itio n  o f the best available techniques can be m odified  by economic 
considerations where the costs w ould be excessive "in  re la tion  to  the nature o f 
the ind u stry  and to the environm ent p ro tection to be achieved"
(Environm ental Protection Act 1990).
The p u rsu it o f environm ental objectives w ith in  the fram ework o f an overall 
economic po licy  stressing fundam ental reliance on m arket princip les led to 
the fact tha t between 1979 and 1992 about 50 m ajor businesses were privatised, 
includ ing 23 water companies. The m ain emphasis o f the p riva tisa tion  
programmes has been to im prove operational efficiency and com petition.
To asses the value o f variable 2, the degree tha t economic considerations 
form ed an obstacle towards im plem entation the values o f the sub-components 
need to be assessed. The value o f sub-component 2a is 0, evidence presented in  
th is case study shows tha t during the negotiations o f the D irective, the 
im plem entation costs were not taken in to  account (Section 7.1.1). The value o f 
sub-component 2b is 0 , the costs o f comphance form ed and s till form s an 
obstacle fo r im plem entation in  the U nited Kingdom. The value o f variable 2 is 
0, out o f a to ta l possible maximum value o f 2.
In  order to arrive  at the overall value o f variable 3, the degree o f in s titu tio n a l 
change, the values o f the in d iv id u a l sub-components have been assessed as 
follow s. Regarding sub-component 3ai, the national legal system fo r the 
actual transform ation o f EC leg islation in to  the national legal system, the 
fo llow ing conclusions can be drawn. As examined in  Chapter IV  the 
transform ation o f EC leg islation in to  nationa l UK law takes place e ffic ie n tly  
and w ithou t delays. This is due to several provisions such as the scrutiny 
reserve and the ru le  once a law has been p u t before ParUament, i t  has to be 
adopted in  that same Parhamentary year. No evidence in  th is case study 
suggest tha t the presence o f a com plicated national legislative system 
contribu ted towards the delay. Consequently the value o f sub-component 3ai 
can be assessed at 4, no t m any decision-making points are present. The value 
o f sub-component 3 a il is 1, since special Act regulating the im plem entation o f 
EC legislation exists in  the U nited Kingdom. The value o f sub-component 3a i i i  
is 0 , since no environm ental fram ework regulating the quahty o f water
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existed p rio r to the im plem entation o f the D rinking W ater D irective. The value 
o f sub-component 3 iv  0, evidence presented in  th is case study show tha t 
subsid iarity was clearly an issue. The UK government e xp lic itly  stated tha t i t  
sought to revise the D irective according to the subsid iarity princip les o f the 
Treaty. The to ta l value o f variable 3 a, the degree to w hich the im plem entation 
process is lega lly structured to  enhance the im plem entation o f directives in to  
national law  is 5.
The value o f sub-component 3b is 1, since no environm ental agency 
con tro lling  the q u a lity  o f d rin k in g  w ater existed p rio r to the im plem entation 
o f the D rinking W ater D irective. The value o f sub-component 3c is 0, since the 
governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom  d id  apply fo r extra tim e to im plem ent the 
D rinking W ater D irective. The value o f sub-component 3d, regarding 
con flic ting  national po licy, is 1. From the evidence presented in  th is case 
study no im m ediate con flic ting  p o licy  w ith  the D rinking W ater D irective was 
present in  the United Kingdom. The overall value o f variable 3, the degree o f 
ins titu tion a l change is 7 ou t o f a possible to ta l o f 15.
F ina lly, from  the evidence presented in  th is case study the fo llow ing 
assessment o f the value o f variable 4, the existence and w orking o f sound 
enforcement and contro l structures at EC and Member State level can be made. 
The D rinking W ater D irective does no t request Member States to in fo rm  the 
Commission regu la rly  on the q u a lity  o f d rin k ing  water, on ly in  certain 
p o llu tio n  incidents specified in  the D irective should the Commission be 
n o tified . Therefore the value o f sub-component 4a, the degree o f legislative 
and executive overview at EC level is 0.
Further, from  the evidence presented in  th is case study i t  is clear tha t the 
governm ent o f the U nited Kingdom  has been slow in  reacting to  the A rtic le  
169 letters and reasoned opinions from  the Commission. I t  was because o f the 
non co-operation o f the governm ent o f the United Kingdom tha t the 
Commission went as fa r as starting three European Court proceedings. The 
value o f sub-component 4b, on action taken by the governm ent o f the U nited 
Kingdom  regarding con tro l and enforcem ent from  Com m unity ins titu tion s is 
0.
For purposes o f enforcing the 1989 W ater Act an im proved q u a lity  con tro l and 
m onitoring system has been insta lled  in  the United Kingdom. An independent 
co n tro lling  agency, the D rink ing  W ater Inspectorate (DW I), who m on itor, 
investigate and report to the Secretary o f State, has been set up. W ater 
undertakers have a du ty to provide inspections from  the DWI w ith  assistance
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and in fo rm ation  to enable them  to perform  those functions; breach o f the d u ty  
being a crim ina l offence (section 86(6) W ater Industry Act 1991). Recently 
three water companies have been brought before local courts. The value o f 
sub-component 4c, on w hether co n tro l and enforcem ent o f the im plem ented 
Directives takes place is 1.
F inally, the evidence presented in  th is case study show not on ly tha t con tro l 
takes place b u t tha t also tha t the water companies adhere to the demands o f the 
regulator. Regular m on itoring  data on the q u a lity  o f d rin k in g  water is given 
to the DWI. Further a system o f ce rtifie d  labs have been introduced, leading 
the way towards more re liab le  testing o f d rin k ing  water. The value o f sub­
com ponent 4d, w hether legislative con tro l is carried out is 1. The overall value 
o f variable 4, the degree o f com m itm ent fo r th is case study is 2, ou t o f a to ta l 
possible maximum o f 4, Table 22 gives a summary o f a ll the values o f the 
composite variables.
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Table 22 : Summary of the composite variables
Country. Kingdom
Directive: t ? IW nidng Water
Variable
Name Level
Component
Variable
Number
Component Variable Description Value
Clarity and 
Precision of 
Directive
EC la precision o f statement o f policy objectives 5
EC lb
degree to which ambiguous standards are 
present in the directive: sub-components 
i to iv
0
EC Ic necessity fo r fu rther explanation 0
Itefcentage 1# p o s ^ ^ ^ to ta l 5096
The Economic 
Dimension EC 2a
consideration o f costs during 
negotiations at EC level 0
MS 2b costs o f compliance 0
0
A o f possible to ta l 096
Degree o f 
Institutional 
Change
MS 3a
degree to which implementation process 
is legally structured to enhance 
implementation o f directives into 
national law: sub-comnonents i to iv
5
MS 3b existence o f a structure o f environment enforcement and control 1
MS 3c time allowed fo r implementation 0
MS 3d conflicting national policy 1
7%
Percentage o f possible tb t^
Committment:
Enforcement 
and Control
EC 4a legislative and executive overview by Commission 0
EC 4b Member State action upon feedback from CQromi55iPi»__ ________ _________________ 0
MS 4c national control and enforcement procedures 1
MS 4d response to national control and enforcement efforts 1
Total 2
Percentage o f possible to ta l 5096
Overall Total Points 14’
Percentage o f possible to ta l 4596
. Average o f Percentage» 37%
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7.5 The EC B irds D ire c tive
7.5.1 In troduction
D irective on the conservation : 79/409/EEC, O JL103,25* A p ril 1979 
o f wUd birds
no tifica tio n  date : 6*  A p ril 1979
fo rm a l com pliance : 6*  A p ril 1981
The D irective on the conservation o f w ild  b irds (Birds D irective) and the 
d irective  on the conservation o f na tu ra l habitats and o f w ild  fauna and flo ra  
(habitats directive, 92/43/EEC, OJ L 206, 22 July 1992) constitute the main 
legislative a c tiv ity  o f the European Com m unity on nature conservation. The 
Birds D irective was adopted because o f concerns fo r m igra to ry b irds in  Europe; 
the habitats d irective reflects the widespread concern as to the loss and 
destruction o f w ild life  habitats in  Europe. The habitats d irective, adopted in  
1992, p a rtly  overlaps, updates and replaces the Birds D irective.
In  1974, a group o f leading members o f nationa l and in te rna tiona l 
organisations fo r the pro tection o f animals presented a p e titio n  (no 8 /74 ) ’on 
the need to save the m igra to ry b irds ’ to  the European Parliam ent, Commission 
and C ounc il. This led the Parliam ent to adopt a resolution on 21^^ February 1975 
urging the Commission and the Council 'to  propose and adopt in  the near 
fu tu re  p ractica l measures fo r the pro tection  o f m igra tory b irds ' (OJ C 
60/51,1975). On the 20 * o f December 1976 the Commission subm itted a firs t 
proposal to  the Council fo r a d irective on b ird  conservation (OJ C 24,1977) and a 
second soon after (OJ C 201,1977). The Birds D irective was adopted, w ith  
m odifications, by the Council in  1979. W ils (1994) argues that:
... some of the modifications adopted by the Council could be regarded as weakening 
the protective regime installed by the directive, in particular by weakening the super 
visionary role of the Commission i.e. nrs. 63 and 123. Several other modifications 
rather tended to strengthen the protection of vtild birds i.e. nrs. 53, 102, 106 and 128 
(Wils. 1994; 220).
The opinions o f the European Parliament (OJ C 163,1977;28), the Economic and 
Social Committee (OJ C 152,1977;3) and earlier versions o f the proposed 
Directive(OJ C 201,1977;2), showed no ind ica tion  o r concern regarding the costs 
im plications o f the D irective. Since its  in itia l adoption in  1979, the Birds 
D irective has been adapted and amended many times, fo r example due to the
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enlargement o f the Com m unity, o r due to the adding o r rem oving o f b ird  
species lis ted  in  the Annexes o r the adoption o f other directives on nature 
conservation such as the habitats d irective . In  1985 the num ber o f species 
lis ted  in  Annex I, fo r which A rtic le  4 o f the Birds D irective requires special 
conservation measures concerning th e ir habitats doubled (85/411/EEC, 25 *
July 1985 amending directive 79/409/EEC, OJ L 233,1985 ).
The Com m unity is also a p a rty  to fo u r in te rna tiona l conventions w hich 
contain provisions on p ro tection  o f w ild life  species and habitats and w hich 
overlap in  pa rt w ith  the Birds D irective a n d /o r the habitats d irective .
These are the 1979 Bern Convention on the conservation o f European w ild life  
and natura l habita t (OJ L 38/1,1982), the 1979 Bonn Convention on the 
conservation o f m igratory species o f w ild  animals (OJ L 210/10,1982), the 1982 
Geneva Protocol concerning M editerranean specially protected areas to the 
1976 Barcelona Convention on the p ro tection  o f the M editerranean Sea against 
p o llu tion  (OJ L 68/36,1984), and the 1992 Rio Convention on biological d ive rs ity  
(OJ L 309/1,1993). Reference should also be made to the 1973 Washington 
Convention on in te rna tiona l trade in  endangered species o f w ild  fauna and 
flo ra  (CITES). A lthough the Com m unity is no t a pa rty  to th is convention, i t  
adopted a regulation to  im plem ent i t  (OJ L 384/1,1982). In  1991 the Commission 
subm itted a proposal to the Council to  replace the la tte r by a new regulation on 
w ild life  trade, w hich is expressly presented as supplementing the b irds and 
habitats directives (OJ C 26/1,1992).
7.6 O u tlin e  o f the  C ontents o f the  B irds D ire c tive
7.6.1 Legal basis
The Birds D irective was adopted on the basis o f A rtic le  235 o f the Treaty:
... if  action by the Communily should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers (Article 235).
Explanation fo r the d irective  can be found in  the preamble o f the Birds 
D irective :
... the programme of action of European Communities on the environment (OJ C 112, 
2 0 *  December 1973) calls for specific action on birds... whereas the species of wild  
birds naturally occurring in the European territory of the Member States are mainly
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migratory species; whereas such species constitute a common heritage and whereas 
effective bird protection is typically a trans-frontier environment problem entailing 
common responsibilities (OJ L 103,1979;!).
Also the European Court o f Justice frequen tly  emphasised the necessity and 
im portance o f the Birds D irective:
The protection of migratory species is typically a trans-frontier environmental 
problem entailing common responsibilities for the Member States. The importance of 
complete and effective protection of wild birds throughout the community, 
irrespective of the areas they stay in or pass through, causes any national legislation 
which delimits the protection of wild birds by reference to the concept of national 
heritage to be incompatible with the directive... (ECJ Case 252/85 , Commission v 
France [1988] ECR 2261).
Since its  amendment by the Single European Act, the EC Treaty contains a T itle  
dealing specifica lly w ith  the environm ent. A rtic le  13 OS now provides a 
specific legal basis fo r environm ental leg isla tion  and consequently the latest 
amendment to the Birds D irective was adopted on th is basis.
7.6.2 General princip les o f the Birds Directive.
The Birds D irective relates to  the conservation o f a ll species o f na tu ra lly  
occurring b irds in  the w ild  state in  the Member States, i t  applies to b irds, th e ir 
eggs, nests and habitats. I t  covers the pro tection , management and con tro l o f 
these species (A rtic le  1). Member States shall take the requisite measures to 
m ainta in  the popu la tion o f the species re ferred to in  A rtic le  1 a t a level w hich 
corresponds in  p a rticu la r to ecological, sc ien tific  and cu ltu ra l requirem ents, 
w hile  taking account o f economic and recreational requirem ents, o r to adapt 
the population o f these species to  th a t level (A rtic le  2).
A rtic le  1 in  conjunction w ith  A rtic le  2, describes the general philosophy o f 
the d irective and imposes a general ob ligation upon the Member States. This 
ob ligation is to take the requisite  measures to  m aintain o r bring b ird  
populations to a level w hich corresponds w ith  the requirem ents m entioned. 
The general philosophy is the pro tection  o f w ild  b irds as serving ecological, 
scientific  as w ell as cu ltu ra l requirem ents and these are clearly weighted 
more heavily than economic and recreational requirem ents. The Birds 
D irective contains two groups o f provisions concerning respective ly the
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p ro tection o f habitats o f w ild  b irds (A rticles 3 and 4) and the d irect pro tection 
o f w ild  b ird  species (A rticles 5 to 9). A rtic le  4 states that:
The species mentioned in Annex I shall be the subject of special conservation 
measures concerning their habitat. Member States shall classify in particular the 
most suitable territories in number and size as special protection areas for the 
conservation of these species. The same applies for regularly occurring migratory 
species not listed in Annex I (Article 4 (2 )). Member States shall send the Commission 
all relevant information (Article 4 (3)). Article 4 (4) contains obligations as to the 
avoidance of pollution, deterioration and avoidance of habitats (Article 4).
Special protection areas
The designation o f the A rtic le  4 "special p ro tection areas" is one o f the most 
crucia l and most contentious issues in  the application o f the Birds D irective. 
The provisions m entioned above leave i t  to  each Member State to  designate 
special pro tection area in  its  own te rrito ry . In  the Commission's o rig ina l 
proposal the Member States would have had to consult the Commission. The 
Council d id  not re ta in  th is, bu t instead added A rtic le  4(3), w hich stipulates tha t 
Member States shall send to the Commission a ll relevant in fo rm a tion  so th a t i t  
may take co-ordinating in itia tive s  to ensure Com m unity w ide coherence.
This provision was made somewhat more specific in  a resolution adopted 
together w ith  the Birds D irective, in  w hich the Council also took ’note o f the 
Commission’s in te n tio n  o f subm itting appropriate proposals regarding the 
c rite ria  fo r the determ ination, selection, organisation and methods o f 
adm in istra tion  o f the special p ro tection  areas (Council Resolution o f 2 A p ril 
1979 concerning D irective 79/409/EEC , OJ 1979 C 103/6). The Commission has 
never subm itted form al proposals to the Council. In fo rm a lly  however, i t  has 
developed some c rite ria  fo r the selection o f the areas to be designated as 
special protection areas (OJ C 258/7,1993).
A crucia l p o in t in  the in te rp re ta tion  o f A rtic le  4 (1 ) and (2) concerns the 
degree o f d iscretion w hich the Member States have in  the choice o f the area to 
be designated. Recent case law (ECJ Case 57/89, Commission v Federal Republic 
o f Germany [1991] ECR 1-924) indicates tha t Member States do have a certain 
d iscretion w ith  regard to  the choice o f the te rrito ries  which are most suitable 
fo r classification as special p ro tection areas pursuant to  A rtic le  4(1) and 4(2). 
However another recent case (ECJ Case C-355/90, Commission v Spain [1993]
ECR 1-4221) indicates tha t the d iscretion is down to alm ost none regarding 
wetlands and habitats o f in te rna tio n a l im portance.
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Artic le  4 (4), Habitat protection
Although Member States do have a certa in d iscretion as to the choice o f areas 
o f special p ro tection  they do n o t have m uch leeway in  reducing o r m odifying 
those areas according a recent judgem ent. In  the Leybucht case concerning 
Germany, the European Court o f Justice decided:
Although the Member States do have a certmn discretion with regard to the choice of 
the territories which are most suitable for classification as special protection areas 
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the directive, they do not have the same discretion under 
Article 4(4) of the directive in modifying or reducing the extent of the areas, since 
they have themselves acknowledged in their declarations that those areas contain the 
most suitable environments for the species listed in Annex 1 to the directive. If that 
were not so, the Member States could unilaterally escape from the obligations imposed 
on them by Article 4(4) of the directive with regard to special protection areas (Case 
C- 57 /89 , Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [1991] ECR 1-924).
As to under w hich circumstances Member States can reduce o r m od ify special 
pro tection areas, the Court o f Justice decided:
It follows that the power of the Member States to reduce the extent of a special
protection area can be justified only on exceptional grounds Those grounds must
correspond to a general interest which is superior to the general interest represented 
by the ecological objective of the directive. In that context the interests referred to in 
Article 2 of the directive, namely economic and recreational requirements, do not 
enter into consideration. As the Court pointed out in its judgements in case 247/85  
(Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 3029) and case 262/85 (Commission v Italy [1987] 
ECR 3073), that provision does not constitute an autonomous derogation from the 
general system of protection established by the directive (Case C -57/89, Commission 
v Federal Republic of Germany, [1991] ECR 1-924).
In  casu the Court o f Justice ru led  th a t coastal protection against possible 
flooding "correspond to a general in te rest w hich is superior to the general 
interest represented by the ecological objective o f the d irective". The C ourt o f 
Justice sim ultaneously in troduced the p rin c ip le  o f "ecological compensation". 
In  o ther words the developm ent o f new special pro tection areas is a 
circum stance (A rtic le  2 Birds D irective) w hich form s ju s tifica tio n  fo r 
reducing a special p ro tection  area.
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A p re lim ina ry  question, whether A rticles 3 and 4 are on ly  b ind ing to  the 
extent tha t th e ir observance is shown to  affect the preservation o f the b irds to 
w hich they apply, o r w hether they conta in autonomous obligations to 
preserve habitats, was p u t forw ard to the European Court o f Justice. In  a 1993 
judgem ent the C ourt unam biguously chose the la tte r in te rp re ta tion :
Articles 3 and 4 of the directive require Member States to conserve, maintain and re­
establish the habitats as such by reason of their ecological value. It follows moreover 
from the ninth recital to the directive that the preservation, maintenance or 
restoration of a sufficient diversity and area of habitats is essential for the 
conservation of all species of birds. The obligations on Member States under Articles 
3 and 4 of the directive accordingly apply before a reduction in the number of birds 
is observed or a risk of the disappearance of a protected species arises (Case C- 
355/90 , Commission v Spain [1993], ECR 1-4221).
In  case 355/90 the European C ourt o f Justice emphasises the responsibilities 
fo r Member States under the Birds D irective to protect habitats fo r Annex I 
species effective ly. In  casu the C ourt o f Justice condemned Spain fo r having 
fa iled  to classify the Marismas de Santona, a coastal area in  Cantabria, as 
special p ro tection area. This judgem ent also settles:
... that a Member State could not justify its failure to classify one area as a special 
protection area by its record of having classified other special protection areas which 
are of importance to other birds, and that Article 4 does not allow for any delay or 
gradual implementation, but must be applied since the entry into force of the Birds 
Directive (Wils, 1994; 230).
A rtic le  4(4) o f the Birds D irective w hich demands tha t Member States "take 
measures to prevent p o llu tio n  and pro tect the special p ro tection areas" has 
been replaced on the basis o f A rtic le  7 habitats d irective by Articles 6 (2),(3), 
(4) o f the habitats d irective  w hich contain more specific duties. The form al 
im plem entation date o f the habitats d irective  is May 1994. The habitats 
d irective  recognises tha t habitats are continu ing to deteriorate and aims to 
conserve flo ra  and fauna and th e ir habitats. The m ethod adopted is to 
designate p a rticu la r habitats as requ iring  protection, w hich m ust be 
'm aintained o r restored to  a favourable conservation status’. In  practical terms 
the d irective  envisages tha t th is w ill be achieved by Member States setting up 
a netw ork o f sites to be known as ’special areas o f conservation’, which w ill
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contain the habitats requ iring  pro tection . These special areas o f conservation 
w ill fo rm  p a rt o f a netw ork o f site across Europe, tha t includes special 
p ro tection areas designated under the Birds D irective (A rtic le  4 (4)). The 
habitats d irective sets out a tim etable and m ethodology fo r establishing the 
special areas o f conservation. Once a site has been designated as requiring  
protection, the Member States are under the ob ligation to avoid de terio ra tion  
and n o t to d istu rb  the habitats and species w ith in  it. Any plan or pro ject 
which is like ly  to affect the site s ign ifican tly  m ust be assessed to determ ine 
w hether i t  wiU cause ecological damage to the site. A pro ject w hich w ill cause 
ecological damage wUl be perm itted  on ly  i f  there are 'ove rrid ing  grounds o f 
public in terest' to ju s tify  the pro ject. The Court o f Justice ru lin g  tha t Member 
States can no t reduce a special p ro tection area (A rtic le  4 Birds D irective) fo r 
economic and recreational reasons (Case C-57/89 Commission v Germany [1989] 
ECR 2849) has been given effect in  the habitats d irective w ith  respect to 
p r io r ity  sites:
... where the site concerned hosts a priority natural habitat type and/or a priority  
species, the only considerations which may be raised are those relating to human 
health or public safety, to beneficial consequences of primary importance for the 
environment or, further to an opinion from the Commission, to other imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest (Article 6(4) habitats directive).
A rtic le  5 o f the Birds D irective states that:
Member States too shall take the requisite measures to establish a general system of 
protection for all species of birds to which the directive applies. Prohibiting in 
particular : (a) killing or capture (b) destruction of nests and eggs (c) egg collection 
(d) significant disturbance and (e) keeping birds of species the hunting and capture 
of which is forbidden.
A rtic le  6 forb ids the sale o f live  o r dead b ird  species to w hich the d irective 
applies, and A rtic le  7 lays down requirem ents regarding the hunting  o f these 
birds. H unting is p roh ib ited  du ring  the m igra to ry season, the w ording o f 
a rtic le  7 led to w ide ly d iffe ring  in terpre ta tions. Some Member States have an 
early end to the m igra tory season i.e. Germany has a closing date o f January 
15^ 1^ , w hile o ther Member States have a late end to the m igra to ry season, i.e. 
France has a closing date o f February The European Parliam ent voted in
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favou r o f Putten (MEP)’s proposal to  amend the Birds D irective and introduce 
January 3 as the end o f the m igra to ry season throughout Europe.
The Birds D irective makes an exception to A rticles 5, 6, 7 and 8, the 
requirem ents fo r such derogations are lis ted  in  A rtic le  9. The circumstances 
under w hich A rtic le  9 applies are b road ly phrased and provide little  guidance, 
fo r example confusion surrounds as to  w hat constitutes 'satisfying solutions' o r 
'substantial damage'. However, the European Court o f Justice has been s tric t in  
requ iring  fu ll transposition o f these p ro h ib itio n s  in to  nationa l law:
. In order to secure the full implementation of directives in law and in fact, Member 
States must establish a specific legal framework in the area in question, ... the fact 
that a number of activities incompatible with the prohibitions contained in the 
directive are unknown in a particular Member State cannot justify the absence of 
appropriate legal provisions (Case C-339 /87 , Commission v the Netherlands [1990] 
ECR l-878;25).
Finally, A rtic le  12 o f the D irective stipu la te that, every three years, Member 
States must send the Commission a report on the im plem entation o f national 
provisions taken under the D irective. The m ain purpose o f these reports is to 
enable the Commission to assess the im plem entation o f the D irective in  the 
d iffe re n t Member States on the basis o f in fo rm a tion  forw arded. However in  
the second report on the application o f the Birds D irective (1993), the 
Commission po in ted ou t several problem s such as the fact that:
... the national reports are submitted late or not at a l l ... this makes it difficult 
for the Commission to assess the implementation in practice of the Directive ... 
and the national reports submitted contain inadequate information. The national 
reports often describe the existing statutory and administrative measures of 
those which have been adopted but fail to mention the practical steps taken ... as 
a result these reports do not always constitute a source of comprehensive 
information on the implementation of the directive in the Member States (COM 
(93) 572 final, 1993;118).
7.6.3 Im plem entation and enforcem ent o f the Birds D irective in  the 
Com m unity in  general
The C ourt o f Justice has generally required  a very h igh level o f preciseness as 
regards the transposing o f the Birds D irective in to  national law  (Case 262/85,
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Commission v Republic o f Ita ly  [1987] ECR 3094 and Case C-399/87 Commission v 
the Netherlands [1990] ECR 1-878). The European Court o f Justice has fu rth e r 
emphasised the creation o f righ ts  and obligations corresponding to the Birds 
D irective. Since the date fo r im plem entation (A p ril 6^^ 1981), im plem entation 
o f the provisions o f the Birds D irective has been problem atic, ranging from  
problems w ith  transposition to  lack o f enforcem ent o f the provisions o f the 
D irective. The Commission has brought before the Court o f Justice more than 
15 actions under A rtic le  169 o f the Treaty against various Member States fo r 
fa ilu re  to com ply w ith  the D irective, and started more than 40 A rtic le  169 
procedures fo r non-im plem entation (commence from  the Commission in  Case 
C-57/89 [1991] ECR 1-924). h i its  eleventh Annual Report (OJ C 154,1994) the 
Commission m entions th a t problem s w ith  the im plem entation occur in  Spain, 
France, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ita ly  (OJ 
C 154,1994; 49-50).
Members o f the European Parliam ent have asked the Commission more than 
500 questions concerning the Birds D irective, in  most instances to denounce 
infringem ents in  th e ir respective Member States. The European Parliam ent 
adopted a resolution on the pro tection and conservation o f w ild  b ird  species in  
the EC, in  which i t  calls upon the Commission to take new measures such as 
establishing open seasons fo r hunting  w hich are co-ordinated between the 
Member States.
7.7 Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f the  B irds  D ire c tiv e  in  the  N e therlands
7.7.1 Scheme o f Regulations
A single statute serving as a base on w hich a ll aspects o f the Birds D irective 
can be im plem ented d id  n o t exist in  the Netherlands. A few specific protection 
measures could be introduced under the 1936 Vogelwet and Vogelbesluit (Dutch 
statute concerning b ird  p ro tection ). H unting in  general inc lud ing  the h u n t 
on b irds is regulated by the 1955 Jachtwet (Dutch statute concerning hunting ). 
For other provisions such as under A rtic le  2 to 4 and A rtic le  10 and 11 o f the 
Birds D irective the 1967 Natuurbescherm ingswet (Dutch nature pro tection  
statute) could serve as a basis. The M in is try  responsible in  the Netherlands fo r 
im plem enting the Birds D irective is the M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re , Nature 
Management and Fisheries (LNV). Four years a fte r the im plem entation 
deadline, the Dutch governm ent issued a M inisteria l order amending the 
Vogelbesluit (K o n in k lijk  Besluit o f 6 May 1985 amending the Vogelbesluit 1937, 
Stb. 1985, 340). In  1985 the M in is try  o f A gricu lture decided tha t the 1936
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Vogelwet and Vogelbesluit needed a complete revision, however there was 
strong opposition to  th is proposal.
Pressure was on the governm ent to develop not jus t a statute fo r the pro tection  
o f w ild  b irds b ü t an integrated flo ra  and fauna conservation statute.
A p o litica l choice was made and the governm ent embarked on an am bitious 
new Flora and Fauna statute incorporating the Vogelwet, Jachtwet and 
Natuurbescherm ingswet. Consequently more M inistries were invo lved in  the 
developm ent o f the new Flora and Fauna statute, such as the M in is try  fo r the 
Environm ent (VROM) and the M in is try  fo r Transport (Verkeer en W aterstaat). 
A fter a 1986 decision by a Dutch Judge tha t the existing adm inistrative 
measures were w ho lly  inadequate fo r the purposes o f im plem entation o f the 
Birds D irective, the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  issued a M in is te ria l order in  
w hich some special p ro tection  areas were located (Staatscourant, 29 October 
1986, 214) and a M in iste ria l o rder amending the Jachtwet, regulating hunting  
perm its (Staatscourant 1987, 40).
The Commission regarded these im plem entation measures as inadequate and 
issued an A rtic le  169 le tte r to  the D utch governm ent regarding non­
conform ity o f national im plem entation measures. In  1987 an European Court 
o f Justice ru lin g  follow ed, the Court condemned the amendments to  the 
Vogelbesluit as no t being su ffic ien t to  im plem ent the Birds D irective (Case C- 
236/85, Commission v the Netherlands [1987] ECR 4005).
In  1987, the Dutch governm ent sent the d ra ft proposal fo r a new Flora and 
Fauna statute to in terest groups and advisory boards fo r consultation 
according to the Dutch constitu tiona l procedures (see section 5.2.4.). 
Consultation continued u n til 1989. The d ra ft statute was critic ised  and rejected 
by various interest groups. One o f the criticism s was tha t the d ra ft proposal 
fo r a new Flora and Fauna statute provided insu ffic ien t pro tection  and lacked 
c la rity . The d ra ft Flora and Fauna statute was sent fo r advice to the Council o f 
State in  1990. The Council o f State also rejected the proposal.
In  1990 a second European Court o f Justice ru lin g  followed. The Court o f Justice 
ru led  tha t the 1987 amendments to the Jachtwet were no t conform  the demands 
o f the Birds D irective (Case C-339/87, Commission v the Netherlands [1990] ECR 
1-878). By th is tim e, a s ituation had developed where the Dutch government 
had been taken to the European Court o f Justice twice and had been condemned 
tw ice fo r fa ilin g  to im plem ent the Birds D irective. The d ra ft Flora and Fauna 
statute aimed at conservation in  general, includ ing  w ild  b ird  pro tection, had
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been rejected by interest groups and the Council o f State, leaving the 
Netherlands, n ine years a fte r the deadline, s till no t having im plem ented the 
Birds D irective. A fte r the re jection o f the proposal fo r a new Flora and Fauna 
statute, the Dutch government agreed in  1990 to amend the Vogelwet, the 
Jachtwet and the Natuurbescherm ingswet in  order make these statutes 
com patible w ith  in te rna tiona l law  and the EC Birds D irective (Staatscourant 
1991, 82). From 1990 to 1991 the m andatory advice rounds took place and in  
1991, the amendments which were in  advance o f the proposed Flora and Fauna 
statute, were send to P arliam ent.
In  1992 a th ird  European Court o f Justice decision regarding the non­
im plem entation o f the Birds D irective in  the Netherlands follow ed, the Dutch 
government was condemned fo r no t having carried out the earlie r ECJ 
judgem ent o f October 1987 (Case C-75/91, Commission v the Netherlands [1992] 
ECR 1-553). A fte r motions and debates in  Parliament, the amendments to the 
Vogelwet, Jachtwet and the Natuurbescherm ingswet were adopted by 
Parliament in  1993 (Statute o f 28 October 1993 W ijzigingswet Stb. 1993, 586).
Two years had surpassed between the sending o f the amendments to 
Parhament and the adoption o f these amendments by Parliament. One o f the 
issues raised by Parhament was the fact th a t the amendments were s till p a rtly  
contrad icting  the Birds D irective i.e. the co llection o f Kievitseggs was s till 
allowed. Parhament was p a rticu la r appahed by the fact tha t no p rio r 
consultation had taken place between the government and the Commission on 
whether the amendments had the approval o f the Commission (Kamerstukken 
1993-94, 22201 23). The M inister o f A gricu ltu re  referred in  th is context to  the 
fact th a t a special agency has been appointed (Vereniging van Weidevogels) to 
oversee the co llection o f Kievitseggs by way o f issuing 'eggs-collecting-cards'. 
The amendments took effect in  1994, th irteen  years a fter the im plem entation 
deadhne o f the Birds D irective, the Birds D irective was fo rm a lly  im plem ented 
in  the Netherlands.
However, the European Commission was no t sta tified  w ith  the application o f 
the D irective in  the Netherlands and in  1996 it  brought an action against the 
government o f the Netherlands (Case C -3/96).
The Commission's allegation was tha t, by no t designating su ffic ien t Special 
Protection Areas w ith in  the meaning o f A rtic le  4(1) o f the Birds D irective, the 
government o f the Netherlands has fa iled  to  fu lf il its  obligations under the 
D irective and under Articles 5 and 189 o f the EC Treaty.
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7.7.2 Environm ental management regarding b ird  pro tection  in  the 
Netherlands
B ird pro tection  fa lls under nature conservation w hich is the responsibiU ty o f 
the M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re , Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV). Nature 
p ro tection and landscape management is aimed at the maintenance, 
enforcem ent, developm ent and conservation o f the countryside inc lud ing  
nationa l parks. The policies regarding nature conservation are carried ou t by 
the state, provinces, waterboards and m unicipa lities. Most intensive invo lved 
w ith  nature conservation are: the N ational Forest Service (Staatsbosbeheer) 
and the Directorate-Generals 'N ature' and 'Forest and countryside 
management' o f the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re , the environm ental departm ents 
o f the provinces, the park and green management departm ents o f the 
m unicipalities and technical departm ent o f the waterboards. A part from  the 
governm ent, p riva te  organisations and priva te  estate owners pa rtic ipa te  in  
nature conservation. P articu la rly  the Society fo r the Preservation o f Nature 
(Natuurm onum enten) and the U nion o f P rovincia l Landscape Organisations. 
The 1967 Natuurbescherm ingswet (Nature p ro tection statute) provides fo r the 
creation o f new nature reserves, regulates designation procedures provided 
fo r the pro tection o f species o f flo ra  and fauna and establishes the Nature 
Conservation Council. The 1961 Forestry Act regulates m atters related to forest 
production  and conservation, as w ell as m u ltip le  use o f forest. O ther Acts 
re la ting  to  nature conservation in  general and b ird  p ro tection  in  specific are 
the earlie r m entioned 1936 Vogelwet and Vogelbesluit (Birds Act) and the 
Jachtwet (Act regulating hu n tin g ). Nature pro tection  inc lud ing  the 
pro tection o f b irds has n o t been h igh  on the agenda o f the M in is try  o f 
A gricu ltu re , Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV). This is underlined  by 
the fact that u n til the m id -1980 there were on ly two national parks in  the 
Netherlands, w ith  a combined area o f 10 200 hectares (table 23). Since the 
in troduction  o f the 1991 Nature Policy Plan o f the Netherlands 1991-1998-2021, 
five  more have been established and 2 o ther national parks are fo rm ula ting  
management plans. In  to ta l the area o f protected nature te rrito ry  in  the 
Netherlands covers 9.5 % in  1990 (table 24).
7.7.3 Environm ental perform ance review  regarding b ird  p ro tection  in  the 
N etherlands
Birds varie ty and occurrence
The to ta l size o f undisturbed areas, ecologically im portan t forest and small-
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Table 23: Area o f nature te rrito ry  in the Netherlands* 
protected on the basis o f national and in terna tional laws
Law
Year 1975 1980 1 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
National Law 
NatuurbescherrainBswet
Protected 'nature 
monuments' 1231 10926 15690 18657 21522 23870 24536 24814 ND
State monuments 4650 11776 141235 157584 182634 187444 189148 269341 ND
Total 5881 22702 156925 176241 204156 211314 213684 294155 ND
Country Estates 104590 105304 104187 102782 103548 23870 ND ND 94500
National Park 10200 10200 10200 15600 15600 19200 22645 23965 31065
number of National Parks 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 6 7
International Law
Wetlands 0 11593 261593 306743 306743 306743 313313 313313 313313
EC-Birds Directive 0 11173 11173 52830 52830 302830 306900 306900 312950
Source: Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) 1994 Milieu statistieken Nederland 
(ND- no data available)
Notes: * in hectares
Table 24: Major protection areas*
Country % of total area
Netherlands 9.5
Denmark 9.8
France 8.7
Italy 4.3
Germany 13.9
United Kingdom 18.9
source: OECD (1995) 
note: *for 1991
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scale na tu ra l elements has decreased by tw o-th irds since the beginning o f the 
ce n tu ry :
... since the 1920s the total of natural areas and forests has declined dramatically, 
from 7 900 (square)km, to 4500 (square)km. Only some 1500 (square)km of this area 
has a relatively high degree of naturalness (OECD, 1995; 96).
The developm ent o f b ird  popu la tion  is m onitored via  inven to ry  m onitoring 
projects w hich are carried out by d iffe re n t b ird  pro tection  organisations in  
the Netherlands (Samenwerkende Organisaties Vogelonderzoek Nederland) 
and the central bureau fo r statistics (CBS). A Red List o f endangered species is 
updated every year, the latest containing a lis t o f 56 b ird  species. Kwak (1989a, 
1989b) published data (Broedvogel m onitorings pro ject) w hich gives an 
overview  o f developments in  the b ird  popu la tion, especially regarding fo u r 
protected species the K ievit, Veldleeuwerik, Zom ertaling and Rietgors. The 
num ber o f K iev it breading pairs is decreasing in  open grass land as w ell as 
semi-developed land. "The im pression is th a t the increasing intensive 
ag ricu ltu ra l p roduction methods are responsible th is" (CBS, 1994; 268). In  
general the trend is a substantial to very substantial decline in  b irds and b ird  
species in  the Netherlands. Data from  m onitoring projects (Oude-Tijdreeksen- 
Project SOVON) show tha t the num ber o f b irds fo r most species declined by 50% 
(CBS,1994;269).
Bird and habita t protection
The num ber o f special p ro tection  areas (A rtic le  4 Birds D irective) has gone up 
from  6 in  1980 (to ta l area o f 11 173 hectares) to 18 in  1994 (312 950 hectares or 
3129 square km) (table 23). Regualtion regarding the pro tection o f these 
habitats take effect on ly a fte r they have been declared as such to the European 
Commission.
In  the Netherlands pressures on species and ecosystems are numerous, 
includ ing  acid ifica tion  due to  large amounts o f ammonia from  manure, 
eutrophication due to the use o f fertiU ser and n itra tes from  manure, 
contam ination due to the use o f pesticides, and water depletion due to the 
abstraction o f surface and groundwater fo r ag ricu ltu ra l purposes. W ater 
depletion has negative effects on certa in  plants requ iring  wet habitats as w ell 
as on certa in species o f b irds and reptiles. P articu larly in  the coastal dunes, 
water depletion is a serious problem  due m ain ly to extraction o f groundwater 
fo r d rink ing  water. Further pressure increased m arkedly in  the 1980s:
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economic development and a growing population led to expansion of roads and 
railways, causing fragm entation of natural areas and constitute barriers to the 
movement of w ildlife. According to the OECD (1995):
The environmental performance of the Netherlands with respect to nature is a cause 
for concern. Since the beginning of the century the amount of natural area has 
dramatically declined and what is left has been severely fragmented; the biodiversity 
of fauna and flora has decreased nationally and regionally (OECD, 1995; 105).
7.7.4 Expenditure on conservation in  the Netherlands
Birds need nature areas such as parks and protected countryside where they 
can find  food and lay their eggs undisturbed. In  order to assess the 
expenditure on bird protection therefore the expenditure on nature 
conservation in  general is relevant. Overall national expenditure on nature 
conservation and landscape has grown since 1985 more or less in  line w ith the 
growth rate of GDP (OECD,1995;103) and in  1993 totalled Gld 875 m illion (table 
25).
Table 25: Costs for Land Managem ent and Nature Protection in  the
Netherlands
Operations Costs*
Grou
nd
costs* Totals
Administrative
body (millions of guilders)
(mins. 
of fl.) (millions of guilders)
Year 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 altyears 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993
The State Chet Riik’) 267 275 294 344 375 36 303 311 330 380 411
Provinces 86 85 76 94 123 0 86 85 76 94 123
Water Boards 5 6 6 7 6 0 5 6 6 7 6
Municipality 24 23 20 20 34 12 36 35 32 32 46
Companies 61 62 74 87 78 3 64 65 77 90 81
Private forest owners 22 14 10 17 22 32 54 46 42 49 54
Nature Protection Orgs. 71 83 89 115 123 25 96 108 114 140 148
Total 536 548 569 684 761 108 644 656 677 792 875
Total in £*** 202 206 214 258 287 40 243 2.47 255 298 330
source: CBS, 'Environmental Statistics for the Netherlands', 1994 and 1996 (ND= no data available) 
notes: * Includes maintenance costs for the verges of roads and deferred Income from Interest on the capital 
Invested In natural areas, ** estimated Income from Interest on invested capital In natural areas,***£1=fl.2.65
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W hile evidence shows tha t ove ra ll progress is being made i.e. in  extending 
legal p ro tection to areas and species, increases in  expenditures on nature 
conservation and pu tting  in  place the necessary management structures to 
im plem ent nature po licy, these are according to the OECD:
... not sufficient by themselves to safeguard the natural resources involved ... 
pressures to nature due to water depletion, acidification, eutrophication and 
contamination are outside the ambit of nature policy ... (OECD, 1995; 107)
Moreover the OECD concludes:
The situation of nature in the Netherlands is a cause for concern. Since the 
beginning of the century there has been a dramatic decline in the amount of 
natural area, and what is left has been severely fragmented. This was realised in 
1990 when the Nature Policy Plan was presented, progress is being made wdth 
the designation of new national parks. The key to the ultimate success of nature 
policy in the Netherlands will be the reduction of pressures on nature: 
fragmentation, desiccation, acidification, eutrophication and contamination 
(OECD,1995;209-210).
7.7.5 Infringem ents and European C ourt o f Justice cases
The Dutch government has been brought before the European Court o f Justice 
three times regarding non-im plem entation o f the Birds D irective.
The firs t case (Case 236/85 [1987] ECR 4005) concerned the non-conform ity o f 
the national im plem entation measures in  casu the 1985 amendment to the 
Vogelbesluit. The fo llow ing  com plaints by the Commission were upheld by the 
Court o f Justice:
• Based on A rtic le  10 o f the Vogelwet a pe rm it could be issued which under 
certain circumstances, i.e. when damage is done to p roperty and crops, 
allows the d isturb ing o f nests and the capture and k illin g  o f the b irds 
responsible fo r the damage. The Commission argued tha t the perm its were 
not conform  to A rtic le  9 (1) o f the Birds D irective;
• A rtic le  6 (2) o f the Birds D irective refers to Annex III w hich contains a lis t 
o f b ird  species tha t need pro tection from  ca p tiv ity  and hunting. The 
Commission argued tha t Articles 9 and 10 o f the Vogelbesluit d id  not contain 
a ll the species o f Annex III o f the Birds D irective;
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•  A rticles 17, 18 and 19 o f the Vogelwet regarding the collection o f eggs, d id  
no t re fe r o r name the derogation c rite ria  as specified in  A rtic le  9 o f the 
Birds D irective;
•  F ina lly A rtic le  23 o f the Vogelwet and A rtic le  14 o f the Vogelbesluit d id  no t 
contain a ll the in  A rtic le  8 and Annex IV p roh ib ited  capture methods.
The Dutch governm ent defended itse lf by emphasising several times tha t 
although the Vogelwet and Vogelbesluit d id  no t e xp lic itly  conta in  a ll the 
provision o f the Birds D irective, the (adm in istra tive) practice in  the 
Netherlands conform ed the Birds D irective. The European Court o f Justice d id  
not accept th is argum ent and argued th a t these adm inistrative practices were 
not widespread known to the pub lic  at large and were no t correct instrum ents 
fo r im plem enting the Birds D irective.
The second European Court o f Justice case (Case C-339/87 [1990] ECR 1-878) 
concerned the non-conform ity o f the 1987 M in iste ria l order amending the 
Jachtwet. Before deciding on the five  com plaints p u t forw ard by the 
Commission, the Court o f Justice addressed a question p u t forw ard by the 
Commission. The Commission doubted w hether the Dutch M in iste ria l orders 
were suitable instrum ents fo r im plem enting EC directives according to  A rtic le  
189 o f the Treaty. The Court o f Justice decided tha t M in isteria l orders could be 
used fo r the im plem entation o f EC directives. The Court came to th is conclusion 
on the grounds tha t M in iste ria l orders were:
• made public in  the Staatscourant;
• general in  th e ir effect and
• created duties and righ ts fo r ind iv idua ls.
The fo llow ing com plaints by the Commission were upheld by the Court o f 
Justice:
•  A rtic le  2 and 20 o f the Jachtwet d id  no t contain a ll the species named in  
A rtic le  7 and Annex II o f the Birds D irective;
•  A rtic le  9 o f the Birds D irective had no t been adequately im plem ented in  the 
Jachtwet regarding the circumstances under w hich hun ting  o f certa in  
species o f b irds could take place and regarding the collection o f eggs:
It must be observed that neither serious damage nor any of the other reasons on which 
derogations may be based that are set out in Article 9 of the directive appear in 
Articles 53 and 54 of the Jachtwet. As has been pointed out above, it appears from the 
case-law of the Court on the conservation of wild birds that the criteria which the
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Member States must meet in order to derogate from the prohibitions laid down in the 
directive must be reproduced in specific national provisions, since a faithful 
transposition becomes particularly important in a case where the management of the 
common heritage is entrusted to the Member States in their respective territories ... 
(Case C-339/87 [1990] ECR 1-878).
Again the Dutch government argued tha t, although the Birds D irective had not 
fo rm a lly  been im plem ented in to  Dutch law, in  practice the provisions in  the 
Birds D irective were being carried out. The European Court o f Justice 
e xp lic itly  stated tha t the provisions in  the Birds D irective had to be fu lly  
reflected in  leg islative provisions (p rin c ip le  o f legal ce rta in ty), even i f  in  
practice in  the Member States carries out the D irective:
The explanation that the requirements as to protection set out in Article 9 of the 
directive are observed in fact by ministerial practice with regard to the use of 
hunting permits cannot be accepted, since as the Court reiterated in the judgement of 
23''(^  February 1988 in case 429 /85  Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 843, mere 
administrative practices cannot be regarded as constituting proper compliance with 
the obligation on Member States to which a directive is addressed pursuant to Article 
189 of the Treaty (Case C -339/87 [1990] ECR 1-878).
The delay and non-im plem entation o f the Birds D irective in  the Netherlands 
has led to some odd situations. In  the D rent crow case (Drentse kraaien-zaak 
President Rechtbank Assen 11^^ A p ril 1989) the question o f horizon ta l effect 
o f the Birds D irective was raised. In  casu the Royal H unting Society 
(K on ink lijke  Nederlandse Jagersverening) was p lanning to  h u n t crows. Under 
Dutch law  the hunting these b irds was perm itted, however the Birds D irective 
forbade hunting o f crows as they were a protected species (Annex II o f the 
Birds D irective). An environm ental group (S tichting k ritis ch  faunabeheer o r 
SKF) claim ed tha t the hu n t in  question was un law fu l according to the Birds 
D irective, which had in  1989 s till no t been im plem ented by the Dutch 
government. The question was raised whether EC Directives could be called 
upon by one in d iv id u a l against another, in  o ther words having horizon ta l 
e ffect.
The President o f the Rechtbank rejected th is poss ib ility  and therefore rejected 
the claim  made by SKF, on the grounds th a t the Birds D irective created duties 
fo r Member States bu t could no t be re lied  upon between citizens. In his note 
Jans (1989) argued tha t the President o f the Rechtbank ru led  according the
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doctrine o f the European C ourt o f Justice: directives do no t constitute, 
independent from  nationa l im plem entation measures, duties upon ind iv idua ls. 
However, an im portan t question rem ained unanswered:
... in the case an individual acts consciously and purposely in violation with the
provisions of a non-implemented Directive and inflict damage to the other party...
(translated form Jans, 1989; 374).
The issue o f free movement o f goods was raised in  the 1989 Gourm etterie Van 
den Burg case (Hoge Raad, 23 A p ril 1989). In  casu Gourm etterie Van den Burg 
bv. was condemned fo r v io la ting  A rtic le  7 o f the Vogelwet, G ourm etterie Van 
den Burg had been selling red grouse in  his shop, w hich he had im ported from  
the U nited Kingdom. A rtic le  7 o f the Vogelwet forbade the capture a n d /o r 
selling o f red grouse in  the Netherlands. A rtic le  14 o f the Birds D irective 
allows Member States to take measures more stringent than the Birds D irective. 
The defendant argued tha t red grouse was legally hunted in  the United 
Kingdom, since red grouse are in  Annex I I I / l  o f the Birds D irective. This 
means tha t such b irds can be lega lly  hunted in  the Member State where the 
species occur.
The question was raised w hether b irds w hich had been lega lly brought on the 
m arket in  one Member State could be sold in  other Member States or whether 
th is could be p roh ib ited  according Articles 30 to 36 o f the Treaty where a 
national law  forb ids the selling o f th a t b ird . The Hoge Raad p u t the issue as a 
p re lim ina ry question before the European Court o f Justice. The Court o f 
Justice (case C-169/89 [1990] ECR 1-2143) ru led tha t A rtic le  7 o f the Vogelwet 
was no t applicable to b irds which d id  no t occur in  the Member State w hich 
forbade the im po rt o f lega lly  hunted Annex H I/1 species in  o ther Member 
States.
In  1992 a th ird  European C ourt o f Justice ru lin g  regarding the non-conform ity 
o f Dutch im plem entation measures w ith  the Birds D irective follow ed. In  Case 
C-75/91 [1992] ECR 1-553, the Dutch government was condemned fo r not 
carrying out the decision o f the European Court o f Justice case 236/85. The 
Dutch government argued tha t in  tim e a new Flora and Fauna statute would 
im plem ent the D irective, however na tiona l constitu tiona l procedures 
influenced the speed o f im plem enting th is new statute.
F ina lly in  1996 European Commission brought a fo u rth  action before the 
European C ourt o f Action against the governm ent o f the Netherlands. The
257
Commission's allegation fo r inco rrect application o f the D irective concentrate 
on the fact tha t the Dutch governm ent fa iled  to  designate su ffic ien t Special 
Protection Areas (A rtic le  4(1) o f the D irective):
... the fact that, in a particular Member State, some populations of Annex I 
species are declining justifies the suspicion that the Member State has not 
complied with the obligation to achieve the appropriate conservation result. In 
the Netherlands, populations of nine Annex 1 species have fallen by over 50%.
The Commission refers to surveys conducted at its behest by the Secrétariat de 
la flore et de la faune of the Musée national d'histoire naturelle in Paris 
. (Eurobrief, OJ C 77 /6 , 1996).
Moreover, the num ber and size o f the Special Protection Areas o f the 
Netherlands do no t meet the requirem ents to be su ffic ien tly  varied and 
representa tive .
7.7.6 Conclusion: Causes fo r delay and problems w ith  im plem entation
Evidence in  this case study shows th a t from  the beginning the Dutch 
governm ent had great d ifficu ltie s  im plem enting the Birds D irective. Several 
m ain causes re la ting to the context and background in  which the 
im plem entation had to be carried ou t led to the im plem entation fa ilu re :
• The late start w ith  im plem entation o f the Birds D irective.
A lthough the Dutch governm ent was invo lved in  the preparation o f the Birds 
D irective, the responsible M in is try  (A gricu ltu re) adopted amendments to the 
Vogelwet as late as 1985, fo u r years a fte r the im plem entation deadline. This 
apparent lack o f urgency regarding the im plem enting o f the Birds D irective is 
m entioned by Jurgens (S tichting N atuur en M ilieu):
... no political priority was given to the implementation of Birds Directive 
(translated from Jurgens, 1990;36).
Also the fact th a t the Netherlands have been condemned several times by 
the European Court o f Justice, fo r fa ilin g  to im plem ent the Birds D irective, 
shows a lack o f urgency towards the im plem entation o f th is D irective.
• The po litica l choices made how to im plem ent the Birds D irective.
A lthough amendments to the Vogelwet, Jachtwet and N atuur
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beschermingswet w ould bave been su ffic ie n t (and less tim e consuming 
than the in troduction  o f a new statute), the choice was made by the 
government in  1986 to embark on a whole new Flora and Fauna statute 
conta in ing a ll aspects o f nature conservation.
•  The constitu tiona l demands fo r preparing and adoption o f leg islation.
It  took almost 9 years fo r the Flora and Fauna statute to be developed and 
adopted by Parliament. C onstitutional demands fo r the adoption and 
amendments o f statutes in  the Netherlands hampered the im plem entation 
process. Many consultation rounds (invo lv ing  a t least twelve parties) were 
held and the proposal was rejected several times, not least by the Council o f 
State. In  fact the more complex and broader the subject o f a statute the more 
advice groups tha t were consulted and the longer the whole process took, as 
was the case w ith  the Flora and Fauna statute.
•  The extra delay during Parliam ent's adoption o f the amendments.
In  1990, a fte r the second C ourt o f Justice ru lin g  the Dutch governm ent started 
the process o f amending the Vogelwet, Jachtwet and N atuur beschermingswet 
fo r purposes o f im plem enting the D irective. These amendments were p u t 
before Parliam ent in  1991, however the adoption o f these was also delayed. It 
took Parliam ent 2 more years before the amendments were fin a lly  adopted in  
1993.
•  The D utch governm ent and in  p a rticu la r the M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re  and 
the M in is try  fo r the Environm ent (VROM) were sim ultaneously preparing the 
d ra ft Flora and Fauna statute and the amendments to the Vogelwet, Jachtwet 
and Natuurbescherm ings wet. These activ ities were inconsistent and 
com peting fo r (departm ental) resources, thus causing confusion and delay.
• The conflicts o f in te rest w ith in  the M in is te ria l departm ent responsible fo r 
im plem entation o f the Birds D irective played an im portan t ro le . The proposed 
Flora and Fauna statute and the Birds D irective have conservation and 
pro tection o f species as a p rio rity . However, economic interests were at risk. 
The pro tection  o f flo ra  and fauna was thought to adversely affect the 
ag ricu ltu ra l sector. The M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re  was and remains a strong 
prom oter o f the intensive a g ricu ltu ra l farm ing methods in  the Netherlands.
In  the 1980s countryside pro tection  and conservation in  general was no t a 
p rio r ity  fo r the M in is try  o f A gricu ltu re . As shown in  the case study, on ly 2
259
national parks were present in the Netherlands in 1985.
Against th is ove ra ll qua lita tive  background the im plem entation process in  the 
Netherlands may be fu rth e r assessed by assigning values to the fo u r composite 
variables tha t param etrise the sub-systems o f the EC policy-m aking and 
im plem entation model. A lthough the Birds D irective has a reasonable clear 
goal - to provide pro tection  o f b ird  spieces - i t  has been critic ised  fo r lacking 
precision. The D irective, as many European Court o f Justice cases underline, 
contains m any unclear d e fin itio n s  and confusing provisions, causing 
im plem entation problem s. In  order to  a rrive  at the overall value o f variable 1, 
the degree o f c la rity  o f the D irective, the values o f the sub components need to 
be assessed. Based on evidence presented in  the case study these values are 
assessed as follows.
The value o f sub-component la  is 3, since the precision o f statement o f the 
po licy  objectives i.e how to  p ro tect b irds, has proven to be no t very clear. 
A lthough th is was no t the m ain cause o f non-im plem entation in  the 
Netherlands, there was some confusing regarding the in te rp re ta tio n  and 
im plem entation o f the D irective. A lthough the D irective is aimed at the 
pro tection o f b irds, th e ir nests, eggs and habitats, the actual im plem entation 
via the creation o f Special Protection Areas has been h igh ly  contentious and 
was and remains the subject o f several European Court o f Justice cases.
The value o f sub-component Ib i is 1, no ambiguous technical standards are 
used in  the Birds D irective. The value o f sub-component Ib ii is 1, since no 
technical standards were used in  the D irective they were no t problem atic to 
im plem ent. The value o f sub-component Ib iii  is 0, several o ther de fin itions 
(i.e. the Special P rotection Areas) and issues (i.e. in te rp re ta tion  o f A rtic le  7 
regarding the end o f the m igra to ry season) were unclear and were d iffe re n tly  
in terpreted. The value o f sub-component Ib iv  is 0, although m any ambiguous 
de fin itions are used in  the Birds D irective, these were no t the reason why the 
D irective was no t im plem ented in  the Netherlands. The value o f sub­
com ponent Ic , regarding the necessity fo r fu rth e r explanation, is 0. For 
example, fu rth e r explanation was required as the Hoge Raad p u t a p re lim ina ry  
question regarding the Birds D irective before the European C ourt o f Justice. In  
Gourmetterie van den Burg (case C-169/89 [1990] ECR 1-2143) the Court decided 
on the re la tion  between Articles 6(2) and 14 o f the Birds D irective. A rtic le  14 
has been in terpre ted as having lim ite d  effects and can on ly be used in  cases o f 
itiig ra to ry  b irds and b irds occurring in  tha t Member State. The overall value
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o f va riable 1, the degree o f c la rity  is therefore 6, out o f a to ta l possible 
maximum value o f 10.
To asses the value o f variable 2, the degree tha t economic considerations 
form ed an obstacle towards im plem entation the values o f the sub-components 
need to be assessed. The value o f sub-component 2a is 0, evidence presented in  
th is case study shows th a t during the fo rm u la tion  process o f the D irective, the 
im plem entation costs were not taken in to  account (Section 7.7.1). The value o f 
sub-component 2b is 1, the costs o f compliance form ed no obstacle fo r 
im plem entation in  the Netherlands. The overall value o f variable 2 is 1, out o f 
a to ta l possible maximum value o f 2.
In  order to arrive  at the overall value o f variable 3, the degree o f in s titu tio n a l 
change, the values o f the in d iv id u a l sub-components have been assessed. 
Regarding sub-component 3 ai, the na tiona l legal process fo r the actual 
transform ation o f EC leg islation  in to  the nationa l legal system, the fo llow ing 
conclusions can be drawn. Evidence in  th is case study suggest tha t the 
presence o f the com plicated nationa l legislative process con tribu ted  towards 
the delay. A fte r 8 years o f w ritin g , m andatory consultation, rew riting  etc. the 
Flora and Fauna statute was p u t before Parliament. As examined in  Chapter IV 
the transform ation o f EC legislation in to  statutes is a complex and long process 
in  the Netherlands. Consequently the value o f sub-component 3ai can be 
assessed at 1, many decision-m aking poin ts are present w hich caused in  th is 
case long delays.
The value o f sub-component 3a ii is 0, since no special Act regulating the 
im plem entation o f EC leg islation exists in  the Netherlands. The value o f sub­
com ponent 3 a i i i  is 1, since an environm ental fram ework regulating the b ird  
pro tection existed p rio r to the im plem entation o f the Birds D irective.
The Dutch governm ent demanded an exception fo r the cu ltu ra l tra d itio n  o f the 
collection o f K ievit eggs in  the N orth o f the country, and m aintained its 
position  by allow ing the practice in  the 1993 amendments to the Vogelwet, 
Jachtwet and Natuurbescherm ingswet. Subsequently, the value o f sub­
component 3 iv  is 1, since subsid iarity was clearly an issue. The to ta l value o f 
variable 3 a, the degree to w hich the im plem entation process is legally 
structured to enhance the im plem entation o f directives in to  national law  is 3. 
The value o f sub-component 3b is 3, since a structure o f environm ental 
enforcem ent and contro l existed p rio r to the D irective: p ro tection o f b irds fe lt 
p a rtly  under the Vogelwet in  w hich case the Provinces were responsible and
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p a rtly  under the Jachtwet in  w hich case the M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re  was 
responsible. The value o f sub-component 3c is 1, since the Dutch government 
d id  no t apply fo r extra tim e to im plem ent the Birds D irective.
The value o f sub-component 3d is 0, from  the evidence presented in  th is  case 
study an im m ediate con flic ting  po licy, tha t o f intensive a g ricu ltu ra l 
production methods, w ith  the Birds D irective was present in  the Netherlands. 
The overall value o f variable 3, the degree o f in s titu tio n a l change, is 7.
F ina lly, from  the evidence presented in  th is case study the fo llow ing 
assessment o f the value o f variable 4, the existence and w orking o f sound 
enforcem ent and con tro l structures at EC and Member State level can be made. 
The Birds D irective does request Member States to in fo rm  the Commission in  
several instances.
First, A rtic le  4(3) o f the Birds D irective states tha t Member States shall send the 
Commission a ll re levant in fo rm a tion  regarding the establishm ent o f special 
p ro tection areas and secondly A rtic le  9(3) states tha t each year the Member 
States shall send a report to  the Commission how the derogation o f A rtic le  9 are 
im plem ented and fin a lly  A rtic le  12 states tha t Member States shall fo rw ard to 
the Commission every three years, a repo rt on the im plem entation o f national 
provisions taken thereunder. Therefore the value o f sub-component 4a, the 
degree o f legislative and executive overview  at EC level is 1. Further, from  the 
evidence presented in  th is case study i t  is clear tha t the Dutch government d id  
not respond to  the A rtic le  169 letters and reasoned opinions and European 
Court o f Justice decision. The value o f sub-component 4b, on action taken by 
the Dutch governm ent regarding con tro l and enforcem ent from  Com m unity 
ins titu tions is 0. The Dutch governm ent d id  no t transpose the Birds D irective 
u n til 1993, and is cu rren tly  fa ilin g  to apply the D irective co rrectly according 
to he Commission.
Therefore the value o f sub-component 4c, on whether con tro l and 
enforcem ent o f the measures im plem enting the D irective are carried out, is 0 
since the D irective rem ained non im plem ented u n til 1994. The value o f sub­
component 4d whether legislative con tro l is carried out is 0. Since the 
D irective was no t transposed in to  Dutch law in  1993 (taken effect from  1994), 
activ ities in  the Netherlands w hich were n o t allowed under the D irective were 
carried out as the D rent crow case shows.
The overall value o f variable 4, the degree o f com m itm ent fo r th is case study is 
1, out o f a possible maximum value o f 4. Table 26 gives a summary o f aU the 
values o f the composite variables.
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Table 26 : Summary values of the composite variables
Coun try: e (Æf. - T liC  ; NCtherlandS ; -
EfirK tive: «
Variable
Name Level
Com ponen t
Variable
Num ber
Com ponen t Variable Description Value
Clarity and 
Precision o f 
Directive
EC la precision o f statement o f policy objectives 3
EC lb
degree to which ambiguous standards are 
present in the directive: sub-components 
i to iv
3
EC Ic necessity for further explanation 0
6
60% 1
The Economic 
Dimension EC 2a
consideration o f costs during  
negotiations at EC level 0
MS 2b costs o f compliance 1
' 1
50% ^
Degree o f 
Institutional 
Change
MS 3a
degree to which implementation process 
is legally structured to enhance 
implem en tation o f directives into  
national law: sub components i to iv
3
MS 3b existence o f a structure o f environm en t enforcement and control 3
MS 3c tim e allowed for implementation 1
MS 3d conflicting national policy 0
Perceslaise of 47% . .
Committment:
Enforcement 
and Control
EC 4a legislative and executive overview by Commission I
EC 4b Member State action upon feedbackfrom  Commission 0
MS 4c national control and enforcement procedures 0
MS 4d response to national control and enforcement efforts 0
Total 1
Percentage of possible total 25%
Overall Total Points . .....j-v 15
Percentage of possible total ; 48%
Average o f Percentage 45%
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7.8 Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f the  B irds D ire c tiv e  in  the  U n ite d  K ingdom
7.8.1 Scheme o f Regulations
The Royal Society fo r the Protection o f Birds (RSPB) and Haigh (1995) m ention 
tha t the European Birds D irective was based, to a large extent, on existing UK 
leg is la tio n :
... the directive follows the British pattern of providing general protection for all 
wild birds, providing extra for some, and allowing the killing of others (Haigh, 1995; 
9.2-5).
This contribu ted to the fact tha t there was little  objection to the proposed 
d irective in  the United Kingdom. In  the U nited Kingdom the firs t Act 
protecting certain species o f b irds was passed in  1869 and the num ber o f 
species protected was extended several times in  the Protection o f Birds Acts 
1954-67. A lthough B ritish  leg isla tion  influenced the fo rm  and contents o f the 
d irective , some changes to  existing leg islation  in  the U nited Kingdom were 
necessary, both in  respect o f hab ita t p ro tection and re la ting to pro tection o f 
b irds themselves. These were made in  the W ild life  and Countryside Act 1981, 
w hich took effect six m onths a fte r the deadline in  the Birds D irective. It 
protects, among other species, a ll b ird  species. However the sections dealing 
w ith  derogations regarding ’pests' b irds were changed in  September 1992 by 
an amendment to the 1991 W ild life  and Countryside Act (the W ild life  and 
Countryside Act Order 1992).
Habitat protection in  the W ild life  and Countryside Act 1981 is based upon the 
designation o f sites requ iring  p ro tection  and p lanning controls. Under the 
W ild life  and Countryside Act, English Nature designates land requ iring  
pro tection  as a Site o f Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and then specifies 
operations like ly  to destroy the features o f the site tha t make i t  o f special 
in terest ('p o te n tia lly  damaging operations' o r PDOs).
As a fu rth e r level o f pro tection, the Secretary o f State fo r the Environm ent 
has the power to  make a site subject to a 'nature conservation order' the effect 
o f w hich is to delay bu t no t fo rb id  o r p ro h ib it any operation fo r one year i f  
English Nature wishes to negotiate a management agreement o r purchase the 
land.
In  August 1982, the M in is try  fo r the Environm ent (DoE) n o tifie d  the 
Commission o f the steps th a t had been taken to classify Special Protection 
Areas (SPAs) under the Birds D irective. Seven SPA areas were lis ted  in  1982,
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however by m id-1991 the figure  had risen to 40. In  1982, according to Haigh it  
seemed that:
... the legislation indeed appears generally to fulfil the obligations of the directive j
with doubt about its adequacy in only two respects: the habitat protection measures *
and the derogations from prohibitions on killing or capture (Haigh, 1995; 9.2-7).
The reason why the hab ita t pro tection  measures in  the U nited Kingdom were
questioned fo r th e ir com pliance w ith  the Birds D irective was the fo llow ing. ,
The 1981 W ild life  and Countryside A ct follow s a vo lun tary approach as to I
habita t pro tection  as required by the Birds D irective. Landowners cannot be
forced to make changes to  th e ir land  management in  the in terest o f nature
conservation and much depends on the w illingness o f the landowning and !
farm ing com m unity to  enter in to  management agreements. The negotiated '
management agreement is the p rin c ip a l means o f p ro tection o f the SSSIs, and
works on the p rinc ip le  tha t the owners o r the occupiers o f the land receive
financia l com pensation from  English Nature in  re tu rn  fo r th e ir com m itm ent
no t to  carry out p o te n tia lly  damaging operations (PDOs). The on ly real 'power'
tha t English Nature has is the last resort o f com pulsory purchase. This has
ra re ly been used (on ly once in  the last ten years: at West Hay Moors in
Somerset Levels). Moreover, both  management agreements and especially
com pulsory purchase are expensive and the agencies' funds are lim ite d .
Regarding the UK derogations fro m  p roh ib itions on k illin g  o r capture o f 
certa in species o f b irds, the fo llow ing  changes were made by the governm ent 
o f the United Kingdom in  1992. In  1993 the W ild life  and Countryside Act Order 
came in to  force w hich resolved the dispute between the governm ent o f the 
U nited Kingdom and the Commission over the licensing o f 'pest' b irds. The 
th irteen  species designated as 'pests' in  Part II o f Schedule 2 o f the 1981 
W ild life  and Countryside Act had been removed. A new licensing system was 
introduced under the provisions o f Section 16 o f the 1981 Act, whereby 
unrestricted annual general licences are issued fo r the con tro l o f named pest 
species. These licences are reviewed each year.
7.8.2 Environm ental management regarding b ird  p ro tection in  the U nited 
K ingdom
The DoE Deputy Secretary o f Cities and Countryside is responsible fo r the 
D irectorate o f Rural A ffa irs. This D irectorate covers nature conservation
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issues inc lud ing : countryside, European and m igra to ry w ild life , ru ra l 
development and traded and exotic w ild life . B ird protection fa lls  under this 
D irectorate. W ith  effect from  1991, the fo rm er Nature Conservancy Council 
was replaced in  England, Wales and Scotland by English Nature, the 
Countryside Council fo r Wales and Scottish N atural Heritage. These together 
w ith  the Countryside Commission are cu rren tly  the sta tu tory bodies w ith  
responsib ility  fo r advising the governm ent on nature conservation and carry 
out research regarding Sites o f Special Scientific Interests (SSSIs).
Local authorities carry out physical land use planning under the Town and 
C ountry Planning Act o f 1990 and the Planning Compensation Act o f 1991.
The Countryside Commission and English Nature have designated large parts o f 
the United Kingdom as national parks (9% o f England and Wales in  1994), and 
areas o f outstanding beauty (14% o f England and Wales in  1994). However:
'National park’ and other such designations do not, ... meet the lUCN definition 
of national parks ... the intention is to improve and strengthen nature 
conservation in the national parks ..." (OECD,1994;37).
The cu rren t system o f Sites o f Special Scientific Interests (SSSIs) consists o f 
6013 sites and covers 8% o f the United Kingdom (6% in  England). W ith in  th is 
netw ork add itiona l national and in te rna tiona l measures are taken (table 27). 
The protection o f SSSIs, as m entioned earlier, is based on a vo lun ta ry 
p rin c ip le : the conservation agencies negotiate w ith  SSSI landowners fo r 
possible compensation fo r loss o f p ro fits  an d /o r fo r entering in to  
environm ental management agreements. Thus SSSI reg is tra tion  does no t 
confer legal o r autom atic p ro tection status and:
Agents other than owners-occupiers, and outside development, may damage 
SSSIs through drainage, infrastructure developments, eutrophication of the 
aquatic environment and air pollution. For instance, 25 per cent of the area of 
SSSIs in Britain will still be subject to acid deposition above provisional 
critical loads when UK sulphur emissions are reduced by 60 per cent over 1980 
levels (OECD,I994;39).
During the 1995 House o f Commons Public Accounts Committee's hearing on 
pro tection and management o f SSSIs in  England, the Friends o f the Earth pu t 
fo rw ard c ritic ism  regarding the cu rren t management o f the SSSIs.
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Table 27: A rea o f na ture  te rr ito ry  in  the U nited  K ingdom * 
pro tected  on the basis o f n a tion a l and in te rn a tio n a l laws
Law
Year 1981 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Statutory protected  
areas
SSSIs (Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest) 13,614 14,338 16,408 17,138 17,785 18,161 18,923 19,431
National Nature Reserves ND ND ND ND ND 1763 1 895 1,930
Local Nature Reserves ND ND ND ND ND 185 206 242
Environmentally Sensitive 
Areas ND ND ND ND ND 8 387 27 207 31,603
Number of SSSIs 90 362 1 053 1 457 1 759 2 032 5 964 6 103
International Imw
Wetlands (Ramsar 
Convention) ND ND ND ND ND 1 441 3 090 3,456
EC-Birds Directive (Special 
Protection Areas) ND ND ND ND ND 1 488 2640 3,126
source: DoE 1992,1995; OECD,1994; HC,1994. 
notes: *in kmZ; (ND= no data available)
Friends o f the Earth firs t m entioned the u n re lia b ility  o f in fo rm ation  and data 
on loss o f and damage to  SSSIs from  the sta tu tory conservation agencies. 
Secondly, the SSSI management agreements were critic ised  by the Friends o f 
the Earth, since they re lay almost exclusively on the goodw ill o f the owner to 
protect, m aintain and enhance habitats and species as enshrined in  the 1981 
W ild life  and Countryside Act (Friends o f the Earth,1995;2).
The House o f Commons Public Accounts Committee agreed w ith  some o f the 
critic ism  th a t have been pu t fo rw ard by the Friends o f the Earth, and 
emphasised the im portance o f having a comprehensive m onitoring system: 
"English Nature need to  do fu rth e r w ork to help id e n tify  im proved 
methodologies fo r analysing and recording the im pact o f th is damage in  th e ir 
annual statistics, and to provide a more in fo rm ative  breakdown o f the actual 
causes o f loss and damage" (HC Committee o f Public Accounts,1995;i).
Action has been undertaken against the overall decline o f species and loss o f 
b iod iversity in  the United Kingdom. In 1994 the UK Action Plan fo r 
B iodiversity was presented, w ith  the overa ll objective to conserve and
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enhance b io logical d ive rs ity  in  the U nited Kingdom. A B iod iversity Steering 
Group w ith  members drawn from  centra l and local governm ent, academic 
ins titu tion s , ind u s try  and non-govem m ent organisations, has been charged- 
w ith  overseeing the developm ent o f a range o f specific chosen targets fo r key 
species and habitats fo r years 2000 and 2010.
7.8.3 Environm ental perform ance review  regard ing_bird_pri^ectionJn_thg 
U nited Kingdom
Birds variety and occurrence
The government o f the U nited Kingdom  produces Red Data books containing 
lis ts o f rare and threatened species, includ ing  a lis t o f 117 b ird  species. The 
U nited Kingdom has a num ber o f species o f m ajor in te rna tiona l im portance, 
e ithe r because the country contains a h igh p roportion  o f the to ta l popu la tion  
o r because habitats in  the U nited Kingdom  (such as wetlands and coastal 
habitats) are im portan t to  an in te rna tio n a l m igra tory popu la tion  o f b irds. This 
applies to  seabirds, m igra ting waders and other m igrating b irds.
In  the last two decades, encouraging results in  a num ber o f areas have been 
achieved, perhaps m ost im p o rta n tly  w ith  growing popu la tion o f such species 
as b irds o f prey and otters (OECD,1994; 43). However, "several b ird  species 
characteristic o f farm land areas, both rare and quite common species 
seriously declined in  numbers between 1977 and 1991, a period coincid ing w ith  
m ajor changes in  agricu ltu ra l practices and habita t reductions" (OECD, 1994; 
32-33) (table 28).
Table 28: Threatened Species of Birds*
Country
Threatened 
species of Birds 
(96 of species 
known)
Netherlands 32.6
Denmark 12.9
France 14.7
Spain 11.6
Germany 44
United Kingdom 22.5
source: OECD (1996); *for 1993
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Bird and habita t protection
The U nited Kingdom has a long tra d itio n  o f vo lun ta ry nature conservation 
organisations which have played and continue to play an im portan t ro le. The 
National Trust owns 2 400 km^ (1% o f UK land), the Royal Society fo r the 
Protection o f Birds (alm ost a m illio n  members) manages 120 reserves to ta llin g  
over 760 km^ and the Royal Society fo r Nature Conservation owns o r manages 
over 2 000 nature reserves (OECD,1994;39). Overall th is means tha t there are 
web-developed in s titu tio n s  w ith  sc ien tific  and landscape management 
expertise on b ird  hab ita t protection.
The governm ent has been critic ised  fo r its  im plem entation o f the Special 
Protection Areas (SPAs) o f the Birds D irective fo r several reasons.
F irst i t  has been critic ised  fo r being ’slow’ w ith  the designation o f Special 
Protection Areas (Stroud, et al, 1990). In  1992 on ly three other Member States 
had designated as Special P rotection Areas a sm aller p ropo rtion  o f th e ir land 
area than the U nited Kingdom (table 29). W ith  less than 1 per cent o f its  land 
surface included in  Special Protection Areas the United Kingdom compares 
poorly  w ith  Denmark (22 per cent o f its  land surface) and Belgium (12 per 
cent) (RSPB,1992;5). This was explained by the fact tha t to  provide protection 
fo r SPAs, th e ir designation is linked  to the English Nature's programme fo r 
n o tily in g  and reno tify ing  SSSIs. Before an area can be designated as an SPA, i t  
must firs t be n o tified  as an SSSI to secure the legal p ro tection given by the 
provisions o f the 1981 Act.
Secondly, the governm ent received c ritic ism  regarding the procedures fo r 
designation o f SPAs and the lack o f designating p a rticu la r areas as SPAs.
The leg islation in  the U nited K ingdom  regarding classifying te rrito rie s  in  
num ber and size as Special Protection Areas fo r the conservation o f w ild  b irds 
is com plicated and unclear. M oreover the RSPB referred to a frus tra tin g  
degree o f secrecy surrounding the process o f devising c rite ria  fo r site 
selection, and on several occasions i t  used the Birds D irective to  settle disputes 
(RSPB,1992).
The Lappel Bank has recently been the subject o f RSPB litig a tio n  when 
planning perm ission fo r docks developm ent was challenged in  1990. The 
whole o f the Medway Estuary, which the Lappel Bank is part of, is o f 
in te rna tiona l im portance fo r its  a ttraction  to wading birds. As such i t  is a 
prim e candidate fo r Special Protection Area under the Birds D irective, b u t the 
Secretary o f State decided on economic grounds (the docks development) to 
exclude Lappel Bank from  the lis t o f Special Protection Areas.
269
Table 29: SPA designation compared between EC Member States*
Country Number of SPAs
Total area of 
SPAs (ha) % of state area
completion of 
SPA 
designation at 
present rate of 
oroeress
Denmark 111 960,092 22.29 1992
Belgium 343 68.227 12.06 1992
Portugal 34 318,872 3,4 1994
Greece 26 191,637 1.45 2021
Spain 43 670,938 1.3 2000
Germany 382 298.902 1.1 1997
Italy 52 271,248 0,9 2007
France 37 417,945 0.77 2027
United Kingdom 40 134,449 0.55 2040
Netherlands 6 8,290 0.24 2053
Luxembourg 2 314 0.12 1991
Ireland 1 63,664 0.05 2037
source: RSPB,1992; *for 1992 
The RSPB lost in  the H igh C ourt and in  the Court o f Appeal, and both courts 
considered a reference to  the European Court o f Justice n o t ju s tiiie d . However, 
the House o f Lords re fe rred  the fo llow ing  p re lim ina ry  question (A rtic le  177) 
to  the European Court o f Justice: "Is a Member State en titled  to  take account o f 
the considerations m entioned in  A rtic le  2 o f the D irective 79/409/EEC in  the 
classification o f an area as a Special Protection Area? This question, whether 
the Secretaiy o f State could re fe r to  economic considerations when defining 
Special P rotection Areas.
The Member State has a d iscre tion w ith  respect to  the choice o f SPAs under 
A rtic le  4(1) and 4(2). The C ourt o f Justice decided in  the Santona Marshes case 
(Case C-355/90) on the general p rin c ip le  applicable to  A rtic le  4 as a whole:
•  "Member States are under a d u ty  to choose and classify SPAs in  accordance 
w ith  o rn itho log ica l c rite ria ;
•  There is a lim ite d  d iscretion w ith  respect to the choice o f SPAs bu t the 
d iscretion must be directed towards choosing the te rrito rie s  w hich are most 
suitable fo r classification as SPAs. Self-evidently, tins is because Member
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States are better placed than the Commission to ascertain w hich o f the 
protected species occur in  th e ir te rrito ry ;
The discretion fa lls away in  circumstances where a Member State is 
confronted w ith  sc ien tifica lly  established p roo f factors po in ting  to  a 
unique o r exceptional in terest. These are like ly  to include wetlands o f 
in ternational im portance; ..." (Harte,1995;254).
In  line  w ith  Case C-355/90 (Commission v Spain) and Case C -57/89 (Commission 
V Germany) the European C ourt o f Justice decided tha t "A rtic le  4(1) o r (2) o f 
the Birds D irective was to be in te rp re ted  as meaning tha t a Member State is not 
authorised to take account o f economic requirem ents m entioned in  A rtic le  2 
thereof when designating an SPA and defin ing its  boundaries" (Case C- 
4 4 /9 5 )(Somsen, 1996;324). The num ber o f Special Protection Areas have almost 
doubled from  1992 to 1994 (table 27) and compared to other Member States, the 
U nited Kingdom designated a large p roportion  o f its  land (18.9%) as a m ajor 
p rotection area (table 24).
7.8.4JExp_enditure on conservation in  the United Kingdom
Birds need nature areas such as parks and protected countryside where they 
can fin d  food and breed undisturbed. In  order to assess the expenditure on 
b ird  pro tection  therefore the expenditure on nature conservation in  general 
is relevant. Overall national expenditure on nature conservation and 
landscape has grown, in  1990 i t  consisted o f £445 m illio n  (£287 m illio n  from  
governm ental bodies and £158 m illio n  from  n o n-p ro fit organisation) (OECD, 
1994; 42) (table 30).
Table 30: Environmental Expenditure by Actor and Activity*
Activity
Expenditure 
(m illions o f pounds)
Government Enterprise Households NPOs** Total %
Pollution Abatement 2240 5400 680 - 8320 60
Environmental
Conservation 290 - - 160 450 3
Environmental R&D 210 40 - - 250 2
Education/T raining 140 10 - - ISO 1
General Administration 120 - - 120 1
Management of Natural 
Resources 630 2780 - - 3410 25
Improvement o f 
Amenities 1150 - - - 1150 8
Total 4780 8230 680 160 13850 100
source ECOTEC,i993 and OECD,1994; 
note: *1990; **non-profit organisations
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In  general i t  is d iffic u lt to  assess the overa ll grow th o f expenditure on nature 
conservation, as the OECD puts it:
"The availaBility of detailed data on UK environmental expenditure is a recent 
development. Historical data are scarce, making it difficult to evaluate trends in 
expenditres and priorities. According to estimates from a study commissioned 
by the European Commission, environmental expenditure in the United Kingdom 
increased by 1.7 per cent annually in the first half of the 1980s and by 4.4 per 
cent annually between 1985 and 1990" (OECD,1994; 103).
7.8.5 Infringem ents and European C ourt o f Tustice cases
Thus fa r there have been no European C ourt o f Justice cases regarding fa ilu re  
to im plem ent the Birds D irective in  the U nited Kingdom. There has been one 
p re lim ina ry  question (Case C -44/95) regarding the designation o f a Special 
P rotection Area.
7.8.6 Conclusion: Causes fo r delay and problems w ith  im plem entation
From the evidence examined i t  m ay be concluded tha t the im plem entation o f 
the Birds D irective was carried out in  the United Kingdom w ithou t too many 
problems o r delays. The fact tha t the U nited Kingdom had the most fa r- 
reaching b ird  pro tection  laws o f any European country before the d irective  
was agreed contribu ted to  the smooth im plem entation o f the Birds D irective. 
The United Kingdom  has a long tra d itio n  o f nature conservation and Isindscape 
management and had designated one o f the highest proportions o f its  land as a 
m ajor nature protection area in  1991 (table 24). The United Kingdom benefits 
from  an extensive netw ork o f well-established and respected sc ien tific  
expertise and a wide range o f strong and active vo lun ta ry organisations.
W ith  the 1981 W ild life  and Countryside Act the Government o f the United 
Kingdom had im plem ented the Birds D irective. In  1982 the M in ister fo r the 
Environm ent announced the classifica tion o f Special P rotection Areas (SPAs) 
as required under the Birds D irective (seven in  to ta l).
The governm ent was critic ised  fo r three issues: the slow designation o f SPAs 
(w hich had to be firs t classified as SSSIs), the fact th a t no t enough areas had 
been classified and the weak legal p ro tection  available fo r the SSSIs.
The RSPB used the D irective on numerous occasions in  order to secure certa in 
areas to be classified Special Protection Areas. Most cases d id  no t reach the 
courts i.e. the Duich Moss dispute regarding the p lanning perm ission fo r a
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d is tille ry  on Islay. A recent dispute went a ll the way to the European Court o f 
Justice in  w hich an im po rtan t in te rp re ta tio n  o f the Birds D irective has been 
c la rified  (Case C -44/95). In  conclusion, although the U nited Kingdom 
transposed the Birds D irective, some practica l obstacles rem ained to  fu lly  
im plem ent the provisions in  Birds D irective (RSPB,1992).
Against th is overall qua lita tive  background the im plem entation process in  the 
U nited Kingdom may be fu rth e r assessed by assigning values to the fo u r 
composite variables tha t param etrise the sub-systems o f the EC policy-m aking 
and im plem entation model.
In  order to arrive  at the overa ll value o f variable 1, the degree o f c la rity  o f the 
D irective, the values o f the sub-components need to  be assessed. Based on 
evidence presented in  the case study these values are assessed as follows.
The value o f sub-component la  is 3 , since the precision o f statement o f the 
po licy objectives i.e. how to p ro tect b irds, has proven to  be no t very clear. 
A lthough th is d id  no t fo rm  an im m ediate obstacle towards the im plem entation 
o f the D irective in  the U nited Kingdom, however there was certa in ly  
confusion regarding the designation o f Special Protection Areas.
The value o f sub-component Ib i is 1, no ambiguous technical standards are 
used in  the Birds D irective. The value o f sub-component Ib ii is 1, since no 
technical standards were used in  the D irective they were no t problem atic to 
im plem ent. The value o f sub-component Ib iii  is 0, several o ther defin itions 
and issues o f the Birds D irective were unclear.
The value o f sub-component Ib iv  is 1, although ambiguous de fin itions are used 
in  the Birds D irective, these d id  no t ham per the im plem entation o f the Birds 
D irective in  the U nited Kingdom: in  1981 the D irective was fo rm a lly  
im plem ented and in  1982 Special Protection Areas were designated.
The value o f sub-component Ic , regarding the necessity fo r fu rth e r 
explanation, is 0. Further explanation was required as the House o f Lords p u t a 
p re lim ina ry  question regarding the Birds D irective before the European Court 
o f Justice. The overall value o f variable 1, the degree o f c la rity  is therefore 6, 
out o f a to ta l possible maximum value o f 10.
To asses the value o f variable 2, the degree tha t economic considerations 
form ed an obstacle towards im plem entation the values o f the sub-components 
need to be assessed. The value o f sub-component 2 a is 0, evidence presented in  
th is case study show tha t during  the negotiations o f the D irective, the 
im plem entation costs were no t taken in to  account (Section 7.7.1). The value o f
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sub-component 2b is 1, the costs o f compliance form ed no obstacle fo r 
im plem entation in  the U nited Kingdom. The overall value o f variable 2 is 1, 
out o f a to ta l possible maximum value o f 2.
In  order to arrive at the overall value o f variable 3, the degree o f in s titu tio n a l 
change, the values o f the in d iv id u a l sub-components have been assessed. 
Regarding sub-component 3ai, the na tiona l legal process fo r the actual 
transform atipn o f EC leg isla tion  in to  the nationa l legal system, the fo llow ing 
conclusions can be drawn. As examined in  Chapter IV  the transform ation o f 
EC leg islation in to  national UK law takes place e ffic ie n tly  and w itho u t delays. 
No evidence in  th is case study suggests otherwise, m oreover the D irective was 
im plem ented in  1981. Consequently the value o f sub-component 3ai can be 
assessed at 5, no decision-m aking points were present causing delays.
The value o f sub-component 3a ii is 1, since a special Act regulating the 
im plem entation o f EC legislation exists in  the United Kingdom. The value o f 
sub-component 3 a i i i  is 1, since an environm ental fram ework regulating the 
b ird  p ro tection existed p rio r to the im plem entation o f the Birds D irective.
The controversy regarding the designation o f Special Protection Areas, most 
p rom inently  vis ib le  in  the Lappel Bank case, underline the subsid ia rity  issue 
when im plem enting the D irective. The government o f the United Kingdom 
clearly was o f the op in ion  th a t i t  had a certa in discretion regarding the SPAs. 
Subsequently, the value o f sub-component 3 iv  is 0, since subsid iarity was 
clearly an issue. The to ta l value o f variable 3a, the degree to w hich the 
im plem entation process is lega lly  structured to enhance the im plem entation 
o f directives in to  national law  is 7,
The value o f sub-component 3 b is 4, since a specific structure o f 
environm ental enforcem ent and con tro l regarding nature p ro tection  and b ird  
pro tection existed p rio r to the D irective, on ly  m inor changes needed to be 
made to transpose the D irective in to  national UK law. The value o f sub­
component 3 c is 1, since the governm ent o f the United Kingdom d id  no t apply 
fo r extra tim e to im plem ent the Birds D irective. The value o f sub-component 
3d is 1, from  the evidence presented in  th is case study no im m ediate 
con flic ting  po licy, was present in  the U nited Kingdom. The overall value o f 
variable 3, the degree o f in s titu tio n a l change is 13, out o f a possible to ta l o f 15.
F inally, fro m  the evidence presented in  th is case study the fo llow ing 
assessment o f the value o f variable 4, the existence and w orking o f sound 
enforcement and contro l structures at EC and Member State level can be made.
274
The Birds D irective does request Member States to in fo rm  the Commission in  
several instances as ind icated in  7.7.6, Therefore the value o f sub-component 
4a, the degree o f legislative and executive overview at EC level is 1. The value 
o f sub-component 4b is 1 since the governm ent im plem ented the D irective in  
tim e and no in fringem ent procedures were undertaken against it.
The value o f sub-component 4c, on whether contro l and enforcem ent o f the 
measures im plem enting the D irective are carried out, is 1. W ith  the 
im plem entation o f the D irective con tro l and enforcem ent measures were pu t 
in  place. The value o f sub-component 4d is 1, there is no ind ica tion  in  the case 
study o f disregard o r non-response to  these contro l and enforcem ent 
measures. The overa ll value o f variable 4, the degree o f com m itm ent fo r th is 
case study is 4, out o f a possible maximum value o f 4. Table 31 gives a summaiy 
o f a ll the values o f the composite variables.
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Table 31 : Summary values of the composite variables
#/C ouniiy:'
IMrective:
Variable
Name Level
Component
Variable
Number
Component Variable Description Value
Clarity and 
Precision of 
Directive
EC la precision of statement of policy objectives 3
EC lb
degree to which ambiguous standards are 
present in the directive: sub-components 
i to iv
3
EC Ic necessity for further explanation required by the Member State 0
tcrtàl
The Economic 
Dimension EC 2a
consideration of costs during 
negotiations at EC level 0
MS 2b costs of compliance 1
.;-//-50% W  •••
Degree of 
Institutional 
Change
MS 3a
degree to which implementation process 
is legally structured to enhance 
implementation of directives into 
national law: sub-components i to iv
7
MS 3b existence of a structure of environment enforcement and control 4
MS 3c time allowed for implementation 1
MS 3d conflicting national policy 1
Committment:
Enforcement 
and Control
EC 4a legislative and executive oversight by Commission 1
EC 4b Member State action upon feedback from Commission 1
MS 4c national control and enforcement procedures 1
MS 4d response to national control and enforcement efforts 1
O vera llTbW W M W
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CHAPTER V III: ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES AND  
CONCLUSION
8.1 In tro d u c tio n : Case S tudy R esults
Having examined the im plem entation a c tiv ity  in  the fo u r case studies an 
assessment o f the relevance and influence o f the composite variables on the 
im plem entation outcome follow s. This is conducted along the three dimensions 
set out in  this study: the analytica l, the nationa l and sector dim ension (figure  
8). The overall presentation is fo r the U nited Kingdom and the Netherlands 
sim ultaneously, thus p rovid ing  a com parative analysis.
A lthough two directives in  two Member States have been investigated and 
these case studies are no t and can no t be representative o f the whole body o f 
EC environm ental leg islation in  the fo rm  o f directives, i t  is noted tha t the 
investigated directives have been chosen since they represent im po rtan t and 
w ell developed sectors o f EC environm ental po licy.
Before proceeding to com parative analysis o f the Netherlands’ and the U nited 
Kingdom ’s im plem entation o f the two D irectives, the explanatory value o f the 
m odel w ith  regards to the investigated case studies is assessed. The aspects o f 
the system which are param etrised by the system variables are believed to be 
su ffic ie n tly  d is tin c t to  enable independent causal linkages between ind iv idu a l 
variables and outcomes.
8.1.1 Data review: variable values from  the case studies
An overview o f the quantified  variable values from  the fo u r case studies is 
presented in  table 32 and allows an exam ination to be undertaken as to 
whether there are patterns to be found in  re la tion  to the im plem entation 
outcomes. For each variable a h igher score is associated w ith  better 
im plem entation. In  o ther words a h igher to ta l model value fo r a d irective  in  a 
Member State should indicate a be tter h is to ric  im plem entation record than 
those directives w ith  lower to ta l model values.
From table 32 the order o f variable values is": the UK Birds D irective (overall 
model value 24), the Dutch D rinking W ater D irective (overall model value 22), 
the Dutch Birds D irectives (overa ll m odel value 15) and the UK D rinking W ater 
d irective  (overall model value 14).
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Table 32: Summary all values of the composite variables
Drink. Water Dir. Birds D rective
Variable
Name Level
Component
Variable
Number
Component Variable Description UK Netherl. UK Netherl.
EC la precision of statement of policy objectives 5 5 3 3
Clarity and 
Precision of 
Directive
EC lb
degree to which ambiguous 
standards are present in the 
directive: sub-components i to iv
0 2 3 3
EC Ic necessit) for further explanation 0 1 0 0
.......... 5 ... 8 6 6
Percentase nf po^b le  toti^ 50% 80% 60% 60%
The Economic 
Dimension EC 2a
consideration of costs during 
negotiations at EC level 0 0 0 0
MS 2b costs of compliance 0 1 1 1
. . « T. .  ^.«.(..I-.si.f,'.'! .. - v-. ■' -
Totaï 0 ' 1 1
' Percentage of possible total 0% . .... 50% 50% 50%
MS 3a
degree to which implementation 
process is legally structured to 
enhance implementation of 
directives into national law: sub­
components i to iv
5 5 7 3
Degree of 
Institutional 
Change
MS 3b
existence of a structure of 
enrironment enforcement and 
control
1 5 4 3
MS 3c time allowed for implementation 0 1 1 1
MS 3d conflicting national policy 1 0 1 0
, • ...... . .... Total
" Percentage of possible total 47% 73% : 87% 47% '
Commitment: EC 4a legislative and executive overview by Commission 0 0 1 1
Enforcement EC 4b
Member States action upon feedback 
from Commission 0 0 1 0
and Control MS 4c
national control and enforcement 
procedures 1 1 1 0
MS 4d response to national control and enforcement efforts 1 1 1 0
Total 2 ... 4 1
^  ' Percentage of possible total 50% ;.f:r k\%.:,'50% .... , 100% 0. . ... 25% .'to
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8.1.2 Data review: im plem entation outcomes
The various possible im plem entation outcomes have been defined according to  
the classification given by the European Commission (Section 6.5.1). As 
discussed earlie r the Commission classifies three categories o f non­
im plem entation, fo llow ing  the three stage in fringem ent proceeding fo r each 
category. The outcomes as classified by the Commission are presented in  table 
33. The score fo r every in fringem ent proceeding is presented as a num ber o f 
penalty points on a scale fro m  5 pena lty points fo r an A rtic le  169 le tte r to  7.5 
fo r a reasoned opin ion to  10 penalty po ints fo r a Court o f Justice case. The scale 
applied here assumes tha t the stages o f the in fringem ent proceedings are 
p ro p o rtio n a lly  increasing in  seriousness. An overall h igher num ber o f 
penalty poin ts indicates a low er level o f im plem entation success.
From table 33 it  can be concluded th a t the im plem entation outcomes as 
indicated by the Commission in  o rder o f decreasing im plem entation success 
are the UK Birds D irective (0 po in ts), the Dutch D rinking W ater D irective (22.5 
points) and the UK D rinking W ater and the Dutch Birds D irectives (both  67.5 
po in ts).
8.1.3 Variable Values and Im plem entation Outcomes
The quantified  variable values from  the fo u r case studies (table 32) are set out 
against the quantified  im plem entation outcomes (table 33) in  table 34.
Tab le  34: V a ria b le  va lues and im p le m e n ta tio n  outcom es
Model Value ImplementationOutcome
C ountry/ D irective Value Percentage of total (penalty points)
UK Birds Directive 24 77 0
ML Drinking water Directive 22 71 22.5
UK Drinking water Directive 14 45 67.5
NL Birds Directive 15 48 67.5
source: present w rite r
Table 34 indicates that an increasing value o f im plem entation penalty points 
(and therefore poorer im plem entation) corresponds to  a trend in  decreasing
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m odel values. The UK Birds d irective , w ith  the highest m odel value, has the 
best im plem entation outcome.
W hen viewed in  a graph (figu re  14), the data fa lls  in to  two sets o f two 
d irectives. On the one hand, the Netherlands B irds D irective and the UK 
D rink ing  W ater D irective share a poorer im plem entation record and a low er 
m odel value, whereas the Netherlands D rink ing  W ater D irective and the UK 
Birds d irective  share a h igher degree o f im plem entation success and a h igher 
m odel value.
Figure 14 : Variable values and Implementation outcomes
Implementation Outcome vs Model values
140
120
100
NL Birds80
UKDr.Water
60
40  2 ^
I Improvement in  2Q I Implementation
NL Dr.W ater
UK Birds
80 1000 40 6020
Model Value (% o f to ta l possible score) ♦  Implementation Outcome (penalty points)
source: based on table 34
The p o in t ( 100,0) on th is graph represents an idea l p o in t to  w hich 
im provem ent in  im plem entation is expected to  converge; th is  d irec tion  is 
shown by the arrow . W ith in  the im plem entation outcomes there are some 
w ide varia tions, the UK Birds D irective  scores 0 pena lty po in ts however seems 
to  lie  outside the zone o f expected m odel values. This suggests an under 
assessment o f the variab le  values and is an example o f the anomalies tha t are 
la te r investigated in  m ore de ta il. I t  can be concluded tha t in  overview  the 
m odel param eters ind icate  a trend  w hich shows a re la tion  to  th a t o f the 
q u a lifie d  im plem entation outcomes, w ith  h ighe r variab le  values 
corresponding to be tte r h is to ric  im plem entation  records, and low er m odel 
values corresponding to poorer h is to ric  im plem entation. In  the next sections 
linkages between variables and outcomes are fu rth e r explored.
281
8 .2  V ariable A nalysis
8.2.1 C la rity
U tilis ing  the m atrix  (table 32) i t  is evident tha t when the c la rity  and precision 
o f the d irective is low  (50%) as in  the UK D rinking W ater D irective case, the 
im plem entation outcome is poor. In  the case o f the UK Birds D irective 
however, vsâth 60% c la rity  and precision o f the d irective, the im plem entation 
outcome is good. In  the case o f the Netherlands Birds D irective on the other 
hand, w ith  60% c la rity  score, the im plem entation outcome is poor. This 
suggests th a t other factors are affecting im plem entation outcome. Moreover, 
i t  puts the im portance o f the c la rity  and precision o f the D irectives, which so 
often is m entioned as a problem  w ith  im plem entation in  some perspective: 
w hile the concept o f c la rity  as postulated in  the hypotheses does no t emerge as 
a factor dom inating im plem entation ooutcomes.
8.2.2 The economic dimension
From the summary values o f the composite variables (table 32) i t  is evident 
th a t when variable 2 (economic dim ension) is low, as in  the UK D rinking 
W ater D irective case (0%), the im plem entation outcome is poor. However, the 
economic dim ension has a s im ila r score (50%) w ith  the o ther three case 
studies, includ ing  the Netherlands Birds D irective where the im plem entation 
outcome was poor and the UK Birds D irective where the im plem entation 
outcome was good. This also suggests a greater con tribu tion  from  o f the other 
factors affecting im plem entation outcomes and the co rre la tion  between this 
variable value and im plem entation outcomes is weak.
8.2.3 Degree o f In s titu tio n a l change
From the data in  table 32 i t  is evident tha t when the degree o f in s titu tio n a l 
change, is low  as in  the case o f UK D rink ing  W ater D irective (47%) and the 
Netherlands Birds D irective (47%), the im plem entation outcome is poor. A 
h igh score o f in s titu tio n a l change, ind ica ting  tha t no o r no t much 
in s titu tio n a l changes has to be carried out, as in  the case o f the UK Birds 
D irective (87%) and the Netherlands D rinking  Water D irective (73%) is linked  
w ith  successful im plem entation outcomes.
This suggests the degree o f in s titu tio n a l change affecting im plem entation 
outcome: the degree o f in s titu tio n a l change variable as postulated in  the 
hypotheses shows a strong corre la tion  w ith  im plem entation outcomes.
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8.2.4 Commitment: Enforcement and Control
I t  is evident from  table 32 tha t when the degree o f enforcem ent and contro l is 
very low  as in  the Netherlands Birds D irective (25%), the im plem entation 
outcome is poor, and when the degree o f enforcem ent and con tro l is very high 
as in  the UK Birds D irective ( 100%) the im plem entation outcome is good.
The degree o f enforcement and contro l has the same value fo r the UK 
D rinking W ater D irective case and the Netherlands D rinking W ater case (50%). 
This re la tive ly  low  value corresponds w ith  the UK D rinking  W ater D irective 
case w hich has a low  im plem entation outcome, however no t w ith  the 
Netherlands D rinking W ater D irective case where the im plem entation outcome 
is good. This suggests tha t the degree o f enforcement and con tro l affects 
im plem entation outcome: the concept o f degree o f enforcement and contro l as 
postulated in  the hypotheses correlates w ith  im plem entation outcomes.
The evidence from  the case studies and the discussion o f the variables show 
tha t there are lim ita tions to the in d iv id u a l assessment o f the influence o f the 
com ponent variables. A fu rth e r com parative qua lita tive  exam ination is 
pursued in  the next Sections,
8.3 Sector A na lys is
8.3.1 The D rinking W ater D irective
Great differences exist between the im plem entation o f the D rinking  W ater 
D irective, w hich had been adopted unanim ously by the Council, in  the 
Netherlands and the U nited Kingdom. The United Kingdom had and continues 
to have d ifficu ltie s  im plem enting the D irective, w hile  in  the Netherlands 
m inor d ifficu ltie s  were present. These concerned the D irective 's frequency o f 
sampling methods w hich as M r. Bresser (VEWIN) argued are outdated and not 
suitable fo r the advanced 'perform ance ind ica to r' methods cu rren lty  used in  
the Netherlands (Appendix 5). D ifferences are also present regarding the 
application o f the D irective. Comparing the percentage o f samples exceeding 
norms, in  o ther words the deviations from  the d rink ing  water standards in  the 
Netherlands and England and Wales (tables 13 and 20) fo r 1994, i t  is found:
• fo r the param eter 'to ta l pesticides':
exceeded in  the Netherlands: 0.2 % o f the to ta l samples taken; 
exceeded in  England and Wales: 4.7 % o f the to ta l samples taken.
• fo r the param eter 'n itr ite ':
exceeded in  the Netherlands: 0.1 % o f the to ta l samples taken;
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exceeded in  England and Wales: 5.1 % o f the to ta l samples taken.
• fo r the param eter 'coUform s':
exceeded in  the Netherlands: 0.4 % o f the to ta l samples taken; 
exceeded in  England and Wales: 0.7 % o f the to ta l samples taken.
Comparison between the deviations o f the d rink ing  water standards in  the 
Netherlands and England and Wales was add itiona lly  hampered by differences 
in  sampUng and reporting. For example in  England and Wales on ly the 
param eter 'co lifirm s* is m onitored, as compared to the Netherlands where also 
therm a lly  to le ran t co liform s and su lfite-reducing c los trid ia  are m onitored. 
W ith  regard to the c la rity  and precision o f the D rinking W ater D irective, i t  is 
strick ing  tha t the same D irective has been perceived d iffe re n tly  regarding its  
c la rity  in  the U nited Kingdom  (the value o f th is variable scores 50%) and the 
Netherlands, where the value o f the c la rity  variable is 80%.
Other variables also score d iffe re n tly : the economic dim ension which has a 
value o f 0% in  the U nited Kingdom and 50% in  the Netherlands, and the degree 
o f in s titu tio n a l change w hich has a value o f 47% in  the U nited Kingdom and 
73% in  the Netherlands.
W ith  regard to the economic dim ension sim ila r developments have been taken 
place in  both England and Wales and the Netherlands:
• the volume o f delivered water stayed more o r less at the same level over the 
last five  years and
• the investm ent costs raised substantia lly over the last three years (a 
doubling in  the Netherlands and England and Wales; tables 16a and 21).
Evidence in  the case studies shows tha t the trends in  the U nited Kingdom  and 
the Netherlands are re la tive ly  sim ila r, however great differences exist 
between the im plem entation o f the D irective in  the lig h t o f its  economic 
consequences. This is very much due to the d iffe ren t structure o f the water 
supply companies in  both countries. As Ofwat puts it  "a balance m ust be struck 
between the environm ental and pub lic  health considerations and the costs and 
a ffo rd a b ility " (Appendix 5).
A lthough th is indicates tha t the economic dim ension does influence the 
im plem entation o f a D irective, i t  also shows tha t the in s titu tio n a l structure 
influences the im plem entation. Further evidence tha t the in s titu tio n a l 
structure plays a sign ificant ro le  regarding the im plem entation comes from  
the fact tha t an extensive legal and in s titu tio n a l structure was already present 
in  the Netherlands regarding d rin k in g  water p rio r to the in tro du ctio n  o f the 
D irective. According to VEWIN the D irective and also the revised D irective
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posed no d ifficu ltie s  regarding its  im plem entation in  the Netherlands. In  fact 
the Netherlands’ advanced and extensively developed d rink ing  water ind u s try  
had problems w ith  the outdated sampling methods o f the D rinking W ater 
D irective .
In  contrast, in  the U nited Kingdom  no leg islation  regarding the setting o f 
standards fo r d rink ing  water existed p rio r to  the D irective. This contribu ted to 
the delay o f im plem entation, especially since there was considerable 
disagreement regarding the con tro l structure  and the plans towards achieving 
the standards in  the D irective between the government o f the U nited Kingdom 
and the Commission.
8.3.2 The Birds D irective
Great differences also exist between the im plem entation o f the Birds D irective, 
w hich had been adopted unanim ously by the Council, in  the Netherlands and 
the U nited Kingdom, The Netherlands had and continues to have d ifficu ltie s  
im plem enting the D irective, w hile  in  the U nited Kingdom  m inor d ifficu ltie s  
were present. D ifferences are also present regarding the application  o f the 
D irective, com paring the designation o f Special Protection Areas in  the 
Netherlands and the U nited Kingdom  in  1994 (table 29): the Netherlands 
designated 8,290 ha (6 SPAs) compared to 134,449 ha (40 SPAs) in  the United 
Kingdom. Comparison between nature p ro tection in  both countries is 
hampered by the fact tha t each follow s d iffe re n t categories o f nature 
te rrito rie s  w hich have d iffe re n t degree o f (legal) pro tection.
W ith  regard to the c la rity  and precision o f the D irective, the value o f th is 
variable is 60% fo r both the U nited Kingdom  and the Netherlands. The value 
fo r the economic dim ension is also s im ila r in  both  Member States. Differences 
are found in  the degree o f in s titu tio n a l change which has a low  value in  the 
Netherlands (47% compared to 87% in  the United Kingdom) and the 
enforcem ent and con tro l variable w hich has also a low  value in  the 
Netherlands (25% compared to 100% in  the U nited Kingdom).
W ith  regard to the degree o f in s titu tio n a l change evidence in  the case studies 
shows tha t a complete new statute w hich w ould im plem ent the D irective took a 
p a rticu la rly  long tim e to  develop in  the Netherlands due to  constitu tional 
demands regarding the fo rm u la tion  and adoption process o f statutes in  the 
Netherlands. The Vogelbescherming sees th is as the m ain reason w hy i t  took 
so long fo r the D irective to be im plem ented. However, the degree o f 
in s titu tio n a l change is a composite variable and the question whether the 
national im plem entation process delayed the im plem entation composes on ly
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pa rt o f the variable. O ther composite factors p lay a ro le as w ell, such as the 
presence o f a special Act regulating the im plem entation and the presence o f a 
con flic ting  nationa l po licy . M oreover the reason w hy the im plem entation o f 
the D irective went re la tive ly  sm oothly in  the United Kingdom  was due to, as 
the RSPB also states, the fact th a t an extensive legislative and in s titu tion a l 
fram ework was present p rio r to  the D irective in  the U nited Kingdom.
8.4 N a tio n a l A n a lys is
8.4.1 The Netherlands
The Netherlands' record on im plem entation o f EC environm ental directives 
displays a paradox. On the one hand the country is proud o f its  pro- 
environm ental stand, i t  has an extensive body o f environm ental leg islation 
and considers its e lf a leader hx the developm ent o f progressive environm ental 
po licy measures. Furtherm ore i t  is very pro-European, and openly com m itted 
to a fu rth e r integrated Europe. But its  record on im plem enting shows a 
d iffe re n t p ictu re : delays in  the transposai o f environm ental d irectives, low  
p rio rity  in  im plem enting EC leg islation and a h is to ry  tha t includes several 
European Court o f Justice cases.
W ith regard to  the transposition o f directives, the Netherlands has persistently 
encountered d ifficu ltie s  in  meeting the deadlines la id  down in  the d irective  
due to its  exceptionally m eticulous legislative process. As a resu lt there is often 
a lengthy period between the in itia tio n  o f a new legislative proposal and its 
u ltim ate  enactment in  a statute o r regulation. W ith  regard to  the enforcement 
o f directives, several comments need to be made. F irst the fact tha t the Birds 
D irective was no t transposed in to  D utch legislation consequently led to the fact 
tha t enforcem ent and application  o f the policies in  the Birds D irective d id  no t 
o r on ly p a rtia lly  took place.
Secondly, con flic ting  na tiona l policies played a substantial ro le  in  the delay o f 
im plem entation in  the Netherlands. The intensive farm ing and ag ricu ltu ra l 
practices in  the Netherlands also negatively influenced the application o f 
o ther directives besides the D rinking  W ater and Birds D irectives. Moreover 
co-operation between the M in is try  fo r A gricu ltu re  and the M in is try  fo r the 
Environm ent d id  not always take place. F ina lly po licy decisions such as the 
co llection o f Kievitseggs delayed the im plem entation o f the Birds D irective.
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8.4.2 The United Kingdom
The U nited Kingdom's record on im plem entation o f EC
environm entaldirectives is good in  the sense the U nited Kingdom  is punctual ' 
in  transposing EC directives in to  na tiona l leg islation. As the Netherlands the 
U nited Kingdom have encountered delays in  im plem entation and has been 
subject to several European C ourt o f Justice cases (i.e. regarding the D rinking 
W ater D irective).
A difference between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is the fact tha t 
the la tte r is seeking economic solutions fo r im plem enting environm ental 
policies includ ing  EC environm ental D irectives. I t  considers i t  very im portan t 
to evaluate the costs and benefits o f policies and measures proposed at EC level, 
especially when the policies necessitate investm ent. Ofwat po ints out fo r 
example tha t the revised D rink ing  W ater D irective contains no cost-benefit 
im pact statement (Appendix 5). D ifference o f op in ion regarding the speed o f 
im plem entation (tim etables fo r w ater companies to achieve standards set in  
the D irective) and in te rp re ta tio n  o f the D rink ing  W ater D irective between the 
government o f the United Kingdom  and the Commission led to  delays o f the 
im plem entation o f the D irective.
8.5 C onclus ion
The relevance and influence o f the composite variables on im plem entation 
outcomes has been assessed along the three dimensions set ou t in  th is study: 
the analytica l, the national and sector dimensions.
The overall ind ica tion  is tha t w hile the fo u r composite variables as postulated 
in  the hypotheses a ll have a bearing on the im plem entation outcome, the 
experience observed in  the case studies suggests tha t the degree o f 
in s titu tio n a l change influences the im plem entation outcome most strongly. 
The degree to w hich the im plem entation process is lega lly structured to 
enhance im plem entation o f d irective  in to  national law and the existence o f a 
structure o f environm ental enforcem ent and con tro l have been shown to 
influence the im plem entation outcome. For the other variables tha t have been 
ide n tifie d  as being p o te n tia lly  im portan t, such as the c la rity  o f the d irective  
and the economic dim ension, the re la tionsh ip  to im plem entation outcome is 
less clear. Regarding the enforcem ent and con tro l variable, evidence 
supported the d ifficu ltie s  encountered by the Commission in  operating in  th is 
mode. However over a longer tim e period, im plem entation o f the Birds
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D irective in  the Netherlands have led to  substantial (constitu tiona l) changes 
regarding the process o f transposing D irectives. A s im ila r im portan t change, 
also over a longer tim e period took place in  the U nited Kingdom where the 
en tire  regulative and in s titu tio n a l structure  fo r d rin k in g  water has been 
changed due to the EC D rinking W ater D irective. For some, as the 
Vogelbescherming argues, these changes and (late) im plem entation comes too 
late, and a clear deficiency o f the Commission operating in  an enforcem ent 
and contro l mode is the fact tha t the process takes too long and concentrates 
on ly on the transposition w h ils t the actual application o f the D irective is 
neglected.
The model adopted from  both Easton's systems theories and from  Sabatier and 
Mazmanian has proven useful in  help ing structure the analysis. This study 
contributes additional support fo r the Sabatier and Mazmanian model, i t  also 
expands its application. The lite ra tu re  on comparative studies regarding the 
im plem entation o f EC directives is ra ther sparse and most o f the studies have 
lim ite d  theoretica l underp inn ing. W hilst the find ings support the im portance 
o f the degree o f in s titu tio n a l change required to speed up im plem entation, the 
operationalisation o f the variables has proven d iffic u lt; fo r example, the 
economic dim ension shows no difference between the Birds D irective in  the 
UK and the Netherlands, even though there are differences in  
im plem entation. C learly, more w ork w ill be required in  the d e fin itio n  and 
operationalisation o f both the explanatory and the dependent variables, 
p a rticu la rly  regarding the economic dim ension.
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION
This thesis has attem pted to provide a structured analysis o f the problem  o f 
im plem entation o f European environm ental law, concentrating on the 
legislative instrum ent w hich has been p re fe ren tia lly  adopted fo r th is purpose: 
the directive. The m ain objective o f th is analysis has been to develop and test a 
model o f environm ental im plem entation in  the European Com m unity, 
cu lm inating in  the em pirica l analysis presented in  Chapter VIIJ.
Statistics pubhshed by the European Commission indicate tha t the problem  o f 
non-im plem entation o f EC environm ental leg islation has no t receded, and 
a fte r a tem porary d ip  in  the early 1990s the num ber o f reported infringem ent 
cases is again on the rise.
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The environm ental issue is a re la tive ly  recent area o f pub lic  po licy  and 
touches upon many other po licy  areas. As the Com m unity was in itia lly  driven 
by economic im peratives, the focus o f th is legislative a c tiv ity  was on those 
directives tha t had economic im plications. The environm ental dim ension was 
often involved as d ive rs ity  in  environm ental standards was considered as an 
obstacle to the free movement o f goods. Simultaneously, the p o litica l 
resurgence o f the Green movement in  Europe provided add itiona l pressure on 
the p o litica l system. As a result, even though the 1957 Treaty o f Rome 
contained no provisions fo r the environm ent, EC environm ental leg islation  
developed in to  a substantial body o f law  during the 1980s and 1990s, w ith  more 
than 200 laws coming in to  effect. M on itoring  o f progress on environm ental 
issues became an estabhshed task. A t EC level, in  the ’Annual Reports to the 
European Parliam ent on Commission m on itoring  the application o f Com m unity 
Law’ and the estabhshment o f the European Environm ental Agency in  1992, 
in itia l proactive steps were taken to incorporate EC environm ental policies 
in to  the national policies o f the Member States. The generation o f 
environm ental leg isla tion  and guidelines fo r im plem entation have had to 
allow  fo r the unique structure o f the Com m unity and the p rinc ip le  o f 
subsid iarity meant tha t Com m unity involvem ent and powers are restricted to 
those issues and areas which are best dealt w ith  at Com m unity level.
The d irective  as a legal instrum ent, w hich allows a degree o f flexib iU ty at 
Member State level w hile  re ta in ing  m andatory norms and standards has been 
chosen fo r environm ental legislation as i t  allows Member States to  adapt 
certa in aspects o f the d irective  to na tiona l (environm ental) conditions. This 
fle x ib ility  p a rtly  explains the observed variance in  environm ental 
im plem entation perform ance by Member States, and is exacerbated by the 
Com m unity's lack o f enforcem ent powers w ith in  the environm ental sector.
The d irective as a Com m unity instrum ent w ith  its  lim ita tions and shortcomings 
has provoked critic ism , leading to a proposed replacement w ith  a d iffe re n t 
Com m unity instrum ent. D uring the ru n  up to the Treaty on European Union, 
signed in  1992 in  M aastricht, propositions were made to review  and renew the 
Com m unity’s legal instrum ents. Both the Commission and the European 
Parliam ent proposed a new h ierarchy o f norms. The proposed changes were 
no t adopted and more w ork is required in  th is area. The more environm entally 
com m itted Member States have pushed fo r the adoption o f a more stringent 
legislative instrum ent, such as the regula tion, fo r environm ental purposes; 
the p o litica l clim ate at the tim e o f w ritin g  suggests tha t i t  is u n like ly  tha t such 
a res tric tion  on the sovereignty o f Member States w ill meet w ith  success.
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A task o f the present pro ject was to seek a theoretica l perspective on po licy 
im plem entation. A lthough the re levant lite ra tu re  on im plem entation is 
p le n tifu l, litt le  analytica l w ork has been done on im plem entation specifica lly 
in  the European Com m unity. Further, lit t le  w ork has been id e n tifie d  which 
em p irica lly  ve rified  the results o f theoretica l concepts and no com parative 
analysis o f im plem entation across d iffe re n t sectors o r Member States o r across 
d iffe re n t d irectives was encountered in  the lite ra tu re .
To overcome th is ‘gap’, a model o f the EC policy-m aking and im plem entation 
process, based on Easton’s systems approach and adapting Sabatier and 
Mazmanian’s w ork on im plem entation, was employed to structure  the analysis. 
P o litica l systems theory was proven to be a suitable vehicle w hich enabled the 
capture o f re levant aspects o f o ther theories and allowed su ffic ient adaptation 
to approxim ate the structure o f the European Community. A model o f the EC 
policy-m aking and im plem entation process was proposed consisting o f two 
overlapping and h ie ra rch ica lly  lin ked  sub-systems com prising the EC and 
Member State sub-systems. An approach fo r systematic measurement and 
analysis o f the degree o f im plem entation success was devised. F irst the model 
was parameterised by fo u r composite system variables: the c la rity  and 
precision o f the d irective, the economic dim ension o f the d irective , the degree 
o f national in s titu tio n a l change necessary to im plem ent the d irective  and the 
com m itm ent or enforcem ent and con tro l o f the Com m unity and Member States 
regarding im plem entation. Each variab le  com prised o f several components, 
which were d is tribu ted  over the sub-systems o f the model. A comparative 
approach was achieved by the establishm ent o f a two-by-two m atrix  w hich 
was tested against actual events using the case method: fo u r detailed case 
studies were perform ed on the Birds D irective and the D rinking W ater 
D irective in  both  the Netherlands and the U nited Kingdom. These Directives 
were selected as they represent two im portan t and developed sectors o f EC 
environm ental po licy and have been in  place fo r some tim e, therefore 
afforded rich  and re la tive ly  stable data sets fo r analysis. The qua lita tive  
analysis o f the case studies was perform ed in  the three dimensions set ou t in  
th is study: the analytical, the nationa l and the sector dimensions. It is not 
claim ed in  th is thesis th a t the find ings w ould allow  generalisation to be 
attem pted e ither in  o ther areas o f legislative a c tiv ity  o r across aU Member 
States as they presently stand. However, the research design requ iring  
em pirica l ve rifica tion  o f unplem entation o f two directives in  two Member 
States, reduces some o f the anticipated lim ita tions in  th is study.
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In  an in itia l analysis, a good co rre la tion  was obtained between the model 
predictions in  general and the im plem entation outcome. The m odel therefore 
successfully explained past im plem entation at the general level and has 
allowed a d irect comparison to be made between two d iffe re n t areas o f 
environm ental leg islation  in  two d iffe re n t Member States. In  a fu rth e r step to 
provide d irect responses to  the hypotheses posed in  earlie r Chapters, attem pts 
were made to establish linkages between each ind iv idu a l composite variable 
and the im plem entation outcomes.
A strong corre la tion  has been observed between the value o f the variable 
'degree o f in s titu tio n a l change' and the im plem entation outcome in  a ll the 
case studies, ind ica ting  the im portance o f the in s titu tio n a l and constitu tiona l 
co m pa tib ility  o f Member State constitu tions w ith  im plem entation o f 
environm ental leg islation. This was also confirm ed in  the va lida tion  
interview s. M r. Bos o f the Vogebescherming stated w ithou t any doubt tha t the 
constitu tiona l system o f the Netherlands has been a serious obstacle to the 
im plem entation o f the Birds d irective  (Appendix 5). In te resting ly, as the 
results o f the case studies show, a given in s titu tio n a l structure w hich is 
successful in  im plem enting one type o f d irective  may no t subsequently 
perfo rm  w e ll fo r another d irective . Less strong bu t s till va lid  correlations 
were observed between im plem entation and the “ c la rity ” and fo r the other 
“enforcem ent and co n tro l” variables. The spread in  the values o f the “c la rity ” 
variable was the smallest fo r a ll fo u r variables, p a rtia lly  due to  the fact tha t 
th is variable assesses the D irective docum ent itse lf. As an o ften cited source o f 
im plem entation problem s, “ c la rity ” seems less im portan t than the lite ra tu re  
makes i t  out to  be. In  the va lida tion  interview s, the lack o f “ c la rity ” was not 
specifica lly m entioned as form ing a m ajor obstacle to  im plem entation 
(Appendix 5).
In  the “enforcem ent and co n tro l” variable, a clear sp lit was noted in  assessing 
the re la tive con tribu tion  o f the EC and the Member States towards enforcem ent 
and contro l. The EC has perform ed poorly  as an enforcer in  environm ental 
matters, where i t  no t on ly lacks powers o f access to data bu t also has 
concentrated too much on form al transposition instead o f the next step, tha t o f 
application o f environm ental d irectives. The weakest corre la tion  was observed 
fo r the “economic dim ension” variable. This was p a rtly  due to  the d ifficu ltie s  
encountered w ith  operationalisation. Q ualitative evidence, however, suggests 
tha t th is variable should continue being included in  the m odel. In  the 
va lida tion  interviews, M r. W ardle o f OFWAT d id  make i t  clear tha t cost d id  and
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s till does fo rm  an im portan t obstacle to  the im plem entation o f the D rinking 
W ater d irective in  the U nited Kingdom (Appendix 5).
From the evidence examined it  may be concluded tha t one o f the more 
im portan t obstacles to  speedy im plem entation o f EC environm ental leg islation 
in  the sample, was the constitu tion  and the lawmaking process o f the Member 
States. Even though the Netherlands and B rita in  have some sign ificant 
differences between th e ir constitu tiona l structures, both systems present 
barriers to rap id  im plem entation o f environm ental d irectives. In  th is respect, 
s im ila rities o r differences in  the general cu ltu re  o f in d iv id u a l Member States, 
were no t suspected to  be an im portan t variable and thus deemed u n like ly  to 
ho ld  a h igh  leve l o f explanatory power in  non-im plem entation.
W hat does appear to be o f im portance is the difference in  constitu tiona l and 
thus law-making processes between the Member States and the EC. It follow s 
tha t rap id  im plem entation o f environm ental leg islation in  the EC requires, 
among other conditions, a certa in level o f s tructu ra l o r constitu tiona l 
adjustm ent o f the processes and d is trib u tio n  o f powers w ith in  Member States. 
The fact tha t Member States e ffective ly have to  consider m odifying th e ir 
domestic law-making systems fo r im plem enting EC environm ental law  is even 
more relevant in  the lig h t o f the fu tu re  expansion o f the European 
Community.
The theoretica l underpinning o f th is p ro ject and the triangu la tion  o f methods 
adopted fo r the fie ldw ork, have helped open up avenues fo r enquiring in to  
fu rth e r areas o f legislative im plem entation and thus contribu ted  to the 
discourse in  th is area.
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A ppendix 1: Conferences
A ttendance  and d iscuss ion  a t C onfe rences:
1. W ater Industry Conferences:
1995: Financial Times Conference, The European W ater Industry , London 24 &  
25 A p ril 1995.
2. Academic conferences:
1994: M aastricht &  Subsid iarity &  the Environm ent, London School o f 
Economics and P o litica l Science.
1995: The im pact o f EC Environm ental Law in  the United Kingdom, Centre fo r 
the law  o f the European U nion - Faculty o f Laws U niversity College London.
1996: The 1996 Environm ental Law Conference, U niversity o f Surrey.
Paper p resen ted  a t re fe re e d  C onference:
1996: "Im plem entation o f EU Environm ental Policy: D ifficu lties  encountered in  
the Netherlands" Dr. P. Kangis and E. Riegstra, presented at The 1996 
Environm ental Law Conference, U n ive rs ity  o f Surrey.
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Appendix 2: EC Water Legislation
E xis tin g  E u ropean C om m u n ity  W ate r le g is la tio n :
Detergents Directive (7 4 /404/EEC
On the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States relating to Detergents 
Surface Water Directive (75/440/EEC)
To help ensure clean drinking water by protecting those rivers, lakes and reservoir used 
as drinking water sources.
Bathing Water Directive (7 6 /160/EEC)
To safeguard the health of bathers and maintain the quality of bathing waters.
Dangerous Substances Directive (76/464/EEC)
To control the pollution of surface water with dangerous substances (emission lim it 
controls).
Titanium Dioxide Directive (7 8 /1 76/EEC)
To control waste from the titanium dioxide industry.
Fish Water Directive (78/659/EECi
To protect fresh water bodies that are capable, or should be capable, of supporting fish 
life, particularly those species which are fished commercially or for recreational 
purposes.
Sampling of Surface Water Intended for the Abstraction of Drinking Water f 79/869/EECi 
Concerning the methods of measurements and frequencies of sampling analysis of surface 
water intended for the abstraction of drinking water.
Shellfish Water Directive ( 79 /92  3/EECi
To protect coastal and brackish waters in order to support shellfish populations and to 
prevent contamination of the harvested product.
Groundwater Directive ( 8Q/68/EFCi
To control the pollution of groundwater with dangerous substances.
Drinking Water Directive (8Q/778/EECi
Objective: To safeguard human health by establishing strict standards for the quality of 
water intended for human consumption.
Mercurv Discharges Directive (8 2 /176/EEC)
On the lim it values and quality objectives for mercury discharges by the Chlor-Alkali 
Electrolysis Industry.
Titanium dioxide Directive (83/29/EEC)
Amending Directive 7 8 /1 76/EEC on Waste from the titanium dioxide industry.
Cadmium Directive (83/513/EEC):
On lim it values and quality objectives for cadmium discharges.
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Dangerous Substances Directive (86/28Q/EECL (88/347/EEC) and f88/432/EEC)
Amending the 76/464/EEC Directive on lim it values and quality objectives for discharges 
of certain dangerous substances.
Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (9 1 /2 7 1 /EF.Ci
On reducing the pollution of surface waters with nutrients (particularly nitrates and 
phosphates) from urban wastewater.
Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)
To complement the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive by dealing with the nitrate 
pollution from agricultural sources.
Proposed E uropean C o m m u n ity  W ate r le g is la tio n :
Ecological Oualitv of Water Directive (COM(93i68Q final)
To maintain and improve the habitat potential of surface waters and, by doing so, to 
improve the quality of such waters generally and increase their potential value as sources 
of water for drinking and other purposes.
Water Resources Framework Directive (CQMf96)59 final)
Rectifying the past piecemeal approach by drawing together much of the quality-objective 
related legislation into the Framework Directive and extending its controls aimed at 
protecting the aquatic environment and managing water quality issues. The Framework 
Directive would require integrated management plans. These plans will contain an 
assessment of the overall situation in a water body including its environmental quality, 
its resource potential and the environmental pressures impacting on it. The Framework 
Directive will be based on quality objectives and under the proposed directive the surface 
water, groundwater, fish water and shellfish water directive vdll be repealed and their 
provisions updated and integrated into the Framework Directive.
R elated E uropean C o m m u n ity  le g is la tio n :
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (85/3/EECl
To ensure that the impact of new development projects on the environment is assessed 
before planning consent is given.
Sewage Sludge Directive (86/278/EECl
To regulate the use of sewage sludge in agriculture to prevent harmful effects on soil, 
vegetation and man.
Reporting Directive (9 1 /6 9 2 /EECl
To simplify and co-ordinate the obligations under many environmental Directives for 
Member States to make regular reports on implementation to the Commission.
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive (COM(93)423 final)
To prevent or minimise pollution of water, air and soil by large polluting industry.
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Appendix 3: In tensive Farm ing in  the Netherlands
Country Number of Pigs per ha (1992)
Netherlands 6.9
Denmark 3.3
France 0.4
Spain 0.5
Germany 4
United Kingdom 0.4
source: Europe's Environment: Statistical Compendium
Appendix 4: Derogations to the D rinking W a ter D irec tive  
Granted by the UK Governm ent
Areas where fu tu re  breaches o f the EC D rinking  W ater D irective have been 
sanctioned by the government o f the U nited Kingdom in  'undertakings’ to 
(new) W ater companies in  1989 (Rose,1990):
Thames W ater
Pesticide levels w ill be allowed to  exceed the EC lim its  u n til a t least 31 December 
2000.
Wess€x.Watgr
Pesticide levels w ill be allowed to  exceed EC lim its  u n til 31 December 1999. 
Southern W ater
Pesticides levels may exceed EC lim its  u n til clean-up equipm ent insta lled  by 31 
March 1998.
Severn T ren t W ater
Occasional breaches o f pesticide levels allowed w hile im provem ents to clean­
up equipm ent investigated. No date set fo r com pleting investigation or 
meeting EC lim its .
N orthum brian W ater
A lum in ium , iron  and manganese levels exceed EC lim its  throughout 
N orthum berland, because o f d is trib u tio n  systems faults. A mains clean-up w ill 
be completed in  unnamed p rio rity  areas by 1994, but no date is given fo r 
meeting EC lim its  throughout the region.
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A ppendix 5: V a lid a tio n  Interview s
Association o f Dutch W ater Supply Companies (VEWIN). M r. G. Vinke.
A lthough the D rinking  W ater D irective is very im portan t fo r the European 
Com m unity as a whole, the Dutch w ater supply companies together w ith  
VEWIN have a re la tive ly  long h is to ry  o f p rovid ing  h igh q u a lity  d rin k in g  
water. This was a m ain reason w hy the im plem entation o f the D rinking  W ater 
D irective went re la tive ly  sm oothly in  the Netherlands. As fa r as the D irective 
itse lf goes, c la rity  d id  no t fo rm  a problem  what d id  cause problems was the fact 
tha t the D irective was outdated and its  revision was long overdue. M r V inke 
emphasised tha t the norms o f the D rinking  W ater D irective should extend to 
other water related products such as the m anufacturing o f taps etc. and th a t in  
th is area more ce rtifica tion  and standardisation is necessary. Regarding the 
recent dispute w ith  the Commission over the pesticide levels in  Dutch d rink ing  
water, M r V inke argued tha t these were on ly  tem porary derogations o f an 
incidenta l nature and form ed no harm  at any p o in t to  the consumer. VEWIN is 
however c ritica l regarding the pesticide po licy  o f the Dutch governm ent, and 
has several times made clear to the governm ent tha t a much stric te r po licy 
should be followed. Several pesticides should be taken o ff the lis t o f allowed 
pesticides and no new ones should be allowed unless the m anufacturer 
discloses the detection m ethod (fo r laboratory purposes) o f the pesticide in  
question. F ina lly the costs fo r d rin k in g  water are ris ing ra p id ly , due to the 
necessary ins ta lla tion  o f advanced p u rifica tio n  insta lla tions. In  th is respect, 
VEWIN argues tha t more needs to  be done to reduce the p o llu tio n  o f the sources 
o f d rink ing  water i.e. from  the a g ricu ltu ra l sector and th is is the 
responsib ility  o f the governm ent.
Office o f W ater Services fO fw atl. M r. R. W ardle.
Ofwat has been approached by the author, however, Ofwat claimed tha t i t  has 
an economic responsib ility  regarding the water ind u s try  and w ould on ly 
answer questions (in  w ritin g ) o f an economic nature, fo r o ther p o litica l and 
legal issues i t  re fe rred  to  the D rinking  W ater Inspectorate. In  w ritin g  Ofwat 
emphasised tha t in  achieving h igher standards a rea listic balance m ust be 
struck between the environm ental and pub lic health considerations and the 
interests o f consumers in  re la tion  to costs and a ffo rd a b ility . Regarding costs 
and a ffo rd a b ility  Ofwat argues tha t the s trickte r lead standard in  the revised 
D rinking W ater D irective w ill lead to  an increase o f £5.50 o r over 5% on the 
curren t average household water b ill (due to  replacement o f lead pipes in  the 
ownership o f water companies in  England and Wales). Regarding the pesticide
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parameter, Ofwat argues tha t th is param eter has imposed sign ificant costs on 
to  customers in  h igher M is . F inally, Ofwat states tha t there is no cost benefit 
im pact statement attached to the proposed revised D rinking W ater D irective, 
w hich makes i f  extrem ely d iffic u lt to  judge whether the benefits to  public 
health w ill be ju s tifie d  by the costs.
D rinking W ater Inspectorate (DW I). M r A. Lloyd.
The D rinking W ater D irective and its  standards fo rm  the basis o f the w ork 
carried out by the DWI. The DWI is an inspectorate and as such m onitors the 
q ua lity  o f the d rink ing  water as m onitored and reported by the water supply 
companies. M onitoring and reporting  d ifférés between Member States and the 
DWI w ould welcome bette r m on itoring  and reporting  by the Member States. 
The recent dispute between the Commission and the government o f the United 
Kingdom, regarding the derogation o f the pesticede param eter form s p a rt o f 
the ’undertakings’ agreed by both the UK governm ent and the Commission. 
The DWI stresses tha t the tem porary derogations form ed no harm  to the 
consum er.
R iiks ins tituu t voor de M ilieuhvgiëne (RIVM). M r. Bresser.
A t the tim e o f w ritin g  the Netherlands has received two A rtic le  169 letters 
from  the Commission. The firs t is regarding the measurement and sampling 
frequencies o f d rin k in g  water samples, the second regarding the excessive 
levels o f pesticides in  d rin k in g  water. M r. Bresser comments on the firs t 
dispute w ith  the Commission regarding the non-im plem entation o f the 
D rinking  W ater D irective, th a t the sam pling methods o f Annex II o f the 
D rinking W ater D irective were to ta lly  outdated and were n o t applicable to the 
advanced lab methods used in  the Netherlands. Regarding the second A rtic le  
169 le tte r, M r. Bresser emphasised tha t the Netherlands has always been and 
continues to be very open and ’honest’ regarding environm ental in fo rm a tion . 
Subsequently aU in fo rm a tion  on d rin k in g  water samples and pesticides levels 
has been and is being disclosed w hile  o ther Member States m ight no t 
necessarily do so. The Commission is dependent on the Member States fo r 
in fo rm a tion  on the q u a lity  o f d rink ing  water and acts on the ’honest’ 
disclosures o f pesticides p o llu tio n  in  the Netherlands. The RIVM w ould 
welcome a greater ro le  o f the European Environm ental Agency regarding 
con tro lling  o f d rink ing  w ater in  the Com m unity.
Royal Society fo r the Protection o f Birds (RSPB). M r. I. Foulks.
M r. Foulks stresses the im portance o f the Birds D irective fo r b ird  p ro tection 
in the  Com m unity in  general (w hich is c learly a transnational issue) and fo r 
the campaign o f the RSPB itse lf. M r, Foulks argues tha t the m ain reason w hy
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the im plem entation o f the D irective d id  not fo rm  a problem  in  the United 
Kingdom was due to  the fact tha t an extensive legislative and in s titu tio n a l 
fram ework already existed p rio r to  the D irective. Nevertheless some 
d ifficu ltie s  are present regarding the c la rity  and im plem entation o f A rtic le  4 
and 9 o f the D irective. Costs form ed no obstacle in  the debate o f the 
im plem entation o f the D irective. The RSPB has used the Birds D irective 
frequen tly  fo r example to  overtu rn  a governm ent decision n o t to  declare an 
area as a Special Protection Area, however a d is tinction  should be made 
between the process o f negotiation o f the D irective at Com m unity level and the 
process o f reso lution o f disputes. Regarding the negotiation at Com m unity 
level, invo lv ing  the setting o f standards and channelling o f resources, the 
RSPB sees a valuable task fo r the Commission. However, regarding the 
resolution o f disputes and Com m unity involvem ent the RSPB sees severe 
lim ita tions. Past cases have shown th a t the Com m unity process takes (too) 
much tim e and by the tim e a judgem ent from  the European C ourt o f Justice is 
handed down, i t  is too late and damage has been done (as in  the recent Lappel 
Bank case).
Vogelbescherming Nederland (B ird  pro tection  Netherlands). M r. G. Bos. 
S im ila rly to the RSPB, the Vogelbescherming regards the Birds D irective as 
crucial and very im portan t fo r its  campaign. The long and com plicated 
im plem entation o f the Birds d irective  in  the Netherlands is due to  several 
reasons according to  the Vogelbescherming . The firs t and m ain reason fo r 
non-im plem entation has been the com plicated and tim e-consum ing process o f 
fo rm ula ting and adopting new legislative acts (statutes) in  the Netherlands. 
Secondly, the fact tha t the Birds D irectives was no t seen as a h igh p rio rity  in  
"The Hague". The c la rity  o f the D irective no r associated costs involved w ith  the 
im plem entation were seen as abstacles to im plem entation. A lthough the 
Vogelbescherming appreciates the Commission's e ffo rts (three European Court 
o f Justice cases) to  ensure transposition o f the Birds D irective in  the 
Netherlands, i t  sees clear lim ita tions to  the Commission's environm ental 
activities. The fact tha t the Commission pursued the Dutch government to 
transpose the Directives lead to neglection o f the real enforcem ent o f the 
D irective. The results o f th is neglect are cu rren tly  shown in  the fo rm  o f a 
shortage o f Special Protection Areas and a serious decline o f the b ird  
popu la tion in  the Netherlands. The Vogelbescherming concludes tha t 
although the D irective is very im portan t, the tim e fram e fo r European action 
is (too) long.
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